Ukrainische Kultur
im Schraubstock des Krieges:
Geschichte – Wort – Bild

Ukrainian culture in the grip of war:
History – Language – Image

Ukrainische Kultur im Schraubstock des Krieges:
Geschichte, Wort, Bild

Institut für Slavische Philologie
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Ukrainische Kultur im Schraubstock des Krieges:
Geschichte, Wort, Bild

Колективна монографія
Українська культура в лещатах війни:
історія, слово, образ

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PRINTED IN
AUSTRIA

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Vorwort

Alle, die an der Herausgabe dieses Bandes beteiligt waren, hätten sich nichts sehnlicher gewünscht, als dass nach der russischen Aggression wieder Frieden in der ganzen Ukraine herrscht. Leider ist derzeit kein Ende des Krieges in Sicht, so dass unser Band nicht in einer Zeit des Friedens erscheinen kann.

Davon unberührt bleibt aber das Ziel, dem die Beiträge aller Beteiligten dienen sollten, unverändert bestehen: Sie wollen zeigen, dass sich die ukrainische Kultur nicht im Schraubstock des Krieges einklemmen, stoppen oder gar paralysieren ließ, sondern dass diese Kultur ganz im Gegenteil ihr Engagement intensivieren und ihre Widerstandskraft eindrucksvoll zum Ausdruck bringen konnte.

Der brutale Krieg, der in den letzten zehn Jahren zur ukrainischen Realität geworden ist, stellt eine große Herausforderung für die politische, soziale und kulturelle Integrität der Ukraine dar. Der Krieg verschärft existentielle Probleme, ruft Gefühle der Hoffnungslosigkeit, Angst und Enttäuschung hervor, zerstört physisch das kulturelle Erbe der Ukraine (einschließlich dessen, was unter dem Schutz der UNESCO steht) und raubt dem ukrainischen Volk das Leben vieler seiner besten Vertreterinnen und Vertreter. Der Krieg gibt aber auch einen Impuls zur nationalen Einheit, zur Konsolidierung, zur Neubewertung kultureller Phänomene und zur Eigenständigkeit der eigenen Kultur sowie zum Ausbau und zum Schutz einer demokratischen Gesellschaft. Letztlich fördert der Krieg trotz aller Herausforderungen und Zerstörungen auch die Entwicklung von Neuem. Die Antwort der Kultur auf die Herausforderungen des Krieges erfordert jedoch dabei übermenschliche Anstrengungen – sowohl von aktiven Künstlerinnen und Künstlern als auch von einfachen Ukrainerinnen und Ukrainern. Oft sind solche Anstrengungen tragisch.

In der Monographie wird der Hauptfokus auf Transformationen im Bereich der Kultur und in weltanschaulichen Bereichen nach dem Kriegsbeginn (ab 2014 oder seit dem Großangriff Russlands auf die Ukraine) gelegt. Es werden Versuche unternommen zu beschreiben, zu reflektieren und zu analysieren, welche konkrete Reaktionen es heute

in verschiedenen Bereichen der materiellen und geistigen Kultur gibt, wie sich die Kunst verändert und transformiert, wie die Sprache und ihr Kommunikationsumfeld darauf reagieren, welche Antworten die Volkskunst darauf gibt und wie sich der Alltag verändert.

Zunächst lassen Rückblicke in die Geschichte der Ukraine die Verwurzelung der aggressiven russischen Argumentation in historischen Narrativen und nicht selten auch Irrtümern erkennen. Eines der zentralen Themen ist hier die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Phänomen des "russkij mir" ("russische Welt") und seinem Einfluss auf das kulturelle Feld und das Weltbild sowohl des russischen Aggressors als auch der Ukrainerinnen und Ukrainer selbst. Die Doktrin des "russkij mir" lehnt grundsätzlich jede Ausprägung ukrainischer Eigenständigkeit als Nation ab und rechtfertigt den russischen Krieg gegen das ukrainische Volk. Besonders gefährlich ist dieses Konzept auf der Ebene des religiösen Diskurses sowie bei der Verbreitung historischer Fälschungen und bei Versuchen Russlands, bedeutende Persönlichkeiten der ukrainischen Geschichte sich selbst "anzueignen".

Dann zeigen vielfältige Erscheinungen und Neuerungen in der ukrainischen Kunst der Vorkriegs- und der Kriegsjahre, wie engagiert und kreativ die ukrainischen Reaktionen auf den Angriffskrieg ausgefallen sind. Seit der Revolution der Würde 2013–2014 hat sich die Ausrichtung der ukrainischen Kunst in eine politische Richtung verändert. Heute wird die Kunst zum Mittel der Dokumentation, der Verhandlungen und häufig auch des Widerstands in Bezug auf die Identität in der modernen Ukraine.

Der permanente und ungebrochene Widerstand der Ukrainer zeigt sich dabei nicht nur in der bildenden Kunst, sondern ebenso in zahlreichen Neuerungen im Bereich der ukrainischen Sprache und ihrer Verwendung und letztlich generell in den ukrainischen Medien. Im Mediendiskurs (u.a. auch im Gebiet Luhans′k und teilweise Donec′k) kommt es fortlaufend zu grafischen und orthografischen Innovationen. Eine deutliche semiotische Umkodierung von Buchstaben des lateinischen Alphabets ist zu erkennen – nach dem Kriegsbeginn verlagerte sich deren Bedeutung von der sprachlichen Ebene hin zur Symbolik russischer Aggression. Die ukrainische Sprache wird zur Sprache des Widerstands, der Identität und der zukünftigen Rekonstruktion ukrai-

nischer Kultur. Auch die zeitgenössische Folklore verändert sich: In ihren Sujets spiegelt sich das Heldentum ukrainischer Soldatinnen und Soldaten und Zivilistinnen und Zivilisten wider, die ihr Heimatland gegen den russischen Feind verteidigen.

All diese Veränderungen sind jedoch mit dem Blut einfacher Ukrainerinnen und Ukrainer getränkt, von dem Leiden der Frauen, Männer und Kinder geprägt – und doch durchdrungen von der Hoffnung auf Gerechtigkeit und ein friedliches Leben in einem eigenen Staat, mit eigener Sprache, mit eigenem Glauben, mit eigener Kultur und eigenen Traditionen.

Für die Idee dieses Buchprojekts, die Gesamtkonzeption, seine thematische Struktur und Auswahl der Beiträge, insbesondere aber für die akribische Arbeit beim Erstellen des vorliegenden Bandes gebühren *Dr. Olena Novikova vom Institut für Slavische Philologie der lmu München* und *Prof. Dr. Marija Petruškevyč, Leiterin des Departments für Philosophie und Kulturmanagement an der Nationalen Universität Ostroher Akademie der Ukraine* größter Dank. Für die technische Realisierung danken wir *Frau Olena Bader*, für die Redigierung des Englischen *Herrn Edward Scoffield und Herrn Stanislav Monachov*. Vielen Dank auch an *Frau Raada Koffman* für das Design des Umschlags sowie an den Verlag *Buchschmiede, Dataform Media GmbH Wien* und das *Referat Elektronisches Publizieren der Universitätsbibliothek der lmu München* für die Aufnahme in ihre Reihe. Nicht zuletzt sind wir dem *Generalkonsul der Ukraine in München Herrn Jurij Nykytjuk* für seine freundliche Unterstützung unseres Buchprojekts zu großem Dank verpflichtet. Vor allem aber danken wir herzlich allen unseren Autorinnen und Autoren für ihre Beteiligung an dem Projekt und ihre Beiträge.

THE EVOLUTION AND FOUNDATIONS OF THE "RUSSIAN WORLD" DOCTRINE AND THE PLACE OF THE FIGURE OF VOLODYMYR THE GREAT IN THE POLITICAL MANIPULATIONS OF ITS ADHERENTS

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The chapter is dedicated to identifying the basic principles, key areas and tools for the implementation of the "Russian world" doctrine by the modern Russian political leadership. Its evolution during the 2000s and 2010s was characterised by an appeal to the past, clericalisation, the use of brutal force and destructive political manipulation. The "Russian world" doctrine completely denies any manifestation of the identity of the Ukrainians as a nation, justifies the genocidal war of the Russian Federation against the Ukrainian people, as it considers the Ukrainian territory, especially Kyiv, the origins of Russia as an empire. Pseudo-religious manipulations within this doctrine play a key role, which has been demonstrated by the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church since the late 2000s. The figure of Volodymyr the Great and Volodymyr's Christianization play a key role in the political and pseudo-religious manipulations of the leaders and adherents of the "Russian world" doctrine, as they appear as "common sources of the unity of the Russian people".

Keywords: Volodymyr the Great, Volodymyr's Christianization, doctrine of the "Russian world", Ukraine, Russia, Russian Orthodox Church, Kyiv.

ЕВОЛЮЦІЯ І ЗАСАДИ ДОКТРИНИ "РУССКОГО МІРА" ТА МІСЦЕ ПОСТАТІ ВОЛОДИМИРА ВЕЛИКОГО У ПОЛІТИЧНИХ МАНІПУЛЯЦІЯХ ЇЇ АДЕПТІВ

Дмитро Гордієнко
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Розділ присвячено виявленню базових засад, ключових напрямків та інструментів реалізації доктрини "русского міра" сучасним російським політичним керівництвом. Її еволюція протягом 2000-х–2010-х рр. характеризується зверненням до минулого, клерикалізацією, застосуванням жорсткої сили та руйнівних політичних маніпуляцій. Доктрина "русского міра" цілковито заперечує будь-які вияви самобутності українців як нації, виправдовує геноцидну війну РФ проти українського народу, адже розглядає терени України, особливо Київ, витоками Росії як імперії. Псевдорелігійні маніпуляції в межах цієї доктрини відіграють ключову роль, про що свідчить діяльність Російської православної церкви з кінця 2000-х рр. Постать Володимира Великого та Володимирове Хрещення відіграють ключову роль у політичних та псевдорелігійних маніпуляціях провідників та адептів доктрини "русского міра", адже вони постають у ролі "спільних витоків єдності російського народу".

Ключові слова: Володимир Великий, Володимирове Хрещення, доктрина "русского міра", Україна, Росія, Російська православна церква, Київ.

Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian political elites have viewed the newly independent states, especially Ukraine, as an exclusive sphere of its influence, whose foreign policy had to be shaped only in a pro-Russian way and in line with Russia's foreign policy. As early as 26.08.1991, two days after the reinstatement of Ukraine's independence, the press secretary of the Russian President Pavel Voščanov publicly stated that Russia, as the successor to the USSR, had the right to revise its borders with all the breakaway republics (Katryčenko 2023). In August 1992 the then chairman of the Russian parliamentary committee

on international and foreign economic relations Jevgenij Ambartsumov demanded that the entire geopolitical space of the former USSR must be recognized as Russia's "sphere of vital interests", similar to the status of Latin American countries under the American Monroe Doctrine (Laruelle 2020, 9). It is noteworthy that this position of Russia was validated by some of the European countries, particularly in Germany. For example, in December 2008, after Russia's aggression against Georgia back in August that year, when it became clear that Ukraine would be the next victim of Russian aggression, the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier publicly opposed the accelerated accession of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO, citing Russia's interest in Ukraine, which was allegedly half Russian, according to his position (Ščerbak 2023, 54–55). Such a lenient position of the Western countries allowed Russia to freely commit acts of armed aggression against neighboring states (e.g. Moldova and Georgia) in the first half of the 1990s.

However, Russia also needed a clearer doctrinal justification for its aggressive foreign policy. This justification was later formed as the political doctrine of the "Russian world", which, in turn, is the ideological core of "ruscism", a modern political concept, which includes some features of historical Fascism and Nazism (Hyryč 2023, 40; Ohryzko 2023, 21; Poljans′kyj 2023, 97–113; Gallaher 2022, 487–488 etc.). For example, the total primacy of the state over the individual, the denial of the right of entire peoples to their own authenticity or even physical existence. However, unlike Fascism and Nazism, the "Russian world" doctrine in its current form does not offer any positive vision of the future, focusing exclusively on the Russian imperial past, the concept of "land acquisition" without explaining the benefits and necessity of this territorial expansion. It appeals to Russia's "great past", the desire to revive the empire in modern conditions without regard to the adequacy of this goal in the modern world. At the same time, it does not contain any positive program of the future for the peoples of the empire in the areas of culture, economy, etc.

The "Russian world" is a concept and political doctrine that denotes the sphere of Russia's military, political, and cultural influence, both within its borders and beyond. The foundations of the modern doctrine of the "Russian world" appear to be a modernized version of Sergej

Uvarov's 19th century formula (formerly "Autocracy – Orthodoxy – Nationality"), transformed into:

1. Orthodoxy, exclusively in its Moscow tradition;
2. the Russian language and Russian culture;
3. common historical memory (Druzenko 2009, 10–12).

The Ukrainian political scientist and international expert Hryhorij Perepelycja characterizes the "Russian world" doctrine as an ideological attempt by Russia to counteract the influence of European countries in the "New Eastern Europe" (post-Soviet countries whose societies identify themselves mainly as European) – Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. According to the researcher, its emergence was a sign of the Russian leadership's return to the great-power model of development, as well as failure of this state to organically fit into the Western cultural, political, and economic model (Perepelycja 2011). According to the Russian political and ideological leadership, the following features should dominate the political life of countries belonging to the "Russian world":

–   Russian should be the second official language;
–   the elites of the countries participating in the "Russian world" should belong to the Russian cultural context rather than to the national one;
–   the "Russian world", which includes Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Kazachstan, is united around the Russian Orthodoxy, the Russian language, cultural identity, as well as a common historical memory and a common vision of the future (Perepelycja 2011).

The leading trends of the "Russian world" doctrine include:

–   economic dependence of neighboring countries (primarily on Russian hydrocarbons) as a means of political pressure on their elites;
–   participation in multilateral intergovernmental organizations under the auspices of the Russian Federation, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Organization of the Collective

    Security Agreement (OCSA), Customs Union and later the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU);

– sponsorship of international non-governmental organizations whose leadership is clearly biased towards Moscow's political leadership (this includes the ROC-MP and its affiliated NGOs);

– support and promotion of the Russian language, culture and media as a tool for preservation of the "Russian historical heritage" and the post-colonial situation of the "near border" countries;

– the program of repatriation of "compatriots" from "near and far abroad", which in the context of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation has acquired the features of forced relocation of Ukrainians from the occupied territories of Ukraine (primarily children) deep into Russia;

– citizenship policy and passportization: granting the right to obtain a Russian passport to all former residents of the USSR, recognizing the possibility of dual citizenship (even if the legislation of another country prohibits it);

– direct armed aggression (from the formation of the unrecognized PMR in 1992 to the full-scale invasion into Ukraine by Russian troops in 2022) (Druzenko 2009, 10–12).

As follows from the above, today's "Russian world" doctrine involves a combination of both "soft" and classical "hard" power, which only increases its danger both for Russia's neighboring countries and for the whole world. It is important to note that since the late 2000s, after the revolutionary events in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), the Russian leadership has realized the ineffectiveness of implementing the "Russian world" by "soft power" projection. (Kudors 2010, 2–4). Since then, the factor of forceful pressure has been growing in importance.

    Also, the proponents of the "Russian world" doctrine see Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Kazakhstan as a "demographic reservoir" to counteract the demographic pressure of China and Turkic peoples. So, Russia's subjugation of the countries of the "Russian world" is aimed not only at political subjugation, but also at exploiting their resources, which is a typical neocolonial approach. The state sovereignty of the subordinate countries, according to the doctrine of the "Russian world"

of the early 2010s, is not to be necessarily formally eliminated (which is fraught with international sanctions against Russia), but is actually to be downgraded through its discrediting in the minds of citizens, which thereby transform into a pro-Russian-oriented society. Thus, according to the "Russian world" doctrine, Ukrainians are seen as carriers of the "malorussian worldview", united by the Russian language, mental and cultural orientation to the metropolis (whether in the form of the USSR or in an attempt to restore tsarist Russia), and dismissive of their native language and national and cultural values (Perepelycja 2011). According to the Ukrainian historian Ihor Hyryč, "From a historical perspective, ruscism is the total censorship of everything that does not fit into the Russian canon of nation and statehood. It implies banning the very terms «Ukrainian» and «Ukraine»" (Hyryč 2023, 56).

The "Russian world" doctrine has its roots and actually replaced the doctrines of: bol′ševik "world revolution", Slavophilism, "Holy Rus′", "fraternal peoples", and, in fact, their original source, the "Moscow – Rome III" doctrine. Thus, on the one hand, it is a Russian-centered concept, and on the other hand, it is anti-European and anti-Western. According to the point of view of its ideologues, the "Russian world" reaches as far as the Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church. Hence, the Russian "special operation", which is, in fact, the full-scale Russian invasion to Ukraine on February 24, 2022, is, in particular, a "religious war" unleashed by the crazy fanatics in the Kremlin. The goal of this war can be compared to Hitler's program of "the final solution of the Jewish issue", that is, depriving Jews of their right to life, to exist as a nation, as a religious community" (Ščerbak 2023, 145). It is symbolic that one of the ideologists and spokespersons of the "Russian world" and the most ardent apologist for Russian aggression against Ukraine, Aleksander Dugin, became famous for participating in Moscow parties in honor of the Nazi SS with shouts of "Sieg Heil!" (Ščerbak 2023, 214).

The expression "Russian world" first appeared in the last third of the nineteenth century as the title of a Slavophile anti-Western news-paper published in the Russian Empire in 1871–1880. However, at that time, obviously, this concept did not become widespread. It began to be actively used by Russian imperial ideologues shortly after the collapse of the USSR in order to find ways to restore the empire. For the first in mod-

ern times, the concept of "Russian world" was publicly used (initially as "The World of Russia") by the Russian publicists Petr Ščedrovickij and Jefim Ostrovskij in their article "The Eagle Spreads Its Wings", published on December 15, 1997, in the newspapers "Expert" and "Financial News". At the time, this concept was understood as "the peaceful restoration of Russian identity, the restoration of its connection with the past and the diasporas" (Laruelle 2020, 4). So, initially, this concept implied the introduction of Russian influence through the "soft power" means rather than through the means of the armed aggression. At that time, it also did not emphasize nostalgia for the "great past" and the need to return to it, but rather the preservation and strengthening of Russian identity in the modern globalized world. But at the same time, it implicitly contained the idea of restoring the empire and Russian imperial identity after the collapse of the USSR, even if it was in the form of cultural cooperation. The authors defined the "Russian people" as a multinational community united not only by origin, but by a "common destiny". In other words, it was about extending Russian identity beyond Russian citizens.

In 1999, P. Ščedrovickij and Je. Ostrovskij in their article "Russia: A Country That Does Not Exist" for the first time in modern history used the phrase "Russian world", which they defined as a network of small and large communities that think and speak Russian. They imagined this phenomenon as cross-border, emphasizing that only a part of the "Russian world" lives within the Russian Federation. Establishing ties between Russia and "compatriots" outside its borders was seen as an important component of the country's integration into the global world (Laruelle 2020, 5). This vision actually justified Russia's disrespect for the existing legal borders, especially those of the former Soviet Union countries, where there was a significant number of citizens who were in the focus of attention of the founders of the "Russian world" doctrine. Also, for the first time, the Russian language was emphasized as a leading factor in belonging to this transborder imaginary community. At the same time, this community, as Ostap Kryvdyk notes, extends to the entire Russian-speaking population of the world "from Ukraine and Moldova to Berlin and New York's Brighton Beach" (Kryvdyk 2023, 11). It is important to note that it was the Russian language, regardless of

the political position of its speaker, that became a significant manipulative argument for the Russian dictator Putin to conduct aggressive military actions against Ukraine, both in 2014 and in 2022, at the stage of a full-scale genocidal war.

The founders of the modern "Russian world" doctrine (Petr Ščedrovickij, Gleb Pavlovskij, and Sergej Černyšev) paid great attention to the tools for implementing this doctrine, in particular, political technologies and information manipulation. They considered the importance of using market technologies and creating brands to implement the ideas of the "Russian world" in the modern globalized relationships as a PR project, and, at the same time, a messianic and imperial project (Laruelle 2020, 6). In this regard, their leading lobbyist in the corridors of power was Vladislav Surkov, who served as Deputy Chief of Staff to the President of the Russian Federation, Assistant to the President, and Deputy Prime Minister in 1999–2020. It was V. Surkov who played a leading role in the first period of the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014–2022 as one of the curators of the unrecognized "Luhans′k" and "Donec′k" "people's republics" (so-called "L/DPR").

A significant role in the evolution of ideas of the "Russian world" doctrine towards its appeal to the past, clericalization, use of the "hard" power and the justification of Russia's further ideological and armed aggression against Ukraine was played by the socio-political association "Congress of Russian Communities", CRC ("Kongress russkich obščin"), which existed in 1993–2003 and was restored in 2011. The ideological foundations of the CRC were based on the principles of Aleksandr Solženicyn's work "The Russian Issue at the End of the Twentieth Century" (1994). According to it, Russia was to be revived on the basis of a "Eastern Slavic unity" – as a single and indivisible state, including Ukraine, Belarus, Transnistria and Northern Kazachstan, for which Russia should actively implement a policy of "protecting compatriots", including the presence and influence of the Russian Orthodox Church – Moscow patriarchy (ROC-MP) in these countries. Politicians who are active supporters of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, such as Dmitrij Rogozin, Sergej Glazev, Sergej Baburin, and Natalija Naročnickaja, actively participated in the work of the CRC (Laruelle 2020, 6–7). In fact, the CRC's ideology rejected the concept of Russians, Ukraini-

ans and Belarusians as "fraternal Slavic peoples" that was widespread during the Soviet period and affirmed the idea of a "single Russian people", which completely denies any form of Ukrainian identity and is constantly promoted by the Russian dictator and Russian propaganda today. Obviously, it was the vision of the "Russian world" by the leaders of the Congress of Russian Communities that contributed to the transformation of Uvarov's formula "Autocracy – Orthodoxy – Nationality" into the newest version "Russian language – Moscow Orthodoxy – Russian historical memory". This vision also substantiated Russia's military, ideological, subversion and intelligence pressure on countries that were seen as part of the "Russian world", primarily Ukraine. This pressure was aimed at "protection of Russian compatriots" in the neighbouring states, imposing the Russian language as the second state language in these countries, Moscow Orthodoxy as opposed to autochthonous Orthodox traditions (especially, Ukrainian Orthodoxy), and the neglect of their own identity as opposed to the imperial and pro-Russian one. At the same time, this version of the "Russian world" retained such features of the original version by Petr Ščedrovickij and Gleb Pavlovskij as the recognition of the need to use modern information and market technologies, political manipulation in order to implement the "Russian world" doctrine. It was the CRC's vision of the "Russian world" that was actively adopted by the Putin regime.

With the growing influence of the secret services (former soviet KGB) on the political leadership of the Russian Federation in the second half of the 1990s, and especially after their representative Vladimir Putin came to full power in 1999–2000, the concept of the "Russian world" has become the newest component of Russia's imperial geopolitical doctrine, which is openly adopted by its authorities. It is under Putin, a man prone to violent methods in realizing his aspirations and fully focused on the imperial past, that has completely turned the doctrine of the "Russian world" neo-totalitarian, directed to the past, based primarily on violent methods of implementation. Since then, its main goal has been not to establish scientific or cultural communications between Russian-speaking individuals inside and outside the Russian Federation, but to revive the Russian empire within the countries and lands that were once conquered by Moscow and St. Petersburg, both peacefully

(through "soft power") and violently. Since then, both statesmen and ideologues of the "Russian world" have been actively using the concept of "compatriots abroad", which was actively emphasized by the CRC, to undermine the sovereignty of the countries of the former Soviet republics where the Russian language is widely spoken. On May 24, 1999, the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted Law No. 99-FZ "On the State Policy of the Russian Federation in relation to Compatriots Abroad". Article 1 of this law defines the concept of compatriots as "persons born in the same state, residing or having resided in the same state and possessing signs of common language, history, cultural heritage, traditions and customs, as well as descendants of the said persons in a direct descending line", while this "same state" includes "the Russian state, the Russian republic, the RSFSR and the USSR" (Zakon 'Law' RF. № 99-FZ). Therefore, according to this law, citizens of modern Ukraine are also considered "compatriots" who should be included in the sphere of influence of modern Russia, because Ukraine in its current recognized borders was part of the USSR. Thus, at the legislative level, since 1999, the idea of the "Russian world" has become an important element of Putin's neo-imperial policy, and Ukraine has also been indirectly proclaimed its object.

Putin first officially used the term "Russian world" shortly after his accession to power in his speech at the World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad in 2001, noting that this phenomenon "extends far beyond the geographical borders of Russia and even far beyond the Russian ethnicity" (Laruelle 2020, 6). At the end of 2006, on the eve of the opening of the Year of the Russian Language, in his speech in St. Petersburg, Putin singled out the language factor as the basic one in the doctrine of the "Russian world". "The Russian world can and should unite everyone who cares about the Russian word and Russian culture, wherever they live, in Russia or abroad. Use this phrase «Russian world» more often" (Syčjova 2007). In 2007, according to Russian President's decree there was created the eponymous "Russian world Foundation", which had a budget of $15 million and 43 grant programs in Ukraine aimed at spreading the Russian language and researching the "common past" and spreading the Russian vision of Ukraine's history in Ukrainian historical scholarship (Ščerbak 2023, 112).

In addition, the doctrine of the "Russian world" has also found its way into academia. In Russia, Ol′ga Batanova's thesis research is also devoted to this topic, considering the phenomenon of the "Russian world" to be a supranational, civilizational reality that encompasses all Russian-speaking people in the world (Batanova 2009, 163). This idea was actively embraced by the Russian dictator. As the British author Timothy Garton-Ash has noted, Putin has completely monopolized the right to be a spokesperson for the "Russian world" ideology, which in his version is reduced to the formula: "if you speak Russian, you belong to Russia" (Garipov 2015). The ukrainian writer, scholar, diplomat and public figure Jurij Ščerbak makes a similar point: Russian has become "the spiritual weapon of the hegemonic nation, its soft (and sometimes very hard) weapon" (Ščerbak 2023, 16).

The religious factor, namely the Russian Orthodox factor, has also significantly increased its role in the policy of promoting the "Russian world" doctrine with the establishment of the Putin regime in Russia. The Russian Orthodox Church has long played a significant role in the territorial expansion of Muscovy and the Russian Empire, ideologically justifying and sanctifying its government's policies, especially in assimilating and keeping non-Russian peoples, especially Ukrainians, in line. Examples of this include bans on book publishing in the tradition of the Kyiv Metropolis in the early eighteenth century, the political anathema imposed on Hetman Ivan Mazepa (1708), and so on. The parishes and dioceses of the Russian Church (in fact, the "spiritual department" of the Russian Empire) were actively used in intelligence activities abroad (Mycyk 2009, 186–189). In Soviet times, with Joseph Stalin's restoration in 1943 of the Moscow Patriarchate, which was totally dependent on the Bol′ševik totalitarian regime and its secret services, granting the title of "Moscow and All Russia" to its head (a strong claim to the Kyivan heritage), and the constitution of the centralized religious organization "Russian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate" (ROC-MP), the use of the church factor for political, propaganda, and intelligence purposes reached a new level. The ROC-MP survived as a single system after the collapse of the USSR, and in the first half of the 1990s it assumed the function of exercising Russian socio-cultural and political influence on all countries outside the Russian Federation, where it had a serious net-

work of parishes. An example of this is the deliberate splitting of Orthodoxy in Ukraine by the leadership of the ROC-MP around the issue of restoring Ukrainian autocephaly in 1992, the imposition of anathema for political reasons on the then leader of the Ukrainian autocephalian movement and the Primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) Patriarch Filaret (Denysenko) in 1997, and so on (Kyjivs'kyj Patriarchat 'Kyiv Patriarchate' 2007). Patriarch Aleksij II (Ridiger) of the Russian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (1990–2008) explicitly emphasized in public speeches his merit in preserving the administrative unity of the ROC-MP in conditions when secular politicians failed to preserve the USSR.

After Putin came to power, the Orthodox church factor in the foreign and ideological policy of the Russian Federation became much more active at the state level. For example, in March 2003, for the first time, Patriarch Aleksij II visited the Russian Foreign Ministry, during which the church was tasked with establishing contacts with the "Russian diaspora" in order to bring together the "Russian world", which was recognized as the joint task of the state and the church (Zdioruk 2023, 76). This soon manifested itself in the state's facilitation of negotiations between the ROC-MP and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR) with Putin's personal participation. The dialogue ended on May 17, 2007 at the Moscow Christ the Savior Cathedral, when the Act of Canonical Unity between the ROC and ROCOR was signed. ROCOR was actually incorporated into ROC-MP, though with rights on autonomy. Despite Putin's own active interference in the affairs of subordination of the ROCOR to the ROC-MP, he and propagandists of the "Russian world" accused in every pissible way the actions of representatives of the Ukrainian authorities aimed at the constitution of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and its recognition in the Orthodox world.

The subversive activities of ROC-MP in Ukraine intensified after the successor of Aleksij II, Kirill (Gundjajev), took over in 2009 and set course for total centralization of ROC-MP, turning it into an absolutely dependent on the Putin regime and its secret services organization. From that time on, the ideas of the "Russian world" were to become mandatory for the clergy and believers of the ROC-MP. The

sabotage and intelligence component of this organization's activities has also intensified. The views of the current Moscow Patriarch are clearly stated in his book "Seven Words about the Russian World" (Moscow, 2015). From now on, according to Jurij Ščerbak, "during Putin's rule, Russia returned to the monarchical and chauvinistic origins of tsarism while preserving the worst traditions of the communist era. There was a kind of alliance between the Stalin-Andropov Chekist state and the obscurantist version of aggressive Orthodoxy, which was embodied in the formation of the «Russian world» doctrine" (Ščerbak 2023, 67–68). It is no coincidence that one of the Russian terrorist groups in Donbas is called the "Russian Orthodox Army". It is quite obvious that Putin is acting on the model of Hitler, who, contrary to the teachings of the Church, sought to put it entirely at the service of the Third Reich.

The important instruments of the destructive influence of the Putin regime and ROC-MP in Ukraine are the substantial structure of ROC in Ukraine – Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) part of which co-operates with the Russian special services, and also affiliated with the ROC-MP international pseudo-NGOs and forums, such as the "World Russian People's Council" (WRPC). As of January 01, 2014 (the year of the beginning of Russia's direct armed invasion of Ukraine), the ROC-affiliated Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) had 12673 registered communities (Relihijni orhanizaciji 'Religious organisations' 2014). This turned UOC-MP into a valuable asset for facilitation of Russia's armed aggression, its ideological justification, sabotage activities against the Ukrainian state, as well as propaganda manipulations around the historical heritage and "common saints for Ukraine and Russia", including the Holy and Equal-to-the-Apostles King[1] Volodymyr the Christianiser of Ukraine-Rus′.

Before the beginning of Russia's direct armed aggression against Ukraine, a significant part of the UOC-MP pursued a policy of "restor-

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[1] The title of Volodymyr the Great is not well established in English-language historiography. "Prince" is the most commonly used title for Volodymyr, but it does not reflect the essence and fullness of his power. Latin sources of the time use exclusively the title "rex" ("king") for Volodymyr. "King" most fully reflects the essence and fullness of Volodymyr's sovereign power, which was recognised by European monarchs of the time (Hordijenko 2024, 204–205).

ing the unity of the Russian world", in particular, organizing summer camps for youth called "Our Home is Holy Rus'" (Pelnens 2009, 258), film festivals of the Russian Orthodox cinema "Pokrov", etc. The "World Russian People's Council" (WRPC) has become another tool for spreading the influence of the ROC-MP and Russian secret services, propagating the ideas of the "Russian world" both inside and outside Russia, including Ukraine. This organization, headed directly by the Moscow Patriarch, includes ROC-MP hierarchs, Russian government officials and political activists, scholars and cultural figures, and was officially proclaimed a discussion forum for the good of Russia. However, in reality, this organization was aimed at spreading Russian political influence far beyond the borders of the Russian Federation and especially in the countries which were recognized as part of the "Russian world". In 2005, the WRPC was granted special consultative status within the United Nations with the establishment of a representative office there (Pelnens 2009, 277–278).

Pro-Russian politicians and public figures from Ukraine, in particular, Jurij Boldyrev (Party of Regions) and Petro Symonenko (Communist Party), were often directly involved in the activities of the WRPC (Pelnens 2009, 280). Petro Toločko, former director of the Institute of Archeology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, was a frequent speaker at the sessions of the WRPC. For example, in 2018, during the time of Russia's direct aggression against Ukraine, he spoke at the session of the WRPC, where he proclaimed himself "part of the Russian world" (Toločko 2018).

In the context of the Russian Federation's full-scale genocidal war against Ukraine, at the session of the WRPC on 27.03.2024, Russian aggression was openly proclaimed a "holy war" (Herasymenko 2024) which caused disagreement even among the part of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine (UOC-MP), some of whose clergy even asked the Council of Primates of the Ancient Eastern Churches to canonically judge Patriarch Kirill for spreading heretical teaching and justifying the war. Already on February 27, 2022, in his first sermon on the war, Patriarch Kirill (Gundjajev) "sanctifies" the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which, according to him, should lead to the restoration of the unity of "Holy Rus'": "God forbid that the current political situation

in Ukraine, which is so close to us, should be aimed at the prevailing of evil forces that have always fought against the unity of Rus′ and the Russian Church ... May the Lord protect the peoples who make up the single space of the Russian Orthodox Church from fratricidal struggle" (Svjatejšij Patriarch 'His holiness the Patriarch') 2022). Obviously, this refers to the forced accession of believers of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, whose recognition by the Ecumenical Patriarch with the granting of the Synodal Tomos was a fatal blow to the ROC in Ukraine. The sermon of Patriarch Kirill on Forgiveness Sunday (March 6, 2022), in which he interpreted Russian aggression as an act of "protection" of Ukrainians, a "holy nation" from the influence of the "godless" West (Patriaršaja propoved′ 'The Patriarch's sermon' 2022), is even more blasphemous. At the same time, the whole essence of the "Holy Rus′" was manifested in the bombing and destruction by Russian troops of hundreds of Orthodox and other churches in Ukraine, including those belonging to the Russian Orthodox Church. This open support of the ROC-MP for Russia's aggression against Ukraine provoked a reaction from the world's leading theologians, who issued a Declaration condemning the teachings of the "Russian world" for being heretical, which appears to be the latest form of ethnophyletic and ethno-nationalist fascism, as deadly as the Nazi ideology. To date, almost three and a half hundred people have signed this Declaration (Declaration 2022).

Another instrument of the "Russian world" doctrine's implementation were the frequent visits of the Moscow Patriarch to Ukraine. From the time of his patriarchal enthronement (February 1, 2009), during 2009–2013, Kirill (Gundjajev) began to make regular visits to Ukraine – every year or even several times a year. His predecessor, Aleksij II, made such trips only three times during his 18 years tenure as a patriarch – twice in 1990 and once in 2008. Moreover, each of Kirill's visits to Ukraine had political overtones – propaganda of the "Russian world" doctrine, violation of internal peace and stability in Ukraine, strengthening ties with pro-Russian organizations and the former government (Viktor Janukovyč and his entourage). During his visits to Ukraine in 2009–2013, he proved himself not as a pastor and theologian, but as a manipulator and propagandist of the "Russian world" doctrine, con-

fusing the souls of Orthodox believers, giving this doctrine a heretical, pseudo-religious hue.

The meeting of the Moscow Patriarch and then-Minister of Education and Science of Ukraine Dmytro Tabačnyk with rectors and professors of leading Ukrainian universities at the Taras Ševčenko National University of Kyiv (2013) deserves special attention. Part of the management of educational institutions was brought to Kyiv through the use of administrative resources, and some of those present were people closely associated with the then political leadership and propagandists of the "Russian world" idea (Mychel′son 2011). This indicates that Russian political and church leaders understand the impact on education in Ukraine in order to spread the political doctrine of the "Russian world" and further subjugate Ukraine. At the same time, the use of administrative resources significantly reduced the genuineness of the public meeting.

During such visits, Kirill was usually concelebrated by hierarchs of other Local Orthodox Churches, which was supposed to emphasize the "unicanonicity" of the ROC in Ukraine and its recognition in the Orthodox world at the time. During the 2011 visit, the Moscow Patriarch was concelebrated by Georgian Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II, who thereby thanked Kirill for recognizing "the jurisdiction of the Georgian Orthodox Church over Abchazija and Tschinvali" (Zajec 2011). This indicates the political nature of the meeting in Kyiv of these church primates, the commonality of their political interests in maintaining the so-called "canonical territory". A particular curiosity of this visit (2011) was the remark of the Russian "guest" at the monument to St. Volodymyr, where he stated: "We held a prayer service, remembering the Christianisation of Rus′, at the place symbolizing the Christianisation of Rus′, where a monument to St. Kirill the Equal-to-the-Apostles was erected". Such a reservation can only testify to the megalomania of the Moscow church functionary, his perception of himself as a figure equal to St. Volodymyr in the construction of the "Russian world" in the present. However, Kirill corrected himself "to King Volodymyr" (Obmovka za Frejdom 'Freudian slip' 2011). As a matter of fact, other trips of the Moscow hierarch were marked by similar curiosities.

After the victory of the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine (2014), the change of pro-Russian political leadership to pro-European, and the beginning of Russian armed aggression in the Crimea and Donbas, Kirill's (Gundjajev) visits to the sovereign territory of Ukraine controlled by the Ukrainian government stopped. At the same time, despite the transition of some communities to the Ukrainian Local Orthodox Church, which is now recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine retains a significant network of its own communities which enables it to influence minds of some Ukrainian citizens and conduct intelligence and sabotage operations. The possibility of Patriarch Kirill's visits to the occupied and annexed territories of Ukraine remains.

Given the focus of the "Russian world" doctrine on the spiritual heritage of the past, an important place in it is given to the "Kyivan heritage" and the figures of St. Ol′ha and especially to her descendant St. Volodymyr the Christianiser of Ukraine-Rus′. It is noteworthy that Volodymyr's figure did not immediately occupy an important place in the doctrine of Moscow imperialism. Thus, in its original version, the "Moscow – Rome III" doctrine, Volodymyr occupies a secondary, subordinate position[2]. In the times of the Vladimir-Suzdal′ principality, the key figure among the Kyivan Kings was Volodymyr's son Jaroslav the Wise. He was viewed as the "ancestor" of the Russian tsars. It is noteworthy that Russia justified its "Drang nach Westen" against the Baltic states by the foundation of Jurijev (Tartu) by Jaroslav the Wise and the origin of the Varagians from the Island of Rügen (Hyryč 2023, 48).

Back in the first half of the seventeenth century, when Kyivan Metropolitan Petro Mohyla asked Moscow to help arrange a shrine for the holy relics of Volodymyr the Great as the "ancestor of the tsar", the latter refused the Ukrainian metropolitan's request and did not return the part of Volodymyr's relics sent to the monarch. It was only in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries that the figure of St. Volodymyr the Great began to be actively used in Moscow's imperial political doctrine. It is noteworthy that the initiator of the "Volodymyr argu-

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2 For more information on the doctrine of "Moscow – Rome III" and the place of Volodymyr's figure in it, see the collection Kaljužnyj 2021.

ment" was a Ukrainian by birth, a graduate of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, its former rector, and later the leader of tsar Peter's I policy in the Russian Orthodox Church, Theophan Prokopovyč, the author of the drama "Volodymyr". In 1782, Catherine II established the Order of St. Volodymyr which was awarded to both military people and civilians. At the same time, Catherine II, a "historian" (the real author was apparently Michail Lomonosov), also made the first Russian "pseudo-academic" falsification-manipulation about the figure of St. Volodymyr, claiming his birth near Pskov, on the "native Russian territory" (Jekaterina II 1801, 74).

The rapid expansion of the Russian Empire's borders and the consolidation of the larger "Rurik heritage" within it made it necessary to articulate an ideological justification for the new political reality. The answer to these requests was the concept of Russian history by Nikolaj Karamzin, which is still a keystone in Russian and pro-Russian historiography. N. Karamzin, an official imperial historiographer, not a historian, clearly included the period of Volodymyr, as well as his personality, in the scheme of Russian history, defining the Kyivan ruler as a "Russian King" (Karamzin 1993, 142, 146 etc.).

In fact, a number of researchers (for example, Russian Aleksej Miller) attribute the formation of the modern doctrine of the "Russian world" to this time, which at that time was expressed in the above-mentioned formula of the 19th century stated by the Russian Minister of Education during the reign of Tsar Nicholas I Count Sjergjej Uvarov: "Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality". In fact, this formula actualized the sacred component of the Moscow doctrine, which, in turn, again referred to the figure of St. Volodymyr of Kyiv. This gives an important context to the naming of Kyiv University after St. Volodymyr by the Russian imperial authorities in the nineteenth century, the construction of St. Volodymyr's Cathedral and the monument to St. Volodymyr the Christianiser in Kyiv, and more. The mid-nineteenth century also saw the formation of the image of Kyiv as the third "spiritual" capital of the Russian Empire, created by Tsar Nicholas I (1825–1855) personally. This idea was also adopted by the ideologues of the "Russian world". In particular, a contemporary Russian propagandist, Aleksander Panarin, long before Russia's open aggression, put forward the idea of declaring Kyiv the

"spiritual" capital of a new Russian "Orthodox" empire, while Moscow was to remain its political center (Ščerbak 2023, 45).

At the same time, along with the mythologization and politicization of history, the concept of the "Russian world" is becoming clearly anti-Western. The origins of this course of Russian ideology go back to the above mentioned conservative newspaper "Russkij mir", published in 1871–1880 by the Russian philanthropists and Slavophile publicists Rostislav Fadejev and Visarion Komarov.

However, the intensification of national movements in Ukraine and Belarus required a new understanding of "Russian" history. And this stage is associated with the name of the prominent Russian philologist Aleksej Šachmatov, who created the concept of a single "Old Russian nationality" which included the ancestors of modern Ukrainians and Belarusians and was supposedly an intermediate link between the pan-Slavic period and the historical period of the Medieval Ukraine (Šachmatov 1916). Despite the artificiality of the Šachmatov scheme and its thorough refutation by Mychajlo Hruševs′kyj, it proved to be resilient and is now dominant in Russian historiography. Ukrainian ideologues and adherents of the "Russian world" doctrine, such as Petro and Oleksij Toločko, also adhere to it.

During the Soviet occupation of Ukraine, the medieval period of Ukraine's history was viewed at the state level exclusively as the history of Russia. In this regard, the situation with the dubbing of Jurij Illenko's Ukrainian film "The Legend of Queen Ol′ha" (1983) is noteworthy, when it was forbidden to make a Ukrainian dub of the film. In particular, it was a response to the achievements of the Ukrainian Revolution (1917–1921), when Volodymyr's Trident (his personal sign) became the national emblem of Ukraine, adopted as the coat of arms by the restored state of Ukraine in 1992 (February 19). The appropriation of Volodymyr's Trident by Ukrainians makes this ruler inconvenient for the Russian ideology. This "inconvenience" could be eliminated by Ukraine's introduction of the "Great Coat of Arms", in which the Trident would become only an element of the renewed state Coat of Arms – the relevant bill was introduced by the current President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelens′kyj on June 29, 2021 (Proekt Zakonu 'Draft Law' 2021). However, under pressure from the Ukrainian public, the bill was not adopted,

leaving Volodymyr the Great as an "inconvenient" King for Russia. At the same time, Ukraine remains the successor to the Volodymyr's state at the visual and symbolic level.

In the history of the Eastern Europe, Volodymyr's figure is a keystone. Since Moscow's neo-imperial plans give a significant place to the historical argument, this inevitably weaponized the use of the figure of St. Volodymyr by the Russian propaganda. Ukrainian historiography views St. Volodymyr as the creator of the first Ukrainian state (Hordijenko 2024a, 40–52, 71–90), while Russian historiography emphasizes the Christianizing role of the Kyivan King. For example, the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine, which actually represents Russia's political interests and ideological preferences, founded the Order of St. Volodymyr the Equal-to-the-Apostles in the 1990s (the Russian Orthodox Church restored this order in 1957). It is noteworthy that among the knights of this order (1999) is Leonid Kučma, President of Ukraine in 1994–2005, who in his activities actively contributed to the spread of the influence of this religious organization. In response, an order with the same name was founded by UOC-KP and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) independently from Moscow. The Order of the Holy and Equal-to-the-Apostles King Volodymyr also exists in the canonically recognized Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which emerged in its present form after the Unification Council of December 15, 2018, as the successor of these churches.

Since 2008, in preparation for the aggression against Ukraine, the Russian political and church leadership began active political and ideological manipulations around the figure of St. Volodymyr. Following the example of its predecessors, the modern Orthodox Russian vision of the "Russian world" adopted the figure of St. King Volodymyr, because at the time of his Christianization, Volodymyr was the King of Kyiv, which inevitably led to the need to recognize the sacredness of Kyiv within the framework of the doctrine of the "Russian world". This was facilitated by the accession of Patriarch Kirill (Gundjajev) to the Moscow Patriarchal throne and the celebration of the 1020th and 1025th anniversaries of the Christianization of Ukraine-Rus′ in 2008 and 2013, respectively. It was Gundjajev, then Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, who proclaimed at a concert in Kyiv in July 2008 that "Russia, Ukraine, and

Belarus are the Holy Rus′″, and later Kirill added Orthodox Moldova to this geopolitical space. At the same time, in the Russian hierarch's view, "Holy Rus′″ is not an ideal or mythologized model, but a historical reality. The pinnacle of the Moscow Patriarch's neo-imperial chauvinism was his statement of affiliation with the Orthodox "Holy Rus′″ also Kazachstan (statement of September 1, 2020). This is despite the fact that the territory of Kazachstan had nothing to do with the state of St. Volodymyr. At the same time, such statements are ideologically in line with CRC and WRPC activities and the WRPC, which have already been openly adopted by the Putin regime, which has become neo-totalitarian since 2012.

After Gundjajev's accession to the Moscow patriarchal throne his regular visits to Kyiv necessarily took place on the day of the celebration of the "Christianization of Rus′″ (July 28), which emphasized the political nature of the celebration and was intended to emphasize Kirill's primacy. Since his first 2009 visit to Ukraine as a patriarch, Kirill began to directly promote the idea of the so-called "Russian world", although he condemned attempts to combine religious and political issues, referring to the problem of establishing a single Local Orthodox Church in Ukraine, independent of Moscow. Thus, on July 27, 2009, at the monument to King Volodymyr in Kyiv, Kirill, thanking the Equal-to-the-Apostles King for his choice of Orthodoxy, proclaimed: "Praying here, at the monument erected to the Holy King on the shore of our common baptismal font, we testify that the covenant of our spiritual progenitor lives on and triumphs in history, that we, the heirs of Volodymyr's baptism, living in different states, sacredly preserve the spiritual unity he commanded" (Patriarch Kirill 2009). Here, obviously, the unity of the imaginary "Russian world" was meant. Kirill also mentioned the same "unity" during his visit to Horlivka in Donbas on July 30 of the same year: "Here, on the sacred land of Donbas, I cannot but speak about the relations between Russia and Ukraine. This is a single space of Holy Rus′, like Belarus, like many other countries. We are one people, who came out of the font of Kyiv baptism. There are differences in languages, in customs, in temperament, but we live by the same values. And as long as there are the same values, there is this spiritual community" (Slovo Patriarcha 'Speech of the Patriarch' 2009).

During this visit Kirill (Gundjajev) called Kyiv "our common" (for Ukraine and Russia) Jerusalem, from which the Orthodox faith originated (Patriarch Kirill 2009). And this fact forces Russia to fight for Kyiv, as it was demonstrated by Russia's full-scale armed aggression against Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, when Russian troops were desperately braking through to Kyiv, committing atrocities in Hostomelʹ, Buča and Irpinʹ along the way. Such attention to the Ukrainian capital is explained by the fact that the loss of Kyiv breaks the imperial "continuity" of Moscow from Constantinople, and thus undermines the "canonicity" of the Russian Church, because, according to a chronicle legend, the Apostle Andrew the First-Called blessed the Kyivan mountains, and the Equal-to-the-Apostles Olʹha and Volodymyr were the rulers of Kyiv. The loss of Ukraine and Kyiv will inevitably lead to the loss of the apostolic tradition of the Russian Orthodox Church, which, according to Ukrainian religious scholar Serhij Sdioruk, is "suicide" for the Russian Church (Zdioruk 2023, 78). The doctrine of "Moscow – Rome III" will also fail, as Moscow and Constantinople are linked by Kyiv.

At this time (2008–2013) the Russian political leader also began active political and ideological manipulations around the figure of Volodymyr the Great and Kyiv as a "common baptismal font" of Ukraine and Russia. For example, in 2013 Russian dictator Vladimir Putin, during his visit to Ukraine, arrived at the monument to the Christianiser King on Volodymyr's Hill in Kyiv and then at the site of Volodymyr's baptism in Cherson (Crimea). At the same time, the Russian leader's speech included statements about the "unity of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples who emerged from the Kyiv font" (Medvedev 2015). This actually means that the Russian leadership began officially abandoning the Soviet concept of the "three fraternal peoples" (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians) and moving to the idea of "Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians" as "one people". At the time, this meant declaring a political desire to fully incorporate Ukraine into Russia's sphere of influence (including full incorporation of Ukrainian territory and people into Russian Federation) by emphasizing a common historical past, to deprive Ukraine of its own separate history, defining it as an exclusively Russian history. Unable to historically "tame" Ukraine, to include it in

the "Russian world", the spokespersons of ruscism, through the words of the "Vice Speaker" of the so-called "Novorossija Parliament", Aleksander Kofman, call for the total genocide of Ukrainians, the destruction of Ukraine as a state and a country: "If it were up to me, the very name of Ukraine would disappear. This state entity should not exist. It is necessary to burn out the roots" (Citation for: Ščerbak 2023, 69).

After the failure of Putin's plans to completely subjugate Ukraine during 2014–2015, the idea of erecting a monument to Volodymyr the Great in Moscow was used to oppose Kyiv politically and ideologically as a historical centre of the spread of Christianity. Russian political and religious leaders came up with the idea of erecting a monument in Moscow to the Christianiser of Ukraine-Rus′ as the founder of the "united Russian people". This is again a political manipulation in line with the doctrine of the "Russian world", because in the epoch of St. Volodymyr, such concepts as "national unity" and "a single Proto-Slavic language" were not used. This idea received active support primarily among the clergy of the ROC-MP and the Russian Military History Society (RMHS), whose chairman is the then Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation Vladimir Medinskij, a native of Smila in the Čerkasy region (Ukraine) and one of the most active propagandists of the "Russian world" ideas (Otkrytoje pis′mo… 'The open letter…' 2015). Its representatives, including RMHS scientific editor, Doctor of Historical Sciences Michail Mjagkov, adopt the Ukrainian statehood argument and emphasise the figure of Volodymyr the Great as the founder of the modern Russian state, despite the fact that the city of Moscow did not exist in Volodymyr's lifetime, nor did the vast majority of the lands of the modern Russian Federation belong to his state. V. Mjagkov states: "This figure marks the beginning of our state… King Volodymyr, in fact, created the ancient Russian people, the ancient Russian state – Kyivan Rus′… Before him there was only a nucleus of the Eastern Slavs, and during his time a united Russian people appeared…" (Citation for: Pamjatnik knjazju Vladimiru 'A monument to Prince Vladimir' 2015).

The Moscow monument was to be laid in 2015, on the 1000th anniversary of the death of Volodymyr the Great. Initially, this monument was to be erected on Vorobjovy Gory area, with a height of 20.4 meters (approximately equal to an eight-story building) and a weight of 300

tons (Pamjatnik knjazju Vladimiru 'A monument to Prince Vladimir' 2015; Medvedev 2015). This project was to be implemented without regard to the position of the public and experts, despite the fact that Vorobjovy Gory is a nature conservation area attached to the cultural monument of the Moscow State University.

It should be noted that the idea of erecting a monument to King Volodymyr on Vorobjovy Gory has caused serious resistance among the experts and the public, primarily from the "Archnadzor" ("Paramount supervision") movement, which aims to preserve the architectural face of the city. This NGO also opposed the erection of the monument on the Borovickaja Square in Moscow, which is included in the UNESCO World Heritage Site. "Borovickaja Square has no connection with the figure of King Volodymyr. This place in Moscow's history is associated with completely different meanings that this monument will not be able to express", said Konstantin Michajlov, coordinator of the "Arkhnadzor" ("Paramount supervision") (Mesto dlja pamjatnika 'A place for a monument' 2015). However, on 03.11.2015, Patriarch Kirill (Gundjajev) of the ROC-MP consecrated the cornerstone at the site of the future construction of the monument to the Holy Equal-to-the-Apostles King Volodymyr on the Borovickaja Square, recalling the "spiritual unity" of the inhabitants of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, which "originates from the accomplishments of King Volodymyr" (Svjatejšij Patriarch 'His holiness the Patriarch' 2015). Finally, on 04.11.2016, the monument to King Volodymyr was unveiled on the Borovickaja Square in Moscow with the participation of the leading propagandists of the "Russian world" doctrine: Putin, V. Medinskij and Kirill (Gundjajev). This monument, like the nineteenth-century Kyiv monument, represents the figure of Volodymyr the Christianiser: he is depicted with a cross and wearing a "Monomach's hat" – a headdress of the Golden Horde origin that was not a part of Volodymyr's state regalia. At the same time, both the Russian dictator and the patriarch used this event for propaganda purposes to justify Russia's current aggression against Ukraine and its desire to restore its former empire. For example, Putin called the Kyivan King "our outstanding ancestor" and "the spiritual founder of the Russian state" (U centri Moskvy 'In the center of Moscow' 2015). Patriarch Kirill (Gundjajev) was even more outspoken in accusing Ukrainians of

allegedly renouncing Volodymyr's heritage in their struggle for independence from Russia: "The monument to King Volodymyr is a symbol of the unity of all the peoples whose father he is. And these are the peoples of historical Rus′, who now live within the borders of many states. There can be a monument to a father wherever his children live, there is no contradiction in this, but it is bad when children forget that they have one father" (Citation for: U centri Moskvy 'In the center of Moscow' 2015).

The failure of the Putin regime to conquer Ukraine in 2014–2015, and the need to diminish Kyiv's place in the Baptism of 988–989, forced the propagandists of the Russian world to look for another "sacred place" associated with the figure of St. Volodymyr, which was meant to close the gap between Moscow and Byzantium taking the loss of Kyiv into consideration. The issue of recognising Cherson (Sevastopol′) in the Russian-occupied Crimea as the site of the Baptism of Rus′ is inextricably linked to the issue of erecting a monument to Volodymyr the Great in Moscow. On 04.12.2014, in his address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Putin actually justified the annexation of the Crimea by the presence there of "the spiritual source... of the Russian nation and the centralised Russian state", which emerged as a result of the Baptism of Volodymyr the Great in Cherson. Moreover, the Russian leader noted that "in addition to ethnic similarities, a common language, common elements of their material culture, a common territory, although its borders were not yet marked, a nascent common economy and state administration, Christianity was a powerful spiritual unifying force that helped to engage various tribes and tribal unions of the vast East Slavic world in the creation of the Russian nation and the Russian state. Thanks to this spiritual unity, our ancestors saw themselves as a single nation for the first time and forever". Thus, in the Russian dictator's view, "the Crimea, ancient Korsun′ or Cherson, Sevastopol′ are of great civilisational and even sacred significance. Just as the Temple Mount in Jerusalem is for those who profess Islam or Judaism" (Poslanie prezidenta 'Message of the President' 2014). In this case, Christianity, as well as its introduction by Volodymyr the Great, in Putin's speeches and actions appears as a purely political and manipulative factor that

should contribute to the return of the empire. This distorts the very essence of Christianity as a religion.

However, the start of the Russian Armed Forces' operation in Syria (officially, Russian army units began to be used in Syria on 30 September 2015) has for some time weakened the interest of the Russian media in the Russian-Ukrainian war and the topic of Cherson as "Holy Korsun'". For example, an official representative of the Moscow Patriarchate called the war in Syria "sacred" and "defensive" for Russia, as it is waged to fight terrorism and protect Christians (V RPC nazvali… 'The ROC called…' 2015), according to the position of the Russian government and ROC-MP. Propaganda TV-programs which pointed to the roots of Russian Christianity in Damascus have appeared on Russian television. This tradition fully resonates with the early modern aspirations of the Russian leadership to falsify the history of their country for political purposes, deriving it, depending on the circumstances, from the Kyivan state, Byzantium or the Golden Horde.

Thus, the erection of the monument to Volodymyr the Great in Moscow and the proclamation of Cherson (Korsun′) as the city of the origins of Christianity in Russia are the interconnected propaganda campaigns aimed at proving the continuity of the modern Russian Federation from the Kyivan state, diminishing or eliminating the role of Kyiv as a centre for the spread of Christianity, and weakening Ukraine's ideological position in the current conflict with Russia. Despite the fact that since the outbreak of the war in Syria, this topic has been less mentioned in Russian propaganda until 2021, it may become relevant at times when it is beneficial for the Kremlin to increase pressure on Ukraine and intensify its destabilisation policy. This is what happened shortly before the start of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, when on 12.07.2021, an article "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" was published under the signature of Putin. It is noteworthy that this article was published on the official website of the President of the Russian Federation not only in Russian but also in Ukrainian. The article, whose main idea was to promote the thesis that Russians and Ukrainians are "one people artificially divided by foreign and Bol′ševik intrigues" who "have always sought reunification", mentions also Volodymyr the Great, who, in addition to his

baptismal rite, is proclaimed both a Novhorod and Kyivan King, who "largely determines our (Ukrainians and Russians – *Authors*) spiritual kinship" (Putin 2021).

It is worth noting here that in the "war of monuments", the Ukrainian vision of King Volodymyr is demonstrated by the monument to St. Volodymyr in London, erected to mark the 1000th anniversary of the Christianization of Ukraine in 1988. The monument glorifies the King as an equal of the Apostles (cross in hand) and as a statesman – he is depicted wearing a crown and holding a Trident on his shield. The inscription on the pedestal is also significant: "St. Volodymyr. Ruler of Ukraine. 980–1015". The King's name is given in the Ukrainian trans-literation "Volodymyr", which corresponds to the chronicle's "Volody-myr") (PSRL 2001, 106), while Russians are forced to modernise the King's name to the Russian language as "Vladimir". The London mon-ument presents Volodymyr as "Ruler of Ukraine", not "Rus′", "Kyivan Rus′" or even "Ukraine-Rus′", but "Ukraine". It is thus the antithesis of the Russian Uvarov formula.

Shortly before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, on February 21, 2022, in his message, Vladimir Putin compares the establishment of both Ukrainian statehood the Orthodox Church of Ukraine to the use of weapons of mass destruction against Russia and the "Russian world" (Putin 2022). As the British theological scholar Brandon Galla-her emphasizes, "For Putin, alien, foreign, or hostile cultures and peo-ples, as well as an independent, separate from Russia church in Ukraine are equivalent to a missile or weapon of mass destruction" (Gallaher 2022, 483). In Putin's imagination, Ukraine as a separate state and cul-ture should disappear or dissolve into the "Russian world". Adherents of these ideas are present in Ukraine, even despite Russia's direct armed aggression. For example, on May 30, and on July 26, 2017, petitions titled "Change, return of the name of the state to Rus′ or Kyivan Rus′" were registered on the official website of the President of Ukraine. For-tunately, these initiatives were not supported by Ukrainians, garnering only 102 votes in total out of the 25,000 required for its mandatory examination by the head of state (Petycija 'Petition' № 22/037322-ep; Petycija 'Petition' № 22/038744-ep). Appearance in the name "Ukraine" of the particle "Rus′" in any form at semantic level makes Ukraine the

part of the "Russian world" or the "Holy Rus'" geopolitical space, leaded by Russia. The rejection of Ruthenian in favor of Ukrainian identity in the nineteenth century marked the watershed between Russia and Ukraine, since "the establishment of Ukraine and Ukrainianness does not imply a discussion of heritage, but the establishment of one's own, separate identity on one's own, autochthonous land" (Hordijenko 2022).

In justifying his aggressive policy against Ukraine, Putin attaches great importance to the historical argument, as evidenced by his interview with the American journalist Tucker Carlson on February 6, 2024. The Russian dictator expressed his manipulative ideas based on the "Russian world" regarding Ukrainian history as a true fact, as the basis for aggression against Ukraine. St. Volodymyr's example is not the only one in the historical manipulations of the "Russian world's" spokespersons. We can recall the manipulations around the figures of Bohdan Chmelʹnycʹkyj, Ivan Mazepa, Symon Petljura, Stepan Bandera, and many other significant figures of Ukrainian history that are inconvenient for Russia.

Returning to the Neo-Uvarovian triad (Moscow Orthodoxy, Russian language, and common historical memory), the manipulations around St. Volodymyr demonstrate all three of its components. Back in the Middle Ages, St. Volodymyr was canonized and seen as an Equal to the Apostles. However, he baptized only Kyiv and Kyivans. Novhorod was christened by the Kyiv voivode Putjata with fire, and by Volodymyr's uncle Dobrynja with the sword. At the end of the 10th century, there was no division of the churches, but Russian propaganda always claims that Volodymyr made an exclusively Orthodox choice, although the choice was determined by political rather than religious factors. The choice of Christianity of the Eastern tradition is used as a justification for the dominance of Moscow Orthodoxy, as evidenced by the erection of a monument to St. Volodymyr in Moscow with the participation of Kirill (Gundjajev). Russian propaganda and historiography also does not recognize the chronicle form of the name of the Kyivan King "Volodymyr", replacing it with the modern Russian form of the name "Vladimir". This is the linguistic component of the manipulations of the adherents of the "Russian world" around the figure of St. Volodymyr. Finally, realizing that Volodymyr ruled in Kyiv, the capital of modern

Ukraine, Russian propaganda attributes him with the formation of the mythical "Holy Rus'", a supranational entity with uncertain geographical boundaries, into which Putin is trying to force Ukraine. Around the notion of "Holy Rus'", the figures of the "Russian world" seek to construct a common historical memory of Ukrainians and Russians exclusively in a Moscow-centered spirit. The core, the spiritual center of this "Holy Rus'" was supposed to be Kyiv, under the conditions of Moscow's exclusive political and power monopoly. However, with the failure of the Russian troops to occupy Kyiv both in 2014 and in 2022, the Russian propagandists began to look for other geographical landmarks. First, Sevastopol' (Cherson) emerged as the "Temple Mount" of Russian Orthodoxy, and later, when the euphoria of the occupation of the Crimea had passed, Novhorod was proposed as the starting point of "Holy Rus'". At the same time, the authors of Russian textbooks, and Putin along with them, forgot that Volodymyr came to Novhorod as a regional prince representing the power of King Svjatoslav of Kyiv, his father. Despite all attempts, Ukraine is not being drawn into the orbit of the Russian world, and in particular, Volodymyr the Great, the King of Kyiv, who still symbolically protects his city and his state from invasion from the East, stands in the way!

Do Ukrainian scholars and cultural figures need to engage in a discussion with the adherents of the Russian world? Obviously, no. You cannot discuss with a paranoid killer. Our task is to develop Ukrainian historical scholarship, to develop Ukrainian culture, to fill it with new themes, images, plots, and figures. We have to rethink and comprehend the Ukrainian past. Truth and research based exclusively on sources is the best answer to V. Putin and other adherents of the "Russian world". Ukrainian historians should study an image of the great, original Ukrainian culture, its past and future, and at the same time restore the multifaceted image of the great ruler of Ukraine, King Volodymyr the Great.

So, to summarize, the doctrine of the "Russian world" in its modern form emerged in the early 1990s as a reaction to the collapse of the USSR and the need for the newly emerging Russian Federation to find its new place in the world. Its historical origins were partly in the Russian imperial messianic doctrines of "Moscow – Third Rome", imperial ideas of

the reign of Nicholas I, Slavophilia, and the Bol′ševik "world revolution". Initially, this doctrine assumed influence based on "soft power", justified the need for Russia's integration into the global world, while containing imperial intentions and justifying the use of ideological manipulations and the latest information, communication and market technologies to gently spread Russian imperial influence. At the turn of the 1990s and 2000s, under the influence of Russian conservative and chauvinistic political forces (CRC) and the new state leadership, which came from the Soviet secret services, the doctrine of the "Russian world" became a significant ideological component of Putin's neo-totalitarian regime. It has lost its focus on the future and turned into a tool for returning to Russia's past "imperial greatness", and the emphasis on soft power has been replaced by the use of force in its implementation (economic pressure, intimidation, sabotage and subversion, and direct armed aggression). According to the modern version of this doctrine, Ukraine has no right to exist as an independent state, and Ukrainians – as a separate people. The importance of Ukraine, especially Kyiv, as a city of Christianization in Russia's imperial geopolitical plans is due to the fact that the loss of influence over it would mean the loss of Russia's imperial identity and connection with the Byzantine tradition.

The Russian Orthodox Church plays a significant role in the ideological justification of the "Russian world" doctrine and its active propaganda, which is characterized by malignant political and ideological manipulations. This role is associated with the church's ability to give the Russian world doctrine an irrational, religious colouring, to develop an extensive network of the ROC-MP in Ukraine (UOC-MP), pseudo-NGOs (such as WRPC), which opens up significant opportunities for pseudo-religious propaganda, and the traditional role of the Moscow church as a service tool of the Russian state and its secret services. Also, the church is a convenient tool for manipulating the theme of "common saints of Russia and Ukraine", in particular the figure of St. Volodymyr the Great. These manipulations especially intensified with the accession of Kirill (Gundjajev) to the Moscow Patriarchal throne, who completely subordinated the church structure to the Putin regime and its secret services, began to make regular visits to Ukraine to openly promote the "Russian world" under the guise of a religious

leader. With the beginning of the direct Russian invasion, the leadership of the ROC-MP and the WRPC even heretically and blasphemously proclaimed this genocidal aggression a "holy war".

The figure of King Volodymyr the Great of Kyiv is not fully convenient for the adherents of the "Russian world", because at the time of his Christianization of Kyiv, neither Moscow nor the Moscow state existed. Moreover, at the time of Volodymyr's baptism, there was no division of the Church into the Western and the Eastern, and therefore it is unjustified to speak of an exclusively "Eastern" and "Orthodox" choice of the Kyivan King. His attribute, the Trident, is the Coat of Arms of the Ukrainian state. Therefore, Russian imperialists and propagandists have a special idiosyncrasy towards this symbol. At the same time, the Russian imperialists are forced to adapt this figure to the doctrine of the "Russian world", since without such adaptation they lose touch with the Baptism of Volodymyr and the Byzantine tradition. This undermines both Russia's imperial identity and the imperial position of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Therefore, the figure of Volodymyr the Great played a significant role in the malignant political and ideological manipulations of the propagandists of the "Russian world", in which he appears as a "common father and Baptist for Ukrainians and Russians", "founder of the single Russian state and single Russian people". The erection of the monument to St. Volodymyr in Moscow (2015–2016) and accenting on his own christening in Cherson are the consequences of the failure of the Russian occupation troops to subjugate Kyiv. The active propagandist manipulations around the figure of Volodymyr the Great by the adherents of the "Russian world" doctrine are the sign of preparation of the Russian aggression against Ukraine on the basis of so-called "historical argument".

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RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE: VOLODYMYR THE GREAT AND HIS DYNASTY IN THE CONTEXT OF RUSSIAN ATTEMPTS TO 'ANNEX THE HISTORY' OF MEDIEVAL UKRAINE AND ITS ADVOCACY OF FRAUDULENT 'RIGHTS' TO THE HERITAGE OF THE KYIV STATE

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The article examines historical fakes and attempts by the Russian Federation to 'appropriate' prominent figures of Ukrainian medieval history, particularly the ruler of the Kyiv state Volodymyr († 1015) and members of his dynasty. There has been analyzed the role of the image of Volodymyr the Great in the ideological construct of the 'Russian world' and the intensification of historical fake propaganda on the eve of the full-scale invasion.

Keywords: Medieval Ukraine, Volodymyr the Great, Russian propaganda, historical fakes.

АГРЕСІЯ РОСІЇ ПРОТИ УКРАЇНИ: ВОЛОДИМИР ВЕЛИКИЙ І ЙОГО ДИНАСТІЯ В КОНТЕКСТІ СПРОБ "АНЕКСІЇ ІСТОРІЇ" СЕРЕДНЬОВІЧНОЇ УКРАЇНИ ТА ФЕЙКОВИХ "ПРАВ" НА КИЇВСЬКУ СПАДЩИНУ

Олена Ясинецька

У статті розглянуто історичні фейки та спроби 'привласнення' Російською Федерацією видатних осіб середньовічної історії України, зокрема, правителя Київської держави Володимира († 1015) і представників його династії. Проаналізовано роль образу Володимира Великого у ідеологічній конструкції "русского міра" та активізації пропаганди історичних фейків напередодні повномасштабного вторгнення.

Ключові слова: Середньовічна Україна, Володимир Великий, російська пропаганда, історичні фейки.

The History of Ukraine as a 'Field of Invasion'

None of us will ever forget the day when, before the dawn of February 24, 2022, Russia invaded the sovereign heartland of Ukraine – the Černihiv, Žytomyr, and Kyiv regions. The first sirens and the first tragic realization that your previous peaceful and happy life was over. The lives of your children have changed forever. Your formerly playful and carefree daughter today sleeps on the floor of the hallway, a hammer under her pillow, ready to die defending herself when bloodthirsty orcs break into our home. Machine gun bursts were already audible at night under the windows in the center of Kyiv. Every Ukrainian – from child to elderly, has felt this terrible word "invasion". But we also understood that the war had begun much earlier. In 2014, the sovereign territories of the Ukrainian Crimea and Donbas were invaded and annexed by the Russian Federation. However, not everyone understood that the invasion by tanks and missile attacks was preceded by ANOTHER INVASION, which every thinking person should have recognized – an invasion of consciousness, the perception of enemy propaganda as truth, with its one single goal – to misinform the world, divide societies, create a distorted perception of reality and as a result – to form no resistance to the enemy, its tanks, shelling, annexation, and occupation…

A special field operation of Russia's invasion was an attack on the HISTORY of sovereign Ukraine as a component of Ukrainians' identity, but notably, this began long before the full-scale war, only to be significantly intensified in the days and months leading up to February 24, 2022. The ideological basis of Russia's aggression against Ukraine was built on the history of Ukraine, which the enemy persistently tried to falsify, appropriate, and annex. This ideological scheme was most clearly outlined six months before the full-scale invasion in the article by the head of the aggressor country, Vladimir Putin, *"On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians"*, published on the official website of the Russian president on July 12, 2021 (Putin 2021). Historians, sociologists and journalists have found many inconsistencies, logical errors and outright falsifications in the material. Some observers dismissed

the essay as an empty propaganda stunt, but others took it very seriously – as a foreboding sign of coming war.

Stockholm Free World Forum Senior Fellow Anders Åslund branded the article *"a masterclass in disinformation"* and *"one step short of a declaration of war"* (Åslund 2021). A. Åslund admitted that "*Russian President V. Putin is obsessed with Ukraine – or, rather, with pretending that Ukraine doesn't exist*" (Ibid). Meanwhile, Russian propaganda newspaper Moskovskij Komsomolec claimed the essay was Putin's *"final ultimatum to Ukraine"* (Rostovskij 2021). In addition to the ultimatum and the not-so-subtle threat of war, the main content of the propaganda opus outlined the ideological ground for the invasion, based on historical fakes and many false postulates, the two main ones being: *"Ukrainians and Russians are one people"*; and "*The state of Ukraine is an artificial entity created by the Russian Bolʹševik Lenin, a case of history that should be grateful to Russia for allowing it to exist"*. Such a logic has been the xenophobic logic of the Russian Federation, the logic of genocide against Ukrainians as a people, the logic of a predator-aggressor, and the method of the justification for its invasion of the sovereign state of Ukraine. The core meaning of these historical fakes boils down to one thing: Ukraine has never existed, and therefore should not exist in the future.

"The Rose Smells Like a Rose…" [1] The Stolen Name of Medieval Ukraine

The name *'Ukraine'* appears in the chronicles in 1187 (Hypatian Codex 1908, 653) to refer to the core of medieval Rusʹ (the name of medieval Ukraine) – the central principalities of Kyiv, Perejaslav, and Černihiv.

Like every other nation and state, throughout its development Ukraine bore different names: *Rusʹ (Ruzzia, Ruthenia, Rósia, Róssia, Roxolania), Rusian Land, Kingdom of Rusʹ (Kingdom of Galicija–Volhynija), Cossack Hetmanate (the Zaporižžian Host), Ukraine, the Land of the Cossacks, Malorossija (Little Rusʹ), Ukraine.* Some parts of our state were comprised of different empires at different times: the Polish-Lith-

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1 *What in a name that which we call a rose? By any other name would smell as sweet …* ("Romeo and Juliet" by William Shakespeare. Act II, Scene II).

uanian Commonwealth, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Russian Empire. In the medieval era, Ukraine (*Rus′, Ruthenia, Rusian Land, Rósia*) with its center in Kyiv, was an empire by itself, ruling over lands from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea. The name *"Rus′, Ruthenia"* was retained by the ethnic group and lands of Ukraine for almost a thousand years – from the 9th century to the beginning of the 18th century. After this period the Muscovite kingdom conquered Ukraine-Rus′ and joined it to its empire, and together with the Ukrainian lands annexed the medieval name of Ukraine – Rus′ (*Rósia* or *Róssia* derived from Ῥωσία in Greek sources) dropping Moscovia and renaming itself Russia (*Rossía)* in the early 18th century.

Ancient Map Evidence: Rus′ → Rósia → Ruthenia → Ukraine versus Moscovia

Old maps, including the famous map by al-Idrisi of 1154 (*Tabula Rogeriana*), contain the name Rus′ (*Rusia*) and the city of Kyiv (*Kiau*) on the territory of modern Ukraine, and also indicate other toponyms and hydronyms related to Ukraine: Dniester, Danube and the most important river of Ukraine – the Dnipro (*Dnabr*).

The map by Johannes Ruysch (1460–1533). Fragment (Johann Ruysch 1507)

Land names in the territory of the modern Russian Federation were never known or marked as *Rus′ or Rossia* in medieval times. These lands appeared on later European maps as *Moscovia* or *Muscovy* (the exonymic name of the Principality of Moscow) which became the King-

dom of Moscow in 1547. The title *'Moscovia'* for indicating and marking the lands of the modern Russian Federation was preserved until 1721, when it was renamed Russia (the Russian Empire), annexing the name of medieval Ukraine. Until the 18th century, the old maps clearly marked the territories of Ukraine as Rus′, Russia, and Ruthenia, distinguishing them from the lands of Moscovia. The map by the Dutch cartographer Johannes Ruysch (c. 1507) clearly marks the lands of southern, central, and western Ukraine as *Russia* and the land of the modern Russian Federation as *Moscovia*.

Russie and Ukraine, the Land of the Cossacks. The Map by G. Sanson (1633–1703): Fragment (Sanson 1674)

Principality of Moscow on the map by Guillaume Sanson (1633–1703)

The map by the French cartographer Guillaume Sanson (1633–1703) keeps to the same location of toponyms with one distinctive feature – the central part of modern Ukraine is marked as *Ukraine Pais de Cosaques (Ukraine, the Land of the Cossacks),* while in the western Ukrainian lands, around the area of modern-day L′viv, the name Rus′ *(Russie)* is preserved (*Russie Noire – Black Ruthenia).*

To the north-east of Ukraine-Russie the principalities (duchesses – Duche) of Smolens′k, Rjazan′, Moscow and others are marked on the territory of the modern Russian Federation.

Based on G. Sanson′s map, an updated and improved version of the map of these territories was later issued, where the mentioned toponyms were preserved even in the early 19th century (in 1806). These included *Muscovie* for the territories of modern-day Russia, and *Ukraine, the Land of the Cossacks* along with *Russie* for the territories of present-day Ukraine.

Russie, Ukraine, the Land of the Cossacks and Moscovie. The map based on G. Sanson's map and improved in 1806: Fragment

On all other European maps, the territories of the modern Russian Federation were not labeled as *Russia* until the 18th century. When Muscovia 'stole' the name of medieval Ukraine.

Personal Involvement of Moscovia's Leaders in Falsifying Ukrainian History

Traditionally, the leaders of Russia (the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation) played an active personal role

in fabricating historical narratives. To conceal the truth and distort the memory of Ukraine's authentic history, Peter I, the Tsar of Moscovia, ordered the collection and withdrawal of all old manuscripts from Ukrainian monasteries transferred to St. Petersburg in the early 18th century (Carskogo veličestva ukaz 'Decree of the Tsar's Majesty' 1720) after the victory of his army over the Ukrainian-Swedish forces at the Battle of Poltava (1709). Many of Ukraine's historical sources were 'rewritten' within the walls of Moscow and St. Petersburg, and today, we know these texts only in their distorted, falsified versions, shaped by imperial ideologists. Everything that could not be stolen or taken away by Russia was mercilessly destroyed.

Acting on orders from Moscow, a significant number of ancient manuscripts, books, and chronicles preserved in the Kyiv Cave Monastery (Kyiv-Pečers′k Lavra) were burned in 1718 (Hyryč 2019; Hyryč 1996, 102–120). These books were not just invaluable historical artifacts and part of Ukraine's cultural heritage; they contained priceless historical knowledge and truths.

Following the destruction of historical sources – evidences of historical truth – Tsar Peter I decided to RENAME the Tsardom of Muscovy and proclaim it the RUSSIAN Empire in 1721. The name Rus′, Ruthenia, or Rosia (derived from Ῥωσία in Greek sources), which had long been associated with Ukraine, was annexed and appropriated by Muscovy. The empire sought to claim the identity and legacy of the subjugated state. French Slavist, senator, and politician Casimir Delamarre wrote in 1869: *"Living between Muscovy and Poland, the Ruthenians (Ukrainians), who were once exclusively referred to as 'Russes' and 'Russiens', were enslaved in the past century (the 18th c.) by the Muscovites. The conquering nation extended the name of the defeated people to itself to provide apparent justification for its rule over them. As a result, the terms 'Russes' and 'Muscovites' appear synonymous to us today, though they are entirely distinct for the historian"* (Delamarre 1869, 24).

Delamarre recognized the motive behind Muscovy's appropriation of the name 'Rus′' as an indication of the land and the ethnos of Ukraine: *"To claim apparent rights to rule over it,"* or, in other words, to falsely assert not only territorial claims but also dominion over the history and millennia-long cultural heritage of Ukraine-Rus′. Delamarre

also noted: *"...The Muscovites appropriated the name of the Ruthenians to grant themselves clear rights to rule over this people. This confusion allowed the Muscovites to conflate under a single common name Russians and Ruthenians (Ukrainians) — undoubtedly Slavs — with Muscovites, whose Slavic identity is more than dubious"* (Ibid).

This deliberate falsification was supported by the efforts of Peter I in the early 18th c. Similarly, this narrative continues to underpin modern Russian propaganda, as exemplified by the article *"On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians"*, published on the official website of the Russian president six months before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Putin 2021).

Medieval Ukrainian history is 'artificially stitched' to the history of Russia: appropriated achievements and figures of the history of Ukraine

Modern Russia developed around the Vladimir-Suzdal′ Principality, established by Kyiv princes in exile, and later the Muscovy Principality, which survived by submitting to the Golden Horde rather than resisting it. The Muscovite rulers sought and received a princely *jarlyk* (a patent of authority) from the khans of the Golden Horde, which granted them the status of regional governors under Mongol rule.

Muscovy did not emerge as a fully-fledged state until long after the Mongol domination, in the 14th–15th centuries (Hruševs′kyj 1904, 300).

A century ago, the prominent Ukrainian historian Mychajlo Hruševs′kyj convincingly proved that there was no shared heritage or 'common nationality' between the Ukrainian and Muscovite peoples. He wrote: *"The Kyivan state, its law, and its culture were the creation of a single nationality of Ukrainian-Rusian (Ruthenian). The Vladimir-Muscovite was created by another one"* (Ibid, 299).

Hruševs′kyj dismissed the theory of a 'united Rus′ nationality' as pure fabrication, referring to it as *'balamutstvo'* [2] (Ibid, 299, 302).

Modern Ukraine emerged from the Kyivan princely state: Kyiv was founded no later than the 6th century and flourished in the 10th–12th centuries. Kyiv as a city declined due to its courageous resistance to

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2 'balamutstvo' means *nonsense* or *deliberate confusion.*

the Mongol invasion and subjugation around 1240 but preserved the name Rus′ (Russia) for its people and the territory as evidenced by the map by Johannes Ruysch (c. 1507) mentioned above. After the Mongol invasion in 1240, the cultural and historical center of Rus′-Ruthenia shifted to the Halyč-Volhynian Principality (Western Ukraine): *"The Kyivan period transitioned not to the Vladimir-Muscovite period, but to the Halyč-Volhynian of the 13th century, and later to the Lithuanian-Polish of the 14th–16th centuries. The Vladimir-Muscovite state was neither the heir nor the successor of Kyiv"* (Ibid, 299).

Mychajlo Hruševs′kyj convincingly proved that the princely period of Ukrainian history was *'artificially stitched'* to the history of modern Russia and has since been presented by the ideologists of the 'Russian world' as their own history, a 'shared cradle.' However, this is not true. M. Hruševs′kyj wrote: *"The Kyivan rulers transplanted to the Moscovian lands forms of socio-political organization, law, and culture [including language–O.J.], developed through Kyiv's historical life, but this does not justify including the Kyivan state in the history of the Russian (Moscovian) nationality"* (Ibid).

The assertion of a shared origin – promoted by imperial propaganda – was a political tool designed to obscure the separate identities of Ukrainians and Russians and to justify claims of dominance over Ukraine's territory, people, culture and history.

Volodymyr the Great in the Ideological Framework of the 'Russian World'

The appropriation of the historical and cultural heritage of medieval Ukraine also includes Russia's claim over prominent figures and key actors in Ukrainian history. This is particularly evident in the case of Volodymyr the Great and his dynasty. The official website of the Russian Orthodox Church's online journal asserts: *"The Holy Equal-to-the-Apostles Prince Vladimir the Great is an exceptional, fateful, and cornerstone figure in Russian history. Through him, the Lord granted great happiness to Rus′ – the Orthodox faith. And the prince, having embraced Christ with all his heart, courageously led the peoples inhabiting ancient Rus′ to the light of God"* (Duchanin 2015). Bearing in mind that 'Rus′' is the old name for medieval princely Ukraine, the meaning of this passage

becomes clear: Volodymyr, a blessed figure for Ukraine who introduced Christianity to his Kyiv state, has become a stumbling block and a 'cornerstone' in constructing the ideological narrative of modern Russia's claims over Ukraine's heritage. The narrative falsely suggests that the 'peoples' inhabiting today's Russian Federation were part of ancient Rus′ (medieval Ukraine). But this is a longstanding falsification. Peoples to the north of the Kyiv state never constituted the kingdom of Rus′, nor did they even belong to it. They were merely its tributaries, with their lands functioning as dominions subordinate to medieval Ukraine and paying tribute to it. Even Novgorod and Vladimir-Suzdal′, one of the first principalities on the territory of Muscovy, were not considered part of Rus′. This is explicitly evidenced by chronicle sources (Hypatian Codex 1908, 329).

Russian Fake Regarding Volodymyr's Birthplace

Volodymyr the Great was born in the 950s or 960s in medieval Ukraine. From c. 980 to 1015, he ruled the state from its capital seat (or principal throne), Kyiv. All subsequent rulers of the Kyiv state were members of his dynasty. The first mention of Moscow – around which the modern Russian Federation eventually emerged – dates back to 1147. At that time, it was a newly founded settlement by descendants of princely Ukraine, located on far distant, remote territories subordinate to Kyiv. This is nearly 200 years *after* the birth of Volodymyr the Great, the baptizer of medieval Ukraine.

Chronicle Records: Budutyne

Two later chronicles mention the village of *Budutyne* as the birthplace of Volodymyr Svjatoslavyč and the residence of his mother, Maluša, who had been sent there by Princess Ol′ha, Volodymyr's grandmother. The *Nikon Chronicle* (1526/1530) states under the year 970: "*… and Volodymyr was born in the village of Budutyne, for Maluša had been sent there in anger by Ol′ha. This village belonged to her, and when she was dying, she gave it to the Holy Mother of God*" (Letopisnyj sbornik 'Chronicle collection' 2000, 35.).

While the location of Budutyne remains unclear from this excerpt, the chronicler indicates that it was part of Princess Ol′ha's estate. Before

her death, Olʹha donated the village to a monastery dedicated to the Mother of God. A similar account is found in the *Ustjug (Archangelogorodsʹkyj) Chronicle Compilation* (first half of the 16th century): "*… and Volodymyr was born in the village of Budutyne, for Olʹha had sent Maluša there in anger. This village belonged to her, and upon her death, Olʹha gave it to the Most Holy Mother of God*" (Ustjužskie i Vologodskie letopisi 'Ustjug and Vologda chronicles' 1982, 60).

To appropriate the figure of Volodymyr, Russian falsifiers of history 'relocated' the settlement where Volodymyr Svjatoslavyč was born to the territory of modern Russia – in the Pskov region, over a thousand kilometers from Kyiv. Since the 19th century, Russian historiography and the Russian Church have also baselessly linked these lands to the origins of Princess Olʹha, Volodymyr's grandmother (Rapov 1998, 165; Alexandrov 2001, 259; Boguševskij 1879, 17; Vasilʹjev 1898, 211; Bolchovitinov 1993, 38), ignoring the lack of evidences for such localization, as proven by Ukrainian scholars (Ryčka 2003, 118–123).

Thus, in the works of Russian historical falsifiers as early as the 18th century, we read: "*Volodymyr was born in Budjatino village near Pskov, which is why Olʹha, angry with Maluša, exiled her there*" (Ilʹinskij 790, 18). Unfortunately, even Russian clerics of the 19th century, known as church historians, perpetuated such false narratives. The Russian priest and Metropolitan Jevgenij Bolchovitinov, in his *History of the Pskov Principality*, also wrote about Volodymyr the Great and Princess Olʹha's birthplace as Pskov (Bolchovitinov 1831, 10). An entry in the famous *Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary* devoted to the chronicle's mention of *Budutyne* acknowledges the true reason for this historical falsification – Russian '*religious ambition*': "*Out of, so to speak, religious ambition, [Bolchovitinov] wished to see his region [Moscovia] as the birthplace of St. Volodymyr*" (Brockhaus-Jefron 1891, 854). The historic falsifiers claimed that the first prominent rulers of princely Rusʹ, canonized as Equal-to-the-Apostles saints and baptizers, 'had to be born not in Ukraine, but on Muscovite lands.' The author of the article in *Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary* admitted that Volodymyr could only have been born on the territory of medieval Ukraine, listing several likely toponyms – *Budyšče* in Poltava region, *Budyši* and

other similarly named villages near Zvenyhorodka and Čyhyryn in the Kyiv region (Ibid).

According to the Ukrainian scholar Jurij Dyba, Volodymyr Svjato-slavyč was born to Maluša in the Volynja (Volhynia) region, near the modern city of Novovolyns′k (Dyba 2012, 37). The scholar also locates the homeland of Ol′ha and Maluša in these lands (Dyba 2011, 23). Indeed, during the princely era, there existed a village called *Budjatyči* (22 km south of the modern day city of Volodymyr in Volhynia), which likely belonged to the holdings of the Drevljan Prince Mal, as well as the village of *Nyskynyči*. According to Jan Dlugosz's *Chronicle*, Prince Mal and his son Dobrynja bore the nickname '*Nyskynja*' or '*Niskynyč*' (Ioannis Dlugossi 1964, 121–123), which may have been connected to their residence and origin.

The ancient cultural development of these lands is supported by archaeological findings. A Roman denarius of Emperor Gordian III was discovered here (Antonovyč 1901, 61), and during O. Zlatohors′kyj's excavations in Budjatyči (2013), settlements from the Prague-Korčak culture of the early 6th century and the Old Rus′ period of the 9th–10th centuries were uncovered (Zlatohors′kyj 2014, 103–104).

In several publications, Jurij Dyba presented substantial arguments in favor of the Volhynian location of *Budjatyno*, where Volodymyr the Great was born (Dyba 2011, 23–28; Dyba 2012, 37–70; Dyba 2014, 484). However, some scholars view the claim as weakened by evidence suggesting that the Volhynian principality was only fully joined to the Kyiv state during the reign of Volodymyr the Great (Vojtovyč 1991, 10). Nevertheless, it is known that at the time of Volodymyr Svjatoslavyč's birth, these lands were already subordinate to Kyiv due to the conquests of his father, Svjatoslav. During Svjatoslav Ihorovyč's rule, the local tribal elite was dependent on the main throne of Kyiv, and only after Svjato-slav's death did they begin seeking support from the rulers of neighboring states (Kryp′′jakevyč 1984, 8). Volodymyr's 981 campaign ultimately solidified the incorporation of the territories of Nadsjannja and the interfluve of the Western Buh to the Kyiv state (Ibid).

According to another theory, Volodymyr was born near the modern city of *Bojarka* near Kyiv (formerly known as *Budajivka*, renamed in 1924). The existence of an ancient settlement in this area is evidenced

by a 1586 charter from Prince Kostjantyn Ostroz′kyj, which confirmed the donation of numerous lands near Kyiv to the local Cave Monastery (Kyiv-Pečers′k Lavra), described as extending *"to the rampart under the Budajivka settlement"* (Pochylevyč 2007, 23; Procenko 2017, 28).

The scholars believe that Ostroz′kyj′s charter validated the earlier charter by Andrij Boholjubs′kyj (in the 12th c.) regarding the transfer of the town of Vasyl′kiv and its surroundings to the Pečers′k Monastery (Zatyljuk 2008, 231–235; Procenko 2017, 28).

It is known that the center of Budajivka featured a castle site dating back to the time of the Kyivan princely state (Malyševskij 1881, 8; Kučera 1987, 21; Šendryk 1977, 70). This location is likely the chronicle-mentioned *Budutyne* referenced in historical sources. Researchers suggest that it belonged to Princess Ol′ha as her rural residence with fortified castle structures, and that pregnant Maluša could have been sent there to give birth to Volodymyr Svjatoslavyč.

The Chronicles state that the village was bequeathed by Ol′ha to the Church of the Holy Mother of God. The close connection between Budajivka and the Kyiv-Pečers′k Monastery is confirmed with the aforementioned charters by Kostjantyn Ostroz′kyj and Andrij Boholjubs′kyj. It is likely that during Ol′ha′s time there may have already been an unrecorded temple dedicated to the Holy Mother of God on these lands, which were granted to the church.

The authors of the multi-volume Russian dictionary of *Brockhaus and Efron* in the 19th century recognized that Volodymyr could only have been born in the territory of medieval Ukraine, most likely in the Kyiv region: "*According to the meaning of the record from the Nikon Chronicle, and later the Archangel′s′k Chronicle, the entire Budutyne village, the birthplace of St. Volodymyr, was located in the Kyiv area and before her death Ol′ha bequeathed this entire estate to the "Holy Mother of God" – a church, apparently, situated in Kyiv*" (Brockhaus-Jefron 1891, 854).

So, both locales of the birthplace of Volodymyr Svjatoslavyč are possible (in the central or western part of the medieval Kyiv state) and both belong to the territory of modern Ukraine.

Volodymyr the Great died in Kyiv and was buried in the Tithe Church in Kyiv. In 1635 the relics of Volodymyr were discovered during excavations of the Tithe Church. Metropolitan Petro Mohyla of Kyiv

transferred them to the Assumption (Dormition) Cathedral of the Kyiv-Pečers′k Lavra, a prominent Orthodox shrine in Kyiv, a necropolis of rulers of medieval Ukraine, as well as the saints and benefactors. This cathedral was the most famous pilgrimage site for all Christians of the Eastern Church.

'Great Church' (Assumption Cathedral) of Kyiv-Pečers′k Lavra. Paintingby V. Vereščagin, 1905

This masterpiece of Ukrainian medieval architecture, built in 1078, was blown up in 1941 at the beginning of the Second World War. For a long time, Russia tried to shift the blame for this crime to the German occupation authorities. However, according to research results, it has been proven that the order to destroy the Ukrainian shrine, along with the relics of saints and rulers of princely Ukraine, was given by Moscow (Heyer 2003, 287; Sebta 2016, 30).

The Assumption Cathedral of the Kyiv-Pečers'k Monastery, destroyed in 1941 by the Russians (Die zerstörte Uspenski-Kathedrale des Kiewer Höhlenklosters, foto 1942. Bundesarchiv). The relics of Volodymyr the Great were also kept here during a certain time

For all Orthodox believers, Kyiv was the 'second Jerusalem', about which pilgrims spoke with piety, as quoted by the 19th-century German traveler G.J. Kohl: "*It is always a holyday in Kyiv. Beautiful churches stand on high mountains, there are many ancient miraculous icons. There are always pilgrims going there and back. The city is continuously filled with the echo of bells …*" (Kohl 1844, 34). Almost all of Kyiv's medieval churches, along with the *'echo of their bells'*, were destroyed by the Russian authorities on orders from Moscow during the Soviet occupation of Ukraine. Most of the unique medieval temples, not only in Kyiv, but throughout Ukraine, churches with priceless artifacts of medieval art, with the burials of Kyiv princes, evidences of Ukrainian outstanding

history and culture that survived the Mongol invasion and many other wars fought over almost a thousand years, could not survive the Russian rule and were blown up. Besides Assumption of the Mother of God Cathedral at the Kyiv-Pečers′k Lavra, among the destroyed churches by Russians are the Golden-Domed St. Michael's Cathedral (built in 1108–1113), the Church of the Virgin Mary of Pyrohošča (built in 1132), St. Basil's Church (built in 1183) and many others (Tretjak 1998, 159; Kalnyc′kyj 2012, 224).

The removal of mosaics from the walls of St. Michael's Golden-Domed Cathedral (built by the Kyiv princes – descendants of Volodymyr the Great, in 1108–1013) before the demolition of the temple by Russians in 1937

And before being destroyed these churches were squeezed dry – their precious medieval mosaics were removed from walls and together with church utensils, icons and other treasures, were taken to Russia and are now exhibited at museums in Moscow and St. Petersburg (Asadčeva 2023).

So, among the great number of medieval churches in Kyiv, destroyed by orders from Moscow, was the majestic Assumption Cathedral of the Kyiv-Pečers′k Lavra. For centuries the relics of the ruler of the holy Equal-to-the-Apostles Prince Volodymyr the Great were kept there. The hypocritical Muscovites, who falsely claimed him as their own and revered him, instead destroyed the cathedral where St. Volodymyr was buried.

Mosaics and frescoes from the Kyiv St. Michael's Golden-Domed Monastery in the Tret'jakov Gallery in Moscow. Photo from open sources (Asadčeva 2023).

Russian Fakes on the Baptism of Volodymyr and His State

The main event associated with the name of Volodymyr the Great is the baptism of medieval Ukraine in 988. Ukraine began to celebrate the special holiday, Baptism Day, at the state level in 2008. Following Ukraine, the Russian Federation introduced this holiday in 2010.

The baptism of state by Volodymyr the Great in 988 took place in Kyiv and refers only to the history of Ukraine. Since ancient times, the lands of Ukraine have been a place where different religions and beliefs coexisted peacefully, shaping the religious tolerance of the local people. By 988, the inhabitants of Ukraine-Rus′ were well acquainted with Christianity. Christian churches existed in Kyiv and, probably, in other cities of medieval Ukraine even during the time of Prince Askold (first half of the 9th century); it is known that the prince was buried in the church in honor of St. Nicholas in Kyiv (Brajčevs′kyj 1988, 86) and Princess Ol′ha, grandmother of Volodymyr the Great, who was a Christian and visited Constantinople (957), her visit described by the emperor of the Byzantine Empire Constantine the Porphyrogenetos in his treatise *"The Book of Ceremonies"* (Constantine VII 1829, 594–598). According to a number of Greek sources, the Rusians (Ruthenian people), led by

a Prince named *Rus′* (some scholars understand him as *Askold*), were baptized during the time of Patriarch Photios in 860s (Patriarch Fotij 1895, 34; Brajčevs′kyj 2009, 74).

Christianity came to Ukrainian lands as far back as the Apostolic Age. According to the chronicles, Andrew the First-Called preached on the historic lands of modern Ukraine called Scythia in those times (Onac′kyj 1957, 32–34). These territories are also believed to have been a place of preaching for another apostle, Philip (Algermissen 1955, 10; Spilman 2017, 125). In 988, Volodymyr the Great, the ruler of the Kyiv state, formalized the process of Christianization recognizing Christianity as the state religion. In the subordinate outskirts to the north of the Kyiv state (for example, in Novgorod), which paid tribute to Kyiv, Christianization was introduced after 988 'by fire and sword' (Tatiščev 1994, 112–113). Paganism resisted for a long time in many remote regions under Kyiv's dominion.

There is a chronicle legend that Volodymyr the Great himself was baptized in Chersonesus in Crimea (now the occupied Ukrainian city of Sevastopol′). The desire to capture Crimea, including Sevastopol′-Chersonesus, was a subject of special importance for the authorities of the Russian Empire and, later, the Russian Federation. The chronicle account of Volodymyr's baptism imbued this place, and Crimea as a whole, with 'sacred' significance within the ideological framework of the 'Russian world': slogans like *"Crimea is ours"*, *"Sevastopol′ is ours"* and *"Volodymyr the Baptizer of Rus′ is ours"* are usual postulates of Russian propaganda, claimed by state authorities and Vladimir Putin himself (Vstreča V. Putina 'V. Putin's meeting' 2014).

In other words, this not only falsely legitimizes the appropriation of the historical legacy of Volodymyr the Great, and the historical event of Christianization, it is used to justify the illegal annexation of Crimea – Ukraine's sovereign territory. It is also an attempt to provide this annexation with a façade of religious justification, cloaked in a 'noble' spiritual meaning.

After the annexation of Ukrainian Crimea in 2014, Vladimir Putin declared Volodymyr the Great the '*founder of the one unified-united Russian nation and state*' (Putin emphasized 2015) meaning that Russians and Ukrainians are one nation. However, *no unified nation* existed

either in 988 or now: the Muscovite state emerged much later and developed on its own ethnic foundation, borrowing cultural achievements from the medieval Kyivan state. In the propagandistic narratives of the 'Russian world,' the figure of Volodymyr the Baptizer is proclaimed 'foundational,' a 'cornerstone' the removal of which would cause the entire unwieldy structure of their ideological construct to collapse.

The Monuments to Volodymyr the Great, the Ruler of the Kyiv State

A symbolic embodiment of Russia's historical falsifications are the numerous monuments to Volodymyr Svjatoslavyč erected across the Russian Federation. The majority – 7 out of 10 existing monuments in Russia – were constructed in the period between the annexation of Crimea (2014) and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (2022).

The first monument to Volodymyr Svjatoslavyč was installed in 1853 in Kyiv, the seat of the principal throne of the rulers of medieval Ukraine, on Volodymyr Hill. Subsequently, monuments to the ruler of the Kyiv state were erected in several other cities in Ukraine, including Volodymyr in Volhynia, a city founded by the prince and named in his honor (Tatiščev 1963, 64); in Korosten′, associated with the Drevljan Principality – the chronicle-recorded homeland of Prince Mal, Volodymyr the Great's maternal grandfather; in Ukrainian Sevastopol′ (Chersonesus), where, according to chronicle legends, Prince Volodymyr was personally baptized. Monuments to this medieval ruler also exist in other Ukrainian cities related to his life and actions. Additionally, statues of Volodymyr the Great have also been erected in cities like Toronto, Gdańsk, and London, thanks to the efforts of Ukrainian diasporas.

However, among all the monuments dedicated to the baptizer of the Kyiv state worldwide, the largest number are in Russia – a country that has *no* historical connection to this figure. For instance, in 1998, during the first decade after the collapse of the USSR, a monument to Volodymyr was erected in Belgorod, Russia. Totalitarian regimes often gravitate toward 'gigantomania', and here the Russian imperialists displayed their desire to appropriate Ukrainian history and Volodymyr's monument in Kyiv. Russian media boasted: "*The monument to Prince Volodymyr in Kyiv is 20 meters tall, which is 2.5 meters shorter than the*

monument in Belgorod. The figure of the prince in Kyiv is 4.4 meters tall, while the Belgorod figure is 7.5 meters" (Sights 1998). In 2003, a monument to Volodymyr was built in Novočeboksars′k (Čuvašija, Russia). On October 1, 2013, just before the invasion of Crimea and Ukraine's Eastern region, a monument to Volodymyr was erected in the distant Russian city of Astrachan′ (Monument to Prince Vladimir 2013).

After the occupation of Crimea and Donbas, Russia's 'monument propaganda' intensified. In 2015, a monument to Volodymyr was installed in Batajsk, Rostov Oblast, Russia. That same year, a similar monument was unveiled in Smolensk, with the personal participation of Moscow Patriarch Kirill. The official website of the Smolensk administration stated: *"The sculpture serves as a reminder to Smolensk residents and visitors of the baptism of Rus′ … Volodymyr is depicted with a cross in one hand and the other pointing toward the water (the Dnipro), as if inviting people to be baptized"* (Monument to Knjaz′ 2015). By referencing Smolensk's location on the banks of the Dnipro River, propagandists sought to further 'declare their rights' for the baptism of Rus′ and the figure of Volodymyr. However, it is well-documented that the people of the Kyiv state were baptized not in the Dnipro but in the local Kyiv river, Počajna (L′vovskaja 1910–1914, 80; Cholmogorskaja 1977, 28; Tatiščev 1963, 63).

In 2017, a 14-meter high monument to Volodymyr was erected in Stavropol′. In 2018, a monument to Volodymyr the Great was installed in occupied Donec′k. The separatists' press proudly noted: *"The monument was a gift from a patron from the Russian Federation"* (Gordo 2018). The 6.54-meter sculpture was intended to symbolize the power of the aggressor state and its concept of the 'Russian world'. That same year, monuments to the baptizer of the Kyiv state were also erected in Samara and Novosibirsk (3863 km from Kyiv). During the unveiling ceremony in Novosibirsk, the governor of the region declared: *"This is a reason for pride and a reminder to today's younger generations of the great history of our homeland"* (Pavlova 2018). This 'pride', rooted in the appropriation of another nation's territory, history, and historical figures, has always been a key component of the ideological construct of the 'Russian world'. However, historical truth makes it clear: the baptism of Volodymyr the Great in 988 took place in Kyiv and is an integral part of the history of medieval Ukraine – the Kyiv state.

The propaganda machine significantly intensified its efforts after the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbas in 2014. Seven of the ten monuments to Volodymyr the Great on the territory of the Russian Federation and occupied parts of Ukraine's Donbas were erected between 2015 and 2018, during the period between the initial occupation and the full-scale invasion.

Monuments to Volodymyr the Great and the years of their erection in Kyiv, occupied Donec'k, and cities of the Russian Federation. Infographic by Eva Jasynec'ka, 2024

The territory of Russia was methodically 'marked' with monuments to the Grand Prince of Kyiv, Volodymyr Svjatoslavyč, intended to assert claims of a 'shared heritage', 'shared baptism,' and 'shared nation.' This historical falsification reached its symbolic apex in 2016, when a monument to Volodymyr the Great was opened near the Kremlin in Moscow. Designed to compete with the Kyiv monument (erected in 1853), the Moscow statue was initially planned to be taller (24–25 meters), as a direct challenge to Kyiv's history and significance (Moscow to build its own monument 2015) Russian propagandists celebrated the monument opening with proud declarations such as: *"Prince Volodymyr is renouncing Kyiv"* (Novikov 2015).

However, something went wrong, and the final height of Moscow's monument was only 17 meters, though it still incorporated certain stylistic elements of the Kyiv original. Evgenij Ass, the monument's architect, noted the political intent behind the monument's design and its deliberate similarities to the Kyiv original: *"This is an absolutely political act. To put it bluntly, this is about transferring Kyiv to Moscow"* (Monument to Volodymyr 2015).

The official pretext for erecting the monument was the millennium of Volodymyr's death (1015). The unveiling of the monument was dedicated to Russia's National Unity Day (November 4). Such timing was no coincidence – the event aimed to symbolize a 'people's unity,' a fabricated unity between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, and through this, to assert Russia's claim over the cultural and historical heritage of medieval Ukraine.

Other 'Annexed' Members of Volodymyr the Great's Dynasty

In the arsenal of historical figures of medieval Ukraine 'appropriated' by the enemy are other members of the dynasty – descendants of Volodymyr the Great.

The 'Stolen' St. Mychajlo of Černihiv († 1246)

Mychajlo Prince of Perejaslav, Černihiv, and Grand Prince of Kyiv, was a participant in the internecine struggle for the Kyivan grand throne. In the face of the Mongol invasion, he unsuccessfully tried to secure support from other European kingdoms and create a coalition against the Mongols (Žylenko 2000, 22–28). He ruled the Kyivan throne (1238–1240) during the Mongol attack on Kyiv, which, according to scholars, made Mychajlo the main opponent of the Horde (Dimnik 1981, 134).

The Hustyn Chronicle under the year 1240 states: *"To Mychajlo Vsevolodovyč, who ruled in Kyiv, the godless Batu sent his commander (…) with flattery, urging him to bow to him; but Mychajlo, recognizing deceit, ordered Batu's envoys to be killed"* (Hustyns′kyj litopys 'Hustyn Chronicle' 1843, 339). Subsequently, as punishment for his resistance, the city was devastated and burned by Batu's numerous armies.

Northern princes from Novgorod, Vladimir and the Suzdal′ lands traditionally went to the Khan of the Horde to receive the permission to rule (a *jarlyk*). Mychajlo was summoned to the Horde's capital, where he was coerced to undergo the humiliating ritual of worshiping pagan idols. The prince refused, saying, *"It is unworthy for a Christian to do this,"* for which he was brutally killed by the Horde along with his loyal boyar Fedor (The texts and versions 1903, 47). Batu knew Mychajlo as a consistent opponent of Tatar domination. There are grounds to believe that Mychajlo knew that the visit could result in his death (Žylenko 2000,

22–28). These events were described by their witness – the Pope's legate, the Italian monk Plano de Carpini (The texts and versions 1903, 47).

The martyrs were canonized soon after their deaths. Their bravery and martyrdom became an example of self-sacrifice for the sake of dedication to Christ and Christian values, as well as devotion to their homeland in resisting invaders (Povest′ ob ubienii 'The story of the murder' 1980, 125–128). Historians wrote that the chronicle sources and hagiographic accounts about Mychajlo of Černihiv are *"imbued with the idea of the necessity to firmly stand for faith and the independence of the homeland"* (Lichačev 1987, 81).

The relics of Prince Mychajlo were brought to his native Černihiv, where they rested for several centuries in The Saviour (Spaskij) Cathedral (now The Saviour-Transfiguration Cathedral).

The Saviour-Transfiguration Cathedral (11th century, Černihiv, Ukraine). The relics of St. Mychajlo of Černihiv rested here from 1246 to 1578

In the 16th century, Černihiv was captured for several decades by the forces of the Moscow prince. In 1572, under the personal orders of the first Moscow ruler to bear the title of Tsar, Ivan IV the Terrible (Zubo-

reva 2010, 80–81), the relics of St. Mychajlo and Fedor were taken to Moscow (Žylenko 2000, 22–28). Ivan IV sought to grant his state fictitious 'rights' as the successor to the former glory of Rome, Byzantium, and the medieval Kyiv state. The theft of Ukrainian saints' relics became another episode in Moscow's wish to appropriate the religious and historical heritage of medieval Ukraine. Even today, the relics of this prince of Kyiv are kept in the Archangel Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin. Russian propagandists boast about the stolen Ukrainian relic as a sacred heritage of Russians, but in truth, this is nothing more than outright theft and the traditional plundering of Ukrainian history by Moscow.

Ingegerd of Sweden – the Attempt of Russian Re-naming and Appropriation

Another illustrious example of such historical falsification is the story related to the wife of Jaroslav the Wise (a son of Volodymyr the Great), Swedish Princess Ingegerd († 1051).

Ingegerd-Irene, daughter of the king of Sweden Olaf Skotkoning, was the wife of the *tsar* (Vysockij 1988, 120–134) of the Kyiv state Jaroslav the Wise, the ruler of medieval Ukraine. This marriage was arranged around 1019. The royal couple ruled the state for more than 30 years. During this period the state flourished, along with its culture, art, booklore and diplomacy. During the reign of Jaroslav and Ingegerd in Kyiv, many grandiose construction projects were carried out. St. Sophia Cathedral was completed, the Golden Gate with the Gate Church of the Annunciation, and the city fortifications were constructed. A scriptorium and a book-collection were established at the Sophia Cathedral. We believe that Ingegerd participated in all the deeds of her husband and in particular supported a convent founded by Jaroslav and Ingegerd-Irene, dedicated to her heavenly patron – Saint Irene.

Princess Ingegerd died in 1051, and her husband survived her by three years. She died in Kyiv and was buried in a marble sarcophagus at St. Sophia Cathedral. However, there is a later Russian fake (created by the Russian historian N. Karamzin in the 19th c.), which claimed that before her death Ingegerd-Irine went to faraway Novgorod (a city located in the modern Russian Federation, well over 1000 km from Kyiv) took monastic vows with a new name, Anna, and was buried not

in the Cathedral of St. Sophia but in Novgorod and is now venerated under the name St. Anna of Novgorod. However, many factors point to this claim as groundless (all the evidences are presented in my research Jasynec′ka 2022, 42–48; Jasynec′ka 2024, 157–162 to dispel this myth). These evidences are based on a solid foundation of sources and anthropological examinations carried out between 1936–2016. Despite this, Karamzin's falsification is still published even though his assertions are thoroughly refuted and debunked. Unfortunately, many modern Russian church figures still insist on a false version of the identity of Anna of Novgorod with Ingegerd-Irene. Numerous contemporary hagiographical stories about St. Anna of Novgorod erroneously promote such an interpretation. Articles by many contemporary scholars still seek to legitimize this version as well as many other myths and fakes in reference to the acting figures of Ukrainian medieval history.

My next example concerns one of the daughters of Ingegerd of Sweden and the ruler of the Kyiv state Jaroslav the Wise. Anna Jaroslavna, Kyiv Princess and the Queen of France († after 1075) married the French king Henry I of the Capetian Dynasty and became the ancestor of all the next kings of France. Her line of descendants can be traced up to the modern European monarchs. Russia is attempting 'to annex' Anna as well, in its usual brutal manner, employing historical fabrications and falsifications.

All Ukrainians remember the joint press conference of Putin and Macron in May of 2017, where the head of the Russian Federation called Princess Anna Jaroslavna of Kyiv a *Russian princess* (Macron reminded whose Anna 2017). Anna was the daughter of the ruler of the Kyiv state, Jaroslav the Wise, and in 1051 she became the queen of France, the wife of King Henry I. A monument dedicated to Anna was erected in the Abbey, founded by her in Senlis, France, and contains the inscription 'Anna of Kyiv – Queen of France'. Putin called Anna '*a Russian Princess*', although neither Moscow nor the Moscovian state existed at that time (the 11th c.).

Anna was born in Kyiv, was educated and grew up there. The French embassy came to Kyiv to ask for her hand in marriage to Henry I. On the walls of the Cathedral of St. Sophia of Kyiv, built by her parents, she left an autograph graffiti before leaving for France (Kornijenko

2014, 22–23; Jasynec′ka 2022, 66). However, unfortunately, this myth about the '*Russian Princess*'*,* like many others related to the history of Ukraine, is not only deeply rooted in Russian history books, but also widely spread in Western European perceptions. As a rule, only Russian narratives and interpretations of our history continue to dominate. Here is another example: just before the war, in January 2022, a several-months-long exhibition in the Moscow Kremlin was arranged. It was called (very imposing but inaccurately) – '*France and Russia. Ten Centuries Together*'. The information about this exhibition is still reflected on the Kremlin's official website France and Russia in 2022). It is unfortunate that the enemy once again misleads the world, claiming its diplomatic relations with France began in the 11th c., when in reality the relations started in the 18th c., the period of Peter I.

The exhibition was opened with unique medieval documents, a charter (or diploma) of the French royal court with the authentic signature of Queen Anna Jaroslavna, as well as the famous Reims Gospel, a part of the rich dowry of the Kyiv princess.

In the official media promotional materials for this exhibition, it was emphasized that *"the name of the princess Anna Jaroslavna turned out to be in demand in the political confrontation that unfolded between Russia and Ukrainian nationalists"* (Haškov 2021). The propagandists emphasize the confrontation over the Ukrainian historical heritage is not even between Russia and Ukraine, but between Russia and '*Ukrainian nationalists*'. So, when we defend our legal rights to truth, historical heritage, to the right to be ourselves – a nation with our own heroes and values, with our own culture and history, then we are declared as nationalists and, even more – Nazis.

It is a pity that famous European institutions sometimes perpetuate these falsifications. Among the organizers of the abovementioned exhibition there were leading European museums: Museum of Victoria and Albert (London), the Museum and National Estate of Versailles and the Trianon, The Château de Malmaison National Museum, the National Library of France, the Municipal Library of Reims, and others. Ukrainian museums appealed to these French institutions asking for the right to exhibit these documents in Ukraine, which are very important for Ukrainian history, but we were refused. The Cyrillic part

of the Reims Gospel was created in Kyiv in the scriptorium of the Kyiv Prince Jaroslav (Anna's father), brought to France from Kyiv by the Kyiv princess, and it is strange that permission for its exhibition was obtained by Russia, but not by Ukraine.

Our modern enemy is our age-old enemy. This is how he has been acting for centuries on our lands – looting, robbing, and destroying. During this current war hundreds of Ukrainian archives, libraries, and museums have been destroyed and looted – in particular, unique exhibits of Scythian gold were stolen from the Melitopol Museum. This pattern is not new: in previous centuries, all the most significant archaeological artifacts discovered on Ukrainian territory were taken to Moscow. Traditionally, the leaders of the Russian Empire and modern-day Russia have played a direct and active role in the process of historical falsifications (Ivan the Terrible, Peter I, Catherine II, Vladimir Putin).

VOLOdymyr or VLADImir?

The walls of St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv, founded by Volodymyr the Great in the early 11th century, bear graffiti with the *Ukrainian* version of the name – *Volodymyr*. This not only testifies to the ancient history and culture of Ukraine but also to the antiquity of its language, which our enemy has labeled a *'local dialect of the Great Russian language'* or *'incorrect Russian, deformed by Polish influence'*. The originality of this language is, among other evidence, proven by the graffiti on the walls of St. Sophia Cathedral. The enemy sought to destroy this temple-document as well, but it miraculously survived.

The frame from video lecture-presentation by V. Kornijenko "Ukrainian language in graffiti of St. Sophia of Kyiv" (Ukrainian language 2022)

The historical figure of Volodymyr the Great, the founder of the St. Sophia Cathedral, holds immense significance in this battle for our true history and identity. Ironically, the leaders of the two warring nations – the aggressor state and the victim state – both bear a name derived from the great ruler of the medieval Ukrainian state: Volodymyr (Ukrainian) and Vladimir (Russian). Another layer of irony lies in the dual meaning of the name 'Volodymyr.' The first part, *'volod-'* or *'vlad-'*, means *'to rule, to have power over smth'* while the second part, *'myr'*, means 'peace' in the Ukrainian language. The word *'mir'* in the Russian language has two meanings: *'peace'* and *'world.'*

To have power over 'peace' or over the 'world'?

Ukraine strives for just PEACE, its sovereign borders, its sovereign democratic governance, and its right to choose – to live in a democratic Europe with respect for the laws of the civilized world and the dignity of every individual. Russia, on the other hand, respects no laws and dreams of destroying Ukraine as a state. The essence of all its pseudo-historical narratives is this: Ukraine never existed, and therefore it should not exist in the future. However, Ukraine is not the only target of the Kremlin's 'appetite'; its ultimate goal is global domination. 'To rule the WORLD' is the primary aspiration of the Kremlin's leader, who has transformed from *Vladimir* into *Voldemort* – a symbol of darkness, a being that brings death and destruction to everything it cannot conquer and subordinate.

In 2016, during the Russian Geographical Society awards ceremony, Russian President Putin asked one of the child nominees: "*Where do Russia's borders end?*" When the boy answered, "*Russia's borders end across the Bering Strait with the USA*", Putin replied, *"Russia's borders end nowhere"* (Putin: Russia's borders 2016). This clearly shows that the aggressor's ambitions extend far beyond Ukraine; the ultimate goal of Russia is world domination. This notion is repeatedly echoed by Russian propaganda, voiced through its fanatical propagandists, including representatives of the church and cultural sectors. For instance, on October 24, 2024, the so-called 'Congress of Russian Orthodox Patriots 'Car'grad" took place in Moscow's Kremlin, held in the Assembly Hall of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior (!). From the elevated podium, one of the propagandists declared: *"And we shall find no rest until Russia*

establishes its protectorate over the entire planet" (There will be no peace for us 2024). This statement was met with thunderous applause from the audience. And these gatherings should not be dismissed as the harmless whims of deranged chatterers. These are killers who crave more blood – either to subjugate the world or to destroy everything that refuses to be conquered.

Monuments to Volodymyr the Great in Kyiv (1853) and Moscow (2016):

"Two Worlds Apart"

Kyiv – the heart of modern and medieval Ukraine, a city that 'witnessed' Volodymyr the Great, his reign, his deeds, and his dynasty. When you carefully examine the monument to Volodymyr the Great erected in Kyiv and compare it with the monument to Volodymyr in Moscow (a city whose founding is recorded 200 years after the birth of Volodymyr the Great, a place he had never visited and could not have, you will notice striking differences.

Volodymyr the Great, Monuments in Kyiv, 1853 (Monument to Volodymyr the Great 2021)

Setting aside the artistic features of the monuments, a significant peculiarity is the object held in Volodymyr's left hand. Kyiv's Volodymyr holds the Monomach's Cap[3], an embodiment of a king's crown, the authority of a ruler, and secular power. Volodymyr lowers his crown, symbolizing the submission of earthly power to the authority of Christ, the Heavenly King symbolically represented by the cross in his right hand, raised above his head.

The Moscow's Vladimir, however, in his left hand holds … a sword – a symbol of war and bloodshed: this is the message to the lands and peoples: "Fear us! Moscow's borders *end nowhere*!" By parading stolen historical symbols on its banners, the 'Russian world' brazenly declares: *"We will come to your lands and subjugate your peoples and cities, or destroy everything we cannot conquer"*. This encapsulates the meaning of Russia's war against Ukraine and the essence of Russian ideology – to subjugate us, falsify our history in order to justify our destruction, and then move on to dreams of global domination.

Vladimir (Volodymyr) the Great, Monuments in Moscow (2016)[4]

3 'Monomach's cap' is another Russian fake. Later Moscow princes did indeed wear caps modeled after the khans of the Horde. But the Kyiv rulers wore real crowns, like imperial Byzantine rulers, which is evidenced, in particular, on the coins of Volodymyr the Great during his lifetime and the frescoes of St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv. Although this is another Russian fake, here the 'Monomach's cap' is just a symbol of a crown.
4 Open internet sources

Unfortunately, the world's tepid response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine reveals its weakness in the eyes of the aggressor and emboldens it. Allowing a bloodthirsty predator to devour a defenseless victim only whets its appetite and enlarges its insatiable maw. A predator that tastes its victim's blood becomes obsessed with seeking the blood of its next prey. Ukraine, at the cost of the lives and blood of its finest people, is desperately holding back this predator in front of the entire world.

The enemy understands the strategic importance of history – on occupied Ukrainian territories, the first Russian priority is to remove history textbooks and replace them with Russian ones, accompanied by propagandist teachers. Where the enemy could not steal, seize, or appropriate our history, it simply destroyed it – just as it is wiping defiant Ukrainian cities and villages off the map in this war. For the enemy, to claim Kyiv, medieval Ukraine-Rus′, Volodymyr the Great, and other prominent Ukrainian historical figures, means to secure the ultimate legitimization of its false name and fabricated history. Most importantly, through such falsification, it seeks to justify its military aggression, legitimizing its claim to Ukrainian cultural and historical heritage, Ukrainian land, and the Ukrainian nation.

The cultivation of historical falsehoods by the Russians has been ongoing for centuries, and the results of these efforts are now painfully evident. For Ukraine, this is a long-term war over history, an integral part of our Ukrainian identity, which has now erupted into the hottest phase. Like an infected abscess that has burst, this moment provides a chance to cleanse the organism of the disease. This is a deadly illness – we will either recover from this attack or perish because of it. There is no third option; no chronic condition can persist any longer. This is an existential war: a battle of life against death, truth against lies. The enemy, like every criminal, brutally seeks to destroy Ukrainians as witnesses and bearers of historical truth.

Thus, the task for all Ukrainian historians today is to 'keep their weapon ready', strengthen the scientific front line, and fight to separate the grains of truth from the chaff of lies and fabrications. We must shed light on our true history to defend the sovereign territory of our heritage and identity.

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RELIGIOUS CODES AND SYMBOLS OF THE "RUSSIAN WORLD" IN THE MODERN RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

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The research highlights the development of the concept of the "Russian world" within the religious discourse of Orthodox Russia. The focus is on the ideological slogans employed by Patriarch Kirill Gundjajev of Moscow in his sermons and public speeches. The study emphasizes claims of Russia's spiritual uniqueness in contrast to the West, which aligns with the annexationist geopolitical policies of Vladimir Putin. The article provides examples of falsification of historical facts in both religious and political spheres to create a strong propaganda narrative during the Russian-Ukrainian war. Patriarch Kirill portrays Russia, as well as its enclave Kaliningrad, as a stronghold of Orthodox civilization. The issue of sacred architecture and prayer spaces plays an important role, with the patriarch using these elements to highlight the differences in worldviews among representatives of various Christian denominations. Special attention is given to his statements on an interconfessional dialogue and the creation of a "united front" with Muslims to defend Russia from its enemies.

Key words: Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, "Russian world", Russian-Ukrainian war, sacred architecture, interreligious dialogue, religious wars, propaganda.

РЕЛІГІЙНІ КОДИ ТА СИМВОЛИ "РУССКОГО МІРА" В СУЧАСНІЙ РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКІЙ ВІЙНІ

Олександр Лук'яненко

Дослідження висвітлює розвиток концепції "русского міра" в релігійному дискурсі православної Русі. У центрі уваги – ідеологічні гасла, які використовує у своїх проповідях і публічних виступах Патріарх Московський Кирило Гундяєв. Дослідження підкреслює твердження про духовну унікальність Росії на відміну від Заходу, який узгоджується з геополітичною політикою анексії Володимира

Путіна. У статті наводяться приклади фальсифікації історичних фактів як у релігійній, так і в політичній сферах для створення потужного пропагандистського наративу під час російсько-української війни. Патріарх Кирило зображує Росію, а також її анклав Калінінград як оплот православної цивілізації. Важливу роль відіграє питання сакральної архітектури та молитовних просторів, за допомогою яких патріарх підкреслює різницю у світогляді представників різних християнських конфесій. Особливу увагу приділено його заявам про міжконфесійний діалог і створення "єдиного фронту" з мусульманами для захисту Росії від ворогів.

Ключові слова: Російська Православна Церква, Патріарх Кирило, "русскій мір", російсько-українська війна, сакральна архітектура, міжрелігійний діалог, релігійні війни, пропаганда.

Spirituality has been a part of the socio-cultural life of mankind since its emergence from other forms of social consciousness, directly or indirectly influencing the everyday life of people even during the time of pre-religious beliefs. The function of religion in society includes, among other things, the rallying of the masses around one idea – often distanced from the religion itself, but significant for the state, within the borders of which religion builds its organization. In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which has been ongoing since 2014 and entered a new, much broader stage on February 24, 2022, the role of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is one of the key factors. As Mark R. Elliot states, with the unfolding of this war, Russia's patriarch and president are straying now into an ever-tighter bond in all foreign and domestic activities (Elliot 2022, 32). In this research, attention is paid to the analysis of the worldview paradigm broadcast by Patriarch Kirill (Gundjajev) during the first seven months of the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of the territory of sovereign Ukraine (the two main components are the ideas of unity and inferiority). His sermons and addresses are reminiscent of political agitations of the era of advanced socialism, where instead of references to the works of Lenin and Brežnev, quotations from the Holy Scriptures are selectively placed and interpreted arbitrarily.

The Beginning

All of the messages that continue to be heard during the aggression have their roots in the "Appeal to the higher clergy and priests, monks, and all the faithful of the Russian Orthodox Church" dated from February 24, 2022. In these messages, the patriarch did not express a clear standpoint on the war while vaguely supporting the thesis of Vladimir Putin's speech that preceded the open aggression of Russia against its neighbour Ukraine (Obraščenie Svjatejšego Patriarcha Kirilla k archipastyrjam, pastyrjam, monašestvujuščim i vsem vernym čadam Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Cerkvi 24 fevralja 2022 goda 'Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill to the archpriests, pastors, monastics and all faithful children of the Russian Orthodox Church on February 24, 2022' 2022). On the one hand, the vocabulary of the appeal set the tone for an empathetic attitude towards the suffering of Ukrainians: "With deep and heartfelt pain I perceive the suffering of people caused by the events taking place" and "I deeply sympathize with all those affected by the misfortune".

On the other hand, he did not call things by their names – war was never recognized as war, murders as murders and occupation as occupation. Instead, neutral phrases such as "events taking place", "parties of the conflict", and "overcoming divisions and contradictions" were used.

Kirill Gundjajev continued to assert the line of the President of the Russian Federation regarding non-recognition of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian people, the assertion of their inferiority and secondary role, a derivative role from Great Russia. This can be seen in the preamble of the address, where Kirill traditionally calls himself the patriarch of "all Rus'" and the head of the church whose congregations are located in Russia, Ukraine, and other countries. He does this while not recognizing the granting of the tomos to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine by the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, indirectly refuting the idea of the self-government of the Ukrainian Orthodox churches under the authority of Metropolitan Onufrij. The same idea of unity is raised several more times down the line (Luk″janenko 2023a, 17).

In his second appeal, the Patriarch talks about "common centuries-old history" of Ukraine and Russia, which should serve as a cementing element in the relations between the two states. Textbook examples of Moscow's encroachment on Rus″s heritage are being put

forward again. Among them, the baptism of Rus′ by the Holy Equal-to-the-Apostles Prince Volodymyr is mentioned. It was this "baptismal" concept in 2014 that was part of the ideological justification of the annexation of Crimea – the place of baptism for Prince Volodymyr in Korsun′, which was supposed to belong to "true Rus′".

In his third address, the idea of a single and indivisible "Russian world", which was supposed to appear during Putin's march to the west, was veiled in the call for "the complete entirety of the Russian Orthodox Church to offer a pure, fervent prayer for the speedy restoration of peace". By "complete" he means a third of the parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church on the territory of Ukraine, who should offer fervent prayers for peace by Moscow's terms.

At the first glance, the last implied message about the unity of all is a neutral call for prayer and unity: "May the All-Merciful Lord, through the intercession of the Most Pure Mother of God and all the saints, preserve the Russian, Ukrainian, and other peoples who are spiritually united by our Church!". However, the very last words about the unification of peoples are a part of the concept of the "Russian world"—immaterial in essence, the boundaries of which are fixed first of all by language and faith, and only then by military presence and the demarcation of forcibly broken borders. These theses form the basis of the "new concept of salvation" through the "liberation" of Ukraine by the occupying forces.

"The Unity of Folks"

The idea of a "united folk" is articulated most clearly by the patriarch. In his appeals, even established terminology of "historical Rus′" emerges. This is what replaced the Soviet concept of "Ancient Rus," which should have worked in favour of the same theory of a single cradle of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian peoples. The use of this name made it possible to avoid the appeal to Kyivan Rus′, which would emphasize the secondary nature of Muscovy and other principalities. A similar function is performed by the newest formula of "historical Rus′" in the sermons of the Moscow patriarch.

In a funeral at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior on the fourth day of the full-scale war, which coincided with the Orthodox Sunday of the

Last Judgment, the idea of the monolithic nature of "fraternal nations" was proposed (Slovo Svjatejšego Patriarcha Kirilla v Nedelju o Strašnom Sude posle Liturgii v Chrame Christa Spasitelja 27 fevralja 2022 goda 'Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill on Last Judgment Sunday after the Liturgy in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior on February 27, 2022' 2022). Nameless catalysts of the confrontation were perceived as faceless "evil forces," the goal of which was the eternal destruction of "united Rus'": "God forbid that the current political situation in our close brotherly Ukraine would be oriented towards the evil forces that have always fought against the unity of Rus' and the Russian Church, won. God forbid that between Russia and Ukraine there would be a terrible border stained with the blood of brothers. We should pray for the restoration of peace, for the restoration of good fraternal relations between our peoples" (Slovo Svjatejšego Patriarcha Kirilla v Nedelju o Strašnom Sude posle Liturgii v Chrame Christa Spasitelja 27 fevralja 2022 goda 'Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill on Last Judgment Sunday after the Liturgy in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior on February 27, 2022' 2022).

International and Domestic in the Spiritual War

The Patriarch draws attention to the position of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, emphasizing its canonical affiliation to the Moscow Patriarchate, which could not help but fuel the war in Ukraine by bringing up the claims to the canonical territory of this state. As a matter of fact, since 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and occupied the East, the UOC itself has tried to avoid direct mention of its "Moscowness," removing it from documents and plaques on churches. Instead, Patriarch Kirill caused a public uproar, showing his "fatherly concern" for Ukrainian believers and their pastors: "Today we also need unity – unity with our brothers and sisters in Ukraine. We know what difficult circumstances the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is currently in. I especially prayed today for His Beatitude the Primate and, of course, for the entire episcopate and for all believers of Ukraine; and I also call you to these prayers" (Slovo Svjatejšego Patriarcha Kirilla v Nedelju o Strašnom Sude posle Liturgii v Chrame Christa Spasitelja 27 fevralja 2022 goda 'Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill on Last Judgment Sunday after the Liturgy in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior on February 27, 2022' 2022).

Orthodoxy itself, as in the days of the Russian Empire, once again becomes a means of cementing nations in opposition to impersonal "insidious" evil – "dark", "hostile," and "external". A religious analogue of Putin's "collective West" is being formed. It is presented not only as a military confrontation, but also as a religious endeavor, in which representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church take part. Of course, in Kirill's opinion, they are doing this from a positionof unity with Moscow: "We cannot allow dark and hostile external forces to laugh at us, we must do everything to preserve peace between our peoples and at the same time protect our common historical Motherland from all actions from the outside, which can destroy this unity. Today there is a special prayer for the Most Blessed Onufrij, for our Church and for our pious children" (Slovo Svjatejšego Patriarcha Kirilla v Nedelju o Strašnom Sude posle Liturgii v Chrame Christa Spasitelja 27 fevralja 2022 goda 'Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill on Last Judgment Sunday after the Liturgy in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior on February 27, 2022' 2022).

The "Russian world", which until then worked more or less veiled, poked its tentacles out from under the priest's gown openly, because the patriarch speaks of the existence of not only a single spiritual, socio-cultural, but also a common geographical space. Thus, the attack on Ukraine by its northern neighbour increasingly acquires the features of a "princely feud": "The guarantee of this brotherhood is our single Orthodox Church, which is represented in Ukraine by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, headed by His Beatitude Onufrij. We also prayed for them today. For the Lord to give them the strength and wisdom to repel, like Patriarch Tichon, the attacks of the evil one and at the same time to serve their people with faith and truth, including in every way contributing to peace. May the Lord keep our Church in unity. May the Lord protect the nations that are part of the single space of the Russian Orthodox Church from internecine struggle" (Slovo Svjatejšego Patriarcha Kirilla v Nedelju o Strašnom Sude posle Liturgii v Chrame Christa Spasitelja 27 fevralja 2022 goda 'Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill on Last Judgment Sunday after the Liturgy in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior on February 27, 2022' 2022).

"Historical Rus'"

Juggling terms and replacing concepts require reference to authorities. An experienced ideologue, Patriarch Kirill perfectly understands this during his public speeches. That is why he resorts to quoting chronicle sources in the corresponding imperial interpretation: "May the Lord protect the Rus′ land. When I say «Rus′», I am using an ancient saying from «The Tale of Timeless Years» – «Where did the Rus′ land come from?». The land that now includes Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and other tribes and peoples. May the Lord protect the Rus′ land from external enemies, from internal troubles, so that the unity of our Church may be strengthened, and that, by God's grace, all temptations, attachments, and provocations may recede, and that our pious people in Ukraine may enjoy peace and tranquility" (Slovo Svjatejšego Patriarcha Kirilla v Nedelju o Strašnom Sude posle Liturgii v Chrame Christa Spasitelja 27 fevralja 2022 goda 'Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill on Last Judgment Sunday after the Liturgy in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior on February 27, 2022' 2022).

The policy of erasing national borders with the help of religious instruments intensified on March 3, 2022, when, after the patriarch's call to "raise a pure, fervent prayer for the speedy restoration of peace", the Moscow Patriarchate's head of public affairs, Metropolitan Dionysius, sent a circular letter to all diocesan reverends with the text of the prayer to be read together during the Divine Liturgy (Svjatejšij Patriarch Kirill blagoslovil vo vsech jeparchijach Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Cerkvi sovershat′ molitvu o vosstanovlenii mira 3 marta 2022 goda 'His Holiness Patriarch Kirill blessed all dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church to pray for the restoration of peace on March 3, 2022' 2022).

The analysis of the text of the prayer for the restoration of peace based on the traditional Christian worldview shows the formation of a common spiritual space. It is formed through the appropriation of the ecclesiastical and historical past of the times of Kyivan Rus′ (the state baptism of Grand Prince Volodymyr, the actual baptism of Princess Ol′ha, and the activities of Iov of Počajiv), an appeal to the ascetic and tragic imperial and totalitarian heritage (Sergius of Radonež, Seraphim of Sarov, the new martyrdom): "Many-merciful Lord, Jesus Christ, our God, through the prayers of the All-Holy Mistress of our Mother

of God and the Blessed Virgin Mary, the holy Equal-to-the-Apostles Grand Prince Volodymyr and the Grand Princess Olʹha, the holy New Martyrs and confessors of our Church, the Venerable Sergius, the Abbot of Radonež, Iov of Počajiv, Seraphim of Sarov and all the saints, make our prayer favorable for the Church and for all Your people. We, Your children, have received grace from the only font of Baptism, which was for the holy Prince Volodymyr, establish the spirit of brotherly love and peace in our hearts forever!" (Cirkuljarnoe pisʹmo 'Circular letter' 2022).

The high-spirited urge and prayer for the suffering, wounded, and destitute in combat are complemented by ambiguous appeals to the Transcendent Being to punish and destroy foreign tribes that rose against the "Holy Rusʹ". Accordingly, a request is formed to strengthen the government in its decisions, and the soldiers in righteousness. We consider it self-explanatory which authority and whose soldiers this religious formula suggests to beg from God. The only question that remains is which "foreign languages" the spiritual labor of the believers of the Moscow Patriarchate should be directed against: "As for the foreign languages that want to be attacked and appeared in Holy Rusʹ, there are prohibitions and plans to overthrow them. By Your grace, lead the power that holds to all good, confirm the soldiers in Your commandments" (Cirkuljarnoe pisʹmo 'Circular letter' 2022).

These prayers for unity become similar to sessions of self-condemnation about the rigidity of such spiritual and political unity of the Russian Orthodox Church with its branch in Ukraine, given the fact that some Ukrainian dioceses stopped commemorating the Moscow Patriarch during divine services. Consequently, they received a reaction from Moscow for this. Thus, after stopping the commemoration of the "Patriarch of Moscow and All Rusʹ" during divine services in the Sumy Diocese, Metropolitan Jevlohij of Sumy and Ochtyrka received a nearly direct hint of schism, as well as "fascism", which russian propaganda actively promoted as a pretext for an attack. In the patriarch's resolution, an odious example from the church history of the Third Reich was given: "I would like to give an example of Prot. Hrihorij Prozorov, who did not stop commemorating the name of the Metropolitan Serhij, doing so until 1942, that is, before his arrest and death, worshiping in the only church of the MP in Berlin during the war. Stopping the

commemoration of the Head of the Church not because of doctrinal or canonical errors or mistakes, but because of inconsistency with certain political views and preferences, is a schism for which everyone who commits it will answer before God and not only in the future, but also in the present (Rezoljucija Svjatejšego Patriarcha 'Resolution of His Holiness the Patriarch' 2022).

The public speech of the head of the church on the Feast of the Nativity of the Most Holy Theotokos in the Začat′jevskij Stauropygian Monastery of Moscow on September 21, 2022, revolved around the topic of "historical Rus′" (Slovo Svjatejšego Patriarcha Kirilla v prazdnik Roždestva Presvjatoj Bogorodicy posle Liturgii v Začat′jevskom stavropigial′nom monastyre g. Moskvy 21 sentjabrja 2022 goda 'The speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill on the Holyday of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary after the Liturgy in the Conception Stauropygial Monastery in Moscow, September 21, 2022' 2022). Appealing to the history of the chronicled battle at the Kulikovo field in 1380, the patriarch emphasizes: "Our motherland, Rus′, historical Rus′ is going through difficult trials. Accordingly, the collective name «historical Rus′» is appropriated by the Russian people not only in the plane of history, but also in the space of modern geopolitics, blurring the existing borders between independent states. Moreover, the sermon deprives Ukraine of the right to any legacy of the ancient past, which is explained by an influence from outside, designed to destroy the common Russian identity: We know what is happening in Ukraine. We know what danger looms over the Ukrainian people, who are trying to reform, to make a state hostile to Rus′, hostile to Russia" (Slovo Svjatejšego Patriarcha Kirilla v prazdnik Roždestva Presvjatoj Bogorodicy posle Liturgii v Začat′jevskom stavropigial′nom monastyre g. Moskvy 21 sentjabrja 2022 goda 'The speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill on the Holyday of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary after the Liturgy in the Conception Stauropygial Monastery in Moscow, September 21, 2022' 2022).

War versus Infighting

A mixture of religious morality and political agenda is typical for sermons that are influenced by propaganda. The patriarch successfully manipulates the feelings of believers. He starts with calling for mercy

and forgiveness, the absence of hatred towards Ukrainians, but in the following phrases he claims there is "a lack of grace" among the neighboring peoples, explaining the need for purges and expressing the wish to revive sacred "fraternal unity" by force. Asking not to call Ukrainians enemies, a moment later he speaks about the enemy's plans to destroy the only Orthodox religious organization: "It is very important that our hearts do not have the feeling that there is an enemy. We should pray today that the Lord would strengthen the fraternal feelings of the peoples of Holy Rus′, so that the unity of our Church, which is really the guarantee of peace on the territory of Rus′, would become even stronger and stronger – why did the collapse of our country begin with attempts to break up the Church, create schisms and divisions. The enemy knew that he must strike into this point" (Slovo Svjatejšego Patriarcha Kirilla v prazdnik Roždestva Presvjatoj Bogorodicy posle Liturgii v Začat′jevskom stavropigial′nom monastyre g. Moskvy 21 sentjabrja 2022 goda 'The speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill on the Holyday of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary after the Liturgy in the Conception Stauropygial Monastery in Moscow, September 21, 2022' 2022).

Here the question of the existence of the canonical Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the counterbalance of the UOC, which in May 2022 declared its separation from Moscow, cannot be ignored. As always, only negative adjectives are chosen for the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, perceiving it as a threat. Instead, the institution managed by Metropolitan Onufrij, [namely the Ukrainian Orthodox Church which used to be subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate] is interpreted as the only banner of peace in the spiritual world: "And although we have suffered losses and a dangerous, sinful and merciless schism has arisen in Ukraine, at the same time, the Orthodox faith is preserved there, and our brothers and sisters, arch pastors and shepherds are united and, I believe, together with us continue to pray around the throne of God and for the cessation of internecine hostilities, and the restoration of peace on the territory of historical Rus′" (Slovo Svjatejšego Patriarcha Kirilla v prazdnik Roždestva Presvjatoj Bogorodicy posle Liturgii v Začat′jevskom stavropigial′nom monastyre g. Moskvy 21 sentjabrja 2022 goda 'The speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill on the Holyday

of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary after the Liturgy in the Conception Stauropygial Monastery in Moscow, September 21, 2022' 2022).

Let us emphasize that Russia's war against Ukraine itself (we may even use the term "special military operation", as it is called in Russia) is not referred to in the sermons as anything other than civil strife, which further confirms the existence of a distorted world map without political borders, which were established in Eurasia after 1991. Another term – "Holy Rus'" – often used by churchmen along with the concept of "historical Rus'" proves this point. They are identical in essence because they denote Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus politically. The difference is that the second concept not only establishes the political power of the Kremlin over these territories, but also the divine power ("The Land of the Virgin") with its earthly center in Moscow in the minds of the faithful in the Russian Orthodox Church. The formation of the image of a "united peoples" is indoctrinated by the appeal to worship of the same saints in the Eurasian space.

Considering the fact that the war is not called a war, it is understandable to wish to create the prospect of ending this "conflict" without excessive casualties (official Russian statistics give 10 times lower numbers of their own losses than the Ukrainian services). So, the logic of striving for peace and well-being without losses within the framework of the myth of the "invincible army" is completely understandable. Only the formula of "victory" that the patriarch asks for is inexplicable. Whose victory is it – Russian? Ukrainian? "Orthodox"? "That's why today we pray to the Lord again and again that He reconciles Rus', stops internecine hostilities, so that Holy Rus' is reunited–in the sense that no disputes and divisions torment the heirs of the one and only Holy Rus'. And today, when we remember the victory of our people in the Battle of Kulikovo, we ask that without special battles and bloodshed, a real victory would come, which would give us back spiritual unity, peace, well-being, and mutual love. Let the Protection of the Queen of Heaven extend over Her lot – over Holy Rus'. May the holy saints of God, who are equally glorified and revered in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and other parts of historical Rus', pray today for us, the unworthy, and arm us with the right thoughts, the right words, but, most importantly, with righteous deeds through which we could bring peace and prosperity to

the land of Holy Rus'" (Slovo Svjatejšego Patriarcha Kirilla v prazdnik Roždestva Presvjatoj Bogorodicy posle Liturgii v Začat'jevskom stavropigial'nom monastyre g. Moskvy 21 sentjabrja 2022 goda 'The speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill on the Holyday of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary after the Liturgy in the Conception Stauropygial Monastery in Moscow, September 21, 2022' 2022).

"The Inferiority of Kyiv"

The affirmation of the unity of peoples in the system of the "Russian Orthodox propaganda" is consistent with their assertion of the inferiority of Kyiv, despite its historical role. A vivid example is the patriarch's speech on the memoral day of Saint Peter, Metropolitan of Kyiv, Moscow and All Rus', after the liturgy in the Assumption Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin (Patriaršee slovo v den' pamjati svjatitelja Petra posle Liturgii v Uspenskom sobore Moskovskogo Kremlja 6 sentjabrja 2022 goda 'Patriarchal speech on the day of Std. Peter's memory after the Liturgy in the Assumption Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin on September 6, 2022' 2022). The church official skillfully manipulates the facts, building a logical picture for the listener-congregant who knows little about history. In it, Kyiv appears as an abandoned, devastated, spiritually, intellectually, and materially impoverished city. If there is some truth that Kyiv significantly lost its greatness during the Mongol invasion, then "good neighborliness" with the Vladimir principality as the heir to Kyiv's glory looks too far-fetched. Especially after the looting and devastation of the ancient capital city of Kyiv by the troops of the Vladimir-Suzdal' prince and the warriors of Andrej Bogoljubskij. Besides, Kyiv was about to be besieged by the Lithuanians from the north. Therefore, the patriarch's historical arguments are rather weak, if expressed in a discussion, and not in a propaganda monologue: "This day turns our attention to the time when the Church of Rus' went through particularly difficult trials. Kyiv, the mother of Rus' cities and the capital of the Rus' state, was open to the disastrous raids of the Horde; the city was set on fire, looted, and riches were taken away from it. It became quite obvious that in those conditions Kyiv could no longer be the capital of the entire Rus' state, because it was too vulnerable, and there was a political and, I would say, strategic necessity to move the center of the

Rus′ state to another, safer place. The city of Vladimir in northeastern Rus′ became such a center. Why? Because Vladimir was in a forest zone, there were dormant forests around, in which the cavalry of nomads – the main military force of those who looted and burned Kyiv – could not operate effectively" (Patriaršee slovo v den′ pamjati svjatitelja Petra posle Liturgii v Uspenskom sobore Moskovskogo Kremlja 6 sentjabrja 2022 goda 'Patriarchal speech on the day of Std. Peter's memory after the Liturgy in the Assumption Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin on September 6, 2022' 2022).

Arguments about the need to transfer the center of political power from Kyiv are far-fetched as well. The Metropolitan Petro Ratens′kyj himself, already living in Vladimir since 1308, was forced to travel in 1312 to the real center of power, the Golden Horde, in order to receive a certificate of protection to ensure the rights of the Rus′ clergy from the hands of Chan Uzbek. Of course, Metropolitan Peter agreed to offer prayers of intercession to the Christian God about the pagan Asian ruler in exchange. But Kirill (Gundjajev) insists: "In order to protect the central church and civil power, a decision was made to go to the forests. This is what ascetics do: many saints, getting rid of temptations and dangers, went to the forests to save souls; and in this case the country had to move the center of its political, state life away from the nomads. Therefore, Vladimir became the next capital of our country, and everyone understood the need for such a decision" (Patriaršee slovo v den′ pamjati svjatitelja Petra posle Liturgii v Uspenskom sobore Moskovskogo Kremlja 6 sentjabrja 2022 goda 'Patriarchal speech on the day of Std. Peter's memory after the Liturgy in the Assumption Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin on September 6, 2022' 2022).

However, this idea of "political seclusion" in the forests of the Vladimir principality, that should have saved the Rus′ state from the Horde, is a new falsehood promoted by the patriarch as some sacred monastic asceticism. The wilderness of the Vladimir-Suzdal′ lands was not an obstacle for Mongols seeking control over the new territories. In fact, they started a siege of the capital of the Vladimir-Suzdal′ principality, the city of Vladimir, under the leadership of Genghiside Batu on February 3–7, 1238. After the capture of Vladimir, the Mongol detachments scattered in different directions across the Vladimir land, devastating 14

cities of the principality in addition to the capital. Diplomats and government officials of Slavic peoples and Rus′ principalities of that time had to leave even the remote swamps of Muscovy and frozen lands of the northern Novhorod for long journeys to the Mongolian capital Saraj of Batu in order to secure their right to power. Even the clergy did it to ensure their "sacred authority."

The migration of the spiritual center to Moscow is explained from the perspective of sheltering high ranking clergy in times of political confrontation of ancient principalities: "Well, and then, when the city of Moscow began to be exalted, when both the intellectual and material forces of the country began to flock here, Grand Prince Ivan Kalita offered the Metropolitan of Kyiv and all of Rus′, who lived in Vladimir, to move to the city of Moscow. And so this happened, and the Grand Princedid everything to ensure that the stay of the Metropolitan of Kyiv, and from now on Moscow, and all Rus′, was prosperous and safe in Moscow" (Patriaršee slovo v den′ pamjati svjatitelja Petra posle Liturgii v Uspenskom sobore Moskovskogo Kremlja 6 sentjabrja 2022 goda 'Patriarchal speech on the day of Std. Peter's memory after the Liturgy in the Assumption Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin on September 6, 2022' 2022).

Again, the listener is not informed about the trial of the Metropolitan in 1313, in the land of Volodymyr, which was organized at the request of the Tver′ Bishop Aleksij. Patriarch Athanasius of Constantinople convened a princely court in Perejaslavl′-Zalesskij, which was supposed to consider accusations of trading church positions. The Metropolitan's acquittal was due to a visit to the Horde and the patronage of Moscow's Prince Ivan Kalita. Therefore, the "proposal" to transfer the metropolitan seat seemed quite justified in the view of the oppression and persecution of Metropolitan Peter in Vladimir, not by pagans, but by Orthodox princes and other bishops. In addition, the transfer of the metropolitanate meant that Ivan the Terrible claimed the right to be titled Grand Prince from then on.

Even through the ideological canvas of Kyiv's supposed inferiority, the already familiar idea of a "Russian world" sewn together by the invisible threads of Orthodoxy breaks through: "But when we talk about geographic centers – Kyiv, Vladimir, Moscow – we don't mean

that around each of these cities, a kind of church community separated from the single Body of the Church was formed" (Patriaršee slovo v den′ pamjati svjatitelja Petra posle Liturgii v Uspenskom sobore Moskovskogo Kremlja 06 sentjabrja 2022 goda 'Patriarchal speech on the day of Std. Peter's memory after the Liturgy in the Assumption Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin on September 6, 2022' 2022).

In addition to the above, the undisguised need for the merging of religious and state power is taking shape, which is necessary for Russia in the 21st century, for the sacralization of the actions of the new Führer: "It was the only Church, the center of which moved along with the movement of the capital, so that the Primate was always clodse to the Grand Prince, so that the spiritual center was where the center of political life was. And Saint Peter moved here, to the city of Moscow, at the urgent request of Grand Prince Ivan Kalita, the same one who collected material assets in Moscow to ensure the stable existence of the new capital. And in order for this capital to be truly recognized by all of Rus′, it was necessary to move the Seat of the High Priest to Moscow" (Patriaršee slovo v den′ pamjati svjatitelja Petra posle Liturgii v Uspenskom sobore Moskovskogo Kremlja 6 sentjabrja 2022 goda 'Patriarchal speech on the day of Std. Peter's memory after the Liturgy in the Assumption Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin on September 6, 2022' 2022).

The doctrine of the "Russian world" and Putin's need to revive the artificially created "Soviet nation," in the 21st century is now being mixed with the domain of Russian Orthodoxy. Patriarch Kirill started playing a decisive role in the process of forming a new imperial consciousness of loyal Russians and occupied Ukrainians in the territories of Crimea and Donbas seized by the Russian Federation. The Russian Orthodox Church turned into the tool of the pseudo-democratic state; it merged with Putin's autocratic machine becoming a cornerstone in the Kremlin's construction of its imaginary ideal "Russian world" in opposition to the Western civilization. For adherents, the Church in the Russian Federation is called Russian not because of its ethnic identity, but because its name indicates that the ROC performs some kind of "messianic pastoral mission" among peoples who accept the Russian spiritual and cultural tradition as the basis of their national iden-

tity, or at least as an essential part of it. In this sense, Ukraine is more of a Christian country than Russia in terms of everyday rituals and church traditions. But, in the sermons of the Patriarch, the image of a second-class nation is formed with the help of stamp-phrases like "the daughter-church", "a country in schism", and "one nation divided". The fight against this heretical half-religious idea consists of the constant presence in the public space of historical, cultural, and religious studies, which debunk the ideological infusions of "Russian Orthodox propaganda".

The Imperial heritage in the ideology of the "Russian world"

In the current war between Russia and Ukraine in the 21st century, the role of religion and the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate goes far beyond the spiritual care of soldiers and victims of the military conflict. The church in its narrowest sense as an earthly institution and a hierarchical organization of worshipers has turned into an appendage to the propaganda machine of the authoritarian Putin regime. There are numerous reasons for such transformation. Among them is the long period of more than half a century of the existence of the Russian Orthodox Church under the control of the Soviet special services. The formation of a complete symphony of the government and the church in Russia was influenced by the activities of the ranked clergymen of the Russian Orthodox Church created by Joseph Stalin as representatives of the Soviet and Communist Party ideology. Here, it is also worth mentioning the "longing" for the imperial heritage, which arose in Russian society in the 1990s. This led to the inferiority (and, in some aspects, the impossibility) of the modernization of the Orthodox Church in Russia, which, after the period of Soviet persecution, was not engaged in evolutionary development, but remained fixed on the revival of "former glory and greatness". In this pseudo-modernization, which started under Patriarch Aleksij II (Ridiger) and was actively continued during the time of Patriarch Kirill, the emphasis is on the number of newly built churches, on the expansion of the martyrologies of the new martyrs of the Soviet period and the canonization of saints from the pre-Soviet period, on the restoration and strengthening of the grandeur of the divine service. The needs of evangelization of a wide range of the

population at the expense of comprehensibility and closeness often give way to the desire to use populistic religiosity (often superstitious), ultra-right chauvinistic ideology and pomposity in promoting the model of "Russian Christianity" (Luk″janenko 2023b, 20).

This mixture of phenomena was organically combined with the ideology of the "Russian world", which formed the basis of the justification for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In many ways, it can be considered a modern imperial doctrine in Russia, of course, given the weak philosophical basis and the frank fluidity of the term itself. Depending on the circumstances, the "Russian world" can include national ("Russian", "Soviet man"), territorial (the former Russian Empire, the former USSR), linguistic ("everywhere where the Russian language is heard") or religious ("Orthodox civilization") community. The Orthodox Church of Russia, represented by its mouthpiece, Patriarch Kirill, has become one of the transmission tools of this idea in the world.

One of the key aspects of the viability of this ideology is propaganda framed as a struggle between good and evil. The game requires the search for an enemy and the formation of a common front to oppose it from among the loyal, chosen supporters of the idea. This fully corresponds to the practice of Soviet political technologists of the 20th century, who successfully tested the procedure of forming mass consciousness (Luk″janenko 2017, 380). In essence, in the sermons of Russian priests, media propagandists, and political figures, we are now faced with the reanimation of Soviet ideological clichés – the ideals of a single correct doctrine, a divided polar world, a semi-deified leader with the characteristics of a demiurge who knows everything, understands everything, calculates everything, and is never wrong (Luk″janenko 2018, 79–86).

The dialectical law of unity and confrontation of opposites explains the current state of things. However, it is precisely the reason why the need to expand the borders of the amorphous "Russian world" is being directly justified. It is declared to be directly opposed to the "collective West" and not being berely different from it. It seems that the question of similarity between the Russian cultural space and the value of the Christian transatlantic civilization is not even raised. In the narrative of Patriarch Kirill, one can trace the idea of unfolding active contradic-

tions of two worldview models. Of course, the church led by him helps to build and support the "unique Russian model".

Sacred Architecture and the Struggle of Two Models of Christianity

In Patriarch Kirill's interpretation, these are no longer differences in the Christian faith, in a single Christian split into denominations. He believes that the "Russian faith" and faith in the West are mutually exclusive.

The Patriarch considers the process of mass temple construction in Russia to be an example of the path to such separation. Thus, in a sermon after the liturgy in the Church of the Ascension in the city of Tobol′s′k on June 10, 2023, he closely tied the successes in modern church architecture in Russia to the issue of the future of the country and the people. In the words of the head of the church, the process of erecting new religious buildings proves the correctness of the "symphony of the state and the church" in Russia (Mojzes 2022, vii), because representatives of the authorities are involved in this process. The patriarch also draws another parallel with the construction of cathedrals and the steady development of Russian business (Slovo Svjatejšego Patriarcha Kirilla posle Liturgii v chrame Voznesenija Gospodnja v Tobol′ske 10 ijunja 2023 goda 'Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill after the Liturgy in the Church of the Ascension of the Lord in Tobolsk on June 10, 2023' 2023).

Of course, within the Russian Federation, such a "building boom" in the field of templar architecture really has taken place. So, back in May 2019, during the consecration of the Church of All Saints in Strasbourg, the Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church noted that an average of three churches were built in Russia per day. Thus, an "architectural renaissance" really took place in the Russian Federation, during which, the number of religious church communities on the territory of the Russian dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) rose seven times from 2,300 in 1988 up to 17,231 churches in 2018 (without taking into account such changes in the ROC parishes in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova) (Gorevoj 2019). And in Moscow itself, the actual growth of the churches of the Russian Orthodox Church in 30 years reached 2300 % (from approximately 50 churches and chapels in 1988 to 1,154 by

the end of 2017. This expansion was mainly due to the implementation of "Program-200", the construction of church buildings within walking distance in the residential areas of Moscow since 2010) (Patriarch Kirill rasskazal, čto RPC stroit tri chrama v sutki 'Patriarch Kirill said that the Russian Orthodox Church builds three churches a day' 2019).

There is a dissonance between such statements and the reality experienced in the Ukrainian religious space. While the Russian patriarch is bragging about a remarkable construction boom in the Russian Federation, according to the Institute of Religious Freedom, at least 494 religious buildings were destroyed, damaged or looted by the Russian military on the territory of Ukraine as of January 31, 2023, alone. What is significant, in terms of denomination, is that the churches of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate, suffered the most from the Russian aggression. In January 2023, the destroyed shrines of this church, which Patriarch Kirill continues to consider his canonical property, numbered at least 143 (Majže 500 relihijnych sporud zrujnovano v Ukrajini vnaslidok rosijs'koji ahresiji 'Almost 500 religious buildings destroyed in Ukraine as a result of Russian aggression' 2023). Among the latest destructions is the Church of St. Nicholas in the city of Kup″jans'k in the Charkiv region. As a result of shelling and fire, the windows and facades of this architectural monument, built in 1850–1852, were damaged (Church of St. Nicholas. Destroyed cultural heritage of Ukraine). Causing shock and resonance in public circles, was the July 23, 2023, destruction of the Odesa Savior's Transfiguration Cathedral, which had been included in the UNESCO World Heritage List this year. A Russian missile hit the right part of the cathedral, right into the altar. The building was penetrated beneath the first floor. The foundation of the cathedral and the central piles were broken. Half of the building was left without a roof, the stucco was damaged, and all the windows were blown out (Prysjažnjuk 2023). This event forced even the staunch adept of the "Russian world" in the Ukrainian religious establishment, Metropolitan of the Odesa and Izmajil Ahafanhel from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, to issue an appeal "to the entirety of the Odesa Metropolitanate". In it, he openly called Russia an aggressor, compared Russian troops and power to the forces of hell ("the forces of hell have

declared open war against Orthodoxy"), and accused the church structures of the neighboring country of serving the devil: "Today, a country that considers itself Orthodox cannot verbally adhere to God's law and at the same time commit acts of evil and darkness. It is not possible to serve God and the ruler of evil at the same time. The Apostle Paul asks the Christians of ancient Corinth: "And what communion hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ with Belial" (Corinthians 6, 14–15)" (Zvernennja mytropolyta Odes′koji ta Izmajil′s′koji Ukrajins′koji pravoslavnoji cerkvy Ahafanhela do vsijeji povnoty Odes′koji mytropoliji 'Speech of Metropolitan Ahafanhel of Odesa and Izmajil of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the entire Odesa Metropolis' 2023).

So, the speeches of the Moscow patriarch about revitalizing the construction of church architecture in Russia are the mirror opposite of what we observe within the borders of Ukraine – in the immediate borders of the "Russian world" so consistently outlined by him with Kyiv, which is sacred to Russians.

In contrast to this "holy space" of Russia, Patriarch Kirill (Gundjajev) creates an image of the West, described as an atheist regime, where the authorities take steps similar to those taken by the Bolševiks during the period of struggle against the church in the first half of the 20th century. They hand over holy buildings to the non-religious organizations, changing their purpose. The patriarch creates an image of Western society, where shrines become places of mockery of the sacred, turning into entertainment facilities for the population: "And how wonderful that God's temples are being created in response to people's revived faith, that the state authorities, and representatives of business circles, and everyone who feels responsible for the fate of the country, for the fate of their people, participate in this! And I want to say once again: what is happening in Russia today is a unique phenomenon. In the West, temples are closed, at best they are given over to Muslims, and at worst they are set up as restaurants, cafes, dance floors, etc." (Slovo Svjatejšego Patriarcha Kirilla posle Liturgii v chrame Voznesenija Gospodnja v Tobol′ske 10 ijunja 2023 goda 'Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill after the Liturgy in the Church of the Ascension of the Lord in Tobolsk on June 10, 2023' 2023).

In the process of confronting the West, Patriarch Kirill traditionally likes to hold competitions in numbers and sizes. Of course, he does it in the best tradition of statistics dating back to Soviet times, citing examples of Russia's advance in one or another area. However, during the time of Nikita Chruščev, competition with the USA was measured by the grandiose production of eggs, milk, and meat per capita. Now, according to the sermons of the Patriarch of Moscow, everything comes down to the size of church administrative units and the number of believers and sacred buildings. For instance, after the liturgy in the Nikolo-Ugreš Stauropygian Monastery[1] on April 18, 2023, the Patriarch called Russia a real exception to the "negative trend in the world" precisely because it is home to the world's largest Orthodox Moscow Metropolitanate. He ambiguously compares it with various religious organizations, noting that this ecclesiastical administrative unit outnumbers individual local churches in terms of the number of churches and monasteries. Here we have an appeal to the imaginary entity of "Holy Rusʹ", which Kirill claims as the territory of his canonical influence. Moreover, this "Holy Rusʹ" has no physical or even defined political border. It passes along the line of settlement of the Orthodox people, who recognize Kirill as their patriarch. Of course, it is precisely the parishioners of this church who are recognized by him as true believers, whereas the countries of the West, according to the patriarch, have only superficially believing Christians: "You and I are present on the territory of the largest Orthodox metropolis in the world. No other metropolis or diocese in the entire Orthodox world can even come close to comparing it; in terms of the number of churches and monasteries, our Moscow Metropolis exceeds many Local Orthodox Churches. Well, what if you think about all of Russia? About this huge number of churches, monasteries, about the Orthodox believing people? Not about formal believers listed in register books, as it is required in some countries, but about people actually participating in the Holy Eucharist, visiting the temples of God, accepting the Holy Mysteries of Christ?" (Slovo Svjatejšego Patriarcha Kirilla vo vtornik Svetloj sedmicy posle Liturgii v Nikolo-Ugrešskom stavropigialʹnom monastyre

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1 In the city of Dzeržinskij near Moscow.

18 aprelja 2023 goda 'Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill on Tuesday of Holy Week after the Liturgy in the Nikolo-Ugreš Stauropygial Monastery on April 18, 2023' 2023).

Along with the number of new religious and cult buildings returned to the ownership of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill resorts to certain qualitative comparisons with temple architecture and the flock of European religious associations. As a good rhetorician, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church works on contrasts: he first notes the grandeur of Gothic and Romanesque architecture, and then emphasizes the fact that behind the elegant facades there is an empty church. Moreover, even the presence of up to a hundred parishioners on Sundays is regarded by the patriarch as the absence of believers. He goes on to skillfully manipulates the difference in tradition, saying that those present at the Sunday liturgy are visible only in the pews. For the consciousness of the Russian Orthodox, the church service is associated with standing for an hour and a half with periodic bows, while the pews along the walls are mainly occupied by the elderly and those who are unable to spend the time of the liturgy on their feet. *Stasidias* (pews) are present in some temples[2]. However, they are the prerogative of only a certain group of people. At the same time, for Christians of the Western rite, the standing of an Orthodox Russian is strange, because there, according to the usual practice, they sit during mass, and a special genuflexorium or kneeler is even attached to the back of church pews, which is not intended for feet, but for believers on their knees certain moments of the Mass, as well as during the Adoration of the Holy Gifts and during individual prayer. Therefore, when Patriarch Kirill places such an emphasis on the seating of hundreds of believers in Western European churches at mass as a symbol of weak faith, it is aimed to appeal to a certain intellectual and cultural limitation of the average Russian parishioner, who is not familiar with the intricacies of religious practices outside of his own tradition. In addition, after the liturgy in the Epiphany Cathedral of the Kostroma Kremlin on September 24,

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2 Armchairs with a folding seat and a small place for standing, which is formed after folding; their purpose is strictly regulated: they can be *stasidias* of singers in the choirs, abbot's, founder's *stasidias*, etc.

2023, Patriarch Kirill remarked: "Many of you probably had to visit the West, where there are magnificent cathedrals – Gothic, Romanesque, masterpieces of architecture. You enter this cathedral – It is empty. You think: you have to go to the service. But if you come on Sunday, it's also empty, with 50–100 people waiting. And when I looked at these deserted cathedrals, I understood that this phenomenon reflected the spiritual state of the people" (Patriaršaja propovedʹ po okončanii Liturgii v Bogojavlenskom sobore Kostromskogo kremlja 24 sentjabrja 2023 goda 'Patriarchal sermon at the end of the Liturgy in the Epiphany Cathedral of the Kostroma Kremlin on September 24, 2023' 2023).

In general, Moscow Patriarch Kirill likes to allude to the "second class" of all Christian denominations, except for the Orthodox – and moreover, in its Russian version. He also talks about this in the context of temple construction. Here, it is not the emptiness of cathedrals in many European countries that is important for him, but the fact that Russian Christianity turned out to be "more Christian" than those of Western countries: "And if there is no desire of people for God, then even if they build a beautiful temple, it will not be filled. And we know that in many cities of the world, majestic temples stand empty. Indeed, these churches are not Orthodox, but the faith is Christian!" (Slovo Svjatejšego Patriarcha Kirilla po okončanii Liturgii v Kazanskom sobore g. Kazani 21 maja 2023 goda 'Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill at the end of the Liturgy in the Kazanʹ Cathedral of the city of Kazanʹ on May 21, 2023' 2023).

Kaliningrad as a "Spiritual Outpost of Russia"

Kirill has tried to prove the primacy of Orthodoxy over other denominations of Christianity during his visits to the enclave of Russia in Western Europe – the city of Kaliningrad (Königsberg). For him, this is part of his "canonical patrimony" as the former Metropolitan of Smolensʹk and Kaliningrad (1984–2009). His ecclesiastical-diplomatic visits to the Kaliningrad Metropolitanate during Russia's war with Ukraine are acts of self-marking of the territory, a defiant look in the eyes of the European community with the conviction that there is no penalty for pushing the propaganda of war through religious sermons.

The religious leader has not hidden that he understands that Russia has found itself in international isolation due to its aggressive actions, which began with the war with Georgia in 2008 and in 2022 resulted in the largest armed conflict in Europe since the Second World War. In his address to the clergy of the Kaliningrad Metropolitanate, he even tried to express empathy to those who live far from a politically stable homeland loyal to the ideas of Putin's imperialism. Of course, what follows is sympathy and justification of such loyalty not by Russian crimes, but by a global trend. And he reduces the function of the Orthodox Church to serving the cause of salvation, without talking about the specific ideological mission of Russian Orthodoxy to form the ideology of the "Russian world": "I think here, in this Russian enclave, it is especially felt that the general atmosphere, in particular the political one, is not becoming calmer. But such is the history of humanity in general: one epoch is replaced by another, some challenges are replaced by others, and the Church of God continues its saving service" (Vstupitel′noe slovo Svjatejšego Patriarcha Kirilla na sobranii duchovenstva Kaliningradskoj mitropolii 2 ijulja 2022 goda 'Introductory speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill at the meeting of the clergy of the Kaliningrad Metropolis on July 2, 2022' 2022).

Patriarch Kirill's shrewdness and skillful political play is clearly visible in a comparison of his speech in front of the clergy and in front of the flock. In front of ordinary people, Patriarch Kirill does not dare to voice the reason for the crisis situation of his country, veiling it behind phrases about the confrontation of worldviews and ideas. He convinces the listeners of the sermons that the countries of the Western world opposed Russia solely because of its dissimilarity to Europe. During his visit to Kaliningrad during the bloodiest period of the Russo-Ukrainian war in June 2022, Kirill blasphemously insists that no one in the Russian Federation understands such a rejection of his peaceful country, which has not violated any international agreements nor committed war crimes against anyone. Addressing the parishioners of the Church of Saints Cyril and Methodius, the First Hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Church creates an unhealthy sense of superiority over Europe in his flock, saying that all the troubles of his compatriots are caused solely by the envy of EU and US citizens towards Russian ways and standard

of living. Patriarch Kirill even defines the purpose of such anti-Russian attacks on the part of the collective West. In his opinion, the whole surrounding world seeks only to alter the consciousness of the Orthodox Russian and transform it in a Western manner. But Russia in this confrontation is known as a truly religious country and a real share of the Holy Mother of God. That is why it will stand tall despite all hostile plans: "And today we really need God to be with us, and here, on the western border of Russia, it is especially felt. Many people are rebelling against our Motherland today, but we know that the Motherland has not done anything bad to anyone. And they rebel not because we are bad, but because we are different. This otherness of Russia arouses feelings of jealousy, envy and indignation, but we cannot change ourselves. Of course, a lot of people wanted, as they say now, to reformat us, but it didn't work out, although such huge forces and funds were invested in the reformation of Russia. And it was and is, in its essence, Holy Russia, the land of the Most Holy Theotokos" (Patriaršaja propoved′ posle Liturgii v chrame ravnoapostol′nych Kirilla i Mefodija v Kaliningrade 3 ijulja 2022 goda 'Patriarchal sermon after the Liturgy in the Church of Equal-to-the-Apostles Cyril and Methodius in Kaliningrad on July 3, 2022' 2022).

The Moscow patriarch periodically humiliates the West in the eyes of his parishioners in a spiritual sense. During the liturgy in the Church of the Equal-to-the-Apostles Constantine and Helena in Kaliningrad on July 2, 2023, Kirill emphasized that the beautiful architecture and interior decoration of the new temple is evidence of the high spirituality of the Orthodox who live and continue to be in the city. We note that, unlike this time, on other occasions the patriarch saw the architectural magnificence of Western European churches only in contrast to the "spiritual poverty" of the parishioners: "I remember this place, completely deserted; and when they told me that it was desirable to build a temple here, there was even some confusion, because there were no buildings around. But the temple was laid and, as we can see, built. Wonderful architecture, interior decoration – all this proves that the temple was built according to the faith of the people, those who live here" (Patriaršaja propoved′ posle Liturgii v chrame ravnoapostol′nych Konstantina i Eleny v Kaliningrade 2 ijulja 2023 goda 'Patriarchal ser-

mon after the Liturgy in the Church of Equal-to-the-Apostles Constantine and Helena in Kaliningrad on July 2, 2023' 2023).

His entire sermon is built around the idea of the Divine Providence in the Russian presence on the land of Königsberg. Of course, Patriarch Kirill never mentions the pre-Soviet history until 1945 of the former administrative center of the German province of East Prussia. Instead, the history after the Second World War, and especially the events of Putin's rule in Russia and his patriarchate, is interpreted as a period of "a miracle of God", as a result of which the Kaliningrad Metropolis appeared. Misleading the listeners to his ideological appeals, Kirill says that only with the arrival of Russia in these lands, where there was no place of worship of God, churches appeared. The patriarch broadcasts a false and radical idea that the religious buildings of denominations other than the Orthodox do not deserve to be considered the heart of religious life. Only the opening of more than 40 monasteries, cathedrals, temples, chapels and house churches in Kaliningrad is a "testimony of the power of God" (Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskaja oblast′) 'Kaliningrad (Kaliningrad region)' 2025). "Thus, actually, it happened by a miracle of God, that the Kaliningrad Diocese was born, and now the Kaliningrad Metropolis. It is hard to imagine that in this city, where there was no place of worship of God, I mean Kaliningrad, such a rich, comprehensive, deep spiritual and church life would arise and develop. Isn't the emergence of the Orthodox Church on the land of Kaliningrad, devastated by war and decades of atheism, where there were no places for prayer, a testimony of God's power?" (Patriaršaja propoved′ posle Liturgii v chrame ravnoapostol′nych Konstantina i Eleny v Kaliningrade 2 ijulja 2023 goda 'Patriarchal sermon after the Liturgy in the Church of Equal-to-the-Apostles Constantine and Helena in Kaliningrad on July 2, 2023' 2023).

This once again illustrates the selectivity of the historical memory of the Russian Orthodoxy, which developed from the time of the creation of the Stalinist Russian Orthodox Church in 1943. Then the church began to look at its history through the prism of the history of the Communist Party and the "reunification of the lands" with Russia. This was the case with the persecution of The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church in the 1940s with its subsequent violent accession to the Russian Orthodox Church at the L′viv pseudo-synod on March 8–10, 1946,

which caused the exodus of Greek-Catholics to the catacombs for half a century. When Patriarch Kirill talks about the absence of any place of worship of God in Kaliningrad, he does not convey to his flock the simple facts that the Christianization of the region began with the activity of the Catholic Teutonic Order, which made the city its capital as a theocratic entity, which later became part of the Kingdom of Poland. The patriarch is silent about the fact that Kaliningrad is still proudly called "a special point in the Christian world", "a bridge that connects the three main branches of Christianity for centuries", even in Russian sightseeing tours. It is especially important to call it the "second homeland of the Lutheran religion" because of the Königsberg Cathedral, which was built as a Catholic church sometime in 1297, and where the first Protestant sermon was delivered in 1525 (The Second Homeland of the Lutheran Religion 2017).

Patriarch Kirill is committed to ideology as he turns a blind eye to the religious history of the city. It is impossible not to mention the numerous projects of the famous Königsberg architect Friedrich Heitmann, which took place at the beginning of the 20th century, including the church in memory of Queen Louise (consecrated on September 9, 1901), the Catholic chapel of St. Adalbert (1902–1904) and the Catholic Church of the Holy Family in the Neo-Gothic style (1904–1907) (Tamanceva 2007). There was also a Jewish community here since the second half of the 17th century, when Jewish merchants from Lithuania and Poland began to visit the Königsberg fairs, and in 1680 they were allowed to open a prayer room during the fair. The first synagogue was built in 1756, when the community numbered about three hundred people. And the constant flow of immigrants from Russia gradually increased this figure to 5082 people in 1880, which made it possible to call Königsberg, as well as Berlin, the center of Jewish religion (Königsberg. Jewish Virtual Library). The Orthodox community wasn't founded thanks to the efforts of Patriarch Kirill during the "Putin's renaissance". It was officially registered in Königsberg back in 1656, and on September 15, 1760, the solemn consecration of the first Orthodox church in honor of the Resurrection of Christ took place. Hence, "spiritual devastation" was brought to the land of the modern Kaliningrad region by Soviet Russia. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the merits of Rus-

sian influence on the "spiritualization" of this region with great reflection on its own mistakes. "The westernmost region, farthest from the historical spiritual centers of Russia, is currently flourishing with the faith of the people who live here ... And as long as these people are on earth to preserve the Orthodox faith, to pray to God, then, despite difficult external circumstances, everything will be for the good, according to God's Providence. And you don't have to be afraid of anything. We, the Orthodox people, should be here. People who believed in the Lord live here, who fill God's temples; and therefore, of the many services of the Church here, on the land of Kaliningrad, the Church of God has a special service – to take care of the spiritual life of the people, so that everyone who loves their land, loves Russia, considers themselves as Orthodox Russian, and Russian, and so that no one even thinks of leaving these places" (Patriaršaja propoved′ posle Liturgii v chrame ravnoapostol′nych Konstantina i Eleny v Kaliningrade 2 ijulja 2023 goda 'Patriarchal sermon after the Liturgy in the Church of Equal-to-the-Apostles Constantine and Helena in Kaliningrad on July 2, 2023' 2023).

In context of such remarks, in the patriarchal concept of "holy Rus′" and "Russian world" (Luk′′janenko 2023a, 23), Kaliningrad becomes an outpost of Russia in the West. Kirill interprets it as an integral part of "historical Rus′", despite the fact that this "outpost" was created only as a result of the "Potsdam Agreement shortly before the end of World War II in 1945. The patriarch calls Russia's isolation on the international stage due to the war against Ukraine "difficult external circumstances", urging his Kaliningrad congregation not to fear anything as long as they keep the Orthodox faith. This once again testifies to the use of a map of Moscow Orthodoxy in the formation of the boundless territory of the "Russian World". As long as they speak Russian here, as long as they believe in the "Moscow way", Russia will stand firmly on the western frontiers. These are slightly veiled, but still the same maxims with which Russian troops entered Ukraine in 2022 – "Russia is here forever" (Rossija zdes′ navsegda 'Russia is here forever' 2022): "God grant that it will continue to be this way, and it is especially important for me to tell you about all this, my dears, who live on the western border of Holy Russia. May the Lord protect the land of Kaliningrad, our people and the entire Russian land from all enemies and opponents. But the most important thing is that

the Lord keeps our hearts and faith in our hearts pure. If it is so, then no enemies are scary to us" (Patriaršaja propoved′ posle Liturgii v chrame ravnoapostol′nych Kirilla i Mefodija v Kaliningrade 03 ijulja 2022 goda 'Patriarchal sermon after the Liturgy in the Church of Equal-to-the-Apostles Cyril and Methodius in Kaliningrad on July 3, 2022' 2022).

In the course of the formation of the ideology of the "Russian world", the Orthodox Church of Russia plays one of the key roles, because it is in direct and constant contact with the broad sections of the population of the Russian Federation, having a high credit of trust as an institution that should be guided by God, and not by human whims. However, in reality, the Russian Orthodox Church and its First Hierarch Patriarch Kirill use preaching from the pulpit as another political stratagem to spread the ideas of Putin's new empire, which currently does not have clear geographical boundaries, but is outlined by the boundaries of the spread of Russian culture, language, faith, and political loyalty. In this system of ideological beliefs, an important role is played by the image of the West as an enemy, which Patriarch Kirill tries to create using criticism of the religious life of Europe and the United States. Among other things, this church official resorts to comparing sacred architecture, looking for qualitative differences in quantitative indicators in favor of Russia. Under the influence of the patriarchal sermons, the average Russian should absorb an image of the West lagging behind the spiritually advanced Russia. Kirill shows the same tendencies in the matter of interreligious dialogue. In the ideology of the "Russian world", where Russia is portrayed as the only place of freedom and equality, he claims that its citizens have achieved justice and harmony of existence not only socially, but also spiritually. Instead, even a superficial analysis of the history of Russia demonstrates the falsity of such statements. We can assert that such ideological sermons of the Moscow patriarch are designed for the average parishioner who is used to trusting authorities and forms his worldview not with the help of critical thinking, but only relying on authorities. In the context of Russia's war with Ukraine, this is especially noticeable where the Russian Orthodox Church begins to work with the consciousness of Ukrainian citizens in the occupied territories, as well as in a number of churches belonging to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.

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A POSTCOLONIAL APPROACH TO UKRAINIAN ART: WAR, RESISTANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL INVOLVEMENT

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This article examines a set of phenomena in contemporary Ukrainian art that engage with social and political processes. The analysis is framed within postcolonial studies, which provides an appropriate theoretical lens for exploring contemporary Ukrainian cultural dynamics. The study focuses on artists and institutions that exemplify engaged art, resistance art, or artivism. The analysis is focused on two case studies: the work of Žanna Kadyrova, who integrates documentary practices with social engagement, actively involving audiences in critical themes, and the activities of the Izoljacija Foundation, which promotes engaged culture and initiates projects that reflect on social and identity transformations resulting from military conflict. Through these examples, the article explores the role of art as a medium of resistance, documentation, and identity negotiation in contemporary Ukraine.

Keywords: Ukrainian engaged art, postcolonial studies, Žanna Kadyrova, Izoljacija Foundation, Russo-Ukrainian war.

ПОСТКОЛОНІАЛЬНИЙ ПІДХІД ДО УКРАЇНСЬКОГО МИСТЕЦТВА: ВІЙНА, ПРОТИСТОЯННЯ ТА ІНСТИТУЦІЙНЕ ЗАЛУЧЕННЯ

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Ця стаття досліджує вибрані явища в сучасному українському мистецтві, які залучені до соціальних і політичних процесів. Аналіз проводиться в межах постколоніальних студій, що забезпечують відповідну теоретичну основу для вивчення динаміки сучасної

української культури. Дослідження зосереджується на художниках та інституціях, які представляють залучене мистецтво, мистецтво спротиву або артивізм. Виокремлено два ключові кейси: творчість Жанни Кадирової, яка поєднує документальні практики із соціальним залученням, активно залучаючи аудиторію до критичних тем, а також діяльність фонду "Ізоляція", що сприяє розвитку культури залученості та ініціює проєкти, які відображають соціальні та ідентичнісні трансформації, спричинені військовим конфліктом. Через ці приклади стаття досліджує роль мистецтва як засобу спротиву, документації та переговорів щодо ідентичності в сучасній Україні.

Ключові слова: Українське ангажоване мистецтво, постколоніальні студії, Жанна Кадирова, Фундація "Ізоляція", російсько-українська.

Piotr Piotrowski, in his analysis of art in post-communist countries, states that a postcolonial perspective provides a more effective interpretative framework than a postmodern approach. However, he warns against the uncritical application of postcolonial theory to the context of Central and Eastern Europe. Instead, he advocates for a selective and context-sensitive utilization of postcolonial theoretical tools to examine specific phenomena within the post-communist landscape while acknowledging the fundamental historical and geopolitical distinctions that differentiate this region from traditional postcolonial contexts.

Piotrowski highlights that the postcolonial framework, as a mode of political and cultural critique, cannot be directly applied to the study of art in Eastern Europe. Rather, it may function as a comparative analytical tool within a broader methodological paradigm. He highlights that postcolonial studies emerged from specific historical experiences and geohistorical assumptions, primarily designed to critique the cultural hegemony of Europe from the perspective of the so-called distant Other. Consequently, while postcolonial theory can provide valuable insights into cultural and artistic dynamics in post-communist societies, its application requires careful adaptation to account for the distinct socio-political and historical trajectories of the region. In contrast, the cultural position of Central and Eastern Europe presents a different

dynamic: "The postcolonial perspective, as a method of political and cultural criticism, cannot be easily applied to the study of art in the eastern part of the continent. At best, one can seek a common framework for this kind of analytical practice. Postcolonial studies were developed based on a completely different historical experience and geohistorical premise. Roughly speaking, their primary goal is to critique the center from the position of the so-called distant Other, that is, to criticize Europe as a cultural hegemon [...]. Thus, the fundamental challenge in applying postcolonial studies to the culture of Europe's periphery lies in the different status of the non-European subject. The distant Other exists outside Europe by definition, while the close Other, in contrast, is European – albeit marginalized" (Piotrowski 2010, 45).

Piotrowski's argument stresses on the need for a nuanced adaptation of postcolonial methodologies in the analysis of post-communist cultural production, acknowledging both shared frameworks and critical divergences. Undoubtedly, however, it is possible to see points of convergence between the situation of the so-called "third world" and the condition of post-communist countries (Kołodziejczyk 2012, 113), which is why the critical instrumentarium of post-colonial studies is used in the study of this area.

This is also the case in the Ukrainian academic space, where part of the intellectual community defines the situation of their country precisely as postcolonial (Kupidura 2015, 250–280).

The popularity of this perspective is evidenced by the works of Olja Hnatjuk, Mark Pavlyšyn, George Grabowycz, Agnieszka Matusjak, Myroslav Škandrij, Tamara Hundorova and others (Trojan 2014, 61–74), while the beginning of this discourse can be considered the year 1997, when Marko Pavlyšyn's essay "Cossacks in Jamaica: postcolonial features of modern Ukrainian literature" (Kupidura 2015, 250–280) was published. The legitimacy of using postcolonial studies in the study of Ukraine is explained by Tamara Hundorova as follows: "The experience of Ukraine, which has been in a situation of semi-colonial dependence since the 17th century and which has gone through the difficult experience of totalitarian colonization in the 20th century, is particularly conducive to the application of a postcolonial methodology, which

unmasks the open and hidden mechanisms of colonial and neo-colonial enslavement" (Hundorova 2014, 8).

Mykola Rjabčuk also sees the postcolonial perspective as a significant stimulae for Ukrainian studies (Rjabczuk 2004, 37). The Ukrainian postcolonial discourse has been critically analyzed by Marko Pavlyšn. The researcher stresses that Ukrainian scholars use the term freely and in a rather colloquial sense, often equating it with the terms "post-totalitarian/post-Soviet" (Pawłyszyn 2014, 76). Pavlyšyn, however, does not deny the legitimacy of applying a postcolonial instrumentation to the study of the condition of independent Ukraine. Oksana Zabužko also joins the voices sympathetic to this perspective. For her, the Čornobylʹ catastrophe is the starting point, which caused in Ukrainian doscourse "[…] the realization that we have become a victim of colonial conditions" (Chruślińska 2013, 360). In the Fortynbras Chronicles essay, the author defines her country's situation explicitly as post-colonial (Zabužko 2009, 154). Ukrainian art historians also use a postcolonial perspective, as exemplified by the research of Halyna Skljarenko (Skljarenko 2004, 83–97).

Socially Engaged Art and Critical Art

The term "engaged art" has been widely discussed in the West (mainly in the US) since the 1970s (Niziołek 2015, 140). As Katarzyna Niziołek observes, Western (particularly American) socially engaged art emerged within a broader movement toward the democratization of culture, with its critical focus on issues of artistic freedom, unrestricted by external limitations or censorship. This form of artistic practice – highly diverse in its manifestations – functioned, in general terms, as "a critique aimed at the homogeneity of dominant culture and existing balance of power" (Niziołek 2015, 140). To a large extent, it operated at the intersection of art and politics, frequently crossing the line of social activism, where artistic freedom of expression was often intertwined with the aesthetics of shock and transgression. The objective of socially engaged art was to amplify the voices of marginalized groups and introduce the discourses of such groups into the public sphere. It also sought to mobilize the audience, emphasizing their agency and encouraging active participation.

Since this article focuses on Ukrainian artistic production, the relevant context is not socially engaged art in a broad sense, but rather its Central and Eastern European iteration. While this artistic tendency shares common roots with postwar ideological currents in the West, it differs significantly due to the totalitarian political context in which artists of this region operated. In Central Europe, the Vienna Actionists can be regarded as early pioneers of socially engaged art. Their experimental and transgressive performances sought to confront and shock the postwar Austrian society, pushing the boundaries of artistic and social conventions (Cavazzini 2009, 161).

In their artistic practice, these creators employed corporeality in its most extreme manifestations. The body, in general, was a central motif in socially engaged art across Central and Eastern Europe, as exemplified by Hungarian performer and photographer Tibor Hajas, Czech artists Jan Mločoch, Karel Miler, and Peter Štembera, as well as the East German collective Autoperforationsartistik (Piotrowski 2003, 234), which emerged in the late 1980s. In this context, the work of Marina Abramović is particularly significant, whose practice intertwines themes of war tragedies and political violence with explorations of corporeality (Piotrowski 2003, 256).

The experience of war and political violence will serve as the primary context for our article. The Ukrainian artists' projects presented below respond to political events while also functioning as a form of social activism, engagement, and resistance. For the most part, they do not rely on drastic representations of corporeality, nor do they seek to shock the audience. This constructive aspect has allowed us to employ Jacek Zydorowicz's concept in our analysis.

In his article, Jacek Zydorowicz says that socially engaged art encompasses "all activities critically tackling important social problems, using relatively radical means of expression and including some kind of positive program in their message" (Zydorowicz 2004, 91). Therefore, socially engaged art involves not only critical reflection and exploration of social and political space, but also a "positive" element mentioned above, the set of values to which the artist refers, and certain, more or less clearly defined, methods of expressing opposition. This is what distinguishes socially engaged art from critical art, which is aimed at acute,

marginalized phenomena and discourses and does not seek to alleviate them or replace them with positive content. According to Zydorowicz, critical art "does not really have a positive program, but it not necessarily encapsulates a negative program. It is not design-oriented, it does not form manifestos, [...] it promises nothing in particular – it only problematizes certain phenomena within cultural discourses and avoids proclaiming alternatives or utopias. It provokes, redefines, asks embarrassing questions, but it does not claim to have any final answers, and does not refer the recipient to any entities which could provide such answers" (Zydorowicz 2004, 91).

In our opinion, Zydorowicz's concept of socially engaged art is fitting as a description of the majority of artistic phenomena associated with the Revolution of Dignity, because Ukrainian artists not only comment on events, not only are attentive to current politics, but also – in most cases – clearly define the sphere of affirmed values in their active participation, not just limited to creativity, in the events of the Majdan revolution and also – in some cases – in the war in eastern Ukraine, clearly supporting what was pro-European and anti-government, and patriotic discourse during the Majdan events, advocating for the territorial integrity of the country since the outbreak of armed conflict in Donbas. Zydorowicz, while sketching the genealogical tree of critical and socially engaged art, suggests that the following categorization of these terms is also possible: "Critical art means dissent against the current situation, while socially engaged art means dissent and active prevention" (Zydorowicz 2005, 76). Artistic projects created on the wave of Ukrainian political events in recent years, are examples of such attempts to actively resist and even counteract both dominant political discourses, oppressive power and foreign aggression. These actions exceeded what Artur Żmijewski once called alienation of art, consisting of "avoiding the effect, refusing to exert a real, verifiable influence" (Żmijewski 2007, 19). Following Nazar Kozak, we would also recall Amy Mullin's approach who "has used to justify the notion of activist art. She borrowed the term from Lippard to define a kind of art that was not just politically "concerned" but politically "involved," which implies a political action and "actively seeks public participation" both in the process of its creation and in its perception. Conservative critics have

constantly dismissed activist art for favouring politics over aesthetics and for aligning itself with propaganda" (Kozak 2017, 8–27).

In the case of Ukraine, contemporary socially engaged art is a phenomenon present since the beginning of the new millennium, it appeared several decades later than in Western Europe and the USA. When we use the term 'engagement' with relation to art, we do not mean the propaganda function of socialist realism or any other form of reducing art to the role of a public loudspeaker or an instrument used by the authorities to exert influence, although, of course, it is also a form of involvement which has repeatedly brought tragic results in the past and, until today causes a feeling of shame and reluctance towards the term "socially engaged art" in countries ruled by regimes in the past (Kozak 2017, 15).

Transformation of Ukrainian art after the collapse of the USSR

On the wave of political transformation, the collapse of the USSR and the establishment of independent states, various artistic activities began to surface and gain momentum, directly reflecting the political situation of post-Soviet societies. It seems, however, that in the case of Ukrainian art of the nineteen eighties/nineties, the term 'critical art' is more adequate, which, according to Izabela Kowalczyk, worked primarily as a tool for unmasking hidden, non-obvious oppressive mechanisms exerting power over social life (Kowalczyk 2002, 24). A major part of the Ukrainian artistic projects in the nineties – especially those related to Soros CMA which has been active in Kyiv since 1993 – can be described as political, critical, unmasking, though being primarily "the art of post-totalitarian reflection" (Sydorenko 2008, 135) which perceived power, above all, in relation to the political situation of a society oppressed by the system. It is worth adding that the nineties were quite a turbulent period in Ukrainian art. The newly acquired freedom opened up possibilities which had not been available before, resulting in chaotic and hasty "catching up". Neo-modernism and postmodernism appeared (referred to as the "new wave"; Skljarenko 2004, 188–196). There were developments in social photography, action art, media art, performance, non-figurative painting, and abstract art. Hlib Vyšeslavs'kyj states that the rapid rate of assimilation of the trends which had been developing

in the West for decades resulted in the coexistence of often contradictory styles, directions and viewpoints (Vyšeslavs′kyj 2007, 93–146). Ol′ha Petrova, on the other hand, emphasizes that this stylistic pluralism is a sign of newly acquired freedom and stands in clear contrast to the unified, censored and ideologized art of socialist realism (Petrova 2015, 33). The acquisition of independence caused a period of "institutional vacuum" in which artists found themselves, focusing primarily on grassroots initiatives in the form of groups, squats etc. This situation began to change as early as 1993, when Soros' CMA began operating in Ukraine, which, on the one hand, introduced a modern organization of art culture based on curating, but, on the other hand, supported only those activities in Ukraine which, because of their radicalism, corresponded with the image of promoted contemporary art.

The 2000s brought many changes in Ukrainian artistic life. At that time, new private contemporary art institutions were set up, such as Kyiv PinchukArtCentre or Mystec′kyj Arsenal, Izoljacija (Donec′k), and JermilovCentre in Charkiv (Bluszcz 2012, 83–92). The work of the generation of artists whose debut took place in the 2000s and was associated primarily with the events of the Orange Revolution. These artistic projects can also be described as "political creativity", because it was based on the idea of art as a commentary on current events. In this generation, however, the awareness of the artist's role and place is quite different than it was in the nineties. Young artists, gathered in REP or SOSka groups, focused primarily on activities which were meant to be direct interventions in the public space, with the clear belief that what the artist did had a real impact on the society and led to worldview changes. This generation has also taken its own curatorial initiatives, seeking to redefine the artist's place in society and create new levels of integration at the institutional level (Bluszcz 2012, 90). It should be added that art in the first decades of the new millennium also became the object of attacks from the authorities, a phenomenon which the artists barely experienced in the nineties (Botanowa 2012,107–120). N. Usenko wrote: "Actions of this art-group demonstrated the impact of politics on ordinary people and marked the need to join the fight against the absurd political pressure" (Usenko 2014, 123).

Political art and resistance to oppressive power

One of the key institutions engaged in documenting the war in its early years was the Museum of the History of Ukraine, which has systematically expanded its collection, Defending the Sovereignty and Independence of Ukraine (Zachyst suverenitetu ta nezaležnosti). This initiative has resulted in several significant exhibitions, including "Ukraine: 2014–2016. War and Peace" 'Ukrajina: 2014–2016. Vijna i myr' and "Combat Ukrainian Cossacks in the ATO" 'Bojove ukrajins′ke kozactvo v ATO', which artistically depict the realities of war and the heroism of Ukraine's defenders.

The project "Ukraine. The Realities of Modern war" 'Ukrajina. Realiji sučasnoji vijny' serves as a compelling example of artistic and museological efforts aimed at documenting the ongoing conflict and preserving its artifacts for future generations. This exhibition, created by the National Museum of the History of Ukraine in the Second World War, seeks to present an accurate portrayal of the war in eastern Ukraine, highlight the Russian military aggression, and provide insight into the situation in Crimea and Donbas, as well as the Ukrainian people's struggle for sovereignty and national independence. Through artistic expression and museum-led documentation initiatives, the war is not only recorded but also critically examined, serving as a crucial testimony for future generations.

A key aspect of these projects is the use of installation art, where displayed objects transcend their original utilitarian purpose and acquire symbolic significance. A particularly notable form within this artistic approach is the politically engaged installation. In 2015, the Ukrainian political scientist N. Choma observed that, unlike traditional art installations, political installations are rarely exhibited in museums, as they are typically displayed in public spaces. However, this paradigm has shifted since the outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine. The artworks in question have frequently been showcased in cultural centers, museums, and community halls, amplifying their societal relevance. These installations invite viewers into a specific context, transforming them from passive observers into participants in a dialogue regarding socially and thematically significant issues.

Žanna Kadyrova is one of the most significant contemporary artists engaging with themes of war, memory, and social transformation in Ukraine. Her work has been widely recognized, earning prestigious awards such as the Kazymyr Malevyč Award (2012), the Grand Prix of the Kyiv Sculpture Project (2012), the Miami Pulse Prize (2018), and the Ševčenko Award (2025). She first gained prominence as a member of the REP (Revolutionary Experimental Space) group, founded during the Orange Revolution. Over the years, her artistic practice has expanded beyond the immediate Ukrainian context, addressing broader themes of social change, collective memory and trauma.

A key example of Žanna Kadyrova's engagement with these themes is *Crowd*, an installation composed of shards of glass, newspapers, and other transient materials. This work symbolically encapsulates the instability and fragility of social movements, referencing Ukraine's revolutions and broader processes of political transformation. Kadyrova's critical engagement with commemoration, symbolism, and the evolving significance of monuments is also evident in "Monument to a New Monument", a work that challenges the role and reception of public memorials within shifting historical narratives. The impact of war on Kadyrova's artistic practice has been profound, becoming a central theme in her recent works. Her 2014 project "Untitled" 'Bez nazvy' presents a three-dimensional Ukraine-shaped structure, progressively deconstructed to signify territorial fragmentation. The missing bricks in the composition serve as a potent metaphor for the country's geopolitical instability. The material used in the installation — bricks sourced from an abandoned Soviet-era factory — further reinforces this symbolism, bearing the tangible remnants of a collapsed empire: fragments of wallpaper, scorch marks, and traces of decay. Another significant work, "Behind the Fence", critically examines the shifting border between Ukraine and Russia, addressing the emotional and political upheaval caused by territorial disputes. By repurposing fragments of Soviet-era fences, Kadyrova compels the viewers to reflect on the constructed nature of geopolitical boundaries and their profound consequences for people. Similarly, her 2018 project "Recanonization" engages with Ukraine's decommunization process, interpreting the dismantling of Soviet ideological symbols and the reevaluation of histor-

ical narratives. Through these works, Kadyrova uses art as a critical medium for examining memory, national identity, and the enduring legacies of past regimes.[1]

Since 2022 Kadyrova's projects take on an even more acute and politically charged dimension, as she seeks to shift public consciousness—not only in Ukraine but globally. One of her most striking works, "Russian Missile", involved placing stickers depicting Russian missiles in public spaces around the world. This action aimed to disrupt the complacency of international audiences, confronting them with the reality of war and its broader implications. In Austria, she created "Safe War", a series of sculptures made from bullet-perforated metal, while in "Date Extraction", she transformed fragments of roads destroyed by explosions into abstract paintings.

A completely different approach is evident in "Tryvoha" 'Air-raid alert', a project she conceived after fleeing Kyiv for Transcarpathia. Inspired by traditional embroidered paintings commonly displayed in Ukrainian homes, Kadyrova recontextualized this folk art by incorporating contemporary slogans and war-related expressions. Through this project, she highlights the intersection of cultural heritage and present-day resistance, reinforcing the role of artistic expression in shaping both individual and collective responses to conflict.

Kadyrova's artistic interventions serve as powerful testimonies to Ukraine's ongoing struggle, positioning her as one of the country's most important cultural ambassadors. Her work not only documents the experience of war but also challenges audiences to engage critically with its broader political, social, and historical dimensions (Kadyrova 2013).

In 2025, Žanna Kadyrova was awarded the Ševčenko Prize for her exhibition "Trajectories of Flight", presented at the PinchukArtCentre (2023–2024) ("Trajektoriji pol′otiv" 'Trajectories of Flight' 2023). The exhibition explored Ukraine's evolving identity, with a particular focus on the impact of war on the daily lives of its people. Kadyrova frequently incorporates discarded materials – broken ceramics, shattered glass, tiles, and metal fragments – into her works, giving new life to objects rendered useless by destruction. These materials, often combined with

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1 www.kadyrova.com

cement, wood, and other structural materials, serve as tangible metaphors for resilience and reconstruction.

One of Kadyrova's most well-known works from the exhibition presents the outline of Ukraine as a fractured, fragmented entity, visually mirroring the devastation inflicted by war. The exhibition as a whole functions as an artistic timeline, guiding the narrative from Ukraine's past through its turbulent present and toward an uncertain but hopeful future. It features works reflecting post-Soviet Ukrainian realities (Orbit), as well as those addressing the occupation of Crimea and ongoing military conflicts. The selection includes pieces from major projects such as "Behind the Fence", "Maps", "Crowd", "Signs", "Shots", "Safe War", "Paljanycja" ('Loaf bread'), "Anxiety", and documentation from "Russian Rockets", "Data Extraction", and "House of Culture", among others (Kadyrova 2013).

As Olena Červonyk wrote in the introduction to the album dedicated to Kadyrova's work "Transforming tile into liquid, cement into rays of light, newspaper cutouts into sculptural material, and «Data Extraction» into «canvases», Kadyrova engages in visual alchemy, creating new three-dimensional metaphors. The artist's works expose the very essence of art as a process of creating semiotic signs that help a person structure the raw, boundless world: though it exists outside of us, we can approach it only through the system of culture, that is to say, through the continuous semiotic process of creating new sign systems. [...] Kadyrova's exceptional quality lies in the fact that she does not stop at the formal quest for new visual approaches. Her artistic agenda is much broader than the formal exploration of possible materials and techniques. Every work ultimately becomes a metaphorical trampoline, catapulting the viewer into the zone of social reflection" (Červonyk 2013, 9).

Analyzing Kadyrova's works, one is reminded of Boris Groys' question concerning the autonomy of art and its connection to politics. Referring to the researcher's work, we could argue that the artist introduces images that combine ethnic and cultural origins with universal representations related to the passage of time, change, and violence into the international art space. In a sense, these works challenge the normativity of contemporary mass media while simultaneously responding

to its demands. They merge both strategies described by the author: "One approach emphasizes images that denote national cultural identity, while the other, inversely, prefers everything international, globalized, media-related. But these two strategies are only quasi antagonistic: both make reference to something that is excluded from a particular cultural context. In the first case, the regional images are excluded; the second targets mass media images. But in both instances, the images in question are simply examples that point to the infinite, 'utopian' realm of aesthetic equality" (Groys 2008, 17).

This superimposition of two dimensions is also reflected in audience reception. In international context, certain elements remain incomprehensible, while others provoke discomfort by pushing viewers out of their comfort zone. As a result, a gap emerges between the artist and the project participants, a phenomenon discussed by Dušan Barok in his interview with Claire Bishop On Participatory Art (Barok 2009). This raises the question of communication and collaboration. Socially engaged artists face the crucial task of contextualizing their art, providing guidance, and explaining the circumstances surrounding their projects. Naturally, in the case of Kadyrova's works, this process unfolds differently in Ukraine than worldwide. Consequently, her projects are not only perceived differently but also acquire new dimensions depending on the location of their exhibition.

Art as a Tool for Social Activism: The Case of the Izoljacija Foundation

The Izoljacija Foundation has played a significant role in shaping the scene of socially engaged art in Ukraine. Originally established in Donec′k within a repurposed mineral wool factory, the center was envisioned as a catalyst for transforming the region's cultural sphere. Its founders aimed to foster artistic innovation and create a space for contemporary cultural dialogue in eastern Ukraine.

Following the occupation of Donec′k by separatist forces, the foundation faced the challenge of sustaining its activities despite severe political and social constraints. One notable example of its continued efforts was the "Ten Years of Spanish Cinema" festival 'festival 10 rokiv ispans′koho kinematografu'. This initiative sought to provide the city's

residents with a semblance of cultural normality amid instability and uncertainty. Through artistic engagement, the foundation contributed to preserving social cohesion, offering emotional resilience, and reinforcing hope among the local population.

The festival of Ukrainian literature, organized on a grand scale in April 2014, was also extremely interesting. Despite the unfavourable circumstances, the foundation decided to publicize questions about the role of Ukrainian culture and about national identity. The curator of the project was Ljubko Dereš who suggested that during the festival the authors should pick up the topic of violence present in the language, and thus in literature and culture. The individual blocks of the festival focused the anatomy of violence, violence in the media, the relationship between civil society and the authorities, the relationship between an individual and the group, and gender-based violence. The guests of the festival participating in meetings with readers, round tables, discussions, presentations, etc. included Jurij Vynnyčuk, Kateryna Babkina, Myroslav Marynovyč, Serhij Dacjuk, Volodymyr Ješkilev, Irena Karpa, Ihor Kozlovsʹkyj, Dmytro Stus, Mustafa Najem, Mark Livin, Chrystja Venhrynjuk, Fedir Besedin, Maksym Kamenev, Natalka, Snjadanko, Lili Hajd, and Svitlana Aleksijevič. Lively dialogue and debates centred around the Ukrainian culture and statehood.

The year 2014, however, became a turning point and the activities of Izoljacija in Donbas came to an end. Its proponents were forced to leave the territory. The fact that, in April 2014, the venue which was a source of contemporary culture in Donecʹk was turned into a high-security prison and a torture chamber was significant and at symbolic.

After the centre was moved to Kyiv, it focused on the work with refugees from Donbas. In recent months, a decision was made to symbolically return to Donbas and open a centre in the city of Soledar. Residencies would be held there, artists from Ukraine and abroad could come to set ties in their immediate surroundings through their work.

The foundation also conducts research on the culture and identity of Donbas. One of such commitments is an interdisciplinary project under the heading "Donbasʹki Studiji" 'Donbas Studies' run since 2014. The project, involving scientists, artists, culture animators and others, includes research as well as creating a library and going out into public space. The

interpenetration of various disciplines creates a new quality and allows for a wider presentation of the problems and specificity of Donbas.

The entire activity of the Izoljacija foundation represents a multi-dimensional commitment: both in social, political environmental and other spheres. Just to mention, for example, projects related to the study of human impact on the environment, whether in Donbas or at the Sea of Azov such as "Coming Out of Isolation: Through Art to Visibility" or "Utopia: transformations of the Ukrainian East" 'Utopija: transformaciji ukrajins′koho schodu'.

One of the examples of social involvement was Anton Šebet′ko's (2018) photography project "Coming Out", aimed at drawing attention to the involvement of the LGBT community in defending Ukraine against Russian aggression in the east of the country. This subject matter is non-existent in the public discourse, it is easier to ignore it and overlook the efforts of homosexuals, often treated as second-class citizens. Šebet′ko's exhibition was a form of assertion claiming their rights and recognition. The artist presented not the general public, but a specific group of people: soldiers, military volunteers, other volunteers with their stories. The characters were masked, their faces were painted in leopard pattern because many of the protagonists were afraid of coming-out in public life.

Another example was the pursuit of the "Metamisto: Schid group" 'Metacity: East group', which investigated the identity of cities in the Donec′k and Luhans′k regions, among others Bachmut, Severodonec′k and Kostjantynivka. Their specificity, narratives and concepts were analysed. Artists such as Serhij Hrech, Vitalij Kochan, Serhij Radkevyč and others were involved in this exercise, creating works inspired by the ideas found in these cities.

"Izoljacija", located within the Kyiv shipyard, additionally established a collaborative workspace under the name IZONE, primarily focused on commercial activities, cultural events, concerts, and similar initiatives. In addition to individual projects, IZONE hosts artist residencies, attracting a diverse group of residents, including artists, architects, filmmakers, programmers, and designers (Didenko 2020).

Even after leaving Donec′k, the Izoljacija Foundation has remained committed to its social mission. As its founder, Ljubov Mychajlova

stated: "Exile was undoubtedly a traumatic experience for all of us, but since relocating to Kyiv, our mission has not changed. We continue to use culture as a tool for social, cultural, political, and economic transformation. IZOLJACIJA remains a multidisciplinary center whose activities focus on three key areas: site-specific artistic projects, educational programs, and creative initiatives aimed at fostering local communities" (Jagodzińśka 2015).

Izoljacija has continued its operations even in the conditions of full-scale war. In 2022, it launched several significant initiatives aimed at supporting Ukrainian society in its struggle, including the exhibition "You know that you are human" (Ty znaješ, ščo ty – ljudyna 'You know that you are human' 2022), organized in collaboration with German artists and curators. This project was conceived before the full-scale invasion as a reflection on the essence of humanity in its various manifestations. However, it gained particular relevance in the wake of Russia's brutal aggression, which negated fundamental human values.

Another initiative directly tied to supporting war-affected communities is the multi-phase project ZMINA 2.0, financially supported by European Union institutions. This program encompasses events and projects aimed at revitalizing cultural life and sustaining cultural engagement in local communities despite wartime conditions. Importantly, its scope extends beyond artistic and cultural activities, incorporating tangible humanitarian aid, including medical, material, and housing assistance for war victims. As stated on Izoljacija's website, the project has "provided immediate assistance to address the urgent war-related needs of communities covered by humanitarian aid efforts" (ZMINA: Rebuilding 2023).

The exhibitions organized since the onset of the war have primarily adopted a socially engaged approach, fostering connections with the lives of residents in besieged, devastated, and bombed cities. One such exhibition, "The Residents of Kyiv", featured the photography of Oleksandr Čekmen'ov. His portraits of ordinary yet courageous individuals were accompanied by texts telling stories of their personal experiences – stories of heroism, altruism, and selflessness, but also fear, uncertainty, and shattered hopes.

The number of Izoljacija's artistic and humanitarian initiatives is extensive and difficult to comprehensively enumerate. However, it is worth highlighting that, since 2023, the foundation has been leading The Cultural Transformation Movement Project, a four-year international initiative. The project aims to transform cultural institutions in Ukraine "by implementing cultural management strategies and methodologies, as well as creative processes developed through the full engagement of underrepresented communities" (The Cultural Transformation Movement Project 2023).

Izoljacija's initiatives can thus be classified into the broader concept of artivism, a term that has been present for several decades in the discourse of various social sciences and humanities, including "political philosophy, art history, art criticism, sociology, pedagogy, as well as the language of curators, artists, and social activists" (Ty znaješ, ščo ty – ljudyna 'You know that you are human' 2022).

As defined by Dorota Ogrodzka, artivism represents "an explosive mix of art and activism. Creators who embrace this fusion are driven by a deep-seated need for transformation—whether it is social, local, global, temporary, or permanent one. They seek to reshape consciousness, law, social structures, and habits" (Ogrodzka 2024, 9).

Artivism, understood as actions responding to various social, political, and cultural crises, is characterized not only by the aspiration to manifest a specific stance on an aesthetic level but also by active engagement in driving real change and seeking "concrete solutions to escalating crises". As John Jordan writes: "It is not about showing new perceptions of the world, but about changing it. Refusing representation, artivism chooses direct action" (Jordan 2016).

On the other hand, the authors of the article "Artivism: A new educative language for transformative social action" point out that creativity, which can be described as artivism, is not characterized merely by its aesthetic qualities but rather by its proficiency in portraying crises and injustices and by striving to level them: "The strength of artivism lies not merely in its aesthetic avant-garde, but in its catalytic power to point out injustice, inequality or emptiness in human development" (Aladro-Vico et al. 2018, 12). Thus, it is not just art with a critical edge, positioned at the intersection of activism, social engagement, and often

political protest, but rather the strategic use of artistic tools in political struggle. This raises fundamental questions about the boundaries of art – whether certain actions can or cannot be classified as artistic – and about the actual capacity of artistic practice to influence social reality and shape political discourse. However, in times of crises as profound as war, such theoretical considerations seem to lose relevance, giving way to the tangible efficacy of artistic interventions. The activities of the Izoljacija Foundation exemplify this crisis-sensitive approach, aimed at transformation, problem-solving, and fostering a new way of thinking – not only in regards to art but, more importantly, to urgent social and political issues. In the current wartime context, these initiatives also facilitate the employment of artistic practises as tools of resistance.

This article examined the role of a postcolonial analysis in highlighting the necessity of distancing Ukrainian culture from Soviet colonization, and its significance in shaping the evolving Ukrainian state narrative. Art emerging from subsequent revolutions acquired a dimension of social and political engagement. Following the Russian military invasion of Ukraine, such art primarily functions as a form of resistance to the Russian aggression, often adopting a documentary approach. Ukrainian artists, such as Žanna Kadyrova, alongside institutions that promote engaged art, such as the Izoljacija platform, have played a central role in this process. Artistic communities, through their responses to current events, contribute to the shaping of public discourse and the development of the Ukrainian national identity.

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THE IMPACT OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY AGGRESSION ON UKRAINIAN ART IN 2013–2023

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The article examines the changes in the vector of Ukrainian art towards politics in the period from the Revolution of Dignity in 2013 and till Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine. The article analyzes artworks and exhibition projects in Ukraine and abroad, in which Ukrainian artists raised topical issues of Ukrainian politics, national identity, and criticism of the influence of the Russian propaganda.

Keywords: Ukrainian art, political art, propaganda, censorship, full-scale invasion, war, Russian aggression.

ВПЛИВ РОСІЙСЬКОЇ ВІЙСЬКОВОЇ АГРЕСІЇ НА УКРАЇНСЬКЕ МИСТЕЦТВО 2013–2023 РР.

Ната Кушнірук

У статті розглянуті зміни вектору українського мистецтва в політичне русло, починаючи з часу Революції Гідності у 2013 р. і до повномасштабної війни Росії проти України. Проаналізовані мистецькі твори, виставкові проєкти в Україні та за кордоном, у яких українські художники піднімали актуальні теми української політики, національної ідентичності та критики впливу російської пропаганди.

Ключові слова: українське мистецтво, політичне мистецтво, пропаганда, цензура, повномасштабне вторгнення, війна, російська агресія.

For a long time after 1991, Ukrainian art was apolitical. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the declaration of independence, Ukrainian artists enthusiastically began to explore color, shape, texture, abstraction,

and certain postmodern practices that European society had outlived long ago. Of course, there were also those who addressed socio-political topics, such as the Ukrainian money projects by Oleh Tistol and Mykola Macenko, or performances by Jurij Sokolov or Vlodko Kaufman. However, it was not systematic phenomenon. The vast majority of artists of the 1990s and early 2000s avoided socio-political topics. It was time when it became possible not to paint as dictated by socialist realism, but to create freely on topics that interest you. At that time, artists were not interested in political life, and when it came to politics, everyone just smiled skeptically and changed the topic of conversation. Everyone was so sick of Soviet propaganda that people treated any government with disgust and contempt. For Russia, in turn, this was a very favourable position, because about at that time the idea of 'art outside politics' emerged. This was the time when Marat Hel′man's gallery was actively working in Kyiv, and Ukrainian artists were presented to the world as the 'South russian wave'. Artists were afraid of losing their creative freedom if they risked making dangerous political statements. At this time, the group "Žyvopysnyj Zapovidnyk" 'Picturesque Reserve' was active, exploring non-mimetic painting, or the "Paris Commune" with its childlike perspective and transavantgarde.

The R.E.P. (Revolutional Experimental Space) group began to raise political issues more actively during the Orange Revolution. However, Ukrainian society at that time was still quite infantile and not ready to take responsibility for the further development of the country and control over the actions of the authorities.

Ukrainian art began to acquire a political vector closer to the Revolution of Dignity in 2013. Political tension was already felt in mid-2013. It was a time of torture in police stations, political manipulation as a result of the Kivalov-Kolesničenko law and mass Russification, political corruption, destruction of small and medium-sized businesses, and the Charkiv agreements that later enabled Russia's annexation of Crimea. The last straw was the failure to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, which had been in the works since 2007. Following the failure to sign the agreement in Vilnius, on November 29, protesters gathered on Kyiv's Independence Square and were dispersed by Berkut officers. This led to large-scale protests across the country.

1.1. Ivan Semesjuk "Pan na rajoni" 'Signior of the district', 2010

Ivan Semesjuk, Oleksa Mann, and Andrij Jermolenko created the informal gallery "Bacteria" in 2013. Their project "Žlob-Art" was a great success. It ironically revealed unattractive Ukrainian realities, such as the bums, thugs, and lifestyles of other lumpen and marginalized groups in Ukrainian cities. In the "Žlob Art" paintings, we see aggressive characters from residential areas in tracksuits drinking beer, picking seeds, and listening to chanson (see Annex 1.1).

"Žlob-art" is perhaps the most vivid description of the socio-cultural situation in which Ukrainian society found itself before the Revolution of Dignity. Their latest joint project, "Zombieland", tells the story of "the cops who rob us, the bums we work with, and the doctors who disembowel us. This is an imprint of the time we live in" (Olijnyk 2013).

On July 26, 2013, the Mystecʹkyj Arsenal in Kyiv hosted the opening of the exhibition "Velyke i Velyčne" 'Great and Majestic', which became the central artistic event of the official program of the 1025th anniversary of the Baptism of Rusʹ. It was intended to demonstrate the civilizing influence of Christianity on the development of culture in Ukraine. At the same time, there was a scandal with Volodymyr Kuznecov's work "Kolijivščyna. Strašnyj Sud" 'Kolijivščyna rebellion. The Last Judgment'. The artist depicts in the mural how modern sinners, such as a deputy, policemen, corrupt judges, and priests, will burn in hell. They are entering the cauldron of hell in a car driven by a drunken girl with a bottle in one hand and a wad of money in the other. The righteous are Jesus, written off from Michelangelo's "Last Judgment", hand in hand with a Čornobylʹ liquidator in protective uniform, a worker in sweatpants, and Iryna Kraškova, who was raped by the police on June 27, 2013 (see Annex 1.2).

1.2. Volodymyr Kuznecov "Kolijivščyna. Strašnyj Sud" 'Kolijivščyna rebellion. Last Judgment'. Unfinished wall painting. Mystec'kyj Arsenal, Kyiv, 2013

The then director of the Mystec'kyj Arsenal, Natalija Zabolotna, told journalists in an interview that this interpretation was not appropriate for the holiday: "I believe that it [the painting] could have offended the feelings of believers in this way, because the project was created to mark the 1025th anniversary of the baptism of Kyivan Rus'" (Kuznecov 2023).

In the end, Volodymyr Kuznecov's artwork was not exhibited at the exhibition because Zabolotna committed an act of censorship at the last minute by painting over the painting with black paint. Of course, this was a provocation, given the authorities in the country at the time, because the exhibition was to be attended by the top leadership of the Party of Regions, including Janukovyč and the UOC-MP, who would have definitely recognized themselves in the characters of The Last Judgment.

This act of censorship by Natalija Zabolotna became a public precedent that marked the political environment of the country, which tried to exercise total control over all public spheres, including art in Ukraine.

In October 2013, the Karas' Gallery opened the exhibition "Pered Stratoju" 'Before the Execution', where the artists Mykyta Kadan, Jevhenija Belorusec', and Mykola Hroch presented their views on the extreme forms of political violence they had witnessed (Ložkina 2020).

The premonition of the revolution was viscerally felt in Vasyl' Caholov's exhibition project "Pryvyd Revoljuciji" 'The Ghost of Rev-

ВИКЛИКАЙ БОГА РЕВОЛЮЦІЇ

1.3. Oleksa Mann "Vyklykaj Boha Revoljuciji" 'Call the God of the Revolution', 2011

olution', which wa exhibited at the Dymchuk Gallery in Kyiv from October 24 to November 20, 2013. The main painting, which has the same name, shows pensioners with pitchforks running somewhere. Running alongside them are skeletons whose earthly life has long since ended, but whose revolutionary fervor has not yet faded. The author is ironic about the fact that these are communists running 'to a brighter future'. At the same time, a new generation of true freedom fighters has been born and raised in Ukraine, but society is still full of pensioners who felt good under the union and are always ready to vote 'for buckwheat' and populist slogans. Vasylʹ Caholov reflected on the immaturity of Ukrainian society in his series "Ukrajinsʹki X-fajly" 'Ukrainian X-Files', "Optyka Pomarančevoji Revoljuciji" 'Optics of the Orange Revolution' (Kostenko 2013), where the irony was indeed justified. However, this time the society showed its readiness to change. A month after this exhibition, Ukrainians showed that they can unite and fight for their values.

Initially, it seemed that the protest would be peaceful, like in 2004. However, when the then government resorted to beating students on November 30, barricades grew on the Majdan. Artists and designers began to actively create posters and share them on social media. Oleksa Mann showed his paintings in a kind of 'art fortress' that activists built from wooden pallets and plywood sheets. Artists met there, exchanged information, created art, gave lectures, held literary readings, and made Molotov cocktails at the same time. Later, this place was called "Mystecʹkyj Barbakan" 'Artistic Barbican' and became a combat unit of the Majdan Self-Defense.

It is interesting that Oleksa Mann's paintings "Vyklykaj Boha Revoljuciji" 'Call the God of the Revolution', "Konduktor Revoljuciji" 'Conductor of the Revolution' or "Vidkryj Koktejlʹ Molotova" 'Open the Molotov Cocktail' were very foresightly created in 2011 (see Annex 1.3, 1.4).

1.4. Oleksa Mann "Vidkryj koktejl' Molotova" ("Open a Molotov cocktail"), 2011

1.5. Oleksandr Mel'nyk "Baču spravy tvoji, ljudyno!" ("I see your actions, man!"), 2013

The images in Oleksa Mann's paintings are intentionally hyperbolic and somewhat caricatured. This is exactly why they are highly recognizable and convey the artist's personal experiences. His paintings capture the most common cliches of the time, how the revolution was perceived by society through the media. For example, the term "New Middle Ages" was often used to describe the ammunition and structure of the Majdan. The catapult, which protesters assembled to defend themselves against Berkut, is also related to this.

"The Morgensterns, the way these weapons were made, all these sticks with nails, some grenades with nails attached, the Berkut on the Majdan, the smoldering of all these tires, it really looked like the Middle Ages" – Oleksa Mann "Halereja protestnoho mystectva" vidkrylasja v Kyjevi '"Gallery of protest art" opened in Kyiv' 2021).

In just a few weeks, the life of the capital changed dramatically beyond recognition. There were more people in helmets than people in hats. The look of the city changed. Everything acquired a special sublime aestheticization.

From the first days of the confrontation, Oleksandr Mel'nyk came to the Majdan with his famous work "Baču spravy tvoji ljudyno!" 'I see your actions, man!' (see Annex 1.5). The large eyes, as if from an icon, looked directly into the human soul and made one think whether he was doing

the right thing. It was an appeal to the security forces.

On the other side of the painting there was the inscription "You are beautiful! I love you!" as a way to support the protesters. It was a call to other artists to come out with their works and speak about their experiences and defend their rights through the language of art (Kovtunovyč, Pryvalko 2016, 154).

1.6. Vasyl' Korčyns'kyj "Majdan. Revoljucija Hidnosti" 'The Majdan. The Revolution of Dignity', 2013

Vasyl' Korčyns'kyj came to the Majdan right after the students were beaten. He left his home in the morning and stayed there until 11–12 at night. He also survived the worst night of shootings near the Trade Unions building from February 19 to 20. He saw with his own eyes the massacre of people, although he did not take part in the clashes. He said: "I was a bit jealous of the artists who could work right on the Majdan: they were drawing portraits, painting helmets. I was so 'excluded' from creativity that I couldn't pick up a brush for a long time. When the mainstream passed, I began to think about how to depict the Majdan. The result of my thoughts is this work – "Majdan. Revoljucija Hidnosti" 'Majdan. Revolution of Dignity' (Dubovyk 2022). This work was pub-

1.7. Lesja Chomenko "Rysunky z Majdanu" 'Drawings from the Majdan', 2013

lished on the cover of the catalog of Oleksandr Melʹnyk's exhibition project "Ukraine from Trypillja to the Present". Today, it is kept in the Museum of the Revolution of Dignity (see Annex 1.6).

The painting depicts a clash between Majdan protesters and Berkut officers where the good force is presented in the form of human heroes and the evil takes shape of a serpent. Above all this, angels are flying, helping to overcome the darkness with fiery spears. "Why are there angels over the Majdan? I am convinced that God was on our side. Tires were burning and the wind was constantly blowing the smoke in the direction of the Berkut officers. It was mystical somehow …" (Dubovyk 2022).

Lesja Chomenko, an already well-known artist at the time, a member of the R.E.P. group, worked on an interesting project on the Majdan, in which she created quick pencil portraits of people she did not know in duplicate (see Annex 1.7). I gave the original to them and kept a copy for my next project. It was a mission to provide psychological support to the people standing there.

"Everyone here does his part, everyone is equal. This is an amazing model that is also incredibly utopian. While in a normal state everything is capitalized and there is a hierarchy of authority, here any feasible participation is equalized and welcomed. Here I meet people who have done a lot for the Majdan and those who have done much less, but the energy from them is absolutely the same" (Serhackova 2013).

On January 31, 2014, the artist Jurij Žuravelʹ, the leader of the Ot Vinta! band, opened an exhibition of his graphic works on the Majdan. The works were placed on a construction fence, of which only the pillars remained, because everything else was used to build barricades. According to the artist, he came with his band to sing on the Majdan, but when he lost his voice, he could no longer sing, but he had to continue the struggle. Then he took up a pencil and began to draw current events – satirical caricatures of Ukrainian politicians – Arbuzov, Janukovyč, Medvedčuk, Jacenjuk, etc., security forces, various symbols of the Majdan, such as 'jolka' or a baby sitting on a Berkut helmet with an EU flag (see Annex 1.8).

1.8. Jurij Žuravel' z vystavky "Na barykadach" 'from the exhibition "On the Barricades"', 2014

"My sharp pencil, guitar, and voice are also worthy weapons. If the pencil breaks, the strings tear, and my voice breaks, I will continue to fight with my fists, teeth, and body…" said Jurij (Hromads′ke 2014). He also created the Majdan chevron with the image of the Archangel Michael.

After the first deaths of Serhij Nihojan, Belarusian Michail Žiznevs′kyj, and Jurij Verbyc′kyj on January 21, the artist Serhij Radkevyč created two monumental works dedicated to the victims of political violence on the Majdan. "Upokij" 'Repose' and "Serhij Nihojan. Virmens′kyj Motyv. Upokij" 'Serhij Nihojan. Armenian Motif. Repose' (see Annex 1.9, 1.10).

1.9. Serhij Radkevyč "Upokij" ("Repose"), 2014

The first work condemns aggression against innocents and emphasizes the absurdity of using human figures as targets in military exercises. These models, even though they are inanimate, have the characteristics of living subjects. This prepares the soldier to kill real people. The work

1.10. Serhij Radkevyč, "Serhij Nihojan. Virmens'kyj motyv" ("Serhiy Nihojan. The Armenian Motif"), 2014

"Repose" is a memory of the victims who gave their lives in the struggle against the government.

The second work is dedicated to Serhij Nihojan, who died during the clashes on Hruševs'kyj Street. The composition of the mural is based on a simplified silhouette, which was previously used in Armenian tombstones in a horizontal position. Serhij Radkevyč transfers Nihojan's portrait into a vertical plane, turning it into an icon that depicts a modern martyr (Vyšnja 2014).

During the active phase on the Majdan, in the 40 days from January to March, Matvij Vajsberh created a unique art project called "Stina" 'The Wall', consisting of 28 paintings (see Annex 1.11). It chronicles the episodes and emotions during the Revolution of Dignity.

"At first, I went to the Majdan simply as a citizen", says Matvij Vajsberh, "I was there from the first to the last day of the Orange Revolution. A few months after the Orange Revolution, Kyiv seemed like a political swamp to me again. And when the Revolution of Dignity began, I realized the happiness of witnessing it" ("Stina" Matvija Vajsberha "'The Wall" by Matvij Vajsberh' 2021).

Here we can recognize posters and graffiti, bonfires, the blackness of the barricades and the colonnade of the Dynamo Stadium, black and red flags, images of protesters with their backs turned to the viewer,

1.11. Matvij Vajsberh "Stina" ("The Wall"), 2014

symbolizing a kind of unanimous mass of people ready to go to the end. Spotlights, puffs of smoke and barely visible Berkut helmets that looked like caviar. And in each of the paintings you can feel the breath of death along with a sense of hope.

In the article "Trauma and Catastrophe. The Wall 2014 by Matvij Vajsberh" Oleksandr Čertenko concludes that Vajsberh uses the principle of relieving anxiety by introducing it into a 'symbolic space' (Eric Santer) and channels it on at least three levels. First, Matvij Vajsberh's "The Wal" absorbs the artistic experience of previous revolutionary events, in particular the works of Eugène Delacroix and Francisco Goya. They are united by a longing for the dead and a kind of resistance anthem. In addition, the parallels are reinforced by the fact that the mood is conveyed without specific characters, only through colors, shapes, hints, and associations (Čertenko 2014).

However, sublimation of creative energy is not a guarantee of internal relief. One of Matvij Vajsberh's works shows a blue sky over the Majdan, but, according to the artist, "it does not make him feel better. This is not catharsis" (Donadio 2014).

Kateryna Nosko considers that Vajsberh's painting concentrated the energy of excitment that materialized in the form of an absolutely pure impression. At the same time, the grouping of impressions will have as

many faces, synesthesia, as there are viewers, who have a clear memory of full-blooded 'yesterday' (Nosko 2014).

The sense of tragedy is deeply felt in one of Vlada Ralko's most important projects, "Kyjivs′kyj Ščodennyk" 'Kyiv Diary', which she created during her daily observations of the revolutionary events (see Annex 1.12).

1.12. Vlada Ralko iz seriji "Kyjivs′kyj ščodennyk" from the series "Kyiv Diary", 2013 – 2014

The artist created almost 400 A4 drawings, where she released all her own and other people's fear and pain, all her experiences and premonitions. However, unlike Vajsberh, she does not express hope, courage, or joy here. There are severed limbs, blood, and death, and in this way, she was telling the foreign audience about the realities of the time. The artist deliberately avoids even a hint of embellishing reality. In some of her works, Vlada Ralko quoted Immanuel Kant, whom she was reading at the time, whose highest value was the human being: "I am interested in the human in those moments when it leaves a person and then comes back again." The main character of this series is a man in an eye costume. This was a real person whom the artist met on the Majdan, but he personified many different contexts – dictatorship, general state control, human blindness (Jakovlenko 2019).

The final emotions and feelings of the Revolution of Dignity are conveyed in the works of Olexandr Rojtburd – "Rizanyna na Chiosi" 'Massacre on Chios' and "Toj Ščo Pidnimaje Znameno" 'The One Who Raises the Flag' (see Annex 1.13, 1.14). They were painted on February

1.13. Oleksandr Rojtburd "Rizanyna na Chiosi" 'The Massacre at Chios', 2014

19–21, 2014. At that time, shots were heard in his studio. The artist visualized all his pain and grief in the work "Rizanyna na Chiosi" 'Massacre in Chios'. It clearly shows the artist's emotional reaction to the shooting of the Heavenly Hundred. The next work, although also about the Heavenly Hundred, has a more inspirational mood. In her Facebook post, Diana Kločko aptly noted that the flag in the painting does not fall, it is passed on (Kločko 2021).

It is picked up by the next person with a new effort, not only muscular but also metaphysical. The body of this character is also surreal, as it flows from the shoulder directly into the leg, but this is the point, because it still returns to the hand that passes the flag. It's a character who survived and took the flag from the hands of the deceased, so he has a special responsibility. And this work is also about the indestructibility of the Ukrainian people – no matter how many times we are shot, we will still rise from the ashes like a phoenix. In terms of composition, there are some references to Caravaggio's "The Laying in the Coffin", but the mood is still more revolutionary, sharp and uncompromising, like Delacroix's.

1.14. Oleksandr Rojtburd " Toj, ščo pidnimaje prapor" 'The One Who Raises the Flag', 2014

"On February 16, I went to Odesa. I was returning on the night of 18–19. They had already started blocking the Odesa highway. Instead of 5 hours, the bus trip took more than 10. There were always traffic jams. I got home absolutely 'dead'. I passed out. When I woke up, I saw smoke coming out of the window and heard echoes of shooting. I went online and realized that there was a massacre. The first day of the massacre. To be honest, I was in a panic. And to somehow cope with this task, I used a canvas. Literally in 2 or 3 hours I wrote this «Massacre at Chios». This is the title of Delacroix's painting. The next day, I went online again and realized that there was a turning point. That they failed to disperse the Majdan. Then, in a few hours, I also painted «The One Raising the Banners»" (Oleksandr Rojtburd pro Revoljuciju Hidnosti 'Oleksandr Rojtburd on Revolution of Dignity' 2021).

Post-revolutionary art 2014–2021

The flight of then-President Viktor Janukovyč was followed by the annexation of Crimea, the occupation of Donbas, and the Ukrainian ATO (anti-terrorist operation). It all happened so fast that it was difficult for Ukrainians to realize all the events, let alone reflect on them. For many artists, this trauma blocked the ability to create freely, while for some, on the contrary, it became an impetus to comprehend socio-political upheavals through the language of art. Ukrainian artists continue to actively reflect on events in society, clearly expressing their pro-Ukrainian position.

The annexation of Crimea is explored by Žanna Kadyrova in her monumental brick installation depicting a map of Ukraine with the peninsula torn off (see Annex 2.1). The artist carved it directly from the wall of an abandoned and destroyed factory. The outlines of the map are ragged. On one side, it is covered with soot, and on


2.1. Žanna Kadyrova "Bez nazvy" 'Untitled', 2014

2.2. Žanna Kadyrova iz seriji "Za parkanom" 'from the series "Behind the Fence"', 2014

the other, it is covered with old Soviet wallpaper in flowers. A piece of the map with the outlines of Crimea lies separately two meters from the base. The installation conveys the disturbing atmosphere of 2014, in which the whole of Ukraine was living at the time. Žanna Kadyrova asks herself and the audience a question: although the house and its walls give a sense of security, how reliable is this protection in the face of changing history?

In an interview on August 6, 2014, she said: "Ukraine has been living independently for 23 years, but this independence is not that great. All this time it has been trying to break out of the post-Soviet coordinate system. As for Crimea, it is with us, just not in our plane. I couldn't make this map without it. But it would have been wrong to make it with Crimea" (Chudožnycja: Krym z namy, prosto ne v nashij ploščyni 'The Artist: Crimea is with us, it is just not in our plane' 2014).

In 2014, Žanna Kadyrova created her project "Za Ohoroŏeju" 'Behind the Fence' on the Birjučyj island in the Cherson region as part of the Birjučyj Contemporary Art Project (see Annex 2.2). The island is located in the Azov Sea near the Crimean coast, which was annexed by Russia. At that time, the topic of walls, fences became especially relevant for Ukraine. New borders appeared between Ukraine and the Russian-annexed Crimea, and the new Ukrainian government began

2.3. Marija Kulikovs′ka, Myl′na figura z kvitamy vseredyni 'Soap figure with flowers inside', Odesa Art Museum, 2019

to make statements about building a huge "European Wall" on the border with the Russian federation. The artist uses elements of former Soviet fences as a basis for this work and paints new metal landscapes and images on these old structures. Žanna Kadyrova installed these metal fences on the beach. The fence blocks the view of the Crimean Peninsula, blocks the horizon and makes the land beyond it inaccessible. The artist's personal website contains detailed photos of the project (Kadyrova 2014).

Marija Kulikovs′ka also discusses the annexation of Ukrainian territories. In 2014, she had to flee her native Kerč, Crimea. During the "Plit. Krym" 'Raft. Crimea' campaign, she sailed a raft from Kyiv down the Dnipro river without any food to remind us of the difficult situation of people who were left homeless after the annexation of Crimea.

In the same year, an exhibition of her social sculptures made of soap at the Izoljacija art center in Donec′k was shot by terrorists from the self-proclaimed unrecognized 'Donec′k People's Republik'. The project was called "Armija Kloniv" 'Army of Clones' and consisted of 20 sculptures of the artist's body (see Annex 2.3). By creating sculptural copies of her own body, Marija Kulikovs′ka declared the presence of women in contemporary art. A year later, in 2015, the artist organized a performance called "Happy Birthday" at the Saatchi Gallery in London. There she smashed her own soap sculptures while being naked, thus pointing to the destruction of her sculptures in Donec′k and the annexation of Crimea. Interestingly, she ordered the soap for her sculptures from a factory where weapons are made and bullets are tested on soap.

On July 1, 2014, an important action took place: 254 unauthorized performances by Marija Kulikovs′ka in St. Petersburg. At the time, the

Manifesta 10th biennial was taking place there. The artist was lying on the steps of the Hermitage in the pose of a fallen soldier, covered with a Ukrainian flag. It all ended with Marija Kulikovs′ka's short-term detention. As a result, she was added to the list of banned artists in Russia (see Annex 2.4). The artist created a series of silk-screen prints based on the documentation of the 254 performance in 2018, in Kyiv.

2.4. Marija Kulikovs′ka, Sankt-Peterburg, performans "254", 2014

In 2014–2018, Alevtina Kachidze implemented the project "Istorija Polunyci Andrijivny abo Ždanivka" 'The Story of Polunycjia Andriivna, or Ždanivka'. It consisted of telephone conversations recorded over four years and meetings with her mother, who lived in the occupied territory of Donec′k region. Alevtina started this project when fighting between the National Guard and separatist bandits of the so-called 'Donec′k People's Republic' began. The only cell phone reception was only at the local cemetery, so it was from there that her mother called Alevtina to let her know she was alive. This project includes videos and propaganda printed materials of the self-proclaimed DPR. The mother passed these materials to the artist. It all reflected the realities in which people had to live in occupied Ždanivka. Polunycja Andrijivna (real name Ljudmyla Kachidze) died on January 16, 2019, at a DPR checkpoint on her way to the government-controlled territory to receive her pension (Kachidze 2014).

The feelings and national position of Ukrainians after the revolutionary events are quite aptly described by the exhibition "Nova Ukrajins′ka Mrija" 'The New Ukrainian Dream' that took place in July 2014 at the Mystec′kyj Arsenal. It featured more than 40 Ukrainian authors already known at the time. As part of this exhibition, curators Oleksandr Solovjov and Mychajlo Kotov encouraged the audience to reflect

2.5. Oleksij Saj "Ne nastupy na hrabli", Oleksandr Vereščak "Terpy. Zabud'" "'Don't step on the rake', 'Be patient. Forget', 2014

on the future development of the country.

In his commentary to the exhibition, Oleksandr Solovjov said: "We live in the era of blockbusters and hits. Projects like «Ukrainian Dream» are needed to add light to the darkness that surrounds us. I decided to take part in the creation of this project because it seemed to me that it was just right. It is clear that it will not change anything dramatically, but it can show the way" (Nova ukrajinsʹka mrija 'New Ukrainian dream' 2014).

Kateryna Nosko aptly noted that it was like an invitation to the viewer to approach the abyss and look down with fear, but also with the thought that this is a chance not to die when falling, but to spread their wings and fly. The exhibition featured a dialog between Oleksij Saj's "Ne nastupy na Hrabli" 'Don't Step on the Rake' and Oleksandr Vereščak's "Terpy. Zabud'" 'Be patient. Forget' (see Annex 2.5). The artists show a dichotomy. On the one hand, it is important to draw conclusions from social revolutionary upheavals, and on the other hand, people always repeat the same mistakes throughout their lives. The Soviet mentality can still play a cruel joke on citizens, when they have to endure and forget everything. Artists seem to be trying to open the viewer's eyes and prevent them from making the wrong choice (Nosko 2014).

Oleksij Saj continues to reflect on post-revolutionary themes, including the ATO, in his bombed-out landscapes. Using a grinder and abrasive, Oleksij made holes in the landscapes, which caused them to lose their outlines, but acquired new very specific meanings (see Annex 2.6). Now they were perceived as fields covered with shell holes forming abstract patterns. Paintings with perforations deprive the viewer of a sense of psychological stability and support. In this case, abstraction is so eloquent and unambiguous that it can say more than any rational

2.6. Oleksij Saj iz seriji "Rozbombleni" 'from the series "The Broken'", 2022

explanation. The result of this work is the exhibition "Rozrachunok vidstani" 'Calculating of the distance', which opened on July 5, 2018 at Port Creative Hub.

The curator of the exhibition Valerija Karpanʹ noted: "Maps are sensitive to political changes, just as artworks change in accordance with the aesthetic modes of our time. Similarly to works of art, maps are a selective medium and can also represent differences

between collective knowledge and individual experience" (Oleksij Saj predstavyv novyj proekt "Rozrachunok vidstani" 'Oleksij Saj presented a new project "Distance calculation"' 2018).

In the same year, 2018, Oleksij Saj took part in the exhibition "Permanentna Revoljucija" 'Permanent Revolution' held at the Ludwig Museum in Budapest. There he presented his work "Plisnjava" 'Mold', which says that the driving force in Ukraine is not hungry peasants or protesting workers, but the ordinary middle class. They are the ones who go to the polls and elect the government, so they are ready to fight for a better future for themselves and their children and take responsibility. The same exhibition also featured an interesting project by Mykyta Šalenyj called "Čorna Sybir" 'Black Siberia' (2016). The artist uses cheap Chinese towels to create a large-scale installation. The work resembles a scorched forest and refers to the collective memory

of concentration camps and repressions in Siberia where Ukrainians were sent.

Overall, the curators of the exhibition, Alisa Ložkina and Kostjantyn Akinša, successfully presented 30 years of Ukrainian art as a holistic and comprehensive museum project to a foreign audience (Avetova 2021, 48).

The exhibition "Kodeks Mežyhir″ja" 'Codex of Mežyhir″ja' (2015) at the National Art Museum in Kyiv, curated by Oleksandr Rojtburd, was a marker of post-revolutionary society. According to the curator, it was an exhibition "about bad taste as a diagnosis of dictatorship. About Janukovyč's childhood traumas that led to a painful attraction to the superficial luxury and corruption in Ukraine". The exhibition consisted of items found in Janukovyč's and Pšonka's estates, including some openly kitschy items, things that should be in museum collections, such as paintings by Polenov and Končalovs′kyj, or unique icons from the fourteenth century, and just plain trash (Olijnyk 2014).

This exhibition caused a real resonance in society, but it showed that people were simply interested in looking at the king's lifestyle. Many

2.7. Roman Minin "Plan Vteči z Donec′koji oblasti" 'Escape plan from the Donec′k region', 2011

people even liked it, and this, again, showed the immaturity of the society, which was ready to fall into the same trap again.

However, people were still tired of the revolutionary and military events in Ukraine. It is often difficult to comprehend and explain some things logically. That's when art comes to the rescue with its therapeutic and purifying effect. In this case, art speaks in an allegorical language about a complex reality, some aspects of which are simply impossible to verbalize. "Art becomes a kind of anti-fiction when it leads the viewer from a fictitious reality to a real one", as Marquard Odo says (Marquard 1983, 35).

Roman Minin has been working with the topic of reimaging Donbas since 2010. He was born in the city of Myrnohrad, Donec'k region, and lived there until he was 16. Miner's mythology, researching the way people from the East of Ukraine think, creating a kind of dystopian model of Donbas. If at that time children there were asked "What do you dream about?" Most of them unanimously said to go as far away as possible. Donbas was perceived as perhaps the most depressing region because of the constant shortages, gangs, and Russian cultural codes. Bandits became the main characters, and prison chanson was a favorite musical genre. One of the main tasks of the Donbas residents was simply to survive in those conditions. Roman Minin embodied his aesthetic dystopian model of Donbas in murals, stained glass, easel and monumental works.

Roman Minin created the iconic monumental composition "Plan vteči z Donec'koji oblasti" 'Escape plan from the Donec'k region' (2011), which acquired new additional meanings after the occupation of the region in 2014 (see Annex 2.7). Another reflection on an infantile society can be read in his work "Kylym obicjanok" 'Carpet of promises' (2016) (see Annex 2.8). All the endless political decisions, promises, pacts, and treaties are perceived by an infantile society as a solution to all their problems. People in the post-Soviet space who are not used to taking responsibility are ready to vote for populist slogans and promises of higher wages, for buckwheat and beautiful campaign signs. Thus, it is perceived as an endless manipulation and a mental trap that people are happy to dive into because it is convenient.

This position is one of the main reasons for Russia's military encroachment on the integrity of Ukraine. Common sense is inferior

2.8. Roman Minin "Kylym obicjanok" 'The Carpet of promises', 2016

to any vow made emotionally and publicly. In his work, Roman Minin figuratively depicted the mechanisms by which each and every promise weaves the unbreakable carpet of history (Macenko 2016).

The topic of responsibility for one's political choice is raised by Mykyta Kadan in his installation "Babuška. (Mavzolej Zabezpečennja)" 'Babuška. (Supply Mausoleum)' (Kadan 2013). The installation has two sides: one is a facade reminiscent of Soviet architecture of the 60s and 70s, and the other is a display case filled with bread (see Annex 2.9). The artist seems to be inviting us to sneak a peek into the minds of pensioners, people of the Soviet era who are used to voting 'for buckwheat', populist promises, and minimal pension supplements. Young people despise them for this, because in doing so, they are selling a future that belongs not only to them.

Their shortsightedness was brought up by the Soviet past, their belief in the strong hand of the authorities that will restore order, their gratitude to the Soviet Union, because they were given free apartments, free medicine, and cheap sausage. However, the apartments could not be freely disposed of, because they were the property of the enterprise. Although medicine was free, Soviet doctors did not have access to new

2.9. Mykyta Kadan "Babuška. (Mavzolej Zabezpečennja)" 'Babuška. (Supply Mausoleum', 2013

research and therefore treated everything with 'folk methods' – mustard poultices, rubbing with alcohol, and drugs banned in the civilized world.

After the Revolution of Dignity, Lesja Chomenko continued to work with political themes. For her, any public presentation of art is a political gesture. She uses photos as a source of reference for her artistic research. These can be photos of her friends or random people from the Internet. Once on the canvas, they lose their identity and acquire a new role. It's like a postmodern game that makes it difficult to distinguish between reality and fiction because of all the information noise. These ideas were embodied in the artist's personal project "Kil'ka Istorij ta Ob″jektiv" 'Several Stories and Objects', which was exhibited in 2020 at the Voloshyn Gallery in Kyiv. At this exhibition, Chomenko presented paintings on a biflex that was stretched over deck chairs. The heroes of the paintings are pro-Ukrainian Crimeans who cannot return home and russian cultural figures who are banned from entering Ukraine after visiting Crimea. These characters argue about the question "Whose is Crimea?" (Voloshyn Gallery 2020).

Another exhibition project in which Lesja Chomenko applies the principle of deconstruction is "Prychovani sposerežennja" ("Covert Surveillance") (2021). In it, the artist used photos of soldiers that she sneakily took from the window of her studio, which is located across one of the military units (see Annex 2.10). She indicates that by objectifying the bodies of the soldiers, she dehumanizes them and rethinks the role of the artist's gaze, comparing it to that of a shooter. She paints

2.10. Lesja Chomenko "Prychovane sposte-režennja" 'Covert Surveillance', 2021

this work in several layers. First, there is the ecorsé, then the soldier on a transparent grid, and at the end Chomenko adds leaves that cover the soldiers' bodies. This work deconstructs the war. By disassembling the body anatomically, she figuratively penetrates inside the soldier. (Kornejčuk 2022).

Full-scale war 2022–2024

At the beginning of February 2022, Ukrainian society was in a state of great tension. Some people were packing their bags, but no one knew for sure whether russia would decide to launch a full-scale invasion. Many of us simply could not believe that in the 21st century, when we have the opportunity to be free from stereotypes, to choose our profession, gender, food, lifestyle, etc., people could be as bloodthirsty as the Russians.

Two days before the full-scale invasion, the Jermilov Center in Charkiv opened an exhibition by Oleh Kalašnik, "Enfant terrible" (see Annex 3.1). The breath of war was already very much felt at that time. In the explications that were placed in the exhibition halls of the Jermilov Center, Serhij Žadan said that the war was so close that one could see the wrinkles under her eyes. It is clear that the exhibition was about this war – the gray, cement, Soviet war. Before that, it had come to our borders for a long time, stood at a distance, peering through the windows, trying to see something. But it was already looking at us all as if we were targets. At the time of the opening of Oleh's exhibition, a little more than a day remained before russia's full-scale attack. You could smell the war. It resembled a serial killer who had already entered your building and was slowly, confidently (even arrogantly) climbing the stairs to your fifth floor. You could already hear his footsteps, which were getting

3.1. Oleh Kalašnik foto z vystavky "Enfant terrible" 'photo from the exhibition "Enfant terrible"', 2022

louder, and the realization that you had a couple of seconds left before coming face to face with evil was not so much calming as exhausting.

Oleh Kalašnik's creative focus is on one object – a toy soldier, which is the quintessence of his childhood. Sets of these soldiers turn the exhibition space into a ghostly playground – a portal to the artist's past childhood, a time of happiness and peace when soldiers were just toys.

The project "Enfant Terrible" was about the inevitability of the future, about its unavoidability. Kalašnik emphasizes that in the childhood of Soviet children there were too many weapons, death, and a distorted vision of heroism. Perhaps the children should have played with completely different toys. The future continues to be catastrophically dependent on the contexts of the past, and the traumatic experience of post-Soviet Ukrainians does not add to their strength but rather makes them vulnerable.

In addition, the Jermilov Center turned from an art space into a shelter, and the toy soldiers that made up the exhibition turned into amulets. Kostjantyn Zorkin recalls that "the art community of Charkiv

3.2. Kostjantyn Zorkin "Zachysnyj šar" 'Protective layer', 2022

was all here. Everyone lived here, ate, drank and slept including children, whole families and even dogs" (Kuzubov 2022).

Kostjantyn Zorkin is a Charkiv-based artist who works with land art, installations, performances, puppetry, and graphics. He addresses the themes of magic, mythology and unconscious archetypes. Reinterpreting outdated techniques, he creates toys made of wood and metal that emphasize the contrast between the roughness of the material and the sensual nature of the product. Through his toys, Zorkin touches our souls and asks viewers to look deep into the nature of what it means to be human. In November 2022, the artist presented his solo exhibition "Zachysnyj šar" 'Protective layer' at the Jermilov Center in Charkiv. In this project, he supplemented his artistic world, which he had been creating in recent years from wood, with metal, which was somewhat aggressive in comparison to his previous works. Working with metal involves possible burns, cuts, rust, and wounds. This trauma resonated with the new Ukrainian realities because metal is harder than the human body. The traumatizing and traumatized metal becomes an embodiment of wartime feelings, a constant ratio of protection and defenselessness (see Annex 3.2).

Kostjantyn says: "I think that my art and this project cannot be a documentary evidence of the tragedy in the literal sense, but art rarely tells and describes events directly. It is important for me that my work captures the mental and physical tension that now unites us all in the

3.3. Anton Lohov "Buča", "Pohovannja na dytjačomu majdančyku v Mariupoli", "Hostomel⊠. Vychid" ""Buča", "Burial on a Playground in Mariupol⊠", "Hostomel⊠. Exit"", 2022

struggle" (Kostjantyn Zorkin "Zachysnyj šar" 'Kostjantyn Zorkin "Protective layer"' 2022).

On September 19, 2023, another landmark exhibition by Kostjantyn Zorkin "Kolyskova" 'Lullaby' opened at the Stedly Art Foundation in Kyiv. A lullaby is an ancient ritual designed to protect a child from bad dreams. A lullaby is like a special code that accompanies a child throughout the night until morning. In this respect, the lullaby plays the role of a kind of prayer consisting of special symbols and signs. Zorkin's symbols add a special depth to his art. In his "Kolyskova" 'Lullaby', a human figure, a snake, a skull, a leaf, and a bird come to life in the hands of a demiurge.

In her article about the exhibition, Darija Požydajeva quotes Zorkin: "The magical role is in the ability to influence reality through indirect actions, and for me it is a practical instruction. I can change something in reality with the help of tools, and I can change the perception of reality or transmit information from soul to soul through the language of images" (Požydajeva 2023).

It is impossible not to appreciate the role of poster art, with the help of which artists responded to events accurately and quickly, and protesters around the world came out with them to pro-Ukrainian demonstrations. The essence of posters is that they do not need to be explained,

because they convey the necessary messages to the viewer in a non-verbal, direct and accurate way. Among the most famous Ukrainian poster artists are Mykyta Titov, Daša Podolʹceva, Dmytro Dzjuba, Olʹha Severina and others.

Anton Lohov's art is a synthesis of posters, paintings and installations. From the first days of the full-scale war, he began creating quick drawings about the war in a notebook and posting them on social media to make as many people in the world aware of Russian aggression as possible. He responded to virtually every shelling with a drawing. At first, the drawings depicted explosions, destroyed houses, and then burials in a playground in Mariupolʹ, terrorist attacks in Vinnycja, Kramatorsʹk, and Odesa (see Annex 3.3). In Anton's most painful works, a black or red bloody sun rises. In some drawings, the artist shows the cynicism of 'good russians' who are supposedly 'not into politics' but sponsor missiles that bomb Ukrainian homes, such as "Rosijanka pryjšla v mahazyn po sviže mʺjaso' 'A Russian woman came to the supermarket to buy fresh meat' (Kušniruk 2022).

In addition, Anton compositionally recreates the most painful photos from Buča, Mariupolʹ, Kyiv and other cities by Mychajlo Palinčak and Jevhen Maloletka. In this way, Lohov seems to be in a dialog with the photographers and gives his own vision of the tragedies.

In addition to quick drawings, Anton Lohov also conveys his impressions of the war through abstractions. In August 2022, he presented his abstract paintings at the "Zalizne nebo" 'Iron sky' exhibition (Skabejeva havkaje, a Anton Lohov tvorytʹ 'Skabejeva barks, and Anton Lohov creates' 2023) at the Kyiv Art Gallery. In this case, Anton did not need to depict a plot to convey pain, tension, and stress. Emotional nervous abstraction is felt much stronger than any narrative. The rhythm, play of colors, drips of paint, tonal contrasts allow you to feel the artist without words.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, many artists have started creating art projects specifically to help the Armed Forces of Ukraine. For example, Radyslav Dzjuba created a series of graphics called "Na moskvu" 'To Moscow' where he uses his own technique to depict stylized rockets in different combinations, with different rhythms and pauses. The "Ї" linocuts in the form of a candle with two lights and a

3.4. Radyslav Dzjuba "Ï" 2023, "Neptun" №5 na moskvu" 2023, "Mechanična ptaška" 2024 'Radyslav Dzjuba "Ï" 2023, "Neptun №5 to Moscow" 2023, "Clock-Bird" 2024'

series of "Ptacha" 'Bird' etchings are symbolically important, as they have become symbols of struggle. In 2024, the artist developed another series of linocuts with symbolic owls "Clock-Birds" which Radyslav donated for the purchase, repair, or components for drones (see Annex 3.4).

The artist sends his works to collectors around the world. In this way, his art becomes not only an important information weapon, but also literally turns into bullets for Ukrainian snipers, drones, and first aid kits (Del Fabro 2023).

Oleksij Revika depicts war conceptually with a ballpoint pen. His apt images make the viewer feel the artist's profound emotions. Oleksij's art is simple and concise, however, it carries a lot of information that is easy to read for the viewer. Here he tells about the events in Mariupol′, Azovstal′, Berdjans′k, and his native Melitopol′. In many of his works, there is an image of home, which should be a place of strength and security, but is often destroyed.

It is important to consider the works through which Revika reveals the essence of the crimes committed by Russians against Ukrainians. In his painting "Maroder" 'Marauder', he depicts a Russian soldier who robbed a Ukrainian home but did not have time to bring the stolen goods home. The work "Ruzzkij Mir. Bogi" 'Russian World. Gods'

3.5. Oleksij Revika "Maroder", "Ruzzkij mir. Bogi", "Vtrata""Looter", "Russian Peace. Gods", "Loss", 2022

depicts a skeleton in the guise of the Virgin Mary (see Annex 3.5). Her omophorion is framed by St. George's ribbons (symbol of Russian military), she has a double-headed eagle on her head and tatooed rings on her fingers. Instead of a baby, she is holding rockets, with the Kremlin at the background (Kušniruk 2023). By the way, the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelens′kyj presented Oleksij Revika's work "Vtrata 2022-58" 'Loss 2022-58' to the Pope. It also deals with the most painful topic – the loss of Ukrainian children.

On February 24, 2022, the Russians came to the Ukrainian land with the intention of wiping us out and expected to do it within three days. However, when they came to our land, they faced an incredible resistance movement. Our unbreakable people took on the enemy with their bare hands. Many of them radically changed their way of life, as in the first days they immediately went to join the local defense and the Armed Forces. Representatives of completely different segments of the population – scientists, teachers, programmers, lawyers, businessmen, doctors, artists – found themselves in the same conditions.

One of them is Kostjantyn Lyzohub, an artist from Charkiv, who joined the Charkiv local defense in the first days of the full-scale invasion. He was a member of both a reconnaissance and sabotage unit under the Main Intelligence Directorate and an engineering and sapper unit, and later began to engage in art therapy with the military. Kostjantyn

3.6. Iryna Kaljužna, kartyny iz seriji "Ja Ukrajina" 'paintings from series "I am Ukraine"', 2022

says that he is unable to create new paintings due to his military service (Takoho v armiji šče ne robyly 'This has never been done in the army before' 2023). Nevertheless, he actively represents Ukrainian art abroad, in particular in exhibition projects by Art Territory and Rukh Art Hub in the USA. Kostjantyn Lyzohub became the prototype for Iryna Kaljužna's painting "Ja Ukrajina" 'I Am Ukraine'. The portrait depicts a collective image of a Ukrainian warrior with a stern, courageous, and confident look. The girl hugging him is a prototype of hope for the future. Ukrainians do have something to defend and protect (see Annex 3.6).

Iryna Kaljužna also reveals the issue of the courage of Ukrainian women who are ready to take up arms and defend their country on an equal footing with men. The painting "Sestry" 'Sisters' conveys the strong bond of women who are not afraid, they are full of determination (Kušniruk 2023).

On February 25, 2023, an exhibition of Ukrainian contemporary artists "Path of Resistance" was held in Culver City, California, organized by Art Territory. All the profit from the paintings sold was donated to purchase equipment for a new children's hospital in L'viv and to support Ukrainian artists who were forced to flee their homes and become refugees due to the war (Path of Resistance 2023).

Ukrainian art, which represents the unbreakable spirit of Ukrainian soldiers, is represented in the United States by Lesja Chomenko, who works with the Voloshyn Gallery in Kyiv and Miami and the Fridman

Gallery in New York. The latter, in particular, hosted Lesja Chomenko's solo show "Full Scale" in March–April 2023. There, she presented her series "Unidentified Figures", in which she shows deliberately blurred and darkened images of Ukrainian soldiers hidden behind pixels to avoid deanonymization of their identities by Russian intelligence. In these paintings her main goal is to show the paradox that the heroes who should be glorified remain anonymous, as if their faces are an extension of their pixelated uniforms. Formally, the superimposition of pixels on the photos of the heroes is not a destruction of their identity, but rather an additional protection (Kornejčuk 2022). In this way, Lesja Chomenko deconstructs the narrative image and transforms paintings into objects and installations.

We often don't know the real faces of people who deserve to be heroes because of this anonymity. Instead of being recognized and honored, they too often go missing. They often die on the battlefield, and then their bodies cannot even be identified. In this case, there is just a number on their graves. The fallen heroes return home under the marker '200'. The sculptor Pavla Nikitina has been thinking about this injustice since 2014. Her installation "5 Minutes" is dedicated to Ukrainian veter-

3.7. Pavla Nikitina "5 chvylyn" 3D reportaž "'5 minutes" 3D reportage', 2019

ans and ATO participants and was created in the genre of 3D reportage (see Annex 3.7). Pavla's main goal was to give back the heroes their real faces (Kušniruk 2023).

Speaking of war, it is impossible not to mention the artistic practice of Polina Kuznecova, who works with magic realism in painting and performance. On March 17, 2022, on Freedom Square in Tallinn, she organized a public performance while being in a cage in the downpour. The cage was wrapped in duct tape with the words "Buča, Izjum, Azov" on it. The artist says that with this action "We tried to draw attention to people who cannot say anything and are in captivity" (Ul′janova, Ol′hovs′kyj 2023).

Another important performance of hers was on June 25, 2023, after the explosion of the Kachovka hydroelectric power station. Polina spent 85 minutes in a large aquarium in the middle of a lake in Charkiv: "Some people must have drowned in their closed houses. It was an experiment, I didn't think I would get so cold. I was there for almost an hour and a half, and I got cold in the first 10 minutes. There were people swimming nearby, they were moving and warm, but I started to feel chills right away. When I was in that aquarium, I started thinking about how hypothermia causes loss of strength", says Polina (Ul′janova, Ol′hovs′kyj 2023). Another aspect of this performance is that the aquarium the artist was in looked like a flask, and she was looked at as an exhibit behind glass. This is about the fact that the world's attention is focused on Ukraine as a bright Hollywood blockbuster, as if through glass.

During the two years of the full-scale war, Polina Kuznecova presented two solo exhibitions in Kyiv – "Časy" 'Times' at the Kyiv Art Gallery in December 2022, and "Strašna kazka" 'A Terrible tale' at the Triptych Art Gallery in August 2023. While the first exhibition did not yet have any clear commentary by the artist, but only her feelings, the second one told a complete story about the terrible reality of Ukrainians. It seems that the sky is blue, the clouds are white, the seasons are changing, but if you look closely, there is darkness, blood, and death everywhere. You feel like a character from hell in Bosch's Garden of Earthly Delights. It's a kind of total surrealism of hell, which Polina calls a 'balagan' (Strašna kazka. Polina Kuznecova 'Scary tale. Polina Kuznecova' 2023).

Nonetheless, in this horrible reality, children are born (or not) and there is love. Polina conveys such a beautiful, but at the same time eerie and murderous aesthetic, for example, in the work "Oranta", which is about the flooded territories of southern Ukraine, where the main character wears a white lace dress without eyes, but with tears on her cheeks against the background of flooded houses. An eerie association with the beautiful but dead Ophelia. Here the author is in a dialogue with her own performance in the aquarium. Babies who died or were not even born with horror on their faces. On the other hand, babies as the spawn of evil: this is what happens if an immature and irresponsible person is given the opportunity to play with weapons (see Annex 3.8).

Polina Kuznecova's magical realism is her exploration of herself, her inner world, experiences, feelings and growth. Almost every painting contains her self-portrait. It changes beyond recognition. The artist refers to psychoanalysis, archetypes and figurative rethinking of reality.

Social, political and deep emotional issues are raised by the anonymous artist known as Ave Libertatemaveamor. In an interview, she states that "It is both a greeting and an abbreviation of the first letters of my name, the name of a person close to me, and the symbolic place where the events I depict take place" (Petjach 2021).

3.8. Polina Kuznecova "Oranta" 2023, "Ihrašky" 2022 '"Oranta" 2023, "Toys" 2022'

She conveys disturbing, eerie images of death and ruins to the audience through magical realism – horrific still lifes that document the reality for people living during the war. The longer the conflict lasts, the darker and more horrifying this reality becomes. It turns into an endless, terrifying nightmare. The artist's works are a representation of this hellish, hopeless reality, where people are trying to survive, seeking refuge and trying to do the impossible – to find some semblance of happiness in the shadow of inevitable death. Ave asks her viewers to empathize, not to forget, and to help them find hope. "Červona krov" 'The Red blood' series of graphic works are thoughts about the end of everything, like the sound of a clock pulsating in your head, like blood (see Annex 3.9).

What does a person go through when they see their house burning and being destroyed by a rocket? Ave's metaphorical graphic works are surreal, like a piercing bell ring that turns into a woman's scream. In her Artistic Statement for the exhibition "Time capsule of Golden record", which is organized to mark the second anniversary of the full-scale invasion, curated by the Ukrainian group Rukh Art Hub in New York, the artist says that the hearts of wives, mothers, daughters of soldiers are bleeding. Those who fell asleep in their arms are covered with a blanket of earth. A child is watching the destruction of his cradle. The pictures of the new reality are frozen in silent images of unspeakable fear and pain, a person who has found rest forever under a burning candle, a

3.9. Ave Libertatemaveamor iz seriji "Červona krov" 'from the series "Red Blood'", 2024

person who has been separated by war, a treasure in the imagination that is warming, a unity in a new reality.

The Time Capsule of Golden Record exhibition was opened on February 24, 2024 in New York and was a landmark for Ukrainian art abroad (The Time   Capsule – a Golden Record Catalog 2024). The exhibition featured works by Denys Saražyn, Polina Kuznecova, Oleh Kalašnyk, Kostjantyn Zorkin, Mychajlo Aleksejenko, Kostjantyn Lyzohub, the children's studio of Aza Nizi Maz, Inna Pedan, Oleksandr Ljapin, and Andrij Bludov. The exhibition curators Polina Kuznetsova and Marija Manujlenko guided the American audience through a deep philosophical journey about light and darkness, life and death, good and evil. This project is a gold mine of human experience, sent across the vastness of space in search of contact.

It is important that Ukrainian art has received much more attention and opportunities abroad since the beginning of the full-scale invasion than before. However, this has been actively exploited by various pseudo-cultural organizations, which often organized exhibitions and auctions of dubious quality. Rukh Art Hub is the first organization in New York that aims to bring the best Ukrainian artists to the American art scene and market as full-fledged competitors to the world. "Time capsule of Golden record" is their third project, and with it they draw

3.10. Tetjana Kolisnyk "Protectress", "Armor", 2022

the attention of Americans to the war in Ukraine in the metaphorical language of contemporary art.

The topic of feminism in the Ukrainian army is also quite acute. It is raised by the artist Tetjana Kolisnyk, who, at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, was forced to evacuate from Charkiv with her two children to Germany. The women in her paintings appear as heroes. The painting "Protectress" depicts a young girl in an embroidered shirt and bulletproof vest with a wreath on her head, shining like a halo (see Annex 3.10). She holds her fists on her hips, and her gaze is full of confidence of success (Kušniruk 2023).

In March 2023, Oleksandr Žyvotkov opened the large solo exhibition "Altar" at the National Center Ukrainian House in Kyiv. It featured works created in 2014–2023. Oleksandr Žyvotkov is one of the most famous and successful contemporary Ukrainian artists, who became known during the times of the artistic group "Žyvopysnyj zapovidnyk" 'Picturesque reserve'. Since 2014, his artistic practice has been associated with the suffering of Ukrainians. His multidimensional monumental philosophical works destroy the boundary between the transcendent and the profane. Like ancient tablets and alters, they symbolize a portal between worlds and civilizations, offering the viewer a reflection on the history of mankind.

The artistic tension observed in Žyvotkov's reliefs and counter-reliefs made of stone, wood, and multilayer cardboard affects the viewer as a documentary evidence of tragedy, the tragedy of existence, and the fragility of humanism. The series "Kyjiv. 2014" cycle shows the most terrible days of the heroic and tragic winter of 2014. The idea was to convey the hope that "having conquered death by death", Ukrainians would no longer sacrifice human lives on the altar of freedom (Donin 2015, 12). However, we know that a full-scale russian invasion of Ukraine followed. At the same time, a new wave of painful works came. On February 24, he did not leave Kyiv and worked in his studio every day. Most of his works from 2022–2023 are strictly tied to specific dates and cities, such as Buča, Mariupolʹ, Irpinʹ, etc. (see Annex 3.11). This evokes painful associations in the viewer and forces them to relive it. However, if after the Revolution of Dignity Ukrainians hoped that now it would be enough to simply change the political leadership to change the country

3.11. Oleksandr Žyvotkov "Descent from the Cross", "Buča", "20 bereznja" ""Descent from the Cross", "Buča", "March 20'", 2022

itself, it has now become obvious that a neighbor like russia will never give up its imperial ambitions and will attack again. This realization is forcing Ukrainian society to grow up and take responsibility.

During the 10 years of war with Russia, Ukrainian society has matured considerably. It has become clear that nothing can exist outside of politics, including art, since one of its main tasks is to react to current events. Many artists of the 1990s did not connect their artistic practice with politics and avoided a specific political positioning, began to speak out on political topics after the Revolution of Dignity and felt free to criticize the government. A new generation of artists with a different type of thinking has grown up, who are not afraid to protest and go against the system. Most artists have stopped focusing on the art scene in the Russian-speaking world, as it turned out to be much more promising to speak English and position themselves on the European and American art markets. After the full-scale invasion, any cooperation with Russians, regardless of their political position, became unacceptable. Of course, many Russians are trying to play the victim card, allegedly supporting Ukraine. Through them, the Russian intelligence network tries to justify Russian culture and get a kind of justification for the crimes committed. However, the number of conscious Ukrai-

nians is constantly growing, and the vast majority of Ukrainian artists carefully check information about the curators, gallerists, and critics they choose to work with in the world.

Prior to the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian culture was a blind spot for the world. High-quality Ukrainian art was served as Russian, and Ukrainian culture was represented mostly by low-quality kitsch projects, limited to stereotypes such as boršč, dumplings, a wreath of plastic flowers, and embroidered folk costumes made of low-quality fabrics.

Fortunately, the situation is changing rapidly today. The Ukrainian cultural community is defending the Ukrainian identity of artists in global museums, such as Ivan Ajvazovs′kyj, Ilja Repin, or Archyp Kuindži at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. Proactive Ukrainians are opening galleries around the world that present worthy contemporary Ukrainian art, such as the Serpen Gallery in Berlin, the Rukh Art Hub, Mriya in New York, or the Voloshyn Gallery in Miami. Ukrainian gallerists actively participate in the world's largest contemporary art fairs, such as Art Frieze, Miami Art Week, Art Basel, Feria ARCO, Art Cologne, Art Vilnius, and others. In this way, in cooperation with artists, they take Ukrainian art out of the Russian context and make it competitive with the world's contemporary art stars. It is the responsibility of the Ukrainian civil society to monitor their actions and prevent any distorted perception of Ukrainian culture.

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IDENTITY IN TIME OF WAR: VISUALISATION OF WOMEN'S IMAGES IN SOCIAL MEDIA

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The article analyses the identity components of Ukrainian women during the Russian-Ukrainian war that started in 2022. Visual images from the Facebook and Instagram social networks are used. Attention is drawn to several themes: religious/Christian subjects, folk motifs, mystical images, geographical personification and motherhood. The methodological approaches of Michel Foucault and Umberto Eco are used.

    Keywords: identity, Ukrainian culture, woman, war, social networks, religion, symbol.

ІДЕНТИЧНІСТЬ В ЧАС ВІЙНИ: ВІЗУАЛІЗАЦІЯ ЖІНОЧИХ ОБРАЗІВ У СОЦМЕРЕЖАХ

Марія Петрушкевич

У статті аналізуються складові ідентичності українських жінок під час російсько-української війни, активна фаза якої розпочалася у 2022 р. Використані візуальні образи із соціальних мереж Фейсбук та Інстаграм. Увага звертається на кілька тем: релігійні/християнські сюжети, народні мотиви, містичні образи, географічна персоніфікація та материнство. Використовуються методологічні підходи Мішеля Фуко та Умберто Еко.

    Ключові слова: ідентичність, українська культура, жінка, війна, соціальні мережі, релігія, символ.

Ukrainian culture has a long and rich tradition of understanding the role and place of women in the socio-cultural life of the state. In times of crisis, war, constant danger, existential situations and elections, the collective consciousness needs support and confidence. National identity is becoming one of the most urgent needs as a basis for the fight against

the invaders. It is a crucial element for comprehending and preserving the memory of the events and emotions of the war for a stable connection with reality in this difficult time of trial.

Artists and photographers create visual images of women mainly based on the national artistic tradition, Ukrainian worldview and mythology, religious beliefs, peculiarities of contemporary culture, and rethinking of Ukrainian and world history.

For the analysis, we selected artworks (paintings, graphics, collages, posters, photography) that are publicly available, mainly on Facebook and Instagram. Many people, both in Ukraine and abroad, have access to such visual images, and, accordingly, these images have a tangible impact on the image of Ukraine and Ukrainian women during the Russian-Ukrainian War.

Using the methodological approaches of the French philosopher Paul-Michel Foucault and the Italian philosopher Umberto Eco, we will try to analyse the components of the identity of Ukrainian women during the war based on existing visual images. Attention is drawn to several themes: religious/Christian subjects, folk motifs, mystical images, geographical personification, and mother images.

Analysing how visual images and tangible and intangible symbols convey values, Ukrainian sociologist Danylo Sudyn notes: "When we talk about visual images, there are many different ways to analyse and interpret them. Unlike in written text, with visual text, we are concerned that we ostensibly see something; our eyes see the objects depicted, so we do not need to interpret them in any way. In fact, this is not true; the visual always has a certain layer of meanings behind it that seem to be absent in the photo, in the painting" (Sudyn 2022).

Religious/Christian themes

Religious/Christian themes appear in visual images independently, as well as elements and signs of a holistic and essentially secular image. First, we should refer to the photo Hungarian journalist Andras Fjoldes took in the Kyiv metro during the first month of the active phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war (see Annex 1). In the image, the Kyiv resident Tetjana Bliznjak breastfeeds her two-month-old baby (Sudyn 2022). This photo was reworked by the artist from Dnipro, Maryna Solomennikova, into a

1. Photo by Andras Fjoldes

painting where the author depicted the branches of the Kyiv metro and a golden halo above her head behind the woman (see Annex 1.1).

D. Sudyn, analysing this image, notes that the halo above the mother's head immediately gives the viewer a frame to understand this image message: a woman as the Virgin Mary holding the infant Jesus Christ. That is why the painting was popularly called "Kyjivs'ka Madonna" 'Kyiv Madonna'. The artist Maryna Solomennikova notes: "This woman with a child was a symbol of all Ukrainian mothers who have to hide from Russian weapons in bomb shelters" (Madonna z kyjivs'koho metro… 'Madonna from the Kyiv metro…' 2022). The context is important here: the actions are taking place in Ukraine while Russians are attacking Ukrainian cities with missiles. D. Sudyn reflects on why the image of the Madonna is chosen and concludes that it is

1.1. Maryna Solomennikova "Kyjivs'ka Madonna" 'Kyiv Madonna'

primarily about sacrifice as a value, as well as the value of human life, where Mary is a symbol of selfless maternal love, and also refers to the biblical story of King Herod, who ordered the killing of all babies born on Christmas Day. "This is the symbol of a victim who in no way deserves to be punished or persecuted, the symbol of a mother protecting her child", the author notes (Sudyn 2022).

1.2. Photo by UNICEF

1.3. Anta Frirean "Ukrajins'ka Madonna"'Ukrainian Madonna'

Also, the halo could not initially belong to the mother. It appears only in the subway while hiding from the bombing, and this halo does not belong to this woman alone; it is an element of the image of all Ukrainian mothers hiding with their children from the Russian danger in shelters. The halo sanctifies life in this existentially dangerous moment; it shows the power of the sacred struggle of the Ukrainian people.

1.4. Viktoria Moriweather "Ukrajins'ka Madonna / Ukrainian Madonna"

This image has a sequel. The image turned out to be so clear and readable that the "Kyiv Madonna" became an icon in the church of Italian Naples in the chapel at the Franciscan Sisters' School (Madonna z kyjivs'koho metro… 'Madonna from the Kyiv metro…' 2022).

Today, we have another similar story about the invocation of motherhood and the elevation of the image of the mother to the level of national iden-

tity. A woman from Kyiv, Ol′ha, covered her baby with her body during a rocket attack by Russian troops and received numerous injuries and cuts from glass (Beljajeva 2022). Her photo, taken by UNICEF, went viral on social networks, and people called her the Ukrainian Madonna (see Annex 1.2).

A Ukrainian journalist, Polina Kravčenko, published an artistic interpretation of this photograph entitled "Ukrajins′ka Madonna" (see Annex 1.3). The painting of Anta Frirean depicts a mother breastfeeding her child with a halo above her head.

Another interpretation of the same image belongs to Viktoria Moriweather, a graphic design lecturer (see Annex 1.4), but it is similar in its meaning and symbols to the existing one.

Another image mentioned by D. Sudyn refers to Christian iconography: a computer graphic by Ukrainian artist, graphic designer and illustrator Maksym Palenko, entitled "Mariupol′s′ka Pokrova" 'Mariupol Intercession' (see Annex 1.5). It was made in the tradition of the icon of the Intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary, which was widespread in Ukraine in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These icons are called the Cossack Intercessions, and the central plot here is the Mother of God, who hides her people from danger with her omophorion, her veil. These icons evoked a sense of identity, of who the people are and who the Virgin protects from danger. D. Sudyn asks the question: Why do we see such continuity in the image?

1.5. Maksym Palenko "Mariupol′s′ka Pokrova" 'Mariupol′ Intercession'

Why is this continuity so essential to us? Because it is a reference to history, to our ancient common identity, which goes beyond religion. The valuable aspect of this image is that it represents a just defensive war of the Ukrainian people, a symbol of solidarity and sacrifice (Sudyn 2022).

A remarkable visual image that helps understand the Rus-

sian-Ukrainian war outside Ukraine is the "Svjata Džavelina" 'Saint Javelina' – an image of the Mother of God with a javelin (see Annex 1.6). The author of the conceptual meme "Saint Javelin" and the fundraising platform of the same name is a Canadian journalist of Ukrainian-Polish origin, Kristian Borys. The design of Saint Javelina was not an original creation by the Canadian. The L′viv-based graphic designer Jevhen Šalašov adapted the painting "Madonna Kalašnikov" by the American artist Chris Shaw. In his painting, Mary is holding an AK-47. It is dedicated to the Arab Spring, which shook the Middle East in early 2010 (Škil′ 2022).

In March 2022, Kristian Borys, illustrating "Saint Javelina", raised a million dollars to support Ukraine. He created a platform of the same name where one can buy clothes, stickers, flags and other items with prints on the war in Ukraine, including the meme "Saint Javelina". The funds were donated to a charity that helps victims of violence in Ukraine (Avtor memu Saint Javelin… 'The author of the Saint Javelin meme…' 2022). In May, a mural with Saint Javelina by Kristian Borys was created in Kyiv. Later, the halo was removed due to protests from representatives of the Ukrainian Council of Churches.

Here, the Virgin Mary is represented in the Orthodox style of iconography, but instead of the little Jesus, she is holding an anti-tank weapon. The Virgin′s clothes are green, which alludes to the military uniforms of the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and makes the Virgin herself involved in active resistance to the enemy. This image feels defiant, rebellious, and somewhat sarcastic but not sacred. In general, the frivolous, humorous perception of the fears and dangers of war has long been a way of psychological relief and consolidation in the Ukrainian mentality. One can recall at least

1.6. Jevhen Šalašov, Kristian Borys "Svjata Džavelina" 'Saint Javelina'

1.7. Natalija Bahac'ka "Madonna novoho času" 'Madonna of the Modern Time'

the Cossack humour of the Zaporiz'ka Sič period.

The Ukrainian artist Natalija Bahac'ka, in her series "Žyttja v Avatari" 'Life in Avatar', reflecting on the events of the war, created the artwork "Madonna novoho časy" 'Madonna of the Modern Time' (see Annex 1.7).

It is a reflection in which the author inscribes a familiar and recognisable image of the Mona Lisa, a painting by the Italian Renaissance artist Leonardo da Vinci, in a military uniform. The woman is holding a javelin and wearing a golden halo above her head. What is special about this visualisation? What meanings and symbols are encoded in it? Just as in the case of the image of Saint Javelina, the viewers, at first glance, see incompatible things: a classic, globally recognised image of ideal femininity, enigma and mystery, and on the other hand, military themes, weapons, which are a priori a source of death. In this image, the context – the insidious, inhumane war in Ukraine – plays an essential role in its interpretation. Here, the image goes beyond the Ukrainian tragedy and becomes global. Every European or American can imagine themselves in this place, which is disturbing. In the film, Ukrainian identity and the spirit of resistance are now reinforced by the history of not only Ukraine but Europe as well. Moreover, this feeling prevents us from giving up or losing our hearts. Once again, the author's image becomes a source of strength for Ukrainian women and men.

Kateryna Biletina is a Ukrainian artist and portrait painter from Odesa. She is the author of the painting project "Ukrajins'kyj portret" 'Ukrainian Portrait', historical portraits-reconstructions "Moloda Lesja Ukrajinka" 'Young Lesja Ukrajinka', "Molodyj Ivan Franko" 'Young Ivan

Franko', and "Portret Romana Šuhevyča" 'Portrait of Roman Šuchevyč'. With the outbreak of war, her painting "Oplakuvannja" 'Lamentation' also turns to Christian motifs (see Annex 1.8). This image is interesting, first of all, because the author conceived the image before the full-scale war, and now, in the new context, it has acquired a new interpretation. It is an exciting example of how individual, private meanings are transformed into symbols of belonging to an entire nation.

1.8. Kateryna Biletina "Oplakuvannia" 'Lamentation'

Kateryna Biletina writes on Facebook: "I have a daughter. Her name is Varja. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, I have been constantly, persistently and even maniacally painting portraits of my daughter. ... Perhaps she is the only real part of that life, my unsurpassed personal and social life, which is now over. Because Russia invaded into Ukraine" (Kateryna Biletina 2022).

The author herself reveals the primary symbolic meanings of the painting: "Varja has a favourite toy – a touching Sheep, with whom we overcame a difficult, anxious and uncertain journey from Ukraine to Europe. The idea for "Lamentation" was born a long time ago. With the war, the picture ... acquired new planes. The sheep toy symbolises immolation – an innocent lamb, a terrible price paid by the Ukrainian people, and many human destinies and lives abandoned in the struggle for independence. This Lamb, a detail of peaceful life, has formed additional meanings, functions, and meaningful allusions since the beginning of our evacuation" (Kateryna Biletina 2022).

The author also analyses a certain dissonance between the terrible situation of the symbolic and actual sacrifice of the Ukrainian people in an unjust war and the light, even romantic, way of expressing the sacrifice

in the painting: "Perhaps this picture is too «sweet» and «beautiful» for the historical moment in which we are forced to live. The rhetoric and images are different now. However, despite my sadness, I want to capture the beauty and tell my personal story through a painting practice that helps me feel the ground under my feet" (Kateryna Biletina 2022). This image's attractiveness is also because we do not often see it in paintings and photographs created after the start of the full-scale invasion. The connotation here is, despite everything, an orientation towards the future: the viewer reads this in the colours, in the calm, dreamy expression of the face, and in the overall harmony. There is some reference here to Ševčenko's images of the future free Ukraine of which the poet dreamed.

Geographical personification

With the outbreak of the war, a layer of the Ukrainians' mythological ideas came close to the surface. Those were the worldview elements pushed into the unconscious by the rational part of the psyche. Therefore, segments of inanimate nature began to be humanised and subjectified: the Ukrainian land, forest, and fields, as well as towns and villages. Geographical personification became a powerful visual component based on female images.

The Mykolajiv-based artist Viktorija Naumova dedicated a series of works to the cities suffering from the armed aggression of the Russian Federation. In her works, Viktorija depicts cities as the women caught up in the war (Bobkov 2022). The images' common connotation is the invincibility and confidence in victory that Ukrainians feel on their land. The images are united by their extroverted emotionality and willingness to sacrifice for victory.

Each woman-city is unique; the artist associates the many images with real people. The first image was inspired by photos and news from Buča (see Annex 2). "When I looked at all these photos, I experienced just an excessive horror. Furthermore, I recollected that I had painted a work about Buča about a year ago. And that Ukrainian woman ... I decided to change her a little bit. I felt better when I did this work" (Bobkov 2022), said Viktorija.

2. Viktorija Naumova "Buča"

2.1. Viktorija Naumova "Mykolajiv"

2.2. Viktorija Naumova "Mariupol'"

2.3. Viktorija Naumova "Poltava"

The second city to which Viktorija dedicated her work in the same style was Mykolajiv, the artist's hometown (see Annex 2.1). "This girl is self-confident, can stand up to anyone and speak out with a strong word. And this gesture of hers (*her middle finger - ed.*) is eloquent in my image of the city. I did not treat it negatively; she is an intelligent girl, but she is confident, she knows what she is doing", the artist said (Bobkov 2022).

According to the artist, when creating the image of Mariupol', she cried, letting all the pain and anger go through her (see Annex 2.2). "Physically, I can draw thousands of cities, but I cannot let it all go through me emotionally; it's too hard. That's why my latest works already have a touch of humour – even sarcasm. There should be at least a little humour. Otherwise, we will go crazy" (Bobkov 2022), said Viktorija (see Annex 2.3).

2.4. Viktorija Naumova "L'viv"

2.5. Viktorija Naumova "Konotop"

For several cities, the prototypes of the images were real people. For L'viv, these are volunteers, a mother and daughter from Bojarka who moved to L'viv (see Annex 2.4). Mykola Sen'kovs'kyj's famous photograph "Stara Huculka" 'Old Huculka', taken in 1926, became the prototype for the image of Konotop. Viktorija also portrayed herself in this work (see Annex 2.5). In the image of Konotop, the author reveals the mythological and mystical plot of witchcraft, which we will address in other images.

The image of Charkiv is exceptional (see Annex 2.6). "For me, Charkiv is like the personification of women fleeing the war, but by no means running away from it just because they are afraid. No. It is just such a sane view of life. That is why the image of Charkiv is a girl who is forced to leave but will definitely return" (Bobkov 2022).

Viktorija Naumova also paid attention to the cities that suffered little from rocket attacks but directed their efforts to volunteer and shelter temporarily displaced people. For example, Vinnycja, Ivano-Frankivs'k, Dnipro, Ternopil' and Černivci (see Annex 2.7) have become a strong support for the Armed Forces and affected citizens (Malaj 2022).

Red, orange and brown shades dominate in the images as a sign of arduous struggle. The author also used the national colours of Ukraine – blue and yellow (Malaj 2022). In general, the author fits all the images into the traditional Ukrainian aesthetics with embroidery and elements of traditional clothing, and this helps the viewer identify these images

2.6. Viktorija Naumova "Charkiv"

2.7. Viktorija Naumova "Dnipro"

with themselves and their place of residence. However, some images are different, for example, of L'viv.

Based on this series of works, the viewer gets a strong impression that the city's body is a living organism that protects its borders and preserves its own life. Therefore, it is not surprising that Ukrainians have responded to Viktorija's artistic images. It was a woman who knew the secret of life and best combined all the experiences, emotions, sacredness and resistance of Ukrainian cities subjected to Russian aggression. The common context of this series of works is the inner peacefulness, even the seeming provincialism of Ukrainian cities, but only until the moment of danger, a threat to their identity, their existence. Each woman-city symbolises its own unique strength and the resilience of Ukraine.

Natalija Leščenko, a Ukrainian artist, illustrator and writer, created a patriotic series of images of Ukrainian cities called "Žinoči Oblyččja Vijny" 'Women's Faces of War', also focusing on female images. The first work was devoted to Mariupol', followed by illustrations of Charkiv, Konotop, Mykolajiv, Čornobajivka, Irpin', Cherson, Lysyčans'k (see Annex 2.8) and other cities. The images combine recognisable national mythological subjects, animated oriental stylistics, and even cyberpunk. The artist weaves yellow and blue colours, tridents and modern weapons into her images. This way of expressing the city character through female image has found an active response from the audience, especially from young people and teenagers, who read elements of national identity in an aesthetic they understand.

2.8. Natalija Leščenko "Mariupol'"

2.8. Natalija Leščenko "Charkiv"

2.8. Natalija Leščenko "Konotop"

2.8. Natalija Leščenko "Mykolajiv"

2.8. Natalija Leščenko " Čornobajivka"

2.8. Natalija Leščenko " Irpin'"

2.8. Natalija Leščenko "Cherson"

2.8. Natalija Leščenko " Lysyčans'k

2.9. Jurij Žuravel' "Kachovka"

One of the cartoons by Jurij Žuravel', a well-known musician and graphic artist from Rivne, personifies the city of Kachovka in the Cherson region and the war crime of blowing up the Kachovka reservoir dam in early June 2023, which caused a humanitarian and environmental disaster (see Annex 2.9). The author depicts the city as a bleeding woman; houses, trees, and temples are drowning in this blood. A vampire monster, visually reminiscent of Vladimir Putin, drinks blood from the woman's neck.

Ukraine

Ukraine is also personified in the visual arts. There is much thematic, stylistic and symbolic diversity in the depictions of Ukraine as a woman. The pictures reveal overwhelming emotionality, expressiveness of images, and clarity of the symbolic component. The main message is that Ukraine is suffering and in pain, but despite this, Ukraine is united as never before in fighting for its freedom, life, and independence. Visual images combined with one context – an existential situation – become markers of national identity. Here are a few examples.

Andrij Jermolenko's poster "Ja tobi ne «krasavica»" 'I am not your «hey beautiful»' (see Annex 3.1): The artist used two illustrations to show how Ukraine has changed over the past eight years. "This is a continuance of a poster I once made. Our girl has already grown up", the author wrote. The first poster depicts a girl with a gun in her mouth, with the inscription "we have to negotiate it" complementing the image. It symbolises the situation in Ukraine in 2014. The second image shows an adult woman in a similar manner pointing a gun at the head of a man resembling the Russian president Vladimir Putin. "I'm not your «hey beautiful»", reads the image's caption. The words on the second poster are from Putin's speech, during which he quoted a song by the

3.1. Andrij Jermolenko ⟨Ja tobi ne «krasavica»⟩ ⟨I am not your «hey beautiful»⟩

band Krasnaja Plesen′ in the context of implementing the Minsk agreements (Lubenec′ 2022).

The artist Marija Lonjuk has several paintings dedicated to the events of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Her images are distinguished by overwhelming emotionality and universality. The author signed one of the paintings: "Buča. Irpin′. Hostomel′. Chočet′sja kryčaty" 'Bucha. Irpin′. Hostomel′. I want to scream' (see Annex 3.2). It is this image that symbolises Ukraine. The red ribbons that accentuate the arms and neck of the screaming woman in a denotative sense refer to the national tradition – the coloured ribbons on the Ukrainian wreath. In the connotative sense, it is the blood that flows incessantly through the body of Ukraine, the life that flows out with the death of every person killed. Emotionally close and intense is the picture "Ja Ukrajina" 'I Am Ukraine' by Iryna Kaljužna (see Annex 3.3), which focuses on the eyes and mouth, folded arms holding wildflowers and a torn red necklace. The artist's style reveals the traditions of the Charkiv school of easel painting, and the image itself, although dynamic, refers to iconographic images of Christian saints.

3.2. Marija Lonjuk "Buča. Irpin'. Hosto-mel'. Chočet'sja kryčaty 'Bucha. Irpin'. Hostomel'. I want to scream'

3.3. Iryna Kaljužna "Ja Ukrajina 'I Am Ukraine'

The artist Anna Hladkovs'ka depicted Ukraine and four other friendly states – Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – as sisters in national costumes (see Annex 3.4). The main idea here is unity and solidarity, family support in the face of the aggressor's challenge. Such a positive and motivating image is inspiring, as it shows that we are not alone; Ukraine has reliable allies.

3.4. Anna Hladkovs'ka

3.5. Tetjana Kolisnyk "Ukraine"

The Charkiv-based artist Tetjana Kolisnyk depicts Ukraine in national clothes and body armour (see Annex 3.5). The pose of the portrayed woman is quite resolute; she boldly looks into the eyes with her hands at her sides. The author has another similar image, but she adds a halo over her head here.

Author's series

A particular emotional intensity and a powerful impact on the viewer make the author's series – mainly artistic. They reinforce familiar female images and national symbols, which, in a situation of war, have become influential broadcasters of national identity and inspirers of resistance to the Russian occupier.

The Kyivan artist Diana Chomutina created a series of 2D drawings of Ukrainian Avengers (see Annex 4). Since Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine began, the artist has been creating works featuring female witches. Each witch has her own power and defends Ukraine from the occupier in her own way. One of the characters has the gift of bringing life back from death, while the other turns rage into fire that destroys the enemy. The Avengers wear Ukrainian costumes and often have ancient amulets (Vsja ljut'… 'All the rage…' 2022).

4. Diana Chomutina Untitled

5. Olena Papka "Vidvaha" 'Courage'

Olena Papka "Vidsikajučy zajve" 'Cutting Off the Unnecessary'

The author notes: "I really like this aesthetic. It has a history and roots. All these symbols woven into the embroidery, rituals, and beliefs are amazing. Of course, I'm mythologising a bit, adding magic, but it conveys the state better" (Vsja ljut'… 'All the rage…' 2022). The artist explains that her works symbolise the unity and resilience of Ukrainians in the fight against the occupier. "When not everyone can go and physically 'interact' with the enemy, we do it mentally; we defeat them first in ourselves, with our unity and resilience, spiritually" (Vsja ljut'… 'All the rage…' 2022).

In a series of stylised images of women from an emotional perspective, the artist Olena Papka recreates the chronicle of the war (see Annex 5). The author combines expressive female images with floral patterns, noting that this influences the Ukrainian tradition of decorative painting and the patterns inherent in our culture. Traditional Ukrainian clothing, carpets, and tableware inspire her. With the outbreak of the war, the artist continued to use floral ornaments, emphasising that she did not feel dissonance; on the contrary, a certain opposition created harmony and revealed the versatility of images because flowers are not necessarily about tenderness or fragility.

Olena Papka "Piksel'na Berehynja" 'Pixel Hearth Mother'

Olena Papka "Synij ptach ce vybir, a ne vdača" 'The Bluebird is the Choice, Not a Luck'

Olena Papka "Smert' voroham" 'Death to the Enemies'

Olena Papka "Duch svobody" 'Spirit of Freedom'

The most famous painting from this series, "Vidvaha" 'Courage', was painted a week before the war in anticipation of struggle and tension. The author tried to create something inspiring for Ukrainians. Here, a Ukrainian woman with a sword, wearing a flowered garment and a wreath, embodies courage as a trait in the female image. The artist remarks that she reveals any topic in her work through the figure of a woman (*from a private conversation with the artist - M.P.*). Each painting has an element sign that refers the viewer to specific events, emotions and situations of this war: a decorative rooster, a skull with the letter Z, a horse, and inscriptions with the words "courage, faith, strength, love". The paintings' titles are also symbolic: "Piksel′na Berehynja" 'Pixel Hearth Mother', "Smert′ voroham" 'Death to the Enemies', "Synij ptach ce vybir, a ne vdača" 'The Bluebird is the Choice, Not a Luck', "Vidsikajuču zajve" 'Cutting Off the Unnecessary', and "Duch svobody" 'Spirit of Freedom'.

The illustrator Maryna Borovykova created an exciting series of paintings based on the method of postmodern quotation. This series was created as part of a project by the Charkiv Women's Association "Sfera" 'Sphere' (see Annex 6). In her works, the author reflects on what kind of a woman a Ukrainian woman is. We have been imposed an image of passivity, sacrifice, and excessive patience for centuries. With her works, the artist tries to correct this injustice. Here, the audience sees a creative rendition of classic images of a Ukrainian woman. The well-known works by the Ukrainian artists T. Ševčenko's "Kateryna", M. Bojčuk's "Ukrajinka" 'A Ukrainian Woman', M. Pymonenko's "Žnycja" 'A Harvester Woman', O. Muraško's "Divčyna u červonomu kapeljusi" 'Girl in a Red Hat' are modernised and stylised in a new way, they have a shared context: a Ukrainian woman is not a victim, not a complement to a man, not a martyr to fate, she is a fighter for our common freedom and a defender of her native land. The author believes that we must overcome the inferiority complex imposed on us because we are now showing the world what Ukrainian society and women are capable of (Žinky ta vijna 'Women and the war' 2022).

The artist calls her rendition of Ševčenko's Kateryna the "most honest and emotional". It embodied the rage for Mariupol′, Buča, Irpin′, and all the cities that were touched by the terrible hand of the Russian occupiers (Žinky ta vijna… 'Women and the war' 2022).

6. Maryna Borovykova

Folk motifs

Folk motifs have become an influential and recognisable way of identifying Ukrainian women. Marta Pitčuk, a Ukrainian artist from Ivano-Frankivs′k, refers to the image of the sacred motanka doll, which in Ukrainian tradition was associated with the family and the memory of ancestors (see Annex 7). The author notes: "A motanka doll is an ancient Ukrainian amulet made by mothers with warmth and care for their children. The paintings show how an inanimate doll of the past centuries steps into the present and merges into one with real life" (Marta Pitčuk 2022).

The artist borrowed the technique of illuminating the image from tempera icon painting. The movement of the brushstrokes cyclically

7. Marta Pitčuk

twists the canvas, accentuating the main elements. The paintings convey the wind and rebelliousness as a reflection of the character of the depicted woman. Each image is strong-willed, proud, and self-absorbed (Hrabovec′kyj 2022).

"The value and mission of my paintings, I believe, is that they convey the energy and strength of a Ukrainian woman who inspires and encourages the viewer to admire their own roots", the artist adds (Kartynu "Motanka

7.1. Olʹha Kovtun "Derevo žyttja" 'The Tree of Life'

z rybamy"… 'The painting "Motanka with fish"…' 2022). Such images, rooted in tradition, when placed in the new context of war, become robust identity markers not only for women but for all Ukrainians.

The theme of connection with ancestors and family was also developed by Olʹha Kovtun, who works in monumental and easel painting, graphics, sacred painting, and iconography. In her work, the artist tries to follow the traditions of Ukrainian Baroque art, namely the Baroque icon. It combines European Renaissance culture and the aesthetics of Dutch painting with the traditions of Ukrainian Baroque (Olʹha Kovtun 2022).

Her work "Derevo žyttja" 'The Tree of Life' is of interest to our analysis (see Annex 7.1). The author notes: "It is no coincidence that I chose the theme of the Tree of Life or the World tree. The Tree of Life is a common amulet of folk art, a symbolic model of the cosmos. In the form of an amazing tree or a lush flower plant, this symbol can be seen in the ornamentation of Ukrainian towels, pysanka, and wall paintings. … The young girl in my work, with her eyes almost closed and her hands carefully folded, is frozen for the moment; her outfit seems to dissolve in the embroidered ornament, imbuing her with the healing energy that the connection with past generations gives us." (Olʹha Kovtun 2022).

7.2. Taras Hajda "Ruskij tank, zamitajsja!!!"
'Russian tank, get out!!!'

Taras Hajda is a Kyivan artist who works in oil painting and digital collage. Although the central theme of his works is the inner world of the individual, since the beginning of the war, Taras has created several works dedicated to rethinking the struggle of Ukrainians against the occupiers. The collage "Ruskij tank, zamitajsja!!!" 'Russian tank, get out!!!' is symbolic and quite interesting (see Annex 7.2).

The painting in the edited version is a reference to Palm Sunday. An old woman in ethnic dress with a homemade broom is depicted sweeping away a scattered Russian military equipment. Above the woman's head is either the sun or a halo. We are already familiar with the halo technique, which refers to sacrifice. However, in combination with this determination, the women's words can also be read as a righteous, sacred call to active struggle. In general, the image is life-affirming and bright, even though the woman's image is taken from an old black-and-white photograph.

8. Serhij Zabelin "Obijmy Ukrajiny"
'Hugs of Ukraine'

Mystical female images

Existential fear and a real threat to life have led to an active public reflection on mystical female images that go beyond the Ukrainian tradition. Elements of the mythological and mystical often appear in visual images of the Russian-Ukrainian war. We have already mentioned some of them – the works by Viktorija Naumova on Konotop and Diana Chomutina. The need for such images is primarily related to the collective existential fear, the deadly challenges of war that the average person faces. Traditional culture

8.1. Olena Fedorova

has always offered compelling mythological narratives and symbols for overcoming crises. In modern warfare, Ukrainians actively use mythology and humour to level their emotional and psychological state.

Among such mystical images is Serhij Zabelin's "Obijmy Ukrajiny" 'Hugs of Ukraine', in which a Ukrainian woman traditionally welcomes guests with bread and salt, but the towel contains skulls with the symbols of the invaders, the letters Z, X, A, and a halo formed by warheads above her head (see Annex 8). The author notes: "I did this work in support of my free people of Ukraine. I love our people; we are united as never before. Now we are fighting for our future! For the right to live and be free!" (Sergey Zabelin 2022).

Two works by Olena Fedorova are very interesting (see Annex 8.1). One work features a stylised image of Ukraine holding a trident and spear in one hand and Putin's head with a Z carved into his forehead in the other. Another work contains text in addition to an image of a pregnant woman holding a wounded heart with blue and yellow blood flowing from it: "Mariupol'. Buča. 2022. You can tear my heart

8.2. Dmytro Krab "Motherland"

8.3. Darcja Ziron′ka "Novyj Ukrajins′kyj Panteon / Ukrajina" 'New Ukrainian Pantheon/ Ukraine'

Darcja Ziron′ka "Novyj Ukrajins′kyj Panteon / Medyky" 'New Ukrainian Pantheon/ Doctors'

out, but you will never take my soul". The symbols used in these images are emotional, understandable and close to the viewers.

Mystical motifs are present in the work of Dmytro Krab, a Ukrainian artist from Žytomyr who works in street art. The author depicts the Motherland wearing blue and yellow clothes, an elegant headdress resembling a crown, and a sword in her hands. The woman wears a trident on her chest (see Annex 8.2). The image is captioned: "Bat′kivščyna. Usoblennja Ukrajiny, jaka protystojit′ zlu. Ukrajina stojit′ i stojiatyme!" 'Motherland. The personification of Ukraine, which resists evil. Ukraine stands and will stand!' The combination of the state colour symbols with the coat of arms and text is very reminiscent of heraldry, which in the European tradition refers to the knightly culture of the Middle Ages and, in Ukrainian history, to the Ukrainian knights – the Cossacks and the struggle for state independence of Ukraine.

The posters from the "Novyj Ukrajins′kyj Panteon" 'New Ukrainian Pantheon' Series were quite popular, with interesting female images such as "Ukrajina" 'Ukraine' and "Medyky" 'Doctors' (see Annex 8.3). The author of the series, Darcja Ziron′ka, is an artist of the Ukrainian comic book/sketchbook "Charakternyk" 'Enchanter' based on the script by Oleksij Čornyj. In the "New Ukrainian Pantheon" Series, female images refer to religious and mythological themes. Ukraine appears as a six-armed deity with a halo over its head – an allusion to the Hindu

pantheon. She is dressed in Ukrainian national clothes with a wreath on her head, holding bloody sabres, a rifle and a baby. This image is quite clear: a Ukrainian woman, breaking all stereotypes, can simultaneously be a mother, guardian, and defender of her land during a sacred war.

The poster "Medyky" 'Doctors' depicts a woman in a military uniform with wings and a halo above her head, holding a sword entwined with snakes. She has wounded hands, a stern expression and only sketchy eyes without pupils. The image is very emotional, and the author deliberately hid the woman's eyes because the viewer would not have been able to bear her scorching gaze.

This image is an allusion to the Christian images of the angels and archangels of the Lord. Another artist, Natalija Rezničenko, has a painting called "Zachysnycja" 'The Defender Woman' (see Annex 8.4), in which the author also refers to the image of an archangel, but the defender is Ukraine itself.

Darcja Ziron′ka talks about these images: "Let's not forget that we have a lot of brave women who fight, protect, defend, care and support. Thank you, women. We will win" (Darcja Ziron′ka 2022).

There are several images with their specific aesthetics and symbolism, which are associated not with women but with the feminine, which is the source of both life and death. It is appropriate to mention the work of Andrij Jermolenko, "Welcome to Čornobajivka" (see Annex 8.5). This is a stylisation of the image of death in the form of a woman's skull with a cap, necklace and two sabres. Also, graphic works by Kateryna Košeleva (see Annex 8.6) and Oleksandr Kom″jachov (see Annex 8.7) interpret the feminine in the context of sacred

8.4. Natalija Rezničenko "Zachysnycja"′ The Defender Woman″

8.5. Andrij Jermolenko "Welcome to Čornobajivka"

8.6. Kateryna Koševela Untitled

8.7. Oleksandr Kom"jachov "Čy znajete vy ukrajins'ku nič?" 'Do you know the Ukrainian night?'

8.8. Anastasija Litepla "Tupu-tupu nohamy, skolju tebe rohamy" 'Tupu-Tupu with my feet, I'll chop you with my horns'

revenge and death. One of the common signs used to create images is the sickle. The word's denotative meaning marks the Ukrainian agricultural tradition, the sown field, the harvest, and the connotative meaning is an instrument of death and revenge. The sickle refers to the Hindu goddesses Shakti and Kali in a broader mythological context.

An original interpretation of the fairy-tale image of the Koza-Dereza 'Goat Dereza', familiar from childhood and therefore immediately readable, was made by Anastasija Litepla in her work "Tupu-tupu nohamy, skolju tebe rohamy" 'Tupu-Tupu with my feet, I'll chop you with my horns' (see Annex 8.8). Goat Dereza, dressed in traditional Ukrainian clothes, sits sadly on a pile of skulls with the letter Z engraved on its forehead. The goat's horns are bloody. The power of the image proposed by the artist is connected, primarily, with the realisation that even fairy-tale characters stand up for their land.

However, the most popular image of this theme is the witch. In July 2022, the calendar "Tak, jak vid'ma skaže" 'As the Witch Says' was published (see Annex 9). The well-known volunteer Dana Jarova initiated the project. The main goal was to raise funds for the needs of Ukraine's Armed Forces. The calendar is based on a poem by the Ukrainian poetess Ljudmyla Horova, "Bude tobi, vraže…" 'You will have it, enemy…'.

The idea of the calendar, as well as its style and symbolism, is "a Ukrainian mysticism, the magic of the land and its witches-protectors. Strong, brave and

9. Calendar "Tak, jak vid'ma skaže / As the Witch Says"

9.1. Tetjana Kolisnyk "Bude tobi, vraže..." 'You will have it, enemy...'

beautiful Ukrainian women curse their enemies. Twelve witches remind us that invaders are not welcome on this land" (Tak, jak Vidʹma skaže… 'As the Witch says …' 2022). However, many of the images created in the calendar are objectifying and sexualised. The prevalence of these images was reinforced by a song by the Rivne band "Endži Krejda" 'Angie Crayon', based on lyrics by Ljudmyla Horova. Tetjana Kolisnyk has also interpreted this poem in her work "You will have it, enemy..." (see Annex 9.1).

The mystical images created are woven into the natural elements of fire, water, earth, and air. The forest and the sown field obey these women. In Ukrainian culture, the closeness to nature and the ability to negotiate with and control it were elements of female strength. In the folk worldview, women had secret connections with all living things and the earth, which refers to Chthonic mythology. That is why the calendar features death signs in women's images, including skulls with the letter Z on their foreheads.

Motherhood

A significant layer of female images is associated with one of the primary social roles of women in traditional culture – motherhood. The image of the mother became a powerful emotional and symbolic marker after the outbreak of a full-scale war, as well as a source of strength to resist the Russian aggressor. Most often, a woman is depicted as pregnant or with an infant or small child. Motherhood is also a powerful reference to the image of Ukraine as a mother, and in many works, these two images merge.

10. Viktor Babak "Ukrajina-Maty" 'Ukraine-Mother'

10.1. Iryna Bilokur Untitled

10.2. Marharyta Pimenova Untitled

10.3. Natalija Rezničenko "Berehynja" 'Hearth Mother'

Many images of mothers are encoded through traditional components – for example, the illustration "Ukrajina-Maty" 'Ukraine-Mother' by the Ivano-Frankivs′k artist Viktor Babak (see Annex 10). Here, a woman

protects her baby from enemy planes and missiles with her hands. In the image created by Iryna Bilokur (see Annex 10.1), a mother protects a child wrapped in a Ukrainian flag from fire. Symbolic elements are present in the image created by Marharyta Pimenova (see Annex 10.2), where a Ukrainian woman with golden wings protects a baby from danger.

Wings in the image of a mother and protector are present in Natalija Rezničenko's stylised painting "Berehynja" 'Hearth Mother' (see Annex 10.3). Here, the author uses many markers already mentioned in the previous works: a golden halo over the woman's head, Ukrainian costumes, and the wings themselves in the form of embroidered towels or scarves.

The Čerkasy-based artist Ol'ha Kurs'ka depicted Mariupol' as a pregnant woman shielding her unborn child from Russian missiles with her hands (see Annex 10.4). The aforementioned Iryna Kaljužna (see Annex 10.5) depicts women and girls under the protection of a yellow veil in one of her paintings, an allusion to the Christian motif of the Protection of the Mother of God.

The same theme is suggested by Dana Vitkovs'ka (see Annex 10.6) in her depiction of Oranta, a stylised 11th-century mosaic in St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv, as a Ukrainian soldier protecting a woman with a

10.4. Ol'ha Kurs'ka "Mariupol'"

10.5. Iryna Kaljužna Untitled

10.6. Dana Vitkovs'ka "Oranta"

baby in her arms. The author notes: "I am grateful to all those who are defending Ukraine, its present and future at the cost of their lives. May Oranta take us all under her protection in this difficult time" (Danavitkovskaart 2022).

All the images described above are united in one semantic plane: a mother is a guardian protecting her child and Ukraine. She is self-sacrificing, loyal, brave and dangerous to offenders. It is a source of inspiration for resisting the enemy.

Several stories with a central mother reflect on the events of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The illustrator and artist Tetjana Kopytova depicted an episode of a rocket attack on the centre of Vinnycja, during which three children were killed (see Annex 10.7). The plot is based on a mother carrying a child in a stroller, with Russian missiles hovering over them; the background of the illustration is blue and yellow. The author says: "I was an illustrator of

10.7. Tetjana Kopytova Untitled

10.8. Olena Papka "I will cover you with love"

children's books and painted nature, animals and children. I loved the sunny colours and cheerful stories. Now, I paint children more often, too. But in a different way. Moreover, my references are cruise missiles. Killing these children" (Istoriji iz socmerež… 'Stories from social media…' 2022).

The artist Olena Papka (see Annex 10.8), whose work we have already analysed, notes: "One of the first paintings of the war period is about a woman who hides her child from the debris, she has a cut face, bandages on her head, and she wears a pink dress with floral ornaments. At that moment, I realised that the pattern symbolised the beautiful, carefree life we had before the arrival of the Russian world" (*from a private conversation with the artist - M.P.*). It is about Ol′ha, a Kyivan woman whose image has been interpreted by several photographers and artists.

The Georgian artist Olena Kavtaradze has some stylised works reflecting on the events of the war in Ukraine. One of the images shows a mother with a baby in her arms running away from Russian missiles. The image is interesting because the woman holds an olive branch, a symbol of victory and peace, with a Ukrainian flag on her shoulder (see Annex 10.9). Unlike the images already analysed, the mother here is primarily a victim and a peacemaker. The author adds the comment "Ukraine, I'm with you!" (Elenalotuss 2023) to the image.

The artist Oleksandr Hrechov offers a different interpretation of the image of a mother (see Annex 10.10) – the form of a six-armed woman

10.9. Olena Kavtaradze Untitled

10.10. Oleksandr Hrechov Untitled

(this symbolism is also present in the work of Darcja Ziron′ka), who, while holding a small child, is also engaged in volunteering, charity, supports the welfare of the family, and, if necessary, takes up arms. The author reflects on the heroism of Ukrainian mothers: "Today... someone's mother got in touch for the first time from the occupied city. Someone's mother is fighting at the front. Someone is waiting for a son or daughter from the war. Someone else is weaving camouflage nets. Volunteering. She works and takes care of the whole family" (Ukrajina-maty z nemovljam… 'Ukraine-mother with a baby…' 2022).

Images of mothers with weapons in their hands are not uncommon outside the Ukrainian art field. However, they have different symbolic accents, and only through the most general denotations and context can a connection with Ukrainian identity be established. For example, in a widespread image on social media created by the American graphic artist Dixon Leavitt (see Annex 10.11), references to Ukrainian symbols are limited to blue and yellow. At the same time, the author notes: "I offer this job to anyone who wants to support Ukraine. I am very saddened by the war in Ukraine. I also felt deeply inspired by the Ukrainian people's sacrifice to protect their families and democracy" (Dixon Leavitt 2022).

In a challenging and crucial historical period of defending their independence, Ukrainian artists are building an influential front for preserving and understanding national identity. Female characters play an essential role here. Analysing the visual representations of women, we can see that the most common themes are religious, mythological and mystical, folk, and the comprehension of motherhood and geographical personification.

Several significant, powerful symbolic images

10.11. Dixon Leavitt Untitled

of Ukrainian women still give confidence and create a modern Ukrainian identity that remains outside the scope of the analysis. These include realistic and symbolic images, ironic images, military themes, sexist images, and the theme of sexual violence.

Avtor memu Saint Javelin stvoryv novyi produkt pro HIMARS 'The author of the Saint Javelin meme has created a new product for HIMARS' (2022). In: *The Village*. Retrieved from: https://www.the-village.com.ua/village/culture/culture-new s/327979-avtor-memu-saint-javelin-stvoriv-noviy-produkt-pro-himars [13.05.2022].

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ANTI-WAR POSTER AND DIGITAL MEDIA AS PROPAGANDA TOOLS

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This study aims to analyze the poster and web resources as propaganda tools in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. To explore the topic within the framework of a brief historical excursion, a hermeneutic approach was chosen, which can be applied in the field of culture not only for textual but also for visual information. Artistic, in particular, colouristic means of expressing social ideas are considered.

Keywords: propaganda, public advertising, anti-war topics, visualization, consolidation.

АНТИВОЄННИЙ ПЛАКАТ І ЦИФРОВІ МЕДІА ЯК ЗАСОБИ ПРОПАГАНДИ

Світлана Прищенко
Тетяна Сенчук

Метою дослідження є аналіз плаката та вебресурсів як засобів пропаганди в контексті російсько-української війни. Для розкриття теми в рамках короткого історичного екскурсу обрано герменевтичний підхід, який можна застосувати у сфері культури не лише для текстової, а й для візуальної інформації. Розглянуто художні, зокрема колористичні, засоби виразу соціальних ідей.

Ключові слова: пропаганда, публічна реклама, антивоєнна тематика, візуалізація, консолідація.

To understand the artistic imagery of the poster and digital media, it is necessary to make a small excursion into its history as a form of sociocultural communication. Visualization took place through various graphic means, drawing was the first and main, then lithography,

photography, font compositions, and computer technologies were gradually added. Today, the most common means combine photos, drawn images, and text elements.

Not only are societal problems important for public posters, but also the main anti-war topic is paramount since military conflicts in different countries have not stopped since the beginning of World War I. The main campaigning buzzer was and remains a poster, its ideological and thematic determination. The existing problem goes beyond the history of Art, in particular the history of posters, combining socio-economic, semiotic, aesthetic, and stylistic means of analysis with new ideological constructions of the world and society understanding (Aulich 2014). Mass-produced, full-colour, large-format war posters were a sign and instrument of the First World War. War posters celebrated, in both their form and content, the modernity of the conflict. They also reached an enormous international audience through their prominent display and continual reproduction in magazines in every combatant nation, uniting diverse populations as viewers of the same image and bringing them closer to the war, in an imaginary and powerful way. Most war posters were aimed particularly at civilian populations (James 2009).

Posters of the first half of the 20th century, during the periods of two world wars can be divided into two main groups of propaganda: heroic, glorifying feats at the front and in the rear, or reflecting the struggle of socialist and capitalist systems, and satirical, exposing financial and industrial groups involved in the production of weapons, ridiculing the enemy, etc.

During World War II the USA government launched poster campaigns that preached being thrifty with goods and services, recycling metals and other materials, growing and storing food at home, obeying price and ration controls, and buying war bonds. Terrence Witkowski examines the consumption context, implementation, creative execution, and impact of government-sponsored poster advertising during this important point in the history of American consumer culture. He considers the significance of these campaigns in consumption and poster history (Witkowski 2003).

The second half of the 20th century passed without global shocks, but the ideological war between socialism and capitalism remained

to be the main theme with preservation of visual stylistics of the past period. The Journal of Decorative and Propaganda Arts (1989) contained many examples of public Soviet posters promoting anti-war propaganda in Eastern European. Peter Paret and Beth Lewis analyzed propaganda posters of the 20th century in Russia, Central and Western Europe, and the United States, emphasizing their uniqueness and syncretism of historical evidence of military events and aesthetic qualities of compelling images. Posters create a bridge between the demands of ideology and the state on the one hand and the support of millions of men and women on the other. Every war has an ideological component, and as history shows, propaganda and patriotic rhetoric often turn into a war of words and images, a kind of battle of ideas. Such battles help to increase the morale of both soldiers and the civilian population (Paret & Lewis 1992).

In modern scientific peer-reviewed journals, we haven't found relevant publications, especially articles devoted to posters to oppose the Russian-Ukrainian war, which has been going on for 10 years. As part of the conducted empirical research, propaganda posters of the 20th – early 21st centuries were analyzed. The famous advertiser Edward Bernays investigated the psychology of manipulating the masses and the ability to use symbolic actions and propaganda to influence politics, to carry out indoctrination for important social changes. He wrote that the human mind is a mixture of inherited prejudices, symbols, clichés and verbal formulations received from leaders. Posters, newspaper and magazine advertisements, street banners and all other types of propaganda must be carefully planned (Bernays 1928). Posters as an inexpensive and effective media was widely used for state influence and control of citizens in Eastern Europe, as well as to praise of communist allies and reproduce historical and cultural images of that period (Heather 2014).

Propaganda posters are characterized by conciseness, intensity of composition, impressive abstraction of forms and decorative nature. The art critic Oleksandr Fedoruk notes that propaganda posters were issued on the occasion of official anniversaries, Party Congresses, various dates and glorified the Bolševik reality. The ROSTA Windows, UKROSTA and The South ROSTA Windows, arising in the 1920s, were at its roots. Satirical graphics made a significant contribution to the development of propaganda poster. The Art Workshop of the Union of

Artists in Ukraine "Agitplakat" 'Campaign poster' was established in 1959 and along with political posters, produced high artistic quality products, which is a great merit of many artists, namely, T. Ljaščuk, F. Hluščuk, O. Vorona, T. Chvostenko, V. Buhlak and others (Fedoruk 2001).

Socialization and consciousness are a combination of areas that include processes of social order, life support, economic, political and legal interaction, as well as philosophy, sociology, psychology, etc. Mental field is a spirit of culture, which influences the development of a collection of ideas, experiences and attitudes of people, peculiar to a particular culture in society. Each nation has its own psychological characteristics, and the people's soul's ins and outs should both be studied equally.

When studying the posters, it is advisable to choose an interdisciplinary approach, since the visualization of the idea is influenced by graphic art, the social and political state of the country at a certain historical stage of development. A hermeneutic approach was chosen to shed light on all of the disciplines necessary. Though, it can be applied in the field of culture not only for textual, but also for visual content. It comprises the following components: *understanding* of the idea, structure and semantic unity of the work; *explanation* (or *interpretation*) and a certain *context* (historical, cultural, social, political, economic).

Axiological, sociocultural, semiotic and comparative methods are proposed to solve the problematic issue of the essence of the poster. A poster should be considered not only as a cultural phenomenon or creation of externally attractive image, but as a derivative product determined by a complex of needs, values and norms of a particular historical period. The *Axiological method* is applied to study the above-mentioned facts and phenomena. The *Sociocultural method* is to study society as an integrity of culture and communications, in particular visual aspects thereof, since poster always has an ideological platform, communicative tasks and motivational attitudes. The *Semiotic method* provides an understanding of poster and web images, which are closely intertwined with social, political, cultural and technological processes. Additionally, this method allows us to consider visual elements of poster as a certain set of signs. A *comparative method* is necessary to obtain generalized results of past and present creative experiences of the poster artists.

Lev Manovyč presents a method for analysis of cultural data, with a particular focus on visual media. Cultural analysis refers to the use of computational and design methods, including data visualization, media, and interaction design, and machine learning for the exploration and analysis of contemporary culture. The main objective of these explorations is to enable us to see what hundreds of millions of people around the world today create, imagine, and value (Manovyč 2020, 189–190).

Let's take anti-war topics as an example to trace how visual information is presented. Public posters belong to non-commercial mass media. The ability to see and reflect clear idea in a poster and to have a poster way of thinking are main features of poster artist. Poster thinking is an excitement and passion in the desire to convey a special idea to a certain audience. Poster artists must filter the idea through the internal analysis of himself and relevant topic in order to convey the image to the viewer simply and clearly. Poster actively forms mass consciousness, integrates into social sign system, significantly influences public opinion and encourages action, represents past and modern creative experience, recording social, cultural and historical development of society. It is proved that the semantic space of a poster is a concise visualization of a significant idea, generalized reproduction of an object or phenomenon in form and colour. We consider posters in the context of sociocultural communications, as noted in our previous study (Pryščenko 2020, 97–103).

The turbulent events of the 20th century specified the critical criteria or a poster – to be an effective and inexpensive means of influencing society. After the Second World War, a poster in Ukraine has already shown the image of a new country (with images of bread, sun, happy women's faces), generally, very close to the picture of "Bread" by Tetjana Jablons′ka. Propaganda posters of solemn-monumental nature with strong ideological and motivating component, and glorifying a flourishing country, a man – the creator, etc. become important at that time. The widespread image of the Motherland comprised features of pride, beauty and strength, romanticism, national character and Ukrainian ornamentation. Poster artists used images, colour convention, compositional schemes of Ukrainian folk art as the foundation of graphic style. But the ideological expansion of the USSR deprived ethno-cultural

1.1. Dmytro Dzjuba "We keep the world" (Ukraine), #StandWithUkraine posters 2022

traditions of the Baltic countries, Moldova, Belarus, the Caucasus and Central Asia very quickly. Creative guidelines of posters for example by V. Šostja, O. Veklenko, V. Lesnjak, Ju. Denisenko, A. Ponomarenko, Je. Kudrjašov, V. Veštak, V. Viter, O. Mikula, V. Bystrjakov, Ju. Neroslik were often in conflict with Soviet authorities.

The colour is a logical reflection of the state of society in certain periods: pre-Soviet (with Ukrainian ethnic motifs), Soviet (almost completely red), and post-Soviet (with the national colours of Ukraine). The Fine Arts Department at the Vernads'kyj National Library of Ukraine has a collection of Ukrainian posters of the 20th century on the following topics: Soviet woman, pioneering, Komsomol, international youth movement, education, army, struggle for peace, and various political slogans. The researcher O. Donec′ notes that poster artists began to be involved in 'monumental propaganda' – the creation of mosaic panels on the facades of new buildings. Posters of the 1960s and early 1970s are characterized by the tradition of using wide decorative planes, generalization of forms, activity, sonority, colour dynamics, energy, immediacy of performance, and monumentality (Donec′ 2015, 209). However, even after the collapse of the USSR, until the end of the 1990s, the Ukrainian poster retained the Soviet-style: red colour, communist symbols, epic images, and patriotic slogans.

Currently, posters are being actively developed both as a graphic art and as a social project, playing a prominent role in design processes: cultural events, poster competitions, festivals, international reviews. But the main meeting place of the poster with the viewer is still exhibition halls. Poster exhibitions (thematic, regional, personal) are held regularly, but access to them is limited and not very actively advertised in

Ukrainian digital media. James Lull, an American sociologist known for his research on the interaction between communication technologies and culture, having studied how media become an integral part of our daily lives, believes that mass culture should be considered as a big factor of influence (Lull 2000).

Posters are divided into three large groups by their main functions: *commercial* (profitable), *political* (positive image of party leaders and administrative ideologies) and *public* (emphasis on social, cultural, or environmental aspects).

1.2. Kateryna Prokopenko to Denis Prokopenko "Azovstal. Ukraine belongs to us" (Ukraine), #StandWithUkraine posters 2022

Poster tends to simplify a distinct object or phenomenon to a sign system of information transmission, which helps not only to analyze the depicted object or phenomenon under consideration, but also to reveal its essence and characteristics. Naturally, some arrangements become inevitable, sometimes it is a complete abstraction of image. These properties of a poster, as well as novelty and authenticity, contribute to the rapid assimilation of the information provided. In fact, poster is the most common type of graphics with features that are determined by propaganda function. In addition, poster is an art work made on a large piece of paper that may include short text for social, political, educational or other purposes. A person 'on the go' must clearly understand the idea of poster information, which influences its form as a concise image, an easy-to-read font and bright colours.

A poster is a powerful 'weapon', a dominant tool for visualizing socially significant ideas. Visual perception in poster is closely related to the semantics of color – not only cultural, but also psychophysiological, since the process of perception combines visual reaction and

thinking, a process of judgments and thoughts. Different levels of significance in a postmodern space, using colour coding and connotations, influence semiological understanding in the construction of national identity through images. Colour universally serves as a manifestation and an expression of a certain idea, however, not in terms of quantity or form, but a quality of that property, without which it is impossible to imagine intelligence. Colours of culture are created by Man, and visual culture, in turn, creates a Man.

Posters and their evolution were influenced by many factors, including two world wars, technical progress, the logic of advertising communications, the state of cultural life in society, modern artistic trends, graphic design schools, and the influence of ideological management. Poster Art is developing along with changes in state infrastructure and cultural policy in terms of depriving Ukraine of the status of a former colony of the Russian Empire.

The modern media space requires the expansion of communication skills, competent visualization of information and a certain heroization of images. The term 'communication' appeared at the beginning of the 20th century and very quickly, along with its general scientific meaning as an instrument of communication between any subjects, acquired a sociocultural meaning. Manuel Castells emphasizes that necessary conditions and structural components of communications require the presence of a common language among the subjects of communications (individuals, groups, organizations, etc.), channels for the transfer of information and certain rules for implementation of communications in the given culture (semiotic, ethical, etc.) in order to form

1.3. Mykola Kovalenko "Theft" (Ukraine), #StandWithUkraine posters 2022

social ties, regulate certain forms of social activity, accumulate and broadcast cultural experience. In the 21st century, communications take the first place, media have become a platform where serious strategies are played out (Castells 2009). In the current technological context, communications go beyond traditional media, poster in particular, include digital media – the Internet and mobile communications.

The understanding of communication characterizes a complex, symbolic process that allows its participants to express certain information or internal emo-

1.4. Action in support of Ukraine in the city of Graz (Austria), #StandWithUkraine posters 2022

tional states, status roles, etc. Considering discourse as a type of communicative activity, an interactive phenomenon, a speech stream in different forms, we emphasize its existence in a certain semantic field, aimed at creating linguistic constructions, including visual ones. At the heart of any discourse there is always a key problem that sets a certain vector for its semantic deployment. Cultural discourse is the result of sign systems functioning, perceived as a manifestation of cultural communication (discourse of culture, modernism, postmodernism, etc.), ethno-cultural features of communication (cross-cultural, multilingual, foreign culture), cultural and historical features of communication (for example, discourse of the New Age, Renaissance). Discursive research examines the reasons for the dominance of some cultures in the global information space, discrimination of others, facts of misunderstanding due to the cultural differences and intercultural conflicts. The current situation is characterized by the presence of antagonism in almost all spheres of culture (Pryščenko 2023, 44).

We define media culture as a set of information and communication tools functioning in society, symbolic systems, as well as the culture of

1.5. Kateryna Hura "Phoenix bird. Ukraine today" (Ukraine), #StandWithUkraine posters 2022

1.6. Damian Klachkiewicz (Poland), #StandWithUkraine posters 2022

their perception by social groups and society as a whole. Thanks to the visual presentation of information (images, videos, animations), consumers perceive it faster and better. The term and a field of application for 'media design' was formed, which falls into the realm of the graphic synthesis, advertising, and web design achievements, which becomes a qualitatively new stage of sociocultural communication designing. Nowadays, the design and development of posters and digital advertising products are significantly influenced by computer technologies, cultural and regional features, and the requirements for their visual and emotional content are also changing.

The media discourse may include a verbal component (oral or written), visual (image or video), audio (musical or noise accompaniment), tactile, taste, etc. In addition, location of poster in urban environment can play a significant role. The emphasis shifts from informative function to communicative one (Danesi 2013, 9). An aesthetic function is introduced in posters through the sign functions, though, semiotics and aesthetics are inextricably linked. The sociologist Robin Cohen believes that posters, placards and advertising appeals are examples

1.7. Dmytro Simonov (Ukraine), #StandWithUkraine posters 2022

1.8. Exhibition action for support of Ukraine in Madrid (Spain), #StandWithUkraine posters 2022

of *creolization*, as they combine the verbal part with the visual, which belongs to a different sign system than language. According to him, creolization occurs when designers choose certain elements of different cultures, give them new meanings and creatively combine to create new images that become products of mass culture (Cohen 2007).

A sociocultural system is an integrated concept that avoids one-sided sociological, technological or cultural determinism. Transition from one type of society to another generates transformation of social structures and cultural artifacts. The emergence of qualitatively different sociocultural phenomena is inherent to the process of development. Products of artistic activity – images – acquire social meaning only with a systematic understanding of cultural processes. Thus, a certain content in the integration of emotional and rational components is presented in the form of a sensory image, which is introduced in particular cultural and communicative contexts and associative connections. No culture exists without a society, but no society can exist without a culture as well. Social values express common goals, play the role of fundamental norms of behavior and communication, serve as social indicators of life quality, ensure the choice of rational actions, create the inner core of culture, spiritual quintessence of needs and interests of individuals and social groups. The value system, in turn, has a reverse effect on

2.1. Diana Petruško "Forever hungry neighbours", poster by a student of the State University Infrastructure and Technologies (Kyiv)

social needs, acting as one of the most significant stimulus for social interaction.

Semiotics contributes to the understanding of poster as a sign system: its applied value, aesthetic informativity and artistic imagery as an ideological product of design. Semiotics considers signs that represent or store information and determine systemic processes in nature, society and communications. Poster is a special form of visual communication that is rapidly reconquering print and electronic media space, where information-figurative or expressive-suggestive messages of targeted nature are served to a wide audience. According to the criterion of 'semiotic code', the means of posters can be divided into visual, verbal and mixed. Verbal information (advertising text) dominates in commercial advertising, and visual, emotional, and non-verbal information prevails in social advertising. However, this distribution is rather relative, since a significant emotional effect can be created with the help of text or, conversely, image can convey more precise information. The importance of visual information is growing. Rodney Jones says that media have recently spurred the development of image-centricity as they allow for the easy and broadband sharing of pictorial content (Jones 2020, 19–20). Visual research consists of knowledge of cultural-historical reality, understanding life of society for the purpose of dialogue between cultures with a direct overview and comparison of objects, phenomena and processes, traditional and digital media in particular.

2.2. Jaroslava Musijenko "RuZZia terrorist", poster by a student of the State University Infrastructure and Technologies (Kyiv)

All signs and images as encodings of certain meanings should create a reliable, stable and open space for the consumer, without negative meanings or interpretations. Therefore, the visual code is a well-established symbolic system in graphical form. We emphasize a wide range of topics and the variety of problems in the process of design, the necessity of providing critical analysis of visual data, synthesis of professional disciplines covering numerous manifestations of this new interdisciplinary trend. Visualization provides a valuable basis for comparative analysis of information tools used in advertising and their impact on society (symbols, ornaments, web graphics, video advertising, printed and outdoor advertising). Visualization is a comprehensive resource for understanding the power of design research and an integral source of inspiration for developing creative concepts. In addition, case studies provide a link between ideas and their practical implementation. The visual language acquires independence, transmits social ideas and actively influences consciousness. Metaphor becomes basic characteristic of modern visual culture, a tool for integrating abstract and concrete concepts, interpreting complex ideas, combining images with emotions; a means of rethinking and emphasizing new meanings (Pryščenko 2021, 27). The use of visual metaphors in posters indicates that they have potentially persuasive power, perhaps at a subconscious level, and, as a result, lead to the desired result (Rozik 1997, 162–163).

Posters are made not only by graphic, but also by pictorial means. Many posters are created in a single copy for the exhibition or for posting outdoors, in a public place. Poster has bright, conditional, laconic graphic and color scheme, sometimes with decorative expressiveness. Specific means of propaganda are: planar image, common symbols, figurative metaphors, spectacular combinations of colours, scales, points of view, degrees of convention, heroic or satirical images. The creative

2.3. Jevhen Danyljuk "This is war", poster by a student of the State University Infrastructure and Technologies (Kyiv)and Technologies (Kyiv)

2.4. Anna Orljuk "Patron dog: I don't want to hear it!", poster by a student of the State University Infrastructure and Technologies (Kyiv)

method of poster artists significantly depends on the level of aesthetic development of the target audience he addresses in his work. The Ukrainian artist Vitalij Šostja aptly noted on one of his posters when the Russian Federation invaded Donbas in 2014: "This is a media war. The murderous weapon of modern times is mass media", by painting the word 'media' in the Russian *tricolor* near to the TV remote control.

Robin Landa has been working on reflecting the industry's shift from print and TV ads to fully integrated transmedia campaigns, giving insight into a broad range of media channels, new concepts, and strategies for creative content (Landa 2016). Foreign researchers rejecting the Internet as the only source of public advertising in the future, believe that mixed formats will serve as a bridge to the expected but not yet fully defined digital future. Thus, the visual research of poster materials has great potential to accompany other methods of studying and understanding the social world (Noble, Bestley 2011; O`Connel 2015).

Political and public (social) posters today are semantically closely intertwined, they are becoming tools of hybrid technologies and visual forms for the first front – military, the second – information and the third – cultural. The beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022 inspired the

2.5. Kateryna Hura "Are you ready for the consequences?", poster by a student of the State University Infrastructure and Technologies (Kyiv)

Charkiv triennial "The 4th Block" for international cooperation among students and professionals in the field of poster art under the slogan "Stand with Ukraine!". Exhibitions were held in different countries: Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Montenegro, France, Bulgaria, Spain, Slovakia, Turkey, Southern Korea and Japan,

2.6. Darija Makovec'ka "Wars – are cursed by mothers", poster by a student of the State University Infrastructure and Technologies (Kyiv)

2.7. Darija Pančenko "Tell me Paljanycja" (Paljanycja is a traditional Ukrainian round bread), poster by a student of the State University Infrastructure and Technologies (Kyiv)

Belgium, Canada, and in the USA. Information about these exhibitions was presented on Ukrainian and foreign news sites, as well as on design web resources.

The yellow-blue explosion from 2014 as a marking of Ukrainian territory and demand for its integrity, as a code of the meaning of national identity and high moral norms of Ukrainian society demonstrated various creative findings, different graphic stylistics, but the only one instrument is colour as a resource of the nation. Summing up, we note that it was Russian aggression that activated consciousness and creativity of artists and designers of the world in the use of Ukrainian national colours in poster.

An international exhibition "Poster against the War" was held in Wroclaw and in Krakow in 2023. The main goal of the project is to publicize the events in Ukraine through graphic art, to draw attention to the threat that Russia poses to the world, and to express the steadfast position of artists from all over the world who condemn the war. A powerful exhibition consisting of 100 posters presented the works by many authors from Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Germany, Armenia, Austria, Great Britain, France, and Japan. Among the creators were both well-known artists and designers, as well as very young artists whose works were distinguished by a high professional level. In their posters, the authors raised not only the problem of war, but also painful social and patriotic topics that reflect the complex interaction of Man with the World (Catalogue of the International exhibition… 2023).

The designer Maksim Palenko drew a poster for the documentary film "Eastern Front" about the war in Ukraine in the style of Marija Prymačenko. The film was included in the Berlin Film Festival program. The documentary was shot with the support of the Czech Republic, Latvia, and the USA, the premiere took place on February 24, 2023, the anniversary of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Many designers and artists also used the interpretation of works of fine art, sculpture, literature, or posters of the 20th century in a new context, for example:

Monument to the founders of Kyiv in the poster "All for the protection of Kyiv!";

Lazar Lisičkij's red wedge in the poster "The Destruction of Pacifism";

Kateryna by T. Ševčenko in the poster "Will I live in Ukraine…";

T. Ševčenko, L. Ukrajinka and I. Franko in military uniform in the poster "Glory to Ukraine!";

umbrella with the colour signs of the European Union, which saves Ukrainians;

Kozak against the background of the Moscow Kremlin in the poster "They set fire to the cigarette-end so that the pipe could be smoked";

V. Symonenko's quote "There is no more room for graves in the cemetery of shot illusions" in the ornamental setting;

a Ukrainian man in embroidered shirt in the poster "Their greatest fear is...";

a matrjoška doll with a grenade in the middle in the poster "From Russia with love", or a foot holding a red bear;

a Christmas tree based on the elements of Petrykivka painting in the New Year's greeting of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine;

a white dove in the word-image "Will";

a Coat of arms of Ukraine as a soaring dove, Ukraine as a Phoenix bird with the hope of revival, and many others.

Also students' works confirm the current negative context in the use of red as a symbol of Russian aggression, and the positive context of Ukrainian national colours as a means of self-identification and ethnicity. For example, #StandWith Ukraine posters 2022 (illustrations from the "ECO-culture club" page: https://www.facebook.com/ECO-culture-club-109900551139700) or posters by students of the State University Infrastructure and Technologies, Kyiv (academic heads Dr. Tetjana Senčuk and Prof. Svitlana Pryščenko, 2023–2024). The Ukrainian philosopher Myroslav Popovyč claimed to write a book about 'red twentieth century', as by his words, it was mostly like that for us (Popovyč 2005, 5).

2.8. Jelizaveta Mitina "The labyrinth. Victory is coming soon", poster by a student of the State University Infrastructure and Technologies (Kyiv)

2.9. Jana Tokareva "Light will win!", poster by a student of the State University Infrastructure and Technologies (Kyiv)

So, the poster has been reimagined as a carrier of graphic trends and a tool of propaganda, considering it as a product of visual culture, a holistic view of the poster as a reflection of the sociocultural sphere of society is presented. The practical value will be important for spreading the awareness of the wider scientific and educational communities of the importance of visual information and imagery represented by posters, as well as their cultural and artistic heritage. Modern media use posters not only in a traditional way for advertising in urban environments. In the hands of designers, it is compositionally transformed into any format of static or animated Internet banners, video advertisements in the subway, digital exhibitions, or presentations for thematic events in Ukraine and abroad.

The important propaganda function of the media has been proven. Based on the visual content analysis of anti-war posters and Internet banners, we conclude that visual clichés should be avoided in favor of artistic imagery, originality, Ukrainian national identity, colour, graphic design tools, and creative approaches. It was the Russian attack that consolidated society and activated the consciousness and creativity of artists and designers worldwide. In the poster and its online counterparts, ornaments or Ukrainian national colours were used, as well as creative techniques such as metaphor, hyperbole, allusion, and allegory.

We state that the poster actively forms mass consciousness, is included in the social symbolic system, has a powerful influence on public opinion, and encourages action. The scientific novelty consists in the conducted empirical analysis of the semiotic use of the red colour (as a symbol of communism, and now as Russian aggression) or the yel-

low-blue combination (Ukrainian national colours) in the poster and digital media.

Nowadays, a visual-communicative approach to media is clear which tends to be concise and should provide a quick and unambiguous perception of information. The affirmation of Poster Art in Ukraine as an independent type of professional design activity, the expansion of global communication space, complex political and socio-economic conditions, contradictory intercultural and ethno-cultural tendencies increase attention to effective means of visualizing social ideas. The visual language of colour in posters has psycho-emotional, associative and semantic properties, combined with verbal factors, it argues in favour of practical use of colour opportunities in this effective means of modern propaganda of Ukrainian national identity. By 'ecology of culture' we mean the preservation of cultural heritage necessary for the social and spiritual life of a person. This is no less an important task than preserving the environment, but the ecology of culture should not be confused with the restoration of art monuments, since the ecological approach, first of all, is applied to comprehend the genesis of the nation's culture and predict its development. Understanding the means of poster visualizing (semantics, aesthetics, and imagination) helps viewers to acquire necessary competencies in the area of public advertising. These materials are included in a lecture course for cultural scientists and designers in the system of higher education.

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UKRAINIAN MILITARY FOLKLORE 2022–2023

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Since the beginning of the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, a number of folklore stories, based on real events have been widely spread. They reflect the heroism of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians who defended their homeland from the Russian enemy. They became symbols of the destruction of the Russian troops and deserve careful study as phenomena of modern folklore.

Key words: Russian-Ukrainian war, genres of folklore, folklore characters.

УКРАЇНСЬКИЙ ВОЄННИЙ ФОЛЬКЛОР 2022–2023 РОКІВ

Роман Офіцинський
Юрій Офіцинський

Від початку широкомасштабного російського вторгнення в Украї-ну 24 лютого 2022 року масово розповсюдилася низка фольклорних сюжетів, які мають реальну документальну основу. У них відобра-жено героїзм українських воїнів і цивільних мешканців, які оборо-няли рідну землю від російського ворога. Вони стали символами знищення російських військ і заслуговують на ретельне вивчення як феномен сучасного фольклору.

Ключові слова: російсько-українська війна, жанри фольклору, фольклорні персонажі.

It is well known that the modern Russian-Ukrainian war began on February 20, 2014 with covert aggression, namely the military incursion of the Russian Federation into two administrative and political regions of

Ukraine – the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopolʹ (Oficynsʹkyj 2023, 18).

From March 1, 2014, the Kremlin tried to implement the "Novorossija" project aimed at separating the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. However, this foreign orchestrated separatist movement largely failed. After all, the Ukrainian armed forces managed to localize the Russian hybrid war in the historical and ethnographic region of Donbas. On the initiative and under the leadership of official Moscow, self-proclaimed terrorist entities under the names "Donecʹk People's Republic" and "Luhansʹk People's Republic" appeared in parts of the Luhansʹk and Donecʹk regions.

The next stage of Russian aggression against Ukraine was an unprovoked large-scale invasion before dawn on February 24, 2022. Since then, a protracted bloody campaign for the gradual liberation of temporarily occupied Ukrainian lands has been ongoing.

Considering the scientific issues related to the military folklore of modern Ukraine, we narrow the time limits of our detailed interest, taking as a point of reference the beginning of the current period of the Russian-Ukrainian war, that is, from February 24, 2022 to the present day.

It is this protracted global socio-political phenomenon – in fact, an intercivilizational confrontation, that has prompted an explosive outbreak of thematic oral folk creativity of various genres (Mychalʹčuk 2022). They will be found primarily in all modern forms of mass communication, especially in the Ukrainian segments of international social networks, for example, "Facebook", "Instagram", "YouTube" or "Tiktok", which is an invaluable resource for various scientific studies.

The fact is that since the beginning of the 21st century, as a result of scientific and technical progress, the Internet transmits popular messages visually and in writing with unparalleled efficiency. That is why the direction "network folklore" or internet lore or net lore took shape in the world humanitarian science. Its most common genres are memes, and gifs.

It is about the combination of different types of art, when words, graphics, video, sound merge into a multimedia work. Creative personalities with a good sense of humor, aesthetic taste, and the ability to draw succeed the most in the creation of such multimedia work and

average internet users expand on the best works and repost (spread) what is the most successfull.

We should immediately note that modern Ukrainian net lore works unite national ideas of identity, patriotism and stability, which have their roots in anti-Soviet political folklore (Jarmolenko 2023, 246). At the same time, such speech genres as proverbs, sayings, orders, or slogans continued a more recent tradition – the revolutionary "Majdan" folklore of 2004 and 2013–2014 (Kuzʹmenko 2023, 597). As a type of written communication, they address a huge audience simultaneously and quickly.

According to the results of a sociological study conducted in September 2023, the Russian-Ukrainian war stimulated Ukrainian citizens to actively use the Internet in all age groups. 93% of respondents used it at home, 52 % at work, and 42 % in transport (Jak ljudy… 'How people…' 2023). On average, 72 % of respondents spent more than four hours a day on the Internet using smartphones, laptops or desktop computers. That is, it has become a social norm, as a source of communication with relatives, friends and acquaintances.

It is very telling that as of January 2022, that is, before the Russian invasion, among social networks "YouTube" gained the largest audience in Ukraine (23,5 million users), followed by "Facebook" (16,4 million), then "Instagram" (almost 16 million) and "TikTok" – 12 million users (Subota 2022).

We would like to emphasize that from February 24, 2022 to the present day, a lot of folklore stories on military topics, based on real events, have been widely spread in Ukraine. They reflect the heroism of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians who defended their homeland from the Russian enemy. The famous tales about the Russian warship and the Konotop witches, the "Ghost of Kyiv" and Čornobajivka, and others, spread the most and, therefore, gained immense popularity. They became symbols of the destruction of Russian troops and deserve careful study as phenomena of modern folklore.

In specific historical circumstances, samples belonging to small folklore genres circulate most intensively. Among them, the most noteworthy are fables and anecdotes personified with recognizable figures of modern Ukraine, in particular with military leaders. One of such

figures is the charismatic commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Valerij Zalužnyj, who, during the repulse of Russian aggression on February 24, 2022, demonstrated the highest virtues in his position, primarily efficiency and professionalism, earned great respect among the people.

Therefore, it is not by chance that personalized proverbs, such as: "When Zalužnyj cuts an onion, the onion cries!" receive a lot of reposts on the "Facebook" social network. At the same time via a charismatic and symbolic character, the courage, stability, endurance, and self-sacrifice of the fighters of all the defense forces of Ukraine, the Armed Forces, are generally emphasized. In this way, the surname itself in the folk tradition turns into the common name of the unconquered defender of his state.

Short stories, mostly anecdotes, are an eloquent reflection of the ideological and thematic trends of modern military folklore. For example, when ordinary people in wartime talk about the political ratings of the Ukrainian elite, the highest level of public trust is often emphasized in the Armed Forces and their commander-in-chief.

In one of the anecdotal stories from the spring of 2022, it is lapidarily emphasized in a benevolent and witty, albeit paradoxical, dialogue that takes place between patriotic interlocutors:

"– In Ukraine, support for Zalužnyj is 102 %.

– Where did the 2 % come from?

– Prisoners of war".

Here, as befits the dynamic genre of the anecdote, the unexpected ending reveals the situational political moods that dominate in Ukrainian society, which, with the support of Western civilization, is heroically fighting, repelling enemy attacks, and in difficult conditions, by all means and methods, bringing the desired by the modern world victory over the Russian aggressor closer.

Modern folklore actively uses allegorical images, such as "Swan Lake", which are usually aimed at activating the socio-cultural phenomenon of historical memory.

The ballet "Swan Lake", known since the end of the 19th century, brought to life by a folklore plot, entered the folk art in the 1980s, symbolizing political changes and the departure of rulers to the afterlife.

Soviet television airwaves were filled with it when dictators died – the general secretaries of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brežnev (November 1982), Jurij Andropov (February 1984), Kostjantyn Černenko (March 1985). And from August 19, 1991, it was shown for three days in a row during the coup attempt in the USSR. As it turned out, the swan dance heralded the death of the Soviet empire.

Since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the humorous reminder of "Swan Lake" has been massively renewed not only in Ukraine. Many in the world were impatiently waiting for the broadcast of the mentioned ballet, which would mark the natural or premature death of the autocrat Vladimir Putin – the hated head of the Kremlin, who launched a criminal war against Ukraine.

Let's note the following as well. On May 18, 2022, the well-known Russian rock singer Jurij Ševčuk spoke from the stage in the city of Ufa, the capital of Baškortostan, with a completely different allegory, which, translated from the original language, sounds as follows: "The motherland is not the president's ass, which should be kissed all the time".

This statement with a direct reference to the irritating figure of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, has gained a significant number of followers – as an established proverb with the ambition to grow into a folk, nameless work of folklore.

It should be kept in mind that myth-making as an instrumental resource of oral folk creativity is characteristic of all direct and indirect participants in the Russian-Ukrainian war, that is, it is mutual. This tool is actively used by the ideologues of Putinism, a type of totalitarian regime that has established itself in the current Russian Federation and is often referred to as rascism.

One of the myth-making images of the imaginary Russian victory in the war with Ukraine is a monument to an elderly woman with a Soviet banner meeting the "liberators" (Karlovs′kyj 2022). It was opened by representatives of official Moscow on May 4, 2022 in the occupied Mariupol′. In some Russian cities, cheap sculptures and murals were also hastily created, banners, posters, and newspapers were published.

In fact, the prototype is a Russian-speaking pensioner, Hanna Ivanova, who lived in a village near Charkiv. In the midst of the fighting in early April 2022, in a rush of emotional peacemaking, she went out

to meet Ukrainian soldiers with a USSR flag, mistaking them for Russian soldiers who were shelling the area and destroyed her home. Later, fleeing from the Russian invasion, she moved to live in the de-occupied part of the Kyiv Oblast – in the village of Dmytrivka. However, she was mythologized in Russia, hoping at least in the attitudes of the older generation to return the imperial past.

The grandmother with the flag of a non-existent country is rather the personification of the current totalitarian state-pariah – the Russian Federation, which is departing into eternity.

As proven in folkloristic studies (Ivanovsʹka 2023; Kuzʹmenko 2023; Rjabčenko 2023; Jarmolenko 2023), numerous ethnostereotypical delineations of cardinal differences between Ukrainians and Russians are observed. At the same time, Ukrainian folk art is based on long-standing stable meanings of the Russian as a foreigner with negative connotations – ignorant, treacherous, cruel, thief, rapist, destroyer.

It should be noted that the current Russian-Ukrainian war will be accompanied by neologisms from both sides. Current military experience gave rise to the very first modern folk terms for Russians. Along with the previously used xenoethnonyms, original ones appeared – "rascist" (derived from "fascist" or "Nazi"), "rusnja" (diminutive, like "kacapnja"), "orc" (after a folklorized character), "čmonja" (the name of a captured Russian collaborator, from a jargonism "čmo" which means a repulsive creature) and others.

There is a dominating mythopoetic perception of a Russian – a "moskalʹ" ("Muscovite") or an "orc" – as an entity from the afterlife. Ukrainians most often call the enemy military orcs, which in the fantasy genre are mythical creatures – untidy, numerous, angry at humanity and with low intelligence.

It is common knowledge that the mythonym "orcs" comes from Western European folklore and denotes fictional humanoid creatures with animal features that serve evil forces, darkness. In the Etruscan and Roman mythology, Orcus is the god of death.

So now "orcs" are the Ukrainian general name for the Russian occupiers (Kreminʹ 2022), who are distinguished mainly by xenophobia and misanthropy, looters and thieves. In addition, there are a few recorded cases when Russians from the hinterland are happy to send their rel-

atives to the war against Ukraine, counting on a one-time payment of seven million Russian rubles in the event of their death, or by in-kind exchange to receive a brand new small class car – "Lada Kalina", which is produced in the Russian Federation.

Fixed expressions characteristic of Russian military neologisms that replace reality mean the opposite of the original phenomenon: "dobraja volja" ("good will") – forced action under irresistible compulsion, "osvo-bodit′" ("liberate") – to cause maximum damage, "začistit′ territoriju" ("clear the territory") – steal as much as possible, etc.

The flow of satirical and humorous content about the Russians and their army became not only a continuation of the folklore tradition based on typical scenarios of ethnic superiority or enmity. It is also a significant spiritual and cultural foundation for the psycho-emotional unification of Ukrainians into a national community.

It is noteworthy that the basis of modern folklore adaptations is usually popular folk proverbs, such as: "Water does not flow under a lying stone", From it, the newest version has been created: "Water does not flow under a lying rusnja". The expression "lying rusnja" best visualizes the fallen Russian invaders.

Another telling example: In the proverb "It's easier to beat a father with a gang", the ambiguity of the used verb "to beat" prompted the new proverb "It's good to beat a moskal′ with a gang". Here the meaning of "defeating the enemy" is emphasized, and the noun "father" is replaced by the xenoethnonym "moskal′".

In the two-component proverb "No matter how much you feed a wolf, it will look at the forest," the reference words, also nouns, are replaced in the same way. It was transformed into the following: "No matter how much you feed an orc, he will look at the Hague". In this revision, the direction of movement was recoded from desirable for the wolf (at the forest) to undesirable for the top Russians – at the Hague where the International Criminal Court is situated and the cases of criminals – officials of the highest level – are considered (Kuz′menko 2023, 599).

The rise of information and technological progress, the accelerated development of electronic communications and computer sciences started a relatively new genre which was marked by eloquent folk-lore achievements regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war: a meme – an

image, video or text which quickly gains national popularity through the Internet. Its manifestations are an atypical joke, a political slur, a caricature, a gesture, and the like.

The "meme" in English means an idea, behavior, style that spreads from one person to another by all possible technical means of exchanging messages: e-mail, messenger, forum, blog, etc. The described phenomenon quickly won the right for independence very recently – at the beginning of the 21st century for entertainment purposes, to divert attention and shape public opinion.

It should be emphasized that folklore text creation in the conditions of the modern Russian-Ukrainian war arouses increased interest. Moreover, social Internet networks are taken into consideration from the perspective of updating previous achievements, allusions and reminiscences. After all, the textual space of military themes consists of both traditional forms (joke, story or lullaby) and new ones (meme). Because of that, the scientific record of newly-created texts, which abound in social networks, is seen as an immediate task (Ivanovs'ka 2023, 54). They vividly reflect the military endeavours of Ukrainians, the realities of the occupation, and the vileness of the enemy.

It is not by chance that the mentioned Internet memes – images and texts that are the imprint of a spontaneous instant reaction to a certain event – deserve special attention. They became the most widespread in Ukrainian social networks. After all, memes appeal to emotions by visualizing and textual framing of real stories with well-known phrases, proverbs or lines from folk songs.

In those widespread examples, a powerful negative image of the Russian invaders was formed, dehumanizing and defaming themselves with a defiantly criminal attitude towards prisoners and civilians (Rjabčenko 2023, 324). Instead, Ukrainian soldiers are always heroized through contrasts and comparisons, starting from equipment and ending with the level of education: "For two Ukrainian soldiers – three higher educations, and for two orcs – three criminal records".

Since memes have a strong influence on mass consciousness, they are considered a valuable tool of military propaganda. Empirical observations of 2022–2023 confirm this. A story of an ordinary person posted online can become a substrate for endless interpretations by the online

audience, for example, a Ukrainian woman who shot down a Russian drone with a glass jar of tomatoes, or a Ukrainian soldier who determined the course of a Russian warship, and with it all of imperial Russia.

From the very beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014, a lot of Internet memes entered the folklore circulation, in particular, "polite people" (in Russian "vežlivyje ljudi" – occupation troops in Crimea without identification marks), "people's mayor" and "people's governor" (separatist leaders), "junta" (Ukrainian government).

Some of them, for example, "počekun" ("the one who waits", in Russian "ždun" – a hidden collaborator waiting for the arrival of the Russian occupiers), which since January 2017 is quite recognizable in Eastern European countries. It appeared not as a result of semantic transformation, but as references to works of art, which shook popular culture.

"Homunculus Loxodontus" is a 2016 plastic and epoxy resin sculpture by the Dutch Margriet van Breevoort in front of a children's hospital in Leiden. It is a mixture of a man with a northern elephant seal and an insect larva without legs, but with human hands. The creation is dedicated to visitors who waited for the doctor's appointment. However, its primary meaning has acquired a negative political meaning in Ukraine under the influence of the wartime, when among the population there is a completely natural national-patriotic mobilization without evasive thinking contrary to the dynamics of "own – foreign", "friend – enemy", "patriot – collaborator".

In connection with the wartime, new sociolinguistic phenomena are also observed. It is not for nothing that, due to the Russian aggression in 2022, the demand for checking code words, such as "paljanycja", has increased among Ukrainian speakers.

During basic anti-sabotage and counter-intelligence checks, in many cases all suspicious individuals who came across units of the armed forces of Ukraine had to say the word "paljanycja" in Ukrainian. It is difficult to pronounce for ethnic Russians due to phonetic features. In Ukrainian, the sound [ts] can be pronounced both hard and soft, and in Russian it is always hard. For Russians who have not yet lived in a Ukrainian-speaking environment, the correct pronunciation of soft [ts'] is quite a stumbling block.

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, a pun meme about "bavovna" ("cotton") spread like wildfire. Here is some context – a few years earlier, for reasons of self-censorship, Russian state media began to replace the frightening word "vzryv" ("explosion") with a calmer, less panicky word with an emphasis on the second syllable – "chlopok" ("a clap"). Defending their native land from an enemy attack, Ukrainians translated "chlopok" ("a clap") as "bavovna" ("cotton") (meaning a textile fiber of plant origin). The thing is that in Russian "chlopok" meaning "a clap" and "chlopok" meaning "cotton" are spelled the same. In this way, its homograph ("chlopok" in Russian) – a word with the same spelling, but different in sound and meaning – was played.

Therefore, to this day, "bavovna" ("cotton") in Ukraine ironically refers to explosions at military facilities in Russia or in areas temporarily occupied by it. The frequently used expression "to treat with cotton" is a euphemism for the deliberate targeting of ammunition depots of the Russian military or collaborators.

Also, the widely known meme-aphorism "koncert Kobzona" ("Kobzon's concert") fully serves as a model of a verbal formula that refers to such a small folklore genre as a curse. The desire to attend "Kobzon's concert" or the statement about his visit means a threat, a curse, the destruction of the Russian occupiers and their accomplices. The meme-aphorism arose after the assassination of the terrorist leader of the terrorist organization "Donec′k People's Republic" Oleksandr Zacharčenko on August 31, 2018. Then the joke spread that Zacharčenko went to the "Kobzon's concert".

The Soviet and Russian pop baritone Josyp Kobzon himself, born in Ukraine in the city of Časiv Jar, Donec′k Oblast, died in Moscow a day earlier from cancer at the age of 81. He tarnished himself with anti-Ukrainian statements and effective support of Russian aggression in Crimea and Donbas back in 2014, which immediately brought him under international sanctions.

In general, the Russian invasion after February 24, 2022 gave birth to a whole bunch of folklore memes in Ukraine. The most famous of them are military aphorisms – the answer "Russkij vojennyj korabl′, idi nachuj!" ("Russian warship, go fuck yourself!") and the greeting "Dobroho večora, my z Ukrajiny!" ("Good evening, we are from

Ukraine!"), the jinx of the "konotops′ki vid′my" ("Konotop witches"), as well as stories about the Kyiv ghost, miraculous javelins and bayraktars. At the same time, they became bright and clear markers of the unconquered Ukrainian nation for the foreign-speaking world.

In the publicly available encyclopedia "Wikipedia", for example, the multifaceted meme "Russian warship, go fuck yourself!," which went down in history as an immortal image of the first day of the war and a symbol of Ukraine's future victory, is explained in 37 languages. And the Kyiv ghost is spoken in 42 languages.

The copyright for the aphorism about the Russian warship was until a certain time attributed to Roman Hrybov, a Ukrainian marine who was released from captivity on March 24, 2022, and who comes from the city of Zolotonoša, Čerkasy Oblast (Russkij vojennyj korabl′… 'Russian warship…'. 2022). Then it was officially announced that he had deliberately taken over the authorship instead of the still-captured border guard officer. His name and surname still remain a mystery.

It all started with the fact that on February 24, 2022, at around 3:00 p.m., the Moscow missile cruiser of the Russian Federation was convincing through the radio exchange channel the defenders of the Zmijinyj Island to betray Ukraine and surrender. The Ukrainian soldier responded triumphantly to the enemy's threat of possible shelling: "Russian warship, go fuck yourself!" These words powerfully echoed around the world, including on billboards, chevrons, various souvenir products, in the media, in songs and poems. After all, as it turned out, the Ukrainian David humiliatingly laughed at the Russian Goliath on a rock in the middle of the sea.

Although the defenders of the Zmijinyj Island, which administratively belongs to the Odesa Oblast, were still captured late in the evening of February 24, they returned home after the exchange, albeit incomplete, with the exception of a few people, including the author of the aforementioned statement. Soon, on April 13, the cruiser "Moskva" sank as a result of a missile strike by the Ukrainian naval forces, which soon, on June 30, 2022, deoccupied the Zmijinyj Island.

The ship meme is related to another that appeared earlier. The chorus "Putin chujlo!" ("Putin is a dickhead!") is based on obscenity and concerns the President of Russia. It was invented by fans of the football

club "Metalist" in Charkiv and performed for the first time on March 30, 2014, at a joint march with fans of the known in Europe football club "Šachtar" from Donecʹk.

At the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war, this joke as the "Song about Putin" spread in numerous versions and variations among opponents of the Kremlin's aggressive policy all over the world.

According to folklorists, the genre feature of memes is manifested in the fact that they can fade away and be revived. Only the code ones of them, which contain patriotic ideas, have a long life such as the ones about the mentioned "Russian waship" or the state language "Kakaja raznica?" ("What's the difference?").

It was spring of 2022 when memes with rhyming incantations about the air raid alarms appeared en masse such as: "Povitrjana tryvoha, perejdy do Tahanroha, z Tahanroha do Pitera ta bunkernoho pidara" ("Air alarm, move to Taganrog, from Taganrog to Piter and bunker asshole"). A year later, in the spring of 2023, folklorist scientists have already recorded a version of the same incantation without swear words and with a softened curse: "Tryvoha, tryvoha, hetʹ vid moho poroha. U Moskvu i Burjatiju na otu vsju bratiju!" ("Alarm, alarm, get away from my doorstep. To Moscow and Burjatija to all those fraternity!") (Jarmolenko 2023, 247).

As we can see, there is frank talk about the desired symmetrical coverage of the unbearable consequences of the war disaster of the entire enemy country. This is emphasized by the names of well-known Russian cities (Moscow, St. Petersburg (Piter in slang), Taganrog) or remote regions (Burjatija).

The story of the Kyiv ghost is often interpreted as an urban legend about the heroic character of the Russian-Ukrainian war – the Ukrainian ace (Pryvyd Kyjeva 'The Kyiv Ghostʹ 2022). This is a collective image of masters of air combat – pilots of the 40th tactical aviation brigade, who selflessly defended the capital of Ukraine from the first hours of the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022.

On March 8, Major Andrij Ljutašyn, at the age of 48, directed a damaged fighter jet at a column of invaders in the village of Berezivka, Žytomyr Oblast. He is buried in the city of Mukačevo, Transcarpathian region. In the sky over Žytomyr on March 13, Major Stepan Tarabalka

died in his thirtieth year of life. He was buried in his native village of Korolivka, Ivano-Frankivs′k Oblast.

Both military pilots were posthumously awarded the highest state award – the title of a Hero of Ukraine, and there are many more those who have been awarded such a title.

The story about the pilot who shot down six enemy planes on the first day of the war, and then brought their number to forty, was so harmoniously superimposed on the moral and psychological matrix of national resistance (Brown 2022) that on the official "Facebook" pages of the Air Force Command of UA Armed Forces on March 23 and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on April 30, 2022 demarcated folklore from historical facts.

The fact is that the Kyiv ghost did not actually have a single prototype, as domestic and foreign reporters assumed.

Regarding the jinx of the "Konotop witches": Thanks to the Ukrainian classic Hryhorij Kvitka-Osnov′′janenko, the title of his satirical fantasy story "Konotops′ka vid′ma" ("The Konotop Witch") written in 1833 became a catch phrase. The image of the Konotop standing at the intersection of opposite worlds symbolizes an old sorceress that transorms into a mysterious girl every morning. In its updated version, the patriotic residents of Konotop decided on February 24, 2022 to demoralize Russian soldiers by saying in Russian: "Do you even know where you are? This is Konotop. Here, every second woman is a witch. Your dick won't get hard from tomorrow".

It is noteworthy that Russian soldiers arrived in the vicinity of Konotop on February 24, and the next day they were already exchanging diesel fuel for vodka. On March 2, they retreated. It was then that this viral video was posted on the "Telegram" channel by the head of the Sumy Oblast Military Administration. This story gained worldwide publicity in hot pursuit, and "The Late Show with Stephen Colbert" – the best late show in the USA – did not miss it as well.

A common greeting after the Russian invasion "Dobroho večora, my z Ukrajiny!" ("Good evening, we are from Ukraine!") actually debuted a few months earlier, in October 2021, as the main phrase in a musical composition by Mark Halanevyč, laureate of the 2020 Taras Ševčenko National Prize of Ukraine. In the new conditions – a full-scale

war – military and statesmen, politicians, journalists, artists and so on addressed the multi-million audience with it (Dobroho večora, my z Ukrajiny 'Good evening, we are from Ukraine' 2022).

The name of the village of Čornobajivka, which is ten kilometers north of the city of Cherson, where the Russian army systematically suffered losses, has become a meme-symbol of the incompetence of the enemy command and the irrational repetition of elementary mistakes, and became a general name of a cursed place where it is easy to get to and from where it is difficult to get out alive (Boji pid Čornobajivkoju 'Battles near Čornobajivka' 2022).

Paradoxically, during the period from February 27 to August 21, 2022, the Armed Forces of Ukraine destroyed the enemy here with air and artillery strikes very often – as many as thirty times. Because of that, Čornobajivka was colloquially compared to the Bermuda Triangle, and this village was compared to other places of numerous defeats of the Russian Federation. Its soldiers nearby panicked en masse and refused to advance in this direction, as was repeatedly noted until the liberation of Čornobajivka by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on November 11, 2022.

It is no less revealing that at the beginning of the Russian invasion, "Bayraktars" and "Javelins" personified the Ukrainian resistance and echoed in folk art and mass culture: paintings, murals, songs (Kuzʹmin 2022). "Bayraktar" (in Persian – "flag bearer") is a Turkish strike operational-tactical medium-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle with a long flight range. "Javelin" is an American portable anti-tank missile system, equipped with a "fire and forget" missile guidance system for hitting armored vehicles, fortifications on the ground, flying objects at low altitude and speed.

Since it was with this reliable weapon that the Ukrainians caused enormous damage to the enemy in the first months of its aggression, its folklorization is quite expected.

To this day, memes, monostrophes, reworkings of jokes about Muscovites, incantations for the death of the occupiers and for victory, folk prayers, curses, stories-memoirs dominate among modern folklore genres brought to life by Russian aggression against Ukraine (Kuzʹmenko 2023, 598). Visual forms of creativity, such as posters, caricatures,

stickers in public places of urban and rural spaces, are endowed with expressive signs of folkloreness.

The mentioned works quickly convey important information, rally around important social goals, and support the moral integrity of the nation. At the same time, they relieve stress, help maintain mental balance, and integrate the war of liberation against the Russian invaders into the system of universal human values. That is because modern folklore is seen as very effective in overcoming mass psychological trauma caused by a devastating war, collective mockery of evil, talking about experienced anxiety, fear or pain mostly through social networks.

Taking into consideration the fact that the modern Russian-Ukrainian war is still going on and has reached a protracted phase, it is reasonable to predict the subsequent rise of oral folk art, the development, improvement and reinterpretation of already known examples of war folklore and the emergence of new ones in all small genres.

Such art, of course, aims first and foremost to raise the fighting spirit and moral stability of the Ukrainian nation for victory over the enemy. That is why, as a socially important phenomenon of mass culture, the observed folklore innovations deserve comprehensive scientific studies today.

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GRAPHEMES AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NEWEST MEANINGS IN CONTEMPORARY UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN DISCOURSES

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The article analyses deviations in the traditional letter sign usage, which is primarily related to the usage of Latin letters instead of Cyrillic. Attention is paid to the process of semiotic recoding of the letters Z and V, which illustrate a shift from the linguistic meaning to the symbolism of Russian aggression in Ukraine.

    Keywords: grapheme, a letter, a sign, a symbol, discourse.

ГРАФЕМИ ЯК РЕПРЕЗЕНТАНТИ НОВІТНІХ СЕНСІВ У СУЧАСНИХ УКРАЇНСЬКОМУ ТА РОСІЙСЬКОМУ ДИСКУРСАХ

Юлія Браїлко

У розвідці йдеться про відхилення в традиційному вживанні літерних знаків, пов'язаних передусім із використанням латинських букв замість кириличних. Увагу приділено процесу семіотичного перекодування літер Z, V, у яких відбувся зсув від мовного значення до символіки російської агресії в Україні.

    Ключові слова: графема, літера, знак, символ, дискурс.

The graphics of any language is constant and not frequently changed compared to other semiotic systems. Thus, the modern Ukrainian alphabet, which at one time was based on the Cyrillic alphabet, was formed in its current form "after 1905, as evidenced by the «Dictionary of the Ukrainian Language» edited by B. Hrinčenko. According to the spelling dated 1933, the letter г was removed and restored in the 3rd edition of «Ukrainian orthography» (1990)" (Pivtorak 2000, 680).

The modern Russian alphabet has existed since "the moment of its last reform in 1917–1918" (Rudnev 2017).

Scientists write about a certain "competition" between the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets, which has been going on since at least the 19th century and to this day, in particular, there have been repeated attempts to translate the graphics of the Ukrainian language into Latin, there are various projects of the Ukrainian Latin alphabet, etc. Today, Latin letters in the Cyrillic text are used both for transliteration and for "modeling the imagery, attractiveness of the artistic and journalistic text (discourse)" (Peresada 2021, 38). According to L. Sobol′, Ukrainian journalists and writers have actively tinkered with the Latin alphabet for the nomination of works, self-nomination, parameterization of text content, etc. (Sobol′ 2017, 202).

However, nowadays Ukrainian and Russian discourses represent deviations in the traditional use of letter signs, primarily connected with the use of Latin letters instead of Cyrillic. This process is caused by extra-lingual factors, in particular, the usage of Z, V and O markings on the military equipment of the Russian Federation, which launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. In fact, immediately the letters Z and V underwent a semiotic recoding: there was a shift from a purely linguistic meaning to the symbolism of Russian aggression in Ukraine. The letter O underwent a transformation only in conjunction with the other two letters (in the ZOV combination), since it cannot independently perform the function of an ideologeme due to the identity of the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets, and therefore the lack of distinguishing potential. The letter combination ZOV, for example, is used as a name/component of the name of propaganda channels on YouTube *("Z O V"*[1]), on Telegram *("Сводки от ополчения Новороссии ZOV"* – *"Summaries from the Novorossija Militija ZOV"*), as a component of a nickname (*ZOV ZEKA ZOV* on Twitter), etc. It should be noted that the graphic symbol Z is more frequent in both Russian and Ukrainian discourse, since, according to media reports (Koval′ov 2022; Kryhel′ 2022), it was used by SMM specialists of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation for propaganda purposes.

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1 All quoted material is given with preservation of the original spelling and punctuation.

As a matter of fact, the Russian-Ukrainian war itself in the period of 2022 acquired the name "*special operation Z*" in Russian discourse, such as: *"Герои спецоперации «Z»: сержант Акулов одним ударом сжег 10 танков"* – *"Z" Special Military Operation Heroes: Sergeant Akulov Allegedly Destroyed 10 Tanks in a Single Strike* (headline of the article on the website kp.ru, 13.05.2022).

The new association of the Russian army with the letters Z, V gained wide popularity in Russian society and outside the Internet discourse, "symbolic letters are used in advertising, on banners; they are given to children and those are lined up to create these letters" (Vovk 2022, 152), regulating the behavior of masses through visual manipulation. Even the penetration of graphic ideologues into the sacred discourse was observed, as mentioned by the Ukrainian mass media: *"Недільна кібершкола «ВоZнесение» (так, це її справжня назва) відкрилася 1 вересня в кубанському Армавірі. Настоятель храму особисто навчає дітей-парафіян збирати та запускати безпілотники"* – *The Sunday cyber school "VoZnesenie" (this is indeed its official name) was launched on September 1 in Armavir, a city in the Kuban' region. A local priest personally instructs children from the parish community in assembling and operating unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)* (Telegram channel "Insajder ZSU" 'AFU Insider' 07.09.2023). The sacralization of these symbols and aggression in general quite naturally evokes a negative and ironic assessment on the part of Ukrainians: *"«ZOV за віру та вітчизну» з обличчям Ісуса: на російському форумі «Армія-2023» презентували надувний польовий храм"* – *"ZOV for Faith and Fatherland" with the Face of Jesus: Inflatable Field Church Presented at Russia's "Army-2023" Forum* (Telegram channel "TSN novyny" – 'TSN news' 15.08.2023).

The propagandistic meaning of the letters Z and V caused, according to the reports of numerous mass media, the reaction of the world community. For example, the Japanese low-cost airline "Zipair Tokyo", the Swiss insurance company "Zurich Insurance" abandoned the image of the letter Z on their logos, the South Korean corporation "Samsung" removed this letter from the names of its equipment models (Z (symbol of the Russian invasion of Ukraine) 2022), etc. "Ukrpošta" stopped issuing postage stamps with letter denominations V and Z (Ukrpošta

introduced the usage of these and other letters of the Latin alphabet to indicate the nominal value in 2017); according to the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers (April 2023), the usage of these letters in car license plates is prohibited" (Taranenko 2023, 15). Prohibitions of symbols of Russian armed aggression against Ukraine took place at the state level in Moldova, Poland, the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Estonia, and Germany (Z (symvol rosijs′koho vtorhnennja v Ukrajinu 'symbol of the Russian invasion of Ukraine') 2022). On 05.22.2022, the Verchovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the law No. 2265-IX "On the prohibition of propaganda of the Russian Nazi totalitarian regime, the armed aggression of the Russian Federation as a terrorist state against Ukraine, symbols of the military invasion of the Russian Nazi totalitarian regime in Ukraine", in which the prohibited symbols, except other, the Latin letters Z, V, used "separately (without a legitimate context or in the context of justifying armed aggression against Ukraine or other military actions)" or used "by replacing the Cyrillic letters "З", "С", "В" "Ф" (Z", "S", "V" "F") or other letters in separate words with visual emphasis on these letters" (Pro zaboronu propahandy … 'On the prohibition of propaganda …' 2022).

It should be noted that although the meaning of the signs Z and V in the Russian and Ukrainian discourses coincides, they have a different ideological load, and therefore a contrasting axiology. Thus, in the Russian segment, these letters are usually given expressive positive and praising connotations, they are actively used as a sign of support for those who are fighting against Ukraine. There are several ways of using the letters Z, V with remedial semantics, in particular, it is the replacement of capital and small Cyrillic letters З / з, С / с, В / в with capital Latin letters, for example: *"Заканчиваем войны", "Za мир", "Za победу", "Za детей Донбасса", "Задача будет Vыполнена"* – *"Zending wars," "Z for peace," "Z for victory," "Z for the children of Donbas," "The Zask will be Vcomplished"* (slogans on posters actively dissiminated on many social networks); *"Za Россию"* – *"Z for Russia"* (a marathon title); *"Za Родину"* – *"Z for the Motherland"* (a journal title); *"Zалог здоровья"* – *"Z is the pledge of health"* (a club title;); *Владлен ТатарZкий, Ирина КуксенкоVa* – *Vladlen TatarZkij, Irina KuksenkoVa* (nickname on a telegram); *#ZaМир, #zАПАЦАНОV*

– #ZForPeace, #ZForTheBoyZ (hashtags on various social networks), *"ЗАПИСКИ VЕТЕРАНА,"* – *"Zotes of a veTeran,",* *"Зорок Зороков"* – *"Zorok Zorokov"* (former title – *"Sorok Sorokov"*);*"Записки мичмана Птичкина"* – *"Zotes of Midshipman Ptičkin"*,*"ТалиноV Online"* – *"TalipoV Online"*, *Русский отряд онлифанZ"* – *"Russian OnlyFanZ Detachment"* (Telegram channel titles); *"Россия беZ цензуры"* – *"Russia Without CenZorship"* (the title of the group on the VKontakte network); *"Za пацанов!"* – *"Z for the Boys"* (the name of the video on the YouTube channel "Pavel Chupryna");*"Жена пилит, чтобы ехал на бамбас воевать Za пацанов и долбиться V очко"* – *"My wife nags me to go fight in the 'Bambas' Z-for-the-boys and take it V in the ass* (zov zeka zov, network "Tweeter", 20.08.2022); *"Anatolij zzov-Je-zov"*, *"Новороссия против укрофашистов CВО zov"* – *"Novorossija Against Ukrofascists – smo zov"* (accounts on the "Odnoklassniki" network). Latin letters are also introduced into the text by adding (the names of the Russian military penal units*"Шторм Z", "Шторм V"* – *"Storm Z", "Storm V"*, telegram channels *"Товарищ Z Майор", "Война Z Украина", "Неофициальный Безсонов «Z»", "Повернутые на Z войне"*, АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА *Z"* – *"Comrade Z Major", "The Z-War in Ukraine", "Unofficial Bezsonov 'Z'", "Obsessed with the Z-War", "The Archangel of Z Special Forces"*), or a combination of both methods (Telegram channel *"Vоенкор Котенок Z"* – *"War Correspondent Kotenok Z"*, nickname on Twitter *"zov zeka zov"*).

In addition, the letters Z and V in both Russian and Ukrainian discourse are used to create the names of objects (equipment, clothes, etc.) that have the following markings: *"Український прапор на своєму місці та понівечені Z-автівки: «Радіо Свобода опублікувало відео зі звільненої Балаклії на Харківщині»"* – *The Ukrainian flag in its rightful place and destroyed Z-vehicles: Radio Svoboda publishes footage from liberated Balaklija (Charkiv region)* (Telegram channel "tsn novyny" – 'tsn news' 12.09.2022); *"Жительницы Кургана исполнили танец живота в камуфляжных Z-костюмах"* – *Women in Kurgan perform belly dance in camouflage Z-costumes* (Telegram channel "astra" 20.07.2022). Such occasional lexemes can also come from the alphabetical name of the last letter of the Latin alphabet: *"Трофейна Zеточка. Ціла, не бита, не «крашена»"* – *"Captured Z-Mobile. Intact,*

undamaged, unpainted (Telegram channel "Real'naja vojna | Ukraina" 'Real war | Ukraine' 14.09.2022).

Giving the letters Z, V and occasionally O a negative connotation is due to the corresponding ideological guidelines of the speakers. This phenomenon occurs in part of the studied Russian-language texts and in all Ukrainian-language samples. "<...> after February 24, 2022, the military-political discourse in the Ukrainian media acquired some new features, – I. Avramenko and V. Drešpak have noted. – And the key here is the acquisition by this discourse of the status of an «independent battlefield», where the military and political situation is not simply described, but where there is an informational confrontation between two states, societies, and even worldview concepts" (Avramenko, Drešpak 2022, 249). These researchers emphasize the fundamental role in this confrontation of words-symbols, as well as words-"signs" and words-"labels". The words-"labels" include "occasionalisms that appeared by replacing the letter З with the Latin Z (the emblem of Russian troops participating in the so-called «special operation» in one of the directions): Zомбі (Zombies), Zлочинці (Zriminals), Zвірі (Zbeasts), руZZкі (ruZZki) etc. And if in Russian socio-communicative space such a replacement of letters is a kind of symbol of patriotism, then in Ukrainian and in countries where Russian aggression is condemned, Z is now clearly perceived as a symbol of the invading country" (Avramenko, Drešpak 2022, 249–250).

For example, addressees, responding to Russian slogans supporting armed aggression against Ukraine, resort to sarcasm, deciphering new symbols (*"Z – зомбі, V – вампіри, O – оборотні"* – *"Z"* – *Zombies,* *"V"* – *Vampires,* *"O"* – *Werewolves* (Sergi Simkhe, comment on Telegram channel "Romanenko Dreams&Nightmare" 8.03.2022); *"Розшифровка позначок на рф-ському металобрухті: V – вмер, Z – здох, O – обісрався"* – *Decoding the markings on Russian scrap metal: V – dead, Z – rotted, O – defecated* (Alla Ivanjuk, Facebook, 31.08.2022); *"Z – Задержки в развитии"* – *"Z – Zelayed in development"* (comment on the Telegram channel "Hončarenko" 10.09.2022).

Both the general public and scientists have noticed the similarity between racist and Nazi symbols: "Russian society (as well as the scientific environment), having been under the all-pervading influence

1. Anti-war poster (published by Oleh Rodič, Facebook 09.28.2022)

of Kremlin propaganda for many years, naturally does not reflect on the fact that the main symbol of the «denazification and demilitarization» of Ukraine resembles the runic sign «Wolfsangel» («wolf's hook»). In Nazi Germany, it was used as a symbol on the emblems of the SS «Reich» and Wehrmacht divisions ⬚…⬚. And the visual connection with the swastika is obvious. Z is found in the words naZi and naZism, in the Russian language there is a word «зига» «Ziga» for the Nazi salute" (Dem″janenko, Dem″janenko 2022, 180). Speakers directly identify the grapheme Z with the swastika, a sign that "became an emblem of German fascism" (VTSSUM 2005, 1105); *"Окупанти в Криму наказали всім власникам маршруток причепити фашистську свастику у вигляді «Z»"* – *Occupying forces in Crimea reportedly ordered minibus owners to attach a fascist-style 'Z' insignia* (Kryms′kyj banderivec′ 'Crimean Banderite', Tweeter, 29.03.2022); *"Малюючи zвастику – Painting the Zvastikan* (UAGeek, comment on telegram channel "Nesemos′!" 'Let's rush!' 20.04.2022); *"Машинку со zвастикой слегка денацифицировали"* – *A car with a Zwastika was slightly de-nazified* (Margarita Bolchovskaja, Facebook 22.04.2022); *"Zвастика людям не нравится"* – *People don't like the Zwastika* (Telegram channel "Berjozovyj sok" 'Birch sap' 25.04.2022); *"Вы понимали, что погибнут люди, и все равно ставили себе на аватарки Zвастики"* – *You knew people would die, and still you used Zwastikas as your profile pictures* (Telegram channel "Sharp's", 6.07.2022); *"Они почему-то стали убирать из своих профилей свастику Z i V"* – *They've begun quietly removing Z and V swastikas from their social media profiles* (Telegram channel "Real′naja vojna | Ukraina" 'Real war | Ukraine' 01.09.2022). The

2. Anti-war poster (published by Leo Oni, Twitter 04.22.2022)

connection of the newest symbol Z with fascism and Nazism can also be traced in the graphic modifications of words to indicate these phenomena or their signs (*фашиZм, нациZм, наZист, Зиганутый* – FashiZm, NaziZm, NaZist, Ziganuty derivational occasionalism z-fascist): *"Знак фашиZму: як компанії відмовляються від нової Звастики на своїх лого та що буде далі"* – Z-ymbol of fascism: How brands are rejecting the new Zwastika in their logos, and what comes next (rau.ua 02.04.2022)[2]; *"Російський державний наZизм – лайно планети Земля"* – *Russian state NaZism is the excrement of planet Earth* (Igor Kondratiuk, Facebook 27.06.2022); *"Пережила Холокост в Мариуполе в 1942м, но не пережила русских наZистов 80 лет спустя"* – *She survived the Holocaust in Mariupol' in 1942, but didn't survive Russian NaZists 80 years later* (Sergej Medvedev, Facebook 22.04.2022); Украина *неминуемо начнет освобождать украинские территории от Зиганутых нацистских оккупантов"* – *Ukraine will inevitably begin liberating its territories from Z-crazed Nazi occupiers* (Telegram channel "CYNIC" 30.09.2022); *"<…> у z-фашистов на Земле есть еще 7,9 миллиардов врагов, зачем-то говорящих на непонятных языках"* – *Z-fascists on Earth somehow see 7.9 billion people speaking foreign languages as their enemies* (Telegram channel "Sharp's" 22.04.2022). Combinations of three Latin letter-symbols are given an ironic twist, for example, updating the meaning of the homophone *зов 'zov' (call)* – "call to come, respond": *"Слышу ZOV сдавать Херсон"* – *I hear the ZOV to surrender Cherson* (Susyk Perfect, comment on Telegram-channel "Jevhen Karas'+", 2.10.2022). Using artistic and graphic modifications, speakers also play with satiric combinations of these letters "smert' – deaths'" (see Annex 1), "zlo – evil" (see Annex 2). To update the seman-

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2 Retrieved from: https://rau.ua/novyni/znak-fashizmu/ [07.06.2025].

tics of the death of the enemy, one grapheme Z can be used, replacing the Cyrillic symbol with it or adding to a certain word: *"Тіла Здохляків від авіакатастрофи доставили до тверського моргу"* – *Bodies of Z-rotten soldiers from the air crash delivered to Tver morgue* (Telegram channel "Operatyvnyj zsu" 'Operative afu' 24.08.2023); *"На карті замість низки вулиць розміщені повідомлення про Здохлих кацапів на еС-Ве-О"* – *"Instead of street names, the map displays notifications of Z-dead invaders in the svo* (Telegram channel "Operatyvnyj zsu" 'Operative afu' 21.08.2023); *"путінська z-могілізація все ближче і ближче до кожного росіянина"* – *Putin's Z-mobilization is coming closer to every Russian citizen* (Telegram channel "Fašik Donec′kyj" 'Donec′k fascie' 14.08.2023). H. Sjuta rightly observes that "the worldview and emotional perception of reality at the level of language is manifested in the cardinal polarization of assessments of «friend» and «foe»: since the beginning of a full-scale war, they have become distinctly unipolar and categorical with positivity and glorification on one hand, and negativity, debase and dehumanization, and transitional boundaries, merging areas between them are completely erased" (Sjuta 2023, 4).

In the letter game, Ukrainians also involve the Cyrillic letter Ï (ji), which from the end of the summer of 2022 underwent a semiotic complication, becoming a symbol of national resistance to the Russian aggressor. For example: *"Z vs. Ï"* (Andrew Okara, Facebook 09.10.2022); *"Ï їбе z"* – *"Ï jibe (fucks) z"* (Saško Lirnyk –comment on Andrew Okara's post, Facebook 09.10.2022); *"Z″ÏV"* (Mike Gliuck, comment on Andrew Okara's post, Facebook 09.10.2022); *"Ï проти Z"* – *"Ï proty (against) Z"* (Rostyslav Chotyn, https://nspu.com.ua/ 10.21.2022). It should be noted that the coding of the letter Y as an ideologeme already took place in the 80s of the last century, when the L′viv magazine of the same name began to be published. "We guessed to use the letter "Ï" for almost 40 years in the struggle against the Soviet Union, and now people in Mariupol′ paint this letter "Ï" on sidewalks or fences as a sign of protest against the current occupation administration. This means that it is an effective tool that Ukrainians will use, perhaps, always as a symbol of self-affirmation," stressed Taras Voznjak, editor-in-chief of the "Ï" magazine (Chotyn 2022).

There is a tendency to add the initial letter Z / z to words in order to create a pejorative axiology or to strengthen it, as a result of which nouns-neologisms appeared, formed by graphization, that is, in such a way that the derivational operator is an uppercase (mostly) or lowercase letter z. These lexemes can be divided into the following thematic groups:

1. The names of those who support or carry out the invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine, or their groups, such as *Z-патріот*, *Z-пропагандист*, *Z-окупант*, *Z-кретин*, *Z-орк* (*Z-patriot*, *Z-propagandist*, *Z-occupier*, *Z-cretin*, *Z-Orc*), etc.: *"На Росії два неадекватні Z-патріоти розпізнали в жовто-синіх дорожніх знаках український прапор…"* – *In Russia, two overzealous Z-patriots mistook yellow-blue road signs for the Ukrainian flag…* (Telegram channel "ᴛsɴ novyny" – 'ᴛsɴ news' 22.07.2022); *"Для Z-патріотки це виявилось сигналом для виклику поліції"* – *For a Z-patriot woman, this was a reason to call the police* (Telegram channel "ᴛsɴ novyny" – 'ᴛsɴ news' 28.08.2022); *"На митинге против могилизации в Москве космонавты задержали очередного Z-патриота"* – *At an anti-mobilization rally in Moscow, police ('cosmonauts') detained another Z-patriot* (Telegram channel "Real′naja vojna | Ukraina" 'Real war | Ukraine' 25.09.2022); *"Z-патриоты пришли на митинг в Екатеринбурге, чтобы спровоцировать протестующих"* – *Z-patriots showed up at a protest in Jekaterinburg to provoke demonstrators* (Telegram channel "ɴᴇxᴛᴀ Live" 21.09.2022); *"Часткова мобілізація різко змінила риторику деяких – Z-патриотів щодо війни в Україні"* – *Partial mobilization sharply changed the rhetoric of some Z-patriots regarding the war in Ukraine* (Telegram channel "ᴛsɴ novyny" 'ᴛsɴ news' 21.09.2022); *"У z-рашистів вечір паніки та зради – Z-Ruscists are panicking again tonight* (Telegram channel "Chameleon" 27.07.2023); *"Можна вічно дивитися на три речі: <…> Як скиглять російські військові Z-пропагандисти, починаючи усвідомлювати неминучий програш у війні"* – *You can watch three things forever: (…) how Russian Z-propagandists start to realize they're losing the war* (Mychajlo Podoljak, Facebook 09.09.2022); *"Упороті z-баби намагаються ганьбити чоловіків, які тікають від мобілізації в Казахстан"* – *Fanatic Z-women are shaming men fleeing mobilization to Kazakhstan* (Telegram channel "Real′naja vojna | Ukraina" 'Real war | Ukraine'

26.09.2022); *"Виявляється, від рук Z-вандалів постраждала не лише будівля, в якій базувався волонтерський центр в Барселоні"* – *Even the building hosting a volunteer center in Barcelona suffered at the hands of Z-vandals* (Telegram channel "ᴛꜱɴ novyny" – 'ᴛꜱɴ news' 15.09.2022); *"Когда в России такое пишет отъявленный путинист и z-фанатик, то я доволен"* – *When even a die-hard Putinist and Z-fanatic writes this in Russia, I feel vindicated* (Telegram channel "Berjozovyj sok" 'Birch sap' 27.09.2022); *"Z-окупанти спричинили ще одну ДТП у Криму"* – *Z-occupiers caused yet another car accident in Crimea* (Kryms′kyj banderivec′ 'Crimean Banderite', crimeaua1.wordpress.com 09.08.2022)[3]); *"Мало хто з командирів Z-орків здатний швидко адаптуватися до поля бою та раптової зміни обстановки"* – *Few Z-Orc commanders can adapt quickly to battlefield dynamics* (Oleh Bojko, Facebook 02.04.2022); *"Від імені єнота навіть цілий рік вели телеграм канал «Енот из Херсона», який використовували для збору грошей з недалеких Z-кретинів"* – *A whole year was spent running a Telegram channel 'The Raccoon from Cherson', collecting money from gullible Z-cretins* (Denis Kazanskij, Facebook 29.10.2023); *"У Z-хероев все настолько плохо, что они побежали за помощью ни к «драгоценному» Путину, а к оппозиции"* – *Things are so bad for the Z-heroes that they turn not to Putin, but to the opposition for help* (Telegram channel "ʀᴜꜱꜱɪᴀ ɴᴇxᴛ", 16.08.2023); *"Реакция типичных представителей z-актива на ликвидацию Е. В. Пригожина и Д. В. Уткина"* – *Reaction of typical Z-activists to the elimination of E. V. Prigožin and D. V. Utkin* (Telegram channel "Andrey Malgin" 23.08.2023); *"Z-певец Николай Расторгуев <…> заявляет, что «репрессии и Сталин кровавый – все это чушь собачья»"* – *Z-singer Nikolaj Rastorgujev claims: 'Repressions and bloody Stalin — it's all nonsense'* (Telegram channel "Dmytro Čekalkin" 23.08.2023); *"Сьогодні випадково*

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3 Povnomasštabne vtorhnennja rosiji. Vypusk #166 za 09.08.2022 "Vatu trjase vid zvistky pro udary po Novofedorivci. Trjase duže ridkym ta smerdjučym" 'Full-scale invasion of russia. Issue #166 for 09.08.2022 ""The vatniks iare shaking from the news of the strikes on Novofedorivka. They are shaking with something liquid and stinky'" (2022): Retrieved from: https://crimeaua1. wordpress.com/2022/08/09/povnomasshtabne-vtorgnennya-rosiyi-vipusk-166-za-09-08-2022-vatu-tryase-vid-zvistki-pro-udari-po-novofedorivtsi-tryase-duzhe-ridkim-ta-smerdyuchim/ [07.06.2025].

побачила пост z-письменника алєксандра пєлєвіна і коментарі до нього від z-поетеси долгарєвой <…>"– Today I accidentally saw a post by Z-writer aleksandr pelevin and the comments by Z-poetess Dolgareva <…> (Svitlana Kostrykina, comment on the post by Iryna Tsilyk, Facebook 20.07.2023); *"Лише конкретна z-армія увійшла в суверенну Україну <…>" – Only a specific Z-army entered sovereign Ukrainian territory <…>"* (Mychajlo Podoljak, Tweeter 07.07.2022). Some of the occasional names were created to mark the entire Russian society: *"Оцените настроения в этой z-среде" – Assess the prevailing mood in this Z-sphere* (Telegram channel "Berjozovyj sok' 'Birch sap' 13.09.2022); *"Z-божевільня у розпачі не може зрозуміти як же так" – The Z-asylum is in despair, unable to comprehend how this happened* (Denis Kazanskij, Facebook 29.10.2023).

2. Abstract nouns that are semantically related to the propaganda of the war against Ukraine or its course: *"В Москве Z-пропаганда встречается не часто, но вот вывесили на придорожном билборде такой плакат" – Z-propaganda is rare in Moscow, but here's a billboard with a poster along the road* (Alexander Podrabinek, Facebook 19.07.2022); *Многие из звезд шоу-бизнеса поехали тратить полученные за участие в Z-пропаганде средства в страны* NATO *<…>" – Many showbiz stars spent their Z-propaganda earnings in* NATO *countries <…>* (Telegram channel "Berjozovyj sok' 'Birch sap' 04.08.2023); *"<…> Украина легко парирует российские Z-кампании и «антинацистский нарратив»" – Ukraine easily counters Russian Z-campaigns and the so-called "anti-Nazi narrative* (Arun Ajer, zn.ua 28.08.2022); *"Там [в Белграде] прошел «крестный ход» в поддержку Z-ценностей, которые биомасса называет традиционными" – In Belgrade, a "religious procession" was held in support of Z-values — which the propaganda calls traditional, but critics refer to as "values of biomass* (Telegram channel "Realʹnaja vojna | Ukraina' 'Real war | Ukraine' 28.08.2022); *"Фонд президентских грантов поддержал проект продвижения Z-ценностей для детей с синдромом Дауна <…>" – The Presidential Grants Foundation supported a project promoting 'Z-values' for children with Down syndrome* (Telegram channel "Berjozovyj sok' 'Birch sap' 13.07.2023); *"Частичная мобилизация уничтожила Z-патриотизм <…>" – Partial mobilization destroyed*

the illusion of Z-patriotism (Telegram channel "Berjozovyj sok" 'Birch sap' 27.09.2022); *"Солідарність?! …То це такі ж нікчемні слова, як і вся ваша Zсутність!!!" – Solidarity?! …Just another meaningless word like your entire Z-sistence!* (Oleh Šumejko, Facebook 17.04.2022); *"Опять Z-ультиматумы?" – More Z-ultimatums again?* (Telegram channel "Real′naja vojna | Ukraina" 'Real war | Ukraine' 28.06.2022).

3. Nouns of the country names that started aggression against Ukraine, or the country that supports it in one way or another: *z-империя – Z-empire,* (Arina Dalina, Facebook 22.09.2022); *Z-Венгрия – Z-Hungary* (Telegram channel "Sharp's" 16.05.2022).

4. Names of the "mass media" emantic group: *"<…> даже пропагандисты и Z-каналы бьют тревогу, говорят о бардаке и требуют привлекать к ответственности военкомов" – Even Z-propagandists and Z-channels are raising alarms, complaining about chaos and demanding accountability from military commissars* (Telegram channel "Berjozovyj sok" 'Birch sap' 25.09.2022); *"На тлі того, що Нідерланди дають нам 42 F-16, всі вже пішли в Z-канали?" – As the Netherlands prepares to deliver 42 F-16s to Ukraine, people are wondering: has everyone gone hiding in Z-channels now?* (Jaroslav Matjušin, Facebook 20.08.2023); *"Z-паблики показали эпичное «уничтожение склада боеприпасов и живой силы» <…>" – Z-channels display "epic footage of destroying enemy ammo depots and personnel"* (Telegram channel "Bohdanov" 02.10.2022); *"<…> у z-пабликах вже істерика через виток цих фоток" – Z-channels are having a meltdown over the latest photo leak* (Telegram channel "Berjozovyj sok" 'Birch sap' 20.08.2023); *"російські z-воєнкори анонсують розвал фронту на Запорізькому напрямку" – Russian Z-war correspondents are already predicting a collapse of the Zaporižža front* (Telegram channel "Real′naja vojna | Ukraina" 'Real war | Ukraine' 21.08.2023).

5. The names of the attributes of the propaganda of Russian aggression, for example *z-пакет* (*Z-package*), *z-наклейка* (*Z-sticker*): *"Росіян із z-наклейками попрошу сформувати окремий батальйон" – Let Russians with Z-stickers form their own battalion* (Telegram channel "Hončarenko" 21.09.2022).

The simultaneous combination of several "z + noun" elements can become one of stylistic means of creating post-folklore:

> *"Пенсионеры величайшей z-империи стыдливо шёпотом:*
> *– А где наши достойные пенсии?*
> *А z-президент гордо ухмыляясь:*
> *– В танках, ракетах, самолётах, снарядах, и чёрных z-пакетах!"* –
> *Pensioners of the great Z-empire whisper:*
> *– Where are our decent pensions?*
> *And the Z-president smirks:*
> *– In tanks, rockets, planes, shells — and black Z-body bags*
> (Arina Dalina, Facebook 22.09.2022).

Occasionally, we observe the above-described way of creating occasionalism with the help of another letter-symbol of Russian aggression – V: *Методичка в действии, рассчитанная на Vголодранцев и Zворье"* – *Instructional propaganda is clearly designed for V-beggars and Z-scum* (Tatiana Gavrilenko, comment on the post by Leonid Švec, Facebook 19.04.2022).

While researching word-forming additives in modern mass media, L. Ševčuk has found that 75 % of the graphoderivatives she recorded "contain the Latin letter Z, which in the Ukrainian and Russian opposition media discourse became a symbol of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and acquired a negative conotation" (Ševčuk 2022, 172). As our research has revealed, the most frequent neologisms are those who support the Russian aggression in Ukraine. It is noteworthy that the alphabetic name of the letter Z was also used to nominate such persons, from which the nouns *зетчик (zetčik), зітнік (zitnik)* (people who support Z-philosophy) adjectives *зетний (zetnyj), z-танутый (Z-tanutyj)* (crazy) with a distinct negative colouring were formed: *"Я з Крима, поддерживаю Украину, тут таких достаточно много, просто тут не повы#буешся потому, что куча зетчиков дурных"* – *I'm from Crimea and I support Ukraine — there are many of us here. But you can't speak up, because there are too many crazy zetčiks* (comment by Fantom on Telegram channel "Jevhen Karas'+" 10.08.2022); *"Згодом стаття про зітніків МДУ з▯явилася і в «Медузі»"* – *A Meduza article later covered the Moscow State University zitniks* (Telegram channel "Maršal" 'Marshal' 03.08.2023); *"В любом случае точно будет куча зетного быдла, что само по себе уже плохо"* – *There'll always be a crowd of Z-trash – and that's already a problem* (Telegram

channel "Real′naja vojna | Ukraina" 'Real war | Ukraine' 12.09.2022); *"У z-мануты бомбит"* – *The Z-tanutyjs are losing their minds* (Telegram channel "Berjozovyj sok" 'Birch sap' 23.08.2023). In 2023, the ergonism *"Storm Z"* became the derivative basis of one of the occasionalisms: after distorting it in order to give the author's neologism contemptible connotations, the speaker produced a neologism *шпротзетівець 'šprotzetivec'*, in which he played with the grapheme Z: *"Чергова «сповідь» шпротзетівця, засудженого в расеї за вбивство сусіда, який убив його <…> шпрот помсився та вбив свого сусіда"* – *Another "confession" of a Z-fighter from the Baltics (šprotzetivec'), convicted in Russia for killing a neighbour* (Telegram channel "Fašik Donec′kyj" 'Donec′k fascie' 27.10.2023). In our opinion, the transformation of *"Шторм Z"* → *шпрот* – *"Storm Z"* → *šprot* happened thanks to the associative connection according to several parameters: prisoners are people who are in a limited space → sprats are placed tightly in a small jar; there are many prisoners, like sprats in a can; prisoners are not of much value, nor are sprats.

Another way of stylistic expression of negative axiology is graphic transformations of words: replacing Cyrillic letters with Latin ones. It can occur sequentially, creating the effect of a corrected error: *"И при желании любая чушь заходит народу мгновенно и никакого критического подхода не вызывает. Практически, єто превращение людей в зомби. V Zомби"* – *And if people are willing, any nonsense gets absorbed by the public instantly, without the slightest hint of critical thinking. This is practically the zombification of society. V Zombis* (Ian Valietov, Facebook 19.07.2022); *"Они зомби их накручивают, что они идут защищать родину. А когда говоришь, что родину не защищают убивая людей в чужой стране, начинают нести нелогичный бред. Впечатление, что говоришь с очень тупым человеком, реально Zомби"* – *"They're zombies. They're brainwashed to think they're defending the motherland. When told that killing in a foreign country isn't defense, they start spouting nonsense. It's like talking to a rock. They're actual Zombis* (Telegram channel "Romanenko Dreams&Nightmare" 27.09.2022); Alex Lupus: *"Хто почав – той і Зло"* – *"Who started it – is the Evil"*. – Vira Dankova: *"він уособлення абсолютного Zло і так..."* – *"He embodies absolute Evil…"* (comment on the post by

Kostjantyn Mašovecʹ, Facebook 24.09.2022); *"Про вчорашню подію у Здичавілих <…>" – "Yesterday's event was yet another example of the Z-ferals losing control"* (Viktor Hromovyj, Facebook 24.08.2023).

It should be noted that literal transformations of words with the root *зомби / зомбі (zombie)* are quite frequent: *"Сутовский просто уничтожил этого зомбоида!" – "Sutovskij absolutely destroyed that Zomboid!* (Vadja, comment on website obozrevatel.com 03.05.2022)[4]; *"Сьогодні астрологічна ситуація дуже сприятлива для знищення z-омбаків рф!" – Astrologically, today is perfect for eliminating* RF *Zombaks* (Oleh Jevtušenko, Facebook 20.04.2022); *"Там, майже, 140 млн. Зомбовир…ків з абсолютно викривленою свідомістю" – Nearly 140 million Zombo-voters with a totally warped worldview…* (Valentina Burlii, comment on the post by Arkadij Babčenko, Facebook 17.05.2022); *"Новий вид спорту від жителів Зомбіленду – метання коров'ячого лайна" – New sport in Zombieland: cow dung throwing* (Telegram channel *"TSN novyny"* 'TSN news' 13.07.2022); *"А зомбо-країна радіє і знов засипає своїх зомбованих недогромадян черовою брехнею"– And Zombocountry rejoices, once again flooding its zombified pseudo-citizens with another wave of lies* (Roman Pavljuk, Facebook 14.07.2022); *"Це не лише військова мета, а і потужний психологічний вплив на зомбоване населення росії" – This is not only a military objective but also a powerful psychological impact on the brainwashed population of Russia* (Volodymyr Ariev, Facebook 20.08.2022); *"Так держать, открывай глаза зомбированной молодежи!" – Keep it up, open the eyes of the brainwashed youth!* (Telegram channel *"Tatʹjana Mej"* 27.09.2022).

Active letter changes to give the word a pejorative colour also occur in writing lexemes of the semantic fields "war", "propaganda", "politics":*"МобилиЗация по руZки" – MobilizaZion, the RuZsian way* (video on YouTube channel *"Dmytro Čekalkin"* 30.09.2022); *"Танки оставлени специально, єто єтап zпецоперации" – The tanks were left on purpose — it's a stage of the 'zpecial operation'* (Viktor Mavrutenkov, Facebook, comment on the post by Andrey Malgin, 18.09.2022);

4 Inšakov, M. (2022): Hendyrektor FIDE "umyv" čempiona svitu, jakyj zradyv Ukrajinu, za pidtrymku vijny. In: Oboz.ua. 01.05.2022. Retrieved from: https://news.obozrevatel.com/ukr/ sport/sport/genedirektor-fide-umiv-chempiona-svitu-yakij-zradiv-ukrainu-za-pid-trimku-vijni.htm [07.06.2025].

"ПеревZyti патріоти: російські блогери-мільйонники тікають з РФ" – *Rebranded patriots: Russian millionaire bloggers are fleeing the Russian Federation* (Telegram channel "ᴛsɴ novyny" 'ᴛsɴ news' 29.09.2022). One of the leading functions of such a transformation in the Ukrainian Internet discourse is the labeling of the enemy (*"зо війн із Zаклятим сусідом. Противостояння України з росією триває не одне століття"* – *30 wars with the Zccursed neighbor. Ukraine's confrontation with Russia has lasted for centuries*) (Telegram channel "Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine" 03.08.2022); *"Акція розійському золдату. Хто перепливе Дніпро із пральною машиною – тому унітаз у подарунок"* – *Special offer for a RuZsian soldier: whoever swims across the Dnipro with a washing machine gets a toilet as a gift* (Mila Nabogova, Facebook 02.09.2022); *"Серед іншого, показано, як золдати жили там в одному домі і срали під себе, у хаті на підлогу"* – *Among other things, it showed how the z-oldiers lived together in one house and defecated on the floor inside* (Viktor Hromovyj, Facebook 28.09.2022) and/or marking its defeat *"ZГИНУТЬ VОРОЖЕНЬКИ"* – *Let the Vnemies Zerish* (Lessons of the Ukrainian language, Facebook 21.06.2022); *"Как правильно писать Zатонув чи Vтопився?"* – *How to write correctly Zunk or Vrowned* (Lesja Kajdaš, Facebook 19.04.2022). The most common replacement of Cyrillic letters with Latin occurs in the following words:

in ethnonyms denoting Russians: *"Если раньше роззияне прятались за формулировками «это не мы, это украинцы сами себя бомбят», то сейчас они полностью расчехлились. Роззияне вас ненавидят, дорогие украинцы. <…> Я сейчас говорю о рядовых роззиянах, всякие там пропагандисты не в счет. Роззияне сейчас вздохнули с облегчением. <…> Они наконец-то стали говорить правду"* – *If earlier Ruzzians used to hide behind phrases like 'It's not us, the Ukrainians are bombing themselves,' now they have completely exposed themselves. Ruzzians hate you, dear Ukrainians. <…> I'm talking now about ordinary Ruzzians — propagandists don't count. The Ruzzians have now breathed a sigh of relief. They have finally started telling the truth* (Michail Ežov, Facebook 24.07.2022); *"Він один із тих, завдяки кому рузкіє не взяли Київ"* – *He is one of those thanks to whom the Ruzzians did not take Kyiv* (Oleksii Bratushchak, Face-

book 03.05.2022); *"Сьогодні зрозуміла: коли робиш відбивні, то про роззіян краще не думати – інакше виходить фарш" – Today I realized: when you make cutlets, it's better not to think about Ruzzians – otherwise, you end up with mince* (Nazar Striljanyj, group *Smiiemos z moZkalia* 'We're laughing at the MoZkal', Facebook 28.07.2022); *"Рональд Рейган під час пресконференції жартує про «оголошення рузні поза законом" – Ronald Reagan jokes at a press conference about making 'Ruzzia' illegal* (Telegram channel "Dmytro Čekalkin" 11.08.2023); *"Коли командувач Наєв каже, що «ми врахували досвід наступу мозкалів на Київ, і більше вони не пройдуть», він не зовсім правду каже. <…> насправді наші зовсім інші дані врахували. І саме тому мозкалі дійсно не пройдуть" – When Commander Najev says, 'We have taken into account the experience of the Mozkals' offensive on Kyiv, and they won't get through anymore,' he's not telling the whole truth. <…> Actually, our data took into account something completely different. And that's exactly why the Mozkals really won't get through* (Oleksander Mychel'son, Facebook 5.08.2022); *"Роззиянці цікавляться, як ми будемо борги за зброю віддавати… Ми Камчаткою розрахуємось))))" – The Ruzzians are wondering how we will pay back the debts for the weapons… We'll settle it with Kamčatka)))* (Oleh Moroz, Facebook 28.04.2022);

in chrononyms – the names of the Russian Federation: *"Вочевидь, що Німеччина поступово відмовляється не лише від газу та нафти з роззії, а від всього розійського" – It is obvious that Germany is gradually abandoning not only gas and oil from Ruzzia, but everything Ruzzian* (Angelika Aleeva, Facebook 16.08.2022); *"УТИЛИЗАЦИЯ РОЗЗИИ" –* DISPOSAL OF RUZZIA (Anti-colorados, Facebook 25.09.2022); *"Нагадую, роззія і руzzкі: <…> ви – діти диявола, ви вічно горітимете в пеклі" – Reminder: Ruzzia and Ruzzians — you are children of the devil, you will burn in hell forever* (Dmytro Furdak, Facebook 30.07.2022); *"Для припинення національно-визвольної війни моZковії проти* УКРАЇНИ *<…>* НЕГАЙНО *прийняти* УКРАЇНУ в НАТО*, і дати ядерному терористу моZковії 24 години, щоб забралися геть з* УКРАЇНИ на маZковію *<…>" – To end the national liberation war of moZcow against* UKRAINE, IMMEDIATELY *admit* UKRAINE to NATO *and give the nuclear terrorist moZcow 24 hours to get out of* UKRAINE to *moZcow region* (Leonid Romanenko, com-

ment on the post by Igor Kondratiuk, Facebook 20.03.2022); *"Russo turisto прибывающие из Zазеркалья в Грузию недовольны такими вот стаканчиками"* – *Russo tourists arriving from the Zooking Glass to Georgia are unhappy with these kinds of cups* (Telegram channel "Berjozovyj sok" 'Birch sap' 17.07.2022); derived from the above-mentioned ethnonyms and choronyms: *"А СБУ затримала прихильника «руzzкава міра» <…>"* – *And the Security Service of Ukraine detained a supporter of the so-called 'Ruzzian world'* (S. Petrov, maidan.org.ua 09.08.2022)[5]; *"В селе Долина, в Донецкой области наши воины, которые фиксируют тотальные разрушения после того, как там побывал «руZZкий мир»"* – *In the village of Dolina, in Doneck region, our soldiers are documenting total destruction after the Ruzzian world visited there (*Telegram channel "Berjozovyj sok" 'Birch sap' 18.09.2022); *"Компанія «ритуальних послуг» заявила, що немає бажання покидати руzzкий ринок"* – *The funeral services company stated that it has no desire to leave the Ruzzian market* (Nazar Striljanyj, Facebook 29.07.2022); *"Великодержавне, моzzковське, передове й прогресивне"* – *The great-power, Muzzcovite, advanced, and progressive* (Ljubov Burak, Facebook 17.04.2022); *"Якщо хтось виглядає наче роZійські «консерви», говорит наче роZійські «консерви» й за своєю сутністю є роZійськими «консервами», то це певно роZійські «консерви» й паньkatися з ними не треба!"* – *If someone looks like Ruzzian 'canned food,' talks like Ruzzian 'canned food,' and essentially is Ruzzian 'canned food,' then they are probably Ruzzian 'canned food' and there's no need to mess around with them!* (Mykola Jurijovyč, comment to the post by Kapranov brothers, Facebook 22.10.2023);

single cases of replacement of such letters in other toponyms denoting geographical objects in the Russian Federation have been found, for example: *"Це ранкове підмоzков'я"* – *This is the morning under-Moscow region* (Oleksandr Bryhynecʹ, Facebook 3.05.2022); *"<…> місяць тому у них вийшла стаття під назвою «МДУ на Z-горах. Люди через стрічку зайшли в університет через юрфак»"* – *<…> a month*

5 Petrov, S. (2022): Charkiv. Chroniky ataky na misto, denʹ 166-j (08.08.2022). 09.08.2022. Retrieved from: https://maidan.org.ua/2022/08/kharkiv-khroniky-ataky-na-misto-den-166-y-08-08-2022/ [07.06.2025].

ago they published an article titled 'MSU on the Z-mountains. People entered the university through the law faculty via the ribbon (Telegram channel "Maršal" 'Marshal' 03.08.2023).

Graphoderivatives are also infrequent; they label the following:

the war against Ukraine: *"Танки оставлени специально, єто єтап zпецоперации"* – *The tanks were deliberately left behind; this is a stage of the zpecial operation* (Viktor Mavrutenkov, Facebook, comment on the post by Andrey Malgin18.09.2022);

occupation authorities: *"Серед наших партизан багато людей маскуються під штатних співробітників «Z-влади», що дає їм можливість спокійно працювати на визволення незалежної!"* – *Among our partisans, many people disguise themselves as regular employees of the 'Z-authorities,' which allows them to calmly work toward the liberation of independence!* (Telegram channel "Operatyvnyj ᴢѕᴜ" 'Operative ᴀꜰᴜ' 06.10.2023);

Ukrainians who supported the aggression of the Russian Federation: *держZрадники* – *state Zraitors* (Telegram channel "Dmytro Čekalkin" 01.08.2023);

artworks: *"«Кинопоиск» скрыл рейтинг пропагандистського Z-фильма «Свидетель», провалившегося в прокате"* – *'KinoPoisk' hid the rating of the propagandist Z-film 'Witness', which flopped at the box office* (Telegram channel "Andrey Malgin" 23.08.2023);

mass media: *"К некрологу прикреплено фото, скорее всего из газетной вырезки а-ла «красная Z-везда»"* – *A photo is attached to the obituary, most likely from a newspaper clipping in the style of the 'Red Z-Star'* (Telegram channel "Maršal" 'Marshal' 14.07.2023);

the general course of the Russian government: *"<…> есть не единственный пример продвижения Z-повестки среди детей с особенностями развития"* – *"… is not the only example of promoting the Z-agenda among children with developmental disabilities"* (Telegram channel "Berjozovyj sok" 'Birch sap' 13.07.2023).

The overuse of Latin letters as a sign of support for armed aggression affects Ukrainian speakers, who also use other letters and the so-called abbreviation special operations to detect sarcasm: *"Русня ѕᴠоих не бросает? Ню-ню…"* – *"Does Russia not abandon its ѕᴠо*

3. Anti-war poster (published in the group "Georgia / Hruzija", Facebook 12.03.2022)

in the special military operation? Yeah, right … (Telegram channel "Berjozovyj sok" 'Birch sap' 13.07.2022).

The usage of Z / z in graphic derivatives is often caused by showing contempt for the initiator and leader of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation. Sometimes graphical modifications are the only way to create additional correlations, such as: *"Путин zаставил всех опоздать"* – *Putin made everyone be late* (Violetta J Civlin, Facebook, comment on the post Andrey Malgin 18.09.2022). They are usually combined with other lexical and stylistic means: *"путін прєZідєнтміра"* – *Putin, preZident of peace* (Oksana Andruščenko, Facebook 20.04.2022); *"Хай живе цісар Владимир Z Пуцін"* – *Long live Emperor Vladimir Z Putin* (Viktor Mavrutenkov, comment on the post by Andrey Malgin, Facebook 19.04.2022); *"У х@йла одне завдання – ZДОХНУТИ!!!"* – *The bastard has only one task – тo die!!!* (Oleksandr Bilozor, comment on the post by Sergii Ivanov, Facebook 09.05.2022); *"<…> інсталяція-послання російському диктатору Володимиру Путіну під назвою «Zастрелись»"* – *"… an installation-message to the Russian dictator Vladimir Putin titled 'Zhoot Yourself'"* (Telegram channel "тsn novyny" 'тsn news' 7.05.2022); *"Це коли ти* (Путін) *надув щоки й почав задирати носа й раптом… обіzzрався"* – *It's when you (Putin) puffed out your cheeks and started sticking your nose up and suddenly… shit yourself* (Taras Čornovil, Facebook 28.06.2022); *"Йому* (Путіну) *однозначно пиzда!"* – *Putin is totally fed!* (Kalistyi Dmytro, comment on the post by Vitalii Chepynoga, Facebook 28.09.2022).

Rarely, by replacing a grapheme in anthroponyms, speakers express contempt for other representatives of the Russian government, such as: *"<…> сьогодні РогоZін показав «саморобну ракетну установку»"* –

… today RogoZin showed a 'homemade rocket launcher' (Telegram channel "Operatyvnyj ᴢꜱᴜ" 'Operative ᴀꜰᴜ' 21.08.2023).

The graphic transformation of vulgarisms and obscene words not only provides the maximum expression of swearing, brutality, but also projects the latest symbolic meaning of the letter Z "supporting the war in Ukraine" onto the semantics of the corresponding lexeme: *"Дешевая мраZь симоньян <…>"* – *Cheap scum Simonyan …* (Telegram channel "Realʹnaja vojna | Ukraina" 'Real war | Ukraine' 01.09.2022); *"Але на жаль ця мраZоta виявилась живучою, тому поки в реанімації, а її рашист охоронець мінуснувся"* – *But unfortunately, this zcum turned out to be resilient, so she's still in intensive care, and her 'rashist' guard was taken out* ("Realʹnaja vojna | Ukraina" 'Real war | Ukraine' 12.09.2022); *"Всегда было интересно, что чувствует эта мраZь, когда передает оккупантам в тюрьмы на пытки своих бывших коллег, соседей, земляков? МраZь"* – *I've always wondered what this zcum feels when it hands over its former colleagues, neighbors, and fellow countrymen to the occupiers for torture in prisons? Scum* (Telegram channel "Sharp's" 16.05.2022); *"Бо ви Z- аїб@али. Саме з букви Z. Це питання виживання і безпеки"* – *Because you're Z- f*ing annoying. Exactly with the letter Z. This is a matter of survival and safety* (Olena Dobrovolʹsʹka, Facebook 17.04.2022).

In order to strengthen negative connotations and express the symbolic meaning, a single Cyrillic letter can be replaced by a doubled Latin letter: *"Разочарование в природе человека, в победе zzвериного бессознательного над слабым разумом"* – *Disappointment in human nature, in the victory of the beazztly unconscious over the weak mind* (Anatolij Belyj, Facebook 15.07.2022).

It should be noted that the tendency to give the newest symbol Z the meaning "beast" was initiated, according to our observations, by the perpetual representative of Ukraine in the ᴜɴ, Serhij Kyslycja, with his post on Twitter: *"Літера «Z», якою російські війська позначають свою військову техніку в Україні, означає «звірі»"* – *The letter 'Z', which Russian troops use to mark their military equipment in Ukraine, means 'beasts'* (Sergiy Kyslytsya, Twitter 08.03.2022).

Speakers achieve maximum expressiveness as a result of the graphic replacement of Cyrillic letters with Latin Z / z thanks to amplification,

which, for example, combines words to denote the manner of death of the occupiers (*"Здох Згнил Зарезан Згорел живьем Заблудился Забыт Зъеден червями Заебашен вЗемле" – "Zead, zotten, ztabbed, zurned alive, zost, orgotten, zaten by worms, zmashed into the ground"*), creating a multitext (see Annex 3). The degree of expressiveness here is directly proportional to the number of consecutive elements, that is, graphically transformed words. We record the largest number of such components (29) in a poem represented on the Facebook page by a user with the nickname Stepan Ihorovyč:

Zуби zламаєте, zдохнете, zнайте.
Zгнóйте землю zомбовані zайди.
Zлóдії, zбоченці, zвірі zдичілі,
Zграйка zадурених, zачерствілих.
Zвитя́г zахотіли? – zлипнеться zад!
Zаразу zдолає zлості zаряд.
Zадавим, zадушим, zнищим zміюк.
Zапеклими zалпами ЗСУ!!! –

You will break your teeth, you will die, know this.
You will rot the land, zombified invaders.
Thieves, perverts, wild beasts,
A gang of deceived, hardened ones.
Want a victory? — the butt will stick together!
The infection will overcome the charge of malice.
We will crush, choke, destroy the serpent.
With fierce volleys of the Armed Forces of Ukraine!!!
(Stepan Ihorovyč, Facebook 22.05.2022).

Je. Karpilovs′ka (Karpilovs′ka 2022) has also cited the following poetic lines with a concentration of graphic derivatives that create the image of an aggressor: *"Zомбі Землею ходять Zаплакані – / Zламані, стомлені, Zовсім Zалякані… / Zарозумілості Zникла Zаслона – / Zброя вже не Zахищає від скону. / Zнищим, Zачистимо і Zапакуємо, / В їхню свідомість навік закарбуємо / Згинуть всі Zombі у нашій сторонці, / Як та роса на палючому сонці" – "Zombies walk the land*

crying — Broken, tired, completely terrified... The shield of arrogance has vanished — Weapons no longer protect from death. We will destroy, cleanse, and pack away, Forever imprint in their consciousness: All zombies in our land will perish, Like dew under the scorching sun" (Natalija Mel′nyčenko, Facebook 28.03.2022).

In general, the newest symbolic function of the Latin letters Z, V is actively used in poetic discourse, where they are explained, for example, as:

a sign of Rashist military equipment (*"Бузок вибухнув бруньками, / Але віти ще не можуть приховати / Розбитий танк з літерою «Z»…" – Lilac burst with buds, / But the branches still cannot hide / The broken tank with the letter 'Z'…* (O. Polevina, litgazeta.com.ua 10.04.2022)[6]); *"Гарчали танки із хрестами, / Тепер на танках мітка Z" – Tanks used to roar with crosses, / Now the tanks bear the mark Z* (O. Šuhaj, litgazeta.com.ua 25.08.2022)[7];

markers of aggressors (*"Ой, втікали зайди босі, / Погубивши зброю й техніку в багні. / <…> / Ой, летіли проти ночі / Дресировані й токсичні комарі! / Ой, запухли у тих очі, / Хто загарбники, рашизти й упирі!" – "Oh, the invaders fled barefoot, losing weapons and equipment in the mud. <…> Oh, flying against the night were trained and toxic mosquitoes! Oh, their eyes swelled, those who are invaders, rashists, and vampires!* (P. Kušč, litgazeta.com.ua 16.06.2022)[8]); *"Оце «V» – вандали, ці «Z» – злочинці. / Їх поклеймила ханська гра" – This 'V' stands for vandals, these 'Z's are criminals. Their mark is the Khan's game* (M. Borovko, litgazeta.com.ua 16.09.2022)[9];

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6 "Poezija bez ukryttja". Pro bil′ i nezlamnist′ '"Poetry without shelter". For the brave and unbreakable' (2022). In: *Ukrajins′ka literaturna hazeta*. 10.04.2022. Retrieved from: https://litgazeta.com.ua/poetry/poeziia-bez-ukryttia-pro-bil-i-nezlamnist/ [06.06.2025].
7 Šuhaj, O. (2022): "I rynut′ u nastup heroji…". In: *Ukrajins′ka literaturna hazeta*. 25.08.2022. Retrieved from: https://litgazeta.com.ua/poetry/oleksander-shuhaj-i-rynut-u-nastup-heroi/ [06.06.2025].
8 Slovo – zbroja 'Word is weapon' (2022). In: *Ukrajins′ka literaturna hazeta*. 16.06.2022. Retrieved from: https://litgazeta.com.ua/poetry/slovo-zbroia-5/ [06.06.2025].
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amplifier of the negative sentiment towards the topos of the aggressor or the aggressor in general (*"Гучна повітряна тривого, / лети й завий до Таганрога! / До Орла і до Тамбова, / до Пєрмі і до Ростова! / <…> / До Костроми та Волгограда, / до Пітера-Зуйлограда!"* – *Loud air raid siren, fly and howl to Taganrog! To Orjol and Tambov, to Perm' and Rostov! <…> To Kostroma and Volgograd, to Peter-Zuilograd!* (P. Kušč litgazeta.com.ua 16.06.2022)[10]); *"Знищено гради дотла – / Скільки смертей страшних. / Хто не прийняв москво-Zла – / Вже його переміг!!!"* – *The Grads were destroyed to ashes — so many terrible deaths. Those who did not accept Moscow's evil — have already defeated it!!!* (T. Majdanovyč, litgazeta.com.ua 02.11.2022)[11]; *"На п'яту ніч зловісного злорадства / ZАгибель сунула з усіх боків"* – *On the fifth night of malevolent malice, death approached from all sides* (V. Kapusta, litgazeta.com.ua, 18.03.2023)[12].

There is an attempt to clarify the reasons for using the letter Z as a symbol of aggression in the poem "On the Swastified Cyrillic alphabet" by V. Mohyljuk: *"Взяли москалики Z-(зет) за емблему, / що свастикує здаля, – / з літерки ветхої зведено меми, / бо мала назву – «земля». / < … > / «Землю» – на лацкан, кітель – на тремпель, – / задля ПАРАДУ ГАНЬБИ!"* – *"The Moskals took the letter Z as their emblem, which from afar resembles a swastika – memes were made from this ancient letter because its name was «zemlja» (earth). <…> 'Zemlja' — on the lapel, the tunic — on the hanger, — for the* PARADE OF SHAME!*"* (в епіграфі до вірша зазначено: *"Російська пропаганда активізувала неймовірні пояснення доцільності маркування військової техніки, що зайшла на територію України внаслідок так званої «спецоперації», знаком Z. Начебто це маркування відповідає дещо адаптованій «Земля» – дев'ятій літері старослов'янського (кириличного) алфавіту… З теленовин"* – *In the epigraph to the poem*

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10 Slovo – zbroja 'Word is weapon' (2022). In: *Ukrajins'ka literaturna hazeta*. 16.06.2022. Retrieved from: https://litgazeta.com.ua/poetry/slovo-zbroia-5/ [06.06.2025].

11 Majdanovyč, T. (2022): "Jabluka pachnut' synovym sadom". In: *Ukrajins'ka literaturna hazeta*. 02.11.2022. Retrieved from: https://litgazeta.com.ua/poetry/tetiana-majdanovych-iabluka-pakhnut-synovym-sadom/ [06.06.2025].

12 Kapusta, V. (2022): "Na lavrs'komu merydiani". In: *Ukrajins'ka literaturna hazeta*. 18.03.2023. Retrieved from: https://litgazeta.com.ua/poetry/viktor-kapusta-na-lavrskomu-merydiani/ [06.06.2025].

it is noted: "Russian propaganda activated incredible explanations justifying the marking of military equipment that entered Ukraine's territory as part of the so-called 'special operation' with the letter Z. Allegedly, this marking corresponds to a somewhat adapted 'Zemlja' — the ninth letter of the Old Slavic (Cyrillic) alphabet … From TV news) (V. Mohyljuk, litgazeta.com.ua 10.04.2022)[13].

Therefore, the latest Russian and Ukrainian Internet discourses show a noticeable tendency to use Latin letters instead of Cyrillic letters, which is connected with the semiotic recoding of the letters Z and V and their acquisition of the symbolic meaning of "Russian aggression in Ukraine". Depending on the ideological guidelines of the speakers, these letters acquire a positive or negative value and affect the words/phrases in which they are used in creation or writing.

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13 "Poezija bez ukryttja". Pro bil′ i nezlamnist′ (2022). In: Ukrajins′ka literaturna hazeta. 10.04.2022. Retrieved from: https://litgazeta.com.ua/poetry/poeziia-bez-ukryttia-pro-bil-i-nezlamnist/ [06.06.2025].

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Pro zaboronu propahandy rosijs′koho nacysts′koho totalitarnoho režymu, zbrojnoji ahresiji Rosijs′koji Federaciji jak deržavy-terorysta proty Ukrajiny, symvoliky vojennoho vtorhnennja rosijs′koho nacysts′koho totalitarnoho režymu v Ukrajinu: Zakon Ukrajiny № 2265-ix vid 22.05.2022 'On the prohibition of propaganda of the Russian Nazi totalitarian regime, armed aggression of the Russian Federation as a terrorist state against Ukraine, and symbols of the military invasion of the Russian Nazi totalitarian regime into Ukraine: Law of Ukraine № 2265-ix of 22.05.2022' (2022). In: *Zakonrada*. Retrieved from: https:// zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/2265-20#Text [23.09.2022].

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LINGUISTICS, ETHICS, AND THE POLITICS OF THE GRAPHEME IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BIG WAR

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The proposed research deals with the interrelation between the dynamics of the literary norm and the transformations in the collective and linguistic consciousness of Ukrainians during the escalation, intensification, and expansion of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The study examines graphic and orthographic innovations in the media discourse of the Luhans'k region and partly the Donec'k region.

Keywords: Russian-Ukrainian war, mass consciousness, linguistic consciousness, media discourse, linguistic sign, graphics, orthography.

ЛІНГВІСТИКА, ЕТИКА І ПОЛІТИКА ГРАФЕМИ В КОНТЕКСТІ ВЕЛИКОЇ ВІЙНИ

Алла Ярова

У запропонованій статті йдеться про взаємозв'язок між динамікою літературної норми і змінами, що відбулися в масовій та лінгвістичній свідомості українців у період загострення, інтенсифікації та розширення масштабів російсько-української війни. Досліджено графо-орфографічні інновації в медіадискурсі Луганщини і частково Донеччини.

Ключові слова: російсько-українська війна, масова свідомість, мовна свідомість, медіадискурс, мовний знак, графіка, орфографія.

Introduction

About three years before the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the all-Ukrainian newspaper "Day" published a notable publication in its book series – "The Power of a Soft Sign". It is easy to understand from the title that the soft sign in this context should be considered

not only as graphic means to denote the softening of a sound in speech but also as a graphic form associated with a certain meaning, that is, a phenomenon of reality. The book raised the problem of the Russia's appropriation of the political, cultural, and religious heritage of the State of Rus′. The Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation legitimized their claims to Ukrainian lands and the historical heritage of Ukrainians on the basis of historical fraud, as the British historian and diplomat Lancelot Lawton[1] called it. Although the Ukrainians' culture, religion, and political traditions are closely linked to the medieval state, Muscovy declared itself Rus′ and rewrote history in the 18th century, declaring itself the direct heir to the State of Rus′. Despite this, the modern Ukrainian language still contains many examples of phonetic, grammatical, and lexical norms that are typical of the Old Kyivan language of Rus′, for instance, the softening of the consonant *s′* in the suffix *-s′kyj,* as opposed to the traditional Russian non-palatalized suffix *-sk.* Therefore, the letter *ь* (soft sign) serves not only as a means of reproducing oral speech in spelling but also acquires a symbolic function – it becomes a marker of the Ukrainian identity and its continuity in time and space.

The constant use of letters in everyday communication makes them an integral element of social life, and the strong connection of graphic and orthographic means with culture and politics is recognized as a fact of linguistic consciousness, often explained by the symbolic function of writing. This role, which involves exhibiting certain national, cultural, social, or civilizational inclinations, is inherent in both individual linguistic methods and the language as a whole (Javors′ka 2000, 230–232). The symbolism of language in general and its various units in particular manifests itself most dynamically in times of important social change, when significant shifts occur in the mass consciousness, and, accordingly, in the linguistic consciousness, which is defined as a form of consciousness that "embraces views, perceptions, feelings, assessments, and attitudes about language and linguistic reality" (Selihej 2012, 40).

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1 "Poezija bez ukryttja". Pro bil′ i nezlamnist′ (2022). In: *Ukrajins′ka literaturna hazeta*. 10.04.2022. Retrieved from: https://litgazeta.com.ua/poetry/poeziia-bez-ukryttia-pro-bil-i-nezlamnist/ [06.06.2025].

Changes in linguistic consciousness give impulse to linguistic reform-ism, which is a reaction to the disruption of the established principles of the social order, the need to choose between competing value systems, and the desire to organize what has lost its established order with the help of symbols that still play a significant role in human life.

An invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2014 and the subsequent full-scale war in 2022 triggered not only a national and civil but also a lin-guistic protest in Ukrainian society, which actively manifested itself in the Ukrainian media discourse. Lowercase letters in the spelling of Russian onyms have acquired symbolic significance and triggered a wave of nationwide language reform that quickly spread from the media discourse to official business and academic texts. The sudden and wide gap between public perceptions of Russia and the real situation related to its aggression and numerous crimes against humanity has led to a change in the long-codified language norm of capitalizing proper names in writing.

This study aims to analyze the impact of shifts in the mass con-sciousness of Ukrainians during the Russian-Ukrainian war on lin-guistic awareness, as well as the resulting changes in the graphic and orthographic systems of the Ukrainian language that have emerged in media discourse. Additionally, it sets the goal of describing variations of newly, spontaneously formed norms while briefly addressing the role of graphic symbols and their linguistic, socio-political, cultural, and ethical potential.

The scope of the problem is limited to the study of local media in the Luhans′k and partially Donec′k regions, which are most affected by Russian hybrid influence. Since April 2014, the armed forces of the Rus-sian Federation and the occupation administrations have established de facto an overall control over parts of the Luhans′k and Donec′k regions. Local publishing enterprises ("Kreminščyna", "Luhanščyna ua", "Popasna Vestnik", "Rubižans′ki Novyny", etc.) and online media ("Tribune", "Schidnyj Variant", "V Čas Pik", etc.) continued to provide information on the territories controlled by Ukraine. After Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022 and the subsequent occupation of the Luhans′k region, the printed media stopped being published, while information websites were still operating, but their editorial offices

were located in other cities of the country or were scattered and operate remotely.

The following local media of the Luhans′k region served as a source base for the consideration of graphic and spelling innovations during the Russian-Ukrainian war:

"Schidnyj Variant"[2], based on the information of the website itself: "Media No. 1 in Donec′k and Luhans′k regions", the "About Us" section explains: "This is an online publication about Donbas". Our journalistic team is from the Donec'k and Luhans'k regions, and we exclusively, honestly and independently provide you with the most interesting events in the region's life"[3]. The newspaper "Schidnyj Variant" was established in 2008 and was published online since 2009. In 2014, the website went down, and in March 2019, it resumed operation.

"Severodonec′k online"[4] – "is an independent media project aimed at providing citizens with access to high-quality professional and exclusive information to counteract Russia's negative external influence on the community and support the European integration of the community of Sivers′kodonec′k, which was forced to move to different parts of Ukraine or remained in the temporarily occupied territories due to Russia's full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, and partially lost ties between its members"[5].

"Irta-fax"[6] is an independent news outlet with the mission to promote personal and economic freedoms, the rule of law and socio-cultural diversity in Ukraine. The purpose of the "Irta-fax" information portal is to inform the audience in a reliable, objective and balanced manner about the main events of the Luhans′k region, Ukraine and the world in key areas of social and political life[7]. The media's motto is: "Working for the Victory of Ukraine" (Ibid.).

"Zmist tyžnja": "News, longreads, people's stories and urban legends, reforms and fact-checking, war and peace, everything about the events

2 https://v-variant.com.ua/ [12.01.2025].
3 https://v-variant.com.ua/about/ [12.01.2025]
4 https://sd.ua/ [11.01.2025].
5 https://sd.ua/editorial-policy. [12.01.2025].
6 https://irtafax.com.ua/ [12.01.2025].
7 https://irtafax.com/redaktsijna-polityka/ [12.01.2025].

in Luhans′k region – this is the "Content" of our media project. We report, film, print, and organize discussions to keep you up to date with the content of life in the Luhans′k region," the website says, explaining that the creation of their website was made possible by the support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as part of the Democratic Governance in Eastern Ukraine project (Ibid.).

"0642. Website of the city of Luhans′k"[8]. There is no information about the media outlet on the media page.

"Real newspaper"[9] – a weekly newspaper publication in Luhans′k on social and political matters until mid-July 2014. Since the second half of 2014, the online information and analytical project of the same name has been launched. In 2017, the staff of the "Real newspaper" launched an independent public organization "Frontier" to provide information support to residents of eastern Ukraine. The website reports that the team strictly adheres to the professional code of journalism[10].

The factual material was obtained as a result of monitoring surveys of local media in the Luhans′k (partially Donec′k) region according to the methodology of the Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy, covering the period of 2014–2024. The applied methodology makes it possible not only to assess the quality of information produced and disseminated by local media, the thematic and genre specificity of materials, their tone, the presence of toxic publications containing signs of hybrid threats but also to capture the phenomena of linguistic dynamism, to study the communicative and pragmatic parameters of the texts, as well as to trace the change in graphic and spelling language norms, in particular, those related to the use of uppercase and lowercase letters in the text and proper names, which is due to significant social changes, in particular the Russian-Ukrainian war.

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8 https://www.0642.ua/ [12.01.2025].
9 https://realgazeta.com.ua/ [12.01.2025].
10 https://realgazeta.com.ua/o-nas/ [12.01.2025].

Presentation of the Main Material. Theoretical aspect

The Russian invasion became a strong external factor that caused changes at various levels of the Ukrainian language. The media discourse shows, among other things, the modifications that have taken place in the semantic and grammatical group of nouns denoting common and proper names. This group is formed on the principle of opposition between nouns that denote an object in a series of similar ones and the proper name as a sign of individualization of the object. Proper can be transformed into common nouns, and common nouns can be transformed into proper names. When proper names become common nouns, they lose their function of individualization and are used as a generalized name for a type of person or a class of homogeneous objects. At the same time, common nouns acquire the meaning of proper names, enriching this lexico-grammatical category with new components.

The innovations in this semantic and grammatical group, which are the subject of our attention, in the context of the intensification of the Russian-Ukrainian war are not characterized by the transition of opposition units into each other. They are facilitated by the spelling markers of proper and common names. According to the semantic principle of Ukrainian orthography, which is based on the differentiation of words by means of different spellings, the spelling sign of common noun vocabulary is a lowercase letter, and proper names formed on the basis of common ones are capitalized.

The modern capitalization of words in the text and proper names is regulated by the rules set forth in the new edition of the Ukrainian spelling (Ukrajins′kyj pravopys 'Ukrainian Spelling Book' 2019), which, in particular, stipulates that we capitalize people's proper names, patronymics, surnames, pseudonyms, nicknames. The exceptions are those names and surnames of people who have been elevated to the category of appellants, and their marker in writing is a lowercase letter: 'patron', 'mentor', 'diesel' 'engine', etc.

The applicable spelling also provides for the lowercase spelling of the proper names of people to whom we have strong negative feelings: "If the surnames (names) are used disparagingly, we write them with a lowercase letter: 'azefs', 'quislings'" (Ukrajins′kyj pravopys 'Ukrainian Spelling Book' 2019, 75). This norm reflects the ability of a graphic sign,

namely the letter, to convey the community's ideas about morality and immorality, about good and evil, that is, to be an ethical marker. Ethics is recognized as an important factor in the conscious maintenance of law and order in society, and, therefore, the graphic sign marking both positive and negative conotations is perceived as a means of influencing reality.

While the language norm allows the lowercase spelling of proper names of people under certain conditions, the requirement for the spelling of geographical and administrative names is invariant, that is, only capitalization is used. Paragraph 50 states that we capitalize geographical proper names (regardless of the number of their components), except for function words and generic names. The notes to clauses 5 and 6 of paragraph 50 state that geographical names used in a figurative sense are capitalized, e.g., 'Versailles' in the sense of 'Peace of Versailles', as well as informal and figurative names of states, territories, regions, localities, cities, rivers, etc. are capitalized (Ukrajins′kyj pravopys 'Ukrainian Spelling Book' 2019, 77–80).

The codified rule also does not allow for variations in capitalization at the beginning of sentences, that is, the first word that begins a text or sentence must be capitalized (Ukrajins′kyj pravopys 'Ukrainian Spelling Book' 2019, 70).

A review of the previous spelling codes of the Ukrainian language[11] reveals that there are no significant differences in the understanding of the spelling of proper geographical names and names of people. For instance, "Rus′ka Grammatyka" by Stepan Smal′-Stoc′kyj and Fedir Hartner, published in 1893 and reprinted in 1907, 1914, and 1928, contains a section on capitalization and lowercase letters. In paragraph 49 of the fourth chapter, the authors emphasize that a capital letter is used "in proper names, by which we call persons (men, gods, spirits, beasts, and whatever we personify), societies, states, nations, peoples, lands, cities, villages, and all places and their inhabitants, rivers and streams, mountains, lakes, and seas (Smal′-Stoc′kyj, Gartner 2004, 115).

11 This data was published earlier: Bykovčenko, Ju., Jarova, A. Variantnist′ pravopysnoji normy: onimy 'rosija', 'putin'. Sučasnyj masovokomunikacijnyj prostir: istorija, realiji, perspektyvy: materialy naukovo-praktyčnoji konferenciji studentiv, aspirantiv ta molodych naukovciv (Sumy, 26–27 travnja 2022 roku). Sumy, 2022, 111–115.

"Rus'ka Pravopys' zi Slovarcem" (1904) in section V also outlines groups of words that are capitalized and are written in lowercase. Paragraph 45 of this section estates that proper nouns begin with a capital letter, such as names of persons (people, gods, holy spirits, etc.), nations, states, territories, cities, villages and their inhabitants; proper names of animals; names of streets, rivers, mountains, lakes, seas, coats of arms, holidays, heavenly bodies, etc. are capitalized (Rus'ka Pravopys' 'Rus' Spelling Book' 2004, 136–137).

The spelling rules adopted by the Ševčenko Scientific Society in L'viv, published in 1922, also regulate the use of uppercase and lowercase letters in words: all proper names of persons, all deities (Christian and pagan), names of holidays, fasts, peoples, parts of the world, states, regions, etc. should be capitalized (Pravopysni pravyla 'Spelling rules' 2004, 332–333).

The revised and extended second edition of the Ukrainian Spelling Book of 1960 formulates in detail the rules for the use of uppercase and lowercase letters. Paragraph 27 of the section "Use of the Capital Letter" defines the groups of words that are capitalized. These include individual names, patronymics, surnames, pseudonyms, nicknames. This section contains notes 3 and 4, where it is stated that the names and surnames of people that have become common names for people and objects are written with a lowercase letter: 'don juan', 'zoël', 'lovelas', 'diesel', 'ford', 'french'; the same is applied to the common names of proper names: 'darwinism'. If the names of people are only used with a general meaning, but have not transformed into common names, they are capitalized (Ukrajins'kyj pravopys 'Ukrainian Spelling Book' 1960, 54). Individual names of people used with a derogatory meaning are written with a lowercase letter: 'quislings', 'azefs', 'fritzs' (Ukrajins'kyj pravopys 'Ukrainian Spelling Book' 1960, 55).

The following guidelines and annotations are established by the Ukrainian Spelling Manual as of 1960 for conveying the proper spelling of geographical names. First and foremost, individual astronomical, geographical, and topographical names are capitalized, including the names of states and autonomous administrative units. Geographical names used in a figurative sense are capitalized. Unofficial names of states and figurative names of geographical objects are also capital-

ized. It also formulates the norm that common names, for example, are capitalized in special stylistic usage: 'Motherland', 'Red Capital' (Ukrajins′kyj pravopys 'Ukrainian Spelling Book' 1960, 56–58).

The Handbook of Ukrainian Spelling as of 1973, outlining the norms for spelling anthroponyms, explains that individual names, patronymics, surnames, pseudonyms, secret nicknames, and nicknames are capitalized. It also notes that the names and surnames of people who have lost the meaning of proper names and have become common names of people and objects are written with a lowercase letter. At the same time, individual names used in a general sense are capitalized when they have not become common names, that is, have not lost their initial meaning: "New scientists are emerging in various fields of science and technology – new Mičurins and Ciolkovs′kyjs" (Tyčyna) (Burjačok et al. 1973, 80). The handbook does not contain rules on the capitalization of common names with special stylistic meanings.

By the way, there is only one requirement for geographical and topographical proper names: they must be capitalized. Geographical names used in a figurative sense are also capitalized (Burjačok et al. 1973, 82–83).

The Ukrainian Spelling Book, published in 2000, explains in the section "Use of the Capital Letter" how to capitalize proper names: individual names, patronymics, surnames, pseudonyms, nicknames, and conspiratorial nicknames should be capitalized. Surnames of people used in a general sense, but which have not lost their initial meaning (have not become common names), are capitalized. If the surnames (names) are used in a derogatory manner, they are written with a lowercase letter: 'quislings' (Ukrajins′kyj pravopys 'Ukrainian Spelling Book' 2000, 48).

Geographical and topographical proper names, according to the Ukrainian Spelling Book as of 2000, regardless of the number of their components, should be capitalized, except for function words and generic designations. Geographical names used in a figurative sense should be capitalized (Ukrajins′kyj pravopys 'Ukrainian Spelling Book' 2000, 50–51).

Summarizing the requirements of the literary standard of the Ukrainian language regarding the use of uppercase and lowercase letters, it should be noted that onymes are a highly codified semantic and

grammatical group. Capitalization is a means of individualizing objects, and lowercase is a means of distinguishing appeals within the lexicon. At the same time, it is equally important that these graphic signs (uppercase and lowercase letters) are able to reflect ethical constructs, that is, the community's idea of the moral and the immoral, and the use of lowercase letters instead of uppercase and vice versa (without the transition of semantic and grammatical oppositional units into each other) is a means of reflecting the public opinion on certain matters.

Uppercase and lowercase letters and the formation of new social values

As a result of the surge in linguistic consciousness after Russia's full-scale invasion, a public demand has arisen to find adequate means of linguistic reflection of the new reality, primarily of the aggressor country, from the point of view of speakers. Some Ukrainian speakers no longer perceive the capitalization of nouns associated with the aggressor as a rule in public communication. In the media, as well as in other discourses – political, scientific, legal, etc. – these lexemes are often written with a lowercase letter. The Ukrainian journalist, media expert, member of the editorial board of Hromads′ke Radio Andrij Kulykov comments:

"Way too many of us have experienced deep frustration and horror at the actions of the nation which for so long was advertised as the closest to us, as the one with which we shared common values and ways of life. We have finally begun to see that Russians do not recognize Ukrainians as a nation in its own right, so the symbols reflecting Russia's history and ambitions have become menacing instead of promising.

I do not share the idea of writing geographical names and personal names in lowercase. As one colleague remarked, when you write "putin" but there is "Hitler" in the next line, many people would think that you think Hitler was a lesser evil for humankind than Putin is, whereas the degree of evil is a very hard measurement to make (even if we think this is morally justified.) Note the inconsistency of writing "russia" and "belarus" but "Iran" and "North Korea". I think that people who opt for using the lowercase have the right to do so but should really look for more effective ways of emphasizing the inhuman nature of the aggressor country and those who run it" (Interview for this publication).

Monitoring of local media in the Luhans′k (partly Donec′k) region shows that since Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine publications often use different lowercase forms of the name of the aggressor state and related proper names (no such trend has been observed since the 2014 invasion), namely:

1) the full and abbreviated name of the aggressor state.:

Kyiv will never legally recognize any occupation of its territories by russia [From here on in examples, underlining is applied – author's note]....[12] Since the beginning of the full-scale war, the russian federation has caused environmental damage to Ukraine amounting to over 1,35 trillion hryvnjas[13].

Despite the formalized rule to capitalize the first word in a text and sentence, a different usage is observed in media discourse. If the text or sentence, as well as the title of the publication, begins with the full or abbreviated name of the Russian state, it begins with a lowercase letter. This innovative rule also applies to the relative adjective 'russian', derived from the noun 'russia':

"russia has turned our fertile black soils into the most explosively contaminated lands in the world. Approximately one-third of Ukraine's territory will require demining, which will take at least 10 years", the agency noted (Ibid.).

"the russian army uses at least 6 Ukrainian Tu-160 strategic bombers, which Ukraine transferred to russia as part of an agreement between the governments of the two states in 1999 in exchange for restructurization of debts for Russian gas. This is stated in the investigation of "Scheme", UNN reports"[14].

2) the name of Belarus, which provided its territory for the deployment and movement of russian troops and the launching of missiles targeting Ukrainian territory. In Ukraine, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have been recognized

12 https://irtafax.com/zelenskyj-rozkryv-umovy-vstupu-ukrainy-do-nato-ta-pozytsiiu-shchodo-okupovanykh-terytorij/ [12.01.2025].
13 https://irtafax.com/rf-zavdala-dovkilliu-ukrainy-zbytkiv-na-ponad-1-35-tryljona/ (November 6, 2022) [12.01.2025].
14 https://irtafax.com/rf-vykorystovuie-bombarduvalnyky-tu-160-iaki-ukraina-viddala-ij-v-kintsi-90-kh-rokiv-zmi/ [12.01.2025].

as complicit states[15] in the crime of russian aggression, along with the Republic of Belarus, but we are partially observing a change in the normative wording only with regard to Belarus:

"Condemning Iran, belarus and North Korea for their military support for russia, members of the European Parliament call on EU *member states to further strengthen the sanctions regime against these countries"*[16].

"They emphasize that both russia's aggressive war against Ukraine and North Korea's involvement in the war, along with its nuclear and missile programs, pose a serious threat to the rule-based international order" (Ibid.).

3) the initial abbreviation of the full name of the aggressor state, regardless of its position in the text or sentence:

the rf utilizes Tu-160 bombers, which Ukraine transferred to it in the late 1990s, media reports [17].

The European Parliament approved the composition of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen being the President. During the presentation of the program, the war of the rf against Ukraine was also discussed, reports UNN, *citing a statement from the European institution* [18];

4) the spelling of the names of separatist quasi-states established in the territories of the Luhans′k and Donec′k regions is also undergoing changes. Instead of "LPR" and "DPR", the usage of "lpr" and "dpr" is observed. However, the application of this new usage is inconsistent, with both variants often appearing within the same text:

In a year and a half, the matter was got off the ground by the same golubev, who recently signed a decree establishing a five-kilometer special zone on the border of the Rostov region with "lpr" and "dpr" [19].

15 Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 23.02.2024 No. 3602-IX. Access mode: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3602-20#Text [12.01.2025].

16 https://irtafax.com/ievroparlament-zaklykav-nadaty-ukraini-taurus-i-novi-patriot-na-tli-novoi-fazy-u-vijni [12.01.2025].

17 https://irtafax.com/rf-vykorystovuie-bombarduvalnyky-tu-160-iaki-ukraina-viddala-ij-v-kintsi-90-kh-rokiv-zmi/ [12.01.2025].

18 https://irtafax.com/ievroparlament-zatverdyv-novyi-sklad-ievrokomisii-fon-der-liaien-na-debatakh-hovoryly-pro-vijny-rf-proty-ukrainy/.

19 https://www.0642.ua/news/3780985/v-rosii-de-fakto-viznali-so-vvazaut-kordon-z-lnr-ta-dnr-derzavnim [12.01.2025].

It should be noted that the Governor of Rostov Region, Vasyl′ Golubev, closed the border of the region with the neighboring self-proclaimed "LPR" and "DPR" (Ibid.).

5) the alternative spelling of Russian geographical and administrative-territorial names: 'moscow', but 'Orel′', 'Brjansk', 'Krasnodar Kraj', etc.:

According to it, Kyiv transferred to moscow eight Tu-160 heavy bombers and three Tu-95MS, as well as 575 Kh-55 cruise missiles (refer to note 3).

It is noted that the russians used strike drones of the "Shahed" type and other unmanned aerial vehicles of unspecified types for the attack. The launches were carried out from the territory of russia, from the directions of Orel, Brjansk, Kursk, as well as from Primorsk-Achtarsk.[20]

Footage posted online shows smoke rising in the port of Tuapse, located in the Krasnodar Territory of russia [21].

6) names and surnames of Russian political figures – the president, ministers, etc.:

putin arrived in occupied Mariupol′: russian media showed a video of the "visit"[22].

By the way, according to russian media, putin was accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister of the rf Marat Chusnullin during the trip, who "reported to the president on construction work in the city and its surroundings" (Ibid.).

Upon his arrival, belousov noted that military cooperation between the countries is expanding. He welcomed the strategic partnership agreement signed by putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un following their June meeting in Pyongyang.…[23]

belousov, a former economist, replaced sergej šojgu as defense minister in May after russian dictator vladimir putin began his fifth term in power (Ibid.).

20 https://irtafax.com/rosijska-ataka-dronamy-zsu-zbyly-36-bezpilotnykiv [12.01.2025].
21 https://irtafax.com/na-rosii-v-portu-tuapse-jmovirno-urazheno-desantnyj-korabel-zmi/ (29.11.2022) [12.01.2025].
22 https://www.0642.ua/news/3565972/putin-priihav-v-okupovanij-mariupol-roszmi-pokazali-vid eo-vizitu [12.01.2025].
23 https:// https://irtafax.com/ministr-oborony-rf-pryikhav-v-kndr-dlia-perehovoriv-shcho-vidomo/ [12.01.2025].

7) selectively the names of russian government entities, institutions and organizations in the names of industrial and commercial enterprises, financial organizations, companies, firms, organizational and legal forms, etc., as well as the first word, in quotation marks, of a symbolic name:

While announcing the visit, the ministry of defense of the rf did not disclose who belousov would meet with or the purpose of the negotiations (Ibid.).

It should be reminded that the day before, russia reported the dismissal of two high-ranking officials in the aircraft manufacturing industry. The positions were vacated by the CEO of PJSC "Jakovlev" and the Managing Director of JSC "Tupolev" (refer to note 6).

Thus, the students of the Luhans'k Economic and Legal Boarding School named after the heroes of the "young guard" were recently awarded the ranks of vice-sergeants [24].

The given examples illustrate the dynamics of the literary norm in the context of the intensification, escalation, and expansion of the war. The transformation of mass consciousness has led to changes in linguistic consciousness, which has influenced established language practices, particularly the use of capital letters in proper names associated with the aggressor state and the accomplice states in the crime of russian aggression. The semiotic nature of the graphic sign has made possible the creation of a new historically variable meaning in the Ukrainian speech environment. Professor Volodymyr Sadivnyčyj assesses the prospect of preserving this innovation within the structure of the literary Ukrainian language:

"The play with capital letters to form the corresponding meaning in verbal creativity has been known since the late XIX and early XX centuries. Fortunately, not all symbols persist in mass consciousness for even a few months.

Unfortunately, not all symbols remain in mass consciousness for several years. This applies to the lowercase spellings of the names of the enemies of the Ukrainian people, as well as proper names related to the aggressor

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24 https://v-variant.com.ua/zaharbnyky-militaryzuiut-ditey-i-vzhe-nadaiut-im-viyskovi-zvannia-luhanska-ova/ [12.01.2025].

state and the accomplice states in the criminal aggression. Everything will return to the way it was after the conflict is done before we even notice. In theory, it could take longer" (Interview for this publication).

The National Commission on State Language Standards of Ukraine decided not to classify the spelling of names such as 'russia', 'moscow', 'muscovy', 'moscow kingdom', 'russian empire', 'state duma of the rf', etc., with a lowercase letter as a deviation from the norms of the Ukrainian language in texts of an unofficial nature.

In conclusion, it should be noted that today the issue of lowercase letters in the names of the aggressor state and its associated entities remains a socially engaged problem, which determines the different speech practices regarding the use of lowercase and uppercase letters. This innovative norm must undergo the test of time and be accepted by various social groups and generations, and accordingly, its use in different discursive practices.

Social factors in the dynamics of the literary norm

The data from sociological studies of the state of the Ukrainian mass consciousness during the Russian-Ukrainian war reveals the impact of significant socio-political transformations on people's perceptions, values, and subjective reactions to the disruption of the normative foundations of the established social order. We would like to draw attention to a few of the alterations noted by sociologists that, in our view, have also contributed to the dynamics of language consciousness and which have influenced language usage practices.

Civilizational orientation towards Europe

Sociologists register changes in the civilizational attitudes of Ukrainians. In 2002–2013, the ratio of pro-Russian and pro-European citizens was not in favour of the latter: 55–60 % of Ukrainian citizens were pro-Russian, while 40–44 % were pro-European. After the annexation of Crimea and the seizure of some parts of the Donec′k and Luhans′k regions (ORDLO), sociological surveys show a relatively stable numer-

ical predominance of 60 % of pro-European citizens over 40 % of pro-Russian citizens[25] (Dembic′kyj et al. 2022, 292).

Thus, the change in the civilizational orientation of Ukrainians has become an important marker of the socio-political transformations that have taken place in the country since 2014. The pro-European choice after the full-scale invasion is not only a political position but also a part of national identity, which confirms the trend of further strengthening of pro-European sentiment in Ukrainian society.

Transformation of political identity

According to the data of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the number of citizens who consider themselves Ukrainians rather than representatives of local or regional identities has increased significantly since 2014. This conclusion is also confirmed by a survey conducted in July 2022 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology: 85 % of the population of Ukraine consider themselves first and foremost citizens of their country. At the same time, there is no significant difference in this indicator among different social categories of the population – age, regional, linguistic and ethnic, gender, and settlement. Among residents of the East, 81 % consider themselves primarily citizens of Ukraine, among Russian-speaking Ukrainians – 81 %, among Russian-speaking Russians – 78 % (Indicators 2022).

Il′ko Kučeriv "Democratic Initiatives" together with the sociological service of the Razumkov Center asked respondents to what extent they are proud or not proud of being a citizen of Ukraine. The answers were as follows: 1) not proud at all – 1,6 %; 2) rather not proud – 3,8 %; 3) it is difficult to answer – 4,2 %; 4) rather proud – 35,9 %; 5) very proud – 54,5 %. The dynamics of the answer "rather proud" (Table 1) and the answer "very proud" (Table 2) during 2002–2022 is telling (Den′ Nezaležnosti Ukrajiny 2022):

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25 The population of the part of the internationally recognized territory of Ukraine that is not under the actual control of the Ukrainian authorities as a result of its occupation by Russia in 2014 became inaccessible for the sociological monitoring samples from 2014–2015.

Table 1

2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2017	2021	2022
30,9	30,0	33,2	36,6	38,4	35,0	36,8	42,1	43,7	45,1	35,9

Table 2

2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2017	2021	2022
10,1	7,7	11,6	13,9	11,1	7,7	23,9	18,0	18,8	27,3	54,5

The above data from sociological monitoring shows that the Russian-Ukrainian war, especially in its full-scale phase, has reduced the national distance between different socio-ethnic communities, while strengthening their cohesion. Serhij Dembic′kyj notes that "the full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine at the end of February 2022 launched another revolutionary change in attitudes towards civic identity, or started the third stage of civic mobilization, in which other variants of territorial or political identity took a marginal or auxiliary place" (Indicators 2022). According to the sociologist's viewpoint, in the case of sustainable democratic development of Ukraine, civic identity will not fall below 75 % in the future.

Faith in the victory of Ukraine

Ukrainian citizens showed a strong belief in Ukraine's victory in the war, although there were some differences among different age groups. The highest percentage of confidence in victory was recorded among young people aged 18– 29 (82,2 %) and 30–39 (81,6 %). With age, this figure slightly decreases, reaching 72,6 % among people aged 60 and older (Den′ Nezaležnosti Ukrajiny 'Independence Day of Ukraine' 2022).

Furthermore, 60 % of Ukrainians said they identified as part of the national resistance, with 43 % completely relating to the statement and 17 % partially relating. Another 32 % felt at least partially involved in the resistance to the Russian aggressor. And only 4 % of respondents rather did not feel part of the resistance to the enemy at all (Sense of personal belonging 2022).

Attitudes towards Russia

The results of a sociological survey conducted by the Il′ko Kučeriv "Democratic Initiatives" in cooperation with the sociological service of the Razumkov Center in August 2022 show that the vast majority of respondents of all age groups blame the Russian leadership for the ongoing war (from 82,6 % of people aged 50–59 and 87,6 % of young people aged 18–29), and Russian citizens are considered guilty of aggression by 37,4 % of older people and 48,9 % of young people. It should be noted that as of October 2024, 93 % of Ukrainians have a negative attitude toward Russia, while only 3 % have a positive attitude (Attitudes of Ukrainians 2024).

Ukrainians of all ages were in favour of a complete severance of relations with Russia after Ukraine's victory. The highest level of support was recorded among young people aged 18–29 (59,9 %) and citizens aged 30–39 (58,9 %). Support for a complete severance of relations with Russia after the victory demonstrates the high readiness of Ukrainians for radical change (Den′ Nezaležnosti Ukrajiny 'Independence Day of Ukraine' 2022).

The Institute of Sociology conducted a study based on the narrative method to see the trends of interaction between the Ukrainian community and the Russian community after the war. Narrative semiotics works well where it is necessary to examine stories for their underlying structures, that is, the fundamental system of values which these stories are based on. 77 semi-structured interviews conducted in March-May 2022 with representatives of various groups of civilians (refugees from the territories that were occupied/under threat of occupation, subjected to shelling, as well as residents of the territories not directly affected by hostilities) were used as the basis for identifying narrative frames. Four main types of expectations were revealed:

"Enemies forever" – based on hatred and hostility due to the suffering and losses caused. This frame reflects the impossibility of forgiveness and emphasizes the historical aggressive nature of the Russian Federation.

"Permanent war" and "distancing" - describe the relationship as a long-lasting conflict with minimization of contacts and creation of "barriers" to avoid new traumas.

"No relations" – implies a complete severance of contacts with Russia at all levels, as well as the desire to isolate Russia in the international space.

"Everything will get better over time" is typical for some Russian-speaking respondents, based on deep-rooted ideas about "friendship of nations" and the possibility of gradual normalization of relations (Dembicʹkyj et al. 2022, 337–347).

Experiencing the collective trauma

The models of interaction between the Ukrainian and Russian communities described in the previous paragraph reflect fundamental, long-term changes in the mass consciousness of Ukrainians compared to peacetime. The collective trauma is a factor in the construction of such relations, characterized by unpredictability, speed of onset, radicality, destruction of the foundations of existence, exogenous nature, external origin, and shock effect (Dembicʹkyj et al. 2022, 337–347). The large number of affected Ukrainian citizens, the unjust deaths of civilians, the aggressor's brutal violation of international norms and customs of warfare, crimes against humanity, and the genocidal nature of the war have exacerbated the trauma and formed a collective unified image of the enemy. At the same time, the Ukrainian society confronts the forces causing trauma and does not limit itself to expressing its own emotional reactions, which helps to overcome the trauma (Dembicʹkyj et al. 337–347). An example of such reactions is, in particular, the change in established language practices of spelling.

Therefore, the transformation of the mass consciousness in the context of the aggravation, intensification, and expansion of the war caused significant changes in the linguistic consciousness of Ukrainians, which influenced the practices of language use accordingly. In particular, this includes violations of the established spelling norm of capitalizing Russian toponyms, anthroponyms and other onyms, as well as capitalizing the first word in a sentence, text, or headlines. The new orthographic reality has every chance of remaining as long as: a) the Russian-Ukrainian war continues, b) the traumatic memory remains strong, c) the Ukrainian civic cohesion and European orientation remain strong, which leads to a clear division of life space into "friend" and "foe".

Conclusions

The intensification and escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian War in 2022 triggered changes within the semantic-grammatical group of nouns denoting proper and common names. The use of lowercase letters in various discursive practices to denote the name of the aggressor state, as well as related proper nouns, has "expanded" the contemporary formalized norm for spelling names of individualized entities. At the same time, an analysis of media discourse reveals varying vectors in the use of lowercase letters to denote Russian proper nouns. Whether this innovation will become a literary standard depends on whether it withstands the test of time and is accepted by different generations of Ukrainians. In any case, the new way of writing Russian proper names is already a historical phenomenon, one of the reflections of the Russian-Ukrainian War period, as well as a means of its commemoration in public consciousness.

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KRIEGSBEDINGTE MOTIVATIONSTRENDS ZUM ERLERNEN DES UKRAINISCHEN ALS FREMDSPRACHE: EINE INTERDISZIPLINÄRE UNTERSUCHUNG

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Der Unterricht des Ukrainischen als Fremdsprache ('UaF') hat sich erheblich weiterentwickelt, insbesondere als Reaktion auf die sich verändernden geopolitischen und sozialen Bedingungen in der Ukraine. Historisch beeinflusst durch den Status der ukrainischen Sprache in der Sowjetunion, hat sich der Unterricht der ukrainischen Sprache von einer kulturellen Kuriosität zu einer praktischen Notwendigkeit gewandelt. Die russische Invasion in der Ukraine im Jahr 2022 hat die Landschaft weiter verändert, und bei den Lernenden sind neue Motivationen entstanden, wie etwa Solidarität, politische Positionierung und der Wunsch, beim Wiederaufbau der Ukraine zu helfen. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die Beweggründe von Ausländern, die zwischen 2003 und 2023 Ukrainisch gelernt haben, und zeigt ein breites Spektrum von Gründen auf, das von beruflichem Nutzen bis hin zu persönlichen Überzeugungen reicht. Die Ergebnisse unterstreichen die wachsende Bedeutung des Ukrainischen als Sprache des Widerstands, der Identität und des zukünftigen Wiederaufbaus und markieren einen bedeutenden Wandel in der Sprachdidaktik und der Rolle des UaF im globalen Kontext.

Stichwörter: Ukrainisch als Fremdsprache, Sprachsituation in der Ukraine, Motivation zum Sprachenlernen, angewandte Linguistik, Sprachpädagogik, Zweitspracherwerb.

МОТИВАЦІЙНІ ТЕНДЕНЦІЇ, ПОВ'ЯЗАНІ З ВІЙНОЮ, У ВИВЧЕННІ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ МОВИ ЯК ІНОЗЕМНОЇ: МІЖДИСЦИПЛІНАРНЕ ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ

Соломія Бук

Викладання української мови як іноземної зазнало значної трансформації, особливо у відповідь на зміну сучасних геополітичних та соціальних умов в Україні. Під впливом історичних обставин та статусу українців в Радянському Союзі вивчення української мови перетворилося з культурної цікавості на практичну необхідність. Російське вторгнення в Україну у 2022 році ще більше змінило ландшафт, і серед студентів з'явилися нові мотиви, зокрема солідарність, політичне позиціонування та бажання допомогти відновити Україну. Це дослідження вивчає мотивацію іноземців, які вивчали українську мову між 2003 і 2023 роками, виявляючи широкий спектр причин, починаючи від професійних переваг і закінчуючи особистими переконаннями. Результати підкреслюють зростаюче значення української мови як мови опору, ідентичності та майбутньої реконструкції, вони підкреслюють значні зміни у лінгводидактиці та ролі української мови у глобальному контексті.

Ключові слова: українська мова як іноземна, мовна ситуація в Україні, мотивація до вивчення мови, прикладна лінгвістика, лінгводидактика, вивчення другої мови.

Einleitung

Der Unterricht des Ukrainischen als Fremdsprache hängt weitgehend vom Status der Sprache in der Ukraine und ihrer Wahrnehmung durch die Bürger des Landes ab. Chronologisch gesehen hat der Unterricht des Ukrainischen als Fremdsprache (UaF) mehrere Phasen durchlaufen und steht nun vor neuen Herausforderungen im Zusammenhang mit dem umfassenden russisch-ukrainischen Krieg und der dadurch ausgelösten Massenmigration. Mit dem Beginn des Einmarsches Russlands in die Ukraine haben sich nicht nur die geopolitische Lage, sondern auch die sozialen, wirtschaftlichen, akademischen und psychologischen

Lebensbedingungen im Lande dramatisch verändert, was zu Veränderungen in der Glottodidaktik (Sprachpädagogik) führt, die sich mit dem Unterricht des Ukrainischen als Fremdsprache befasst.

Bevor ich mich dem spezifischen Kontext des UaF-Unterrichts und den Ergebnissen meiner Studie 2022–2023 über die Motivation von Ausländern, die diese Sprache lernen, zuwende, möchte ich einige wichtige Fakten über die ukrainische Sprache hervorheben. Sie ist die Nationalsprache der Ukrainer. Sie gehört zur ostslawischen Gruppe der indoeuropäischen Sprachfamilie. Sie ist die Amtssprache der Ukraine und hat auch in Polen, Moldawien, Rumänien, der Slowakei, Serbien, Ungarn, Kroatien, Bosnien und Herzegowina und der Tschechischen Republik offiziellen Status (außer in diesen Ländern wird sie auch in Weißrussland, der Russischen Föderation, Kasachstan, Argentinien, Brasilien, dem Vereinigten Königreich, Kanada, den Vereinigten Staaten und anderen Ländern, in denen Ukrainer leben, gesprochen). Sie wird von etwa 45 Millionen Muttersprachlern gesprochen (von denen die meisten in der Ukraine leben), sie ist eine der dreißig meistgesprochenen Sprachen der Welt und die zweit- oder drittmeistgesprochene slawische Sprache nach Russisch und möglicherweise Polnisch (Mozer 2019, 596; Ethnologue 2023).

Die sprachliche Situation in der Ukraine

Die Sprachsituation in der Ukraine ist seit langem Gegenstand von Diskussionen, Debatten und eingehender Forschung in den Bereichen Politik, Soziologie, Kulturwissenschaften, Ethnologie und darüber hinaus. Studien zur Situation der ukrainischen Sprache werden in akademischen Kreisen durchgeführt und in der Presse in der Ukraine und im Ausland beschrieben (Besters-Dilger 2019; Buk, Babeljuk 2024; Drozdov 2024; Ebel, Chudov 2023; Hentschel, Palinska 2022; Kiss 2022; Kiss et al. 2025; Koval′ova 2020; Kulyk 2024; Sajkovs′ka 2024; Zelenina 2024, u.a.). Die historischen und kulturellen Faktoren seiner Entstehung reichen bis in die Zeit der Kiewer Rus′ zurück, über die Verbote durch das "Valujev Zirkular" (1863) und den "Emser Ukaz" (1876) bis hin zur langen Zeit der Staatenlosigkeit (Rudnyc′kyj 1976, 153–155). In der USSR war es oft gefährlich, Ukrainisch zu sprechen, nicht nur im offiziellen, sondern auch im privaten Leben. Die effektiven Methoden der

Russifizierung zwangen viele Menschen, auf die "allgemein verständliche" Sprache, also Russisch, umzusteigen, denn nur so war es möglich, eine gute Ausbildung zu erhalten, Karriere zu machen, eine staatliche Wohnung zu bekommen etc. (Danylenko 2019, 19–39). Aber nicht alle Ukrainer gingen diesen Kompromiss ein, sondern zeigten nationales Bewusstsein und sprachlichen Widerstand. So begann die Wahrnehmung des Ukrainischen als Sprache des Widerstands, des Patriotismus und der Selbstidentifikation: Ich bin Ukrainer, nicht nur ein 'Sowjet'.

Gleichzeitig gab es eine in der romantischen Literatur verwurzelte kulturelle Wahrnehmung der ukrainischen Sprache als "kalyna" (mova kalynova, Viburnum-Sprache, Viburnum 'Schneeball' ist die Symbolpflanze der Ukraine) oder als "Nachtigall", d.h. als zweitmelodischste Sprache der Welt (nach Italienisch). Sehr oft wurde dies so interpretiert, dass für die Ukrainer selbst ihre Schönheit, Melodie und Kohärenz ein ausreichender Grund ist, die ukrainische Sprache zu lernen und zu verwenden, und auch, weil es die Sprache ihrer Vorfahren ist, ihr Erbe. Die meisten Ausländer, die sich für das Erlernen der ukrainischen Sprache interessieren, sind Mitglieder der ukrainischen Diaspora, wie etwa Kinder und Enkelkinder von Ukrainern, die aus verschiedenen Gründen und zu verschiedenen Zeiten ins Ausland ausgewandert sind.

Seit die Ukraine nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion 1991 ihre Unabhängigkeit erlangte, haben sich die Wahrnehmung der ukrainischen Sprache im Allgemeinen und die Methoden des Sprachunterrichts deutlich in Richtung eines Verständnisses der ukrainischen Sprache als Gebrauchssprache, die für die Lösung der Alltagsprobleme der in der Ukraine lebenden Menschen notwendig ist, verschoben. Dies war vor allem das Ergebnis des Übergangs zur Marktwirtschaft, eines Mentalitätswandels und der Wiederherstellung der Staatlichkeit der Ukraine. Vereinfacht lässt sich die Situation wie folgt beschreiben: Bis 1991 genügte es, Russisch zu können, jetzt stellt sich jedoch heraus, dass mit dem Ukrainischen als einziger Amtssprache etwas mehr erforderlich ist, was berücksichtigt werden muss, wenn auch nur bei offiziellen internationalen Kontakten. Auf dem ukrainischen Markt (der mit seinen 46 Millionen Verbrauchern nicht nur in Europa, sondern auch in der Welt ein großer Markt ist) war es Anfang der 90er Jahre kaum ein Thema, die Anleitungen für importierte Waren wie Baumaterialien,

Maschinen, Haushaltsgeräte, Elektronik, Software usw. in eine andere Sprache als Russisch zu übersetzen.

Es hat sich jedoch gezeigt, dass die ukrainische Öffentlichkeit von den Herstellern verlangt, die ukrainische Verfassung zu respektieren und ihre Produktbeschreibungen ins Ukrainische zu übersetzen, und es wurde sogar eine NGO gegründet, um dieses Ziel zu erreichen. Universitäten und akademische Einrichtungen im Ausland haben ihre Haltung gegenüber der ukrainischen Sprache überdacht. Zum einen, weil es sich um die Sprache eines großen slawischen Landes handelt, und zum anderen, weil viele wissenschaftliche Studien (auch außerhalb der Ukraine) in dieser Sprache veröffentlicht wurden. Infolgedessen ist das Interesse an der Erforschung der ukrainischen Sprache unter Historikern, Ethnologen, Kulturwissenschaftlern, Linguisten und internationalen Osteuropaexperten gestiegen. Darüber hinaus konnten Ausländer nach dem Fall des Eisernen Vorhangs ungehindert in die Ukraine einreisen, die sich mit ihrer reichen und interessanten unbekannten Kultur, der schönen Natur, den Bergen und dem Meer sowie den erschwinglichen Preisen als wahre "Goldgrube" für Touristen erwies. Unternehmer fanden qualifizierte Arbeitskräfte und einen offenen Markt vor, der gute Bedingungen für eine Unternehmensgründung bot.

Methoden und Auswertung des Materials

Seit der Unabhängigkeit der Ukraine hat sich der Kreis der Ausländer, die Ukrainisch lernen, erheblich vergrößert. Dazu gehören nicht nur Ausländer ukrainischer Abstammung, sondern auch Diplomaten und Mitarbeiter von Botschaften und offiziellen Vertretungen in der Ukraine, Privatunternehmer und leitende Angestellte multinationaler Unternehmen, Akademiker (einschließlich Sprachwissenschaftler, für die Ukrainisch oft zu einer dritten oder vierten slawischen Sprache geworden ist), Reisende und Reiseveranstalter. Die in diesem Artikel vorgestellten Daten basieren auf den Meinungen zweier Gruppen von Ausländern. Alle haben Ukrainisch im Einzelunterricht oder in privaten Sprachschulen in Lemberg und Kiew gelernt: (1) 121 Personen im Zeitraum 2003–2021 und (2) 118 Personen im Zeitraum 2022–2023. Da das Ziel darin bestand, die Meinungen eines möglichst breiten Spektrums von Befragten aus verschiedenen sozialen Gruppen einzuholen

und ihre Beweggründe für das Erlernen der ukrainischen Sprache als Fremdsprache zu ermitteln, wurden in der Umfrage keine Studenten staatlicher oder nichtstaatlicher akademischer Einrichtungen befragt, da die Mitglieder dieser Gruppe eine relativ klare Antwort auf diese Frage geben: Sie werden durch ihren Wunsch, eine Ausbildung zu erhalten und eine Karriere zu beginnen, zum Erlernen der ukrainischen Sprache motiviert. Das Alter dieser Referenzgruppe ist relativ begrenzt (19–27 Jahre), und ihre Ausbildung wird oft nicht von ihnen selbst, sondern von ihren Eltern oder staatlichen Organisationen finanziert (dies gilt insbesondere für Studenten aus Indien, China, Malaysia, Aserbaidschan, Turkmenistan, Usbekistan, der Türkei, Ägypten usw.). Und es sind diese Organisationen, die die Entscheidungen der jungen Menschen darüber, wo sie studieren und welche Sprache sie lernen wollen, beeinflussen können. Einerseits ist es technisch einfacher, Universitätsstudenten zu befragen, da sie alle an Gruppenkursen teilnehmen, aber alle oben genannten Faktoren würden die Vielfalt der Befragten, die wir im privaten Sektor erhalten könnten, stark einschränken.

Verschiedene Motive für ein UaF-Studium – Ergebnisse der Befragung

Im Rahmen der Umfrage konnte ein breites Spektrum an Motiven für ein UaF-Studium ermittelt werden. Häufig nannten die Befragten mehrere Gründe gleichzeitig, die an der Schnittstelle zwischen beruflichen, persönlichen, sozialen und anderen Lebensbereichen angesiedelt sind. Es lassen sich daher mehrere Arten von Motiven unterscheiden:

Ukrainisch ist notwendig und nützlich

Obwohl multinationale Unternehmen, die in der Ukraine tätig sind, von ihren Mitarbeitern – je nach Art der Arbeit und Position – oft gute Englischkenntnisse verlangen, lernen auch ihre ausländischen Eigentümer und Manager Ukrainisch: Eine 42-jährige Amerikanerin, Managerin in einem multinationalen Unternehmen in L'viv, erzählt uns:

Ich habe einen professionellen Übersetzer bei der Arbeit, aber was mache ich danach? Ich muss Essen im Restaurant bestellen, ein Taxi rufen, einkaufen gehen. Mein Übersetzer und ich haben uns angefreundet und

er hilft mir gerne, aber ich möchte nicht von ihm abhängig sein. Ich kann Ukrainisch auf elementarem Niveau lernen.

Die Ukraine ist reich an Sitten und Gebräuchen, interessanten Feiertagen und Volksglauben, die die Menschen ständig begleiten, und bis vor kurzem war der Inhalt des UaF-Unterrichts oft auf die Vermittlung von Wissen über die ethnographische Kultur ausgerichtet. Es hat sich jedoch gezeigt, dass die Lernenden mehr an der Alltagskultur und einem kommunikativen Unterrichtsansatz interessiert sind. Mit den Worten eines Schweizers (30 Jahre, Direktor einer IT-Firma in der Ukraine):

Es ist sehr interessant, zu Weihnachten Krippenspiele zu sehen und zu Ostern Osterkuchen zu essen, aber viel wichtiger ist es für mich zu verstehen, worüber die Mitarbeiter meines Unternehmens jeden Tag reden und denken, worüber sie in ihren ukrainischen Chatrooms schreiben.

Ein anderer Befragter – ein Norweger, 53 Jahre alt, Geschäftsführer eines Unternehmens in Novojavorivs′k - sagt:

Es ist leicht zu verstehen, warum Ukrainer Dinge nicht über die Schwelle tragen, aber ich muss mit Managern kommunizieren, um Aufgaben zu verteilen, und einige von ihnen sprechen kein Englisch, also lerne ich Ukrainisch.

Eine 37-jährige Polin, eine Geschäftsfrau aus Bialystok, die nach Lemberg gekommen ist, um Ukrainisch zu lernen, damit sie ihre zukünftigen ukrainischen Mitarbeiter in ihrer Firma besser verstehen kann, denkt genauso.

2022 lernten mehr Menschen Ukrainisch

Diese Beispiele zeigen eine Verschiebung in der Wahrnehmung des Ukrainischen vom "Traditionsträger" hin zum Ukrainischen als "wesentlich, notwendig und nützlich".

Auch der Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst (DAAD) hat eine positive Entwicklung des Interesses an ukrainischen Studien festgestellt: "Russlands Krieg in der Ukraine hat gezeigt, dass wir in Deutschland mehr Expertise zu Osteuropa und speziell zur Ukraine benötigen. Ein Wiederaufbau des Landes und eine Heranführung der Ukraine an die Europäische Union setzt auch bei uns vertieftes Wissen zu Geschichte, Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur und Gesellschaft der Ukraine voraus. Beide Zentren werden dazu einen wichtigen Beitrag leisten" (DAAD 2024).

Solidarität und Hilfe

Duolingo, eine digitale Plattform zum Sprachenlernen, verzeichnete unmittelbar nach der russischen Invasion in der Ukraine im Jahr 2022 einen enormen Anstieg beim Erlernen der ukrainischen Sprache. Der größte Trend auf der Website von Duolingo im Jahr 2022 war das wachsende Interesse an der ukrainischen Sprache: Nach dem 24. Februar 2022 begannen mehr als 1,3 Millionen Menschen weltweit, diese Sprache zu lernen.

Die häufigsten Gründe für das Erlernen einer Sprache sind Studium, Arbeit und Reisen, und die Zahl derer, die sich für das Erlernen der Kultur interessieren, nimmt zu. Aber dieses Jahr haben wir einen neuen Grund entdeckt: Solidarität (Duolingo-Sprachreport 2022).

Das Team der kostenlosen Sprachlern-App stützt sich bei dieser Aussage auf die Daten von mehr als 500 Millionen Nutzern.

Abbildung 1: Anzahl der Duolingo-Nutzer, die im Jahr 2022 Ukrainisch lernen. Vertikale Achse: Anzahl der UaF-Lernenden. Horizontale Achse: Monate im Jahr 2022 (Duolingo-Sprachreport 2022).

In den ersten sechs Monaten nach der Invasion stieg die Zahl der ukrainischen Lernendenfolgendermaßen:
– in Deutschland um mehr als das Sechzehnfache im Vergleich zum Vorjahr
– in Polen um mehr als das Sechzehnfache
– mehr als das Fünfzehnfache in der Tschechischen Republik, usw.

Duolingo erklärt diese Entwicklung damit, dass diese Länder die meisten ukrainischen Flüchtlinge aufgenommen haben. Durch die Aufnahme ihrer Landsleute kehren Ukrainer und Ukrainer im Ausland zu ihren Wurzeln zurück, erinnern sich an die Sprache ihrer Urgroßmütter und Urgroßväter und beginnen oft, sie von Grund auf zu lernen. Und dank des Engagements von Freiwilligen, Nichtregierungsorganisationen und Unternehmen wird die ukrainische Sprache auch Menschen vermittelt, die bisher keinen Bezug zur Ukraine hatten.

Ein Amerikaner, 57 Jahre alt, Sekundarschullehrer, sagt:

Ich bin nicht ukrainischer Abstammung, aber ich lerne Ukrainisch, damit ich mit den ukrainischen Einwanderern in der Kirche sprechen kann. Es ist eine ukrainische Kirche, die viel Hilfe in die Ostukraine schickt und viele Vertriebene von dort aufgenommen hat. Sie sprechen noch kein Englisch, und ich möchte ihnen von meiner Familie und von Amerika erzählen und ihre Geschichten hören. Ich fühle sehr mit ihnen.

Die Wahl der ukrainischen Sprache ist eine politische Position, ein Indikator für "Freund" oder "Feind"

"Das Sprachengesetz ist in Kriegszeiten entscheidend. Deshalb muss das Maß seiner Einhaltung so hoch wie möglich sein. Heute ist es nicht mehr möglich, darüber zu diskutieren, ob die ukrainische Sprache ein Unterscheidungsmerkmal auf der Linie zwischen «eigen» und «fremd» ist. Alles andere würde dem Feind in die Hände spielen, der die Sprache systematisch als eines der Kriegsinstrumente einsetzt", so Taras Kremin, Beauftragter für den Schutz der Staatssprache und ukrainischer Politiker (zitiert in: Andrejeva 2023).

Eine ähnliche Meinung spiegelt sich in den Antworten der weiblichen Befragten in derselben Umfrage wider. Eine 52-jährige georgische Menschenrechtsexpertin, die für eine internationale Organisation in der Ukraine arbeitet, sagt:

Die Ukraine hat es geschafft, ihre Identität zu bewahren, anders als zum Beispiel Belarus. Heute ist die Wahl der Kommunikationssprache eine politische Haltung, eine pro-ukrainische oder pro-russische Einstellung. In Georgien spricht die junge Generation zum Glück kein Russisch. Ich spreche Russisch, aber ich lebe in Charkiv, Dnipro und Kyiv und spreche Ukrainisch - normalerweise wechseln die Leute mit mir ins Ukrai-

nische. Ich bin immer traurig, wenn das nicht ab und zu passiert. Ich brauche Ukrainisch auch, um die ukrainischen Medien zu verstehen, die ich oft studiere.

Ein 44-jähriger Deutscher ist Militärberater an einer Militärakademie für die Angleichung ukrainischer Standards an die der NATO:

Die ukrainische Armee war sehr postsowjetisch, russifiziert von der Befehlssprache bis hin zu den offiziellen und inoffiziellen Einsatzregeln und Methoden der Kriegsführung. Ich bin Berater für die Angleichung der ukrainischen Standards an die der NATO und helfe der Ukraine, sich von den sowjetischen Standards zu lösen und sich den neuen, effektiveren Methoden der Kriegsführung anzuschließen. In einem solchen Kontext ist es schlecht, Russisch zu lernen (obwohl es eine internationale Sprache ist), also lerne ich Ukrainisch. Ich habe den Eindruck, dass die ukrainische Sprache heute ein Indikator für etwas Fortschrittliches und pro-Demokratisches ist.

Die Ukrainer haben auch einen großen taktischen Vorteil gegenüber den russischen Angreifern, weil sie die Sprache der Angreifer verstehen, während die Angreifer kein Ukrainisch können. Daher die vielen Codes, Slogans, Memes und Witze zu diesem Thema. "Die ukrainische Sprache unterscheidet uns: Der Feind kann sich in Uniform kleiden, unsere Farben tragen, aber nicht unsere Sprache sprechen" (Siehe das Video, das auf dem Kanal von Jegor Firsow gepostet wurde: https://www.youtube.com/watch?=au6H9DSpfSk. Früher war er Volksabgeordneter und befasste sich mit Umweltfragen. Heute ist er Soldat der ukrainischen Streitkräfte und Spezialist für taktische Medizin und Evakuierung. Auf seinem Kanal versucht er, Militärvideos zu veröffentlichen).

Ukrainisch ist die Sprache der Helden, die die Wahrheit verteidigen

Das Beispiel heldenhafter ukrainischer Wehrdienstleistender und die Taten einfacher Menschen inspirieren Ausländer, die unter Einsatz ihres Lebens und ihrer Gesundheit an der Seite der Ukraine kämpfen. Sie sind es, die militärische "Ausländerlegionen" bilden und die ukrainische Sprache lernen, um mit den ukrainischen Streitkräften kommunizieren zu können.

Unsere Soldaten profitieren von den Erfahrungen der NATO auf den Truppenübungsplätzen in Deutschland, Polen, Großbritannien und anderen Ländern, und die Militärausbilder lernen mit Begeisterung die ukrainische Sprache, um sich einem Volk anzunähern, das um seine Unabhängigkeit und seine Kultur kämpft. Die ersten Sätze, die sie lernen, sind "Ruhm der Ukraine!" 'Slava Ukrajini!', "Ruhm den Helden!" 'Herojam slava!' und "Ich liebe die Ukraine" 'Ja ljublju Ukrajinu'.

Ein 71-jähriger amerikanischer Brigadegeneral sagt:

Die Ausbildung der ukrainischen Streitkräfte ist die wichtigste Aufgabe, die ich je übernommen habe. Nie zuvor hatte ich das Gefühl, dass meine Aufgabe so wichtig ist. Ich muss zumindest Grundkenntnisse der ukrainischen Sprache haben, um mit den Ukrainern kommunizieren zu können. Für mich ist das ein Zeichen des Respekts gegenüber der Ukraine.

Ein 62-jähriger Kanadier, ein Oberst, erzählt:

Ich habe schon vor 2014 angefangen, Ukrainisch zu lernen, als ich Teil einer kanadischen Mission auf dem Truppenübungsplatz Javoriv war. Mein Urgroßvater ist zuerst nach England und dann nach Kanada ausgewandert, aber ich habe mich nicht für meine Herkunft interessiert, bis ich zufällig in die Ukraine kam. Jetzt bin ich einfach nur glücklich, glücklich, ein Teil des zukünftigen Sieges der Ukrainer zu sein. Ich war noch nie so stolz auf das Land meiner Vorfahren!

So drückt es ein 49-jähriger amerikanischer Feldwebel aus:

Ich genieße es sehr, mich mit ukrainischen Soldaten in ihrer Sprache zu unterhalten. Wir kommen sofort ins Gespräch und werden oft Freunde fürs Leben. Die Ukrainer verteidigen ihr Land, die Demokratie in Europa und kämpfen für die Wahrheit. Ich bin sehr froh, mit ihnen zusammenzuarbeiten!

Ukrainisch als Sprache des Wiederaufbaus und der Zukunft der Ukraine

Viele Ausländer leben und arbeiten immer noch in der Ukraine, viele haben es geschafft, ihre privaten Unternehmen hier zu behalten, viele engagieren sich als Freiwillige und helfen der lokalen Bevölkerung auf verschiedene Weise, die Tragödie des Krieges zu überwinden. Ein Kanadier, 59 Jahre alt, Chirurg, erzählt:

Ich habe Urlaub genommen, um in die Ukraine zu kommen und in den Lazaretten zu helfen. Ich weiß, dass ich in den 25 Tagen, die ich hier bin, keine Zeit haben werde, jeden zu heilen, aber ich möchte wirklich helfen. Ich habe begonnen, online Ukrainisch zu lernen, damit ich meine Patienten verstehen kann. Wenn ich den Krieg gewonnen habe, denke ich ernsthaft darüber nach, hier eine private Rehabilitationsklinik zu eröffnen.

Ein Deutscher, 34 Jahre, Manager:

Ich werde die Ukraine nach dem Krieg wieder aufbauen und habe eine Idee, wie man hier ein Immobiliengeschäft machen kann, also bereite ich mich jetzt vor und lerne Ukrainisch.

Ein norwegischer Legionär, der in der Nähe von Luhans'k verwundet wurde:

Ich mag die Ukraine und die Ukrainer, ich lerne Ukrainisch, weil ich nach dem Krieg hierher zurückkehren und mich in Odesa niederlassen möchte.

Ukrainisch statt der Sprache der Aggressoren und Besatzer

Schüler, die Ukrainisch lernen, lernen oft auch Russisch. Ihre Hauptmotivation ist es, die Gründe für den Ausbruch des großen Krieges 2022 zu verstehen und Antworten auf die Frage zu finden, wie die russische Gesellschaft, die ihren Präsidenten 20 Jahre lang geduldet und dann Kriegsverbrechen zugelassen hat, gedemütigt werden konnte. "Die professionellen Russisten - Geschichte, Sprache, Literatur, Kultur, Soziologie, Geopolitik etc. – haben das Wichtigste übersehen oder nicht bemerkt (oder sich geweigert, es zu bemerken) – den Verfall der russischen Kultur und Gesellschaft, der zum heutigen russischen Faschismus geführt hat. Wie konnten russische Wissenschaftler, deren Aufgabe es ist, "die tiefe russische Seele zu analysieren und zu verstehen", den Faschismus übersehen?" (Zabužko 2024).

Es ist kein Geheimnis, dass sich viele slawistische Fakultäten in der ganzen Welt seit langem auf Russisch konzentrieren, die Sprache des einst größten Landes der Welt, der internationalen Kommunikation und der Vereinten Nationen. Und obwohl es das Land eines feindlichen, undemokratischen Lagers jenseits des Eisernen Vorhangs war, haben fleißige Gelehrte in ihm die Schönheit der Werke von Puškin, Dostojevskij und Tolstoj entdeckt. Noch heute nennen sich viele Ins-

titute "Slawistik und Russistik", ein beredtes Zeugnis für die zahlenmäßige Dominanz der Russen in der Slawistik. Viele von ihnen stellen sich heute, während sie ihr Russisch verbessern oder Ukrainisch lernen, eine berechtigte Frage: Wie kommt es, dass sie sich auf Puškin konzentrieren und dabei die unumkehrbaren Prozesse in der modernen russischen Gesellschaft und Kultur übersehen?

Einer der amerikanischen Studenten der ukrainischen Sprache, ein 67-jähriger Universitätsprofessor, bemerkt verzweifelt:

Ich habe mein Leben damit verbracht, Brücken zwischen der russischen und der amerikanischen Kultur zu bauen, Studentenaustausch zu organisieren, demokratische Werte unter jungen Menschen zu verbreiten, aber ich verstehe nicht, wie das passieren konnte .... Wie konnten wir die Brutalität, den Ausbruch des Krieges und das Töten von Ukrainern übersehen?

Eine 28-jährige Engländerin, Studentin in Oxford und Leiterin einer Wohltätigkeitsorganisation, die Ukrainern hilft, sagte:

Ich bin nach Charkiv gezogen, um den Menschen zu helfen, die Fenster zu ersetzen, die im Winter durch den Beschuss der Raschisten[1] zerbrochen sind. Ich weiß, dass die meisten Menschen in der Region Charkiv Russisch sprechen, aber ich fühle mich nicht wohl dabei, es zu lernen, also lerne ich Ukrainisch, um mit den Menschen sprechen und ihre Probleme verstehen zu können. In Oxford war das Thema meines Forschungsprojekts ein russischer Dichter aus dem frühen 20. Jahrhundert, aber ich will nichts mehr mit dieser kriminellen Kultur zu tun haben, also habe ich das Thema auf eine Studie über ukrainische Kriegsprosa aus dem Jahr 2022 geändert.

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1 Der Begriff "Raschismus" wurde künstlich geschaffen, um eine totalitäre Ideologie zu beschreiben, die Elemente des Faschismus und des Stalinismus vereint. Der Begriff wurde insbesondere nach der umfassenden Invasion der Ukraine im Jahr 2022 populär, nachdem er bereits nach der Annexion der Krim im Jahr 2014 bekannt geworden war. Zum Beispiel, Hončarenko, R. (2023) "Raschismus": So prangert die Ukraine Russlands Krieg an. In DW. 10.05.2023. 10. Mai 2023: "Raschismus" ist die Kurzform für "Russischer Faschismus". Das ukrainische Parlament definiert den Begriff im Zusammenhang mit Russlands Angriffskrieg als "eine Kunst totalitärer Ideologie".

Schlussfolgerungen und Diskussion

Zweifellos hat der Krieg viele Veränderungen im sozialen, demographischen, intellektuellen, kulturellen und akademischen Leben der Ukraine und der Ukrainer im In- und Ausland bewirkt. Die sprachliche Situation im Land veränderte sich dramatisch, ebenso die Einstellung zum Ukrainischen als Sprache des Staates, der nationalen Konsolidierung und des Widerstands, während das Russische weitgehend zur Sprache der Besatzungsmacht, des Aggressors und der Rücksichtslosigkeit wurde. Auch in der Glottodidaktik hat sich der Schwerpunkt verschoben, insbesondere was die Zusammensetzung der am Erlernen des Ukrainischen Interessierten und ihre Motive betrifft. Vergleicht man die Befragten der Jahre 2003–2021 mit denen der Jahre 2022–2023, so wird deutlich, dass sich unter den Befragten neue Kategorien von Ausländern herausgebildet haben: Militär und medizinisches Personal; Freiwillige, die in die Ukraine kommen, um zu helfen, den Krieg zu überleben; Freiwillige, die den Ukrainern in ihren Heimatländern helfen (USA, Kanada, Deutschland, Polen, Tschechien usw.); Unternehmer, die sich auf den Wiederaufbau des Landes nach dem Krieg vorbereiten und hier ihr eigenes Unternehmen gründen. Es wurde auch eine andere Art von Motivation für das Erlernen einer Fremdsprache identifiziert: Solidarität und Hilfe. Die Umfrage hat gezeigt, dass Ausländer Ukrainisch als eine notwendige und nützliche Sprache für das Leben, als eine politische Position im Gegensatz zum Raschismus als ein Zeichen für "Freund oder Feind" und als die Sprache des Wiederaufbaus und der Zukunft der Ukraine betrachten.

Mit der Entscheidung, diese Sprache zu lernen, drücken die Menschen ihre aufrichtige Sympathie, Solidarität und Unterstützung für das ukrainische Volk aus und unterstreichen ihre Verbundenheit mit den Helden, die nicht nur ihr Land, sondern auch die universellen Werte von Gerechtigkeit und Unabhängigkeit verteidigt und den Feind auf seinem Weg nach Westeuropa aufgehalten haben.

Zu den Einschränkungen der Studie gehört die Tatsache, dass nur Ausländer berücksichtigt wurden, die eine Entscheidung getroffen haben und bereits UMI studieren/studiert haben und daher eine positive Einstellung haben, die durch die investierten finanziellen und zeitlichen Ressourcen bestätigt wird. In der Zukunft wäre es gut, die Gründe

zu untersuchen, warum einige Ausländer in der Ukraine die Landessprache nicht lernen, in welchem Stadium sie den Unterricht abbrechen und warum. Es wäre interessant, diese Statistiken nach Alter, Geschlecht, Herkunftsland usw. zusammenzustellen und sie mit den Daten der Nationalen Kommission für staatliche Sprachstandards zu vergleichen.

Die heutigen globalen Herausforderungen erfordern ein Überdenken der didaktischen Ansätze sowohl im Hinblick auf die sich verändernde geopolitische Lernumgebung als auch auf die sich verändernden Motivationen für das Erlernen einer Fremdsprache. Das Verständnis dieser Motivationen ist wichtig für die Entwicklung effektiver Lehrmethoden für den Fremdsprachenunterricht, da sie die Grundlage für die Anpassung des Lernprozesses an die Bedürfnisse und Interessen der Schüler bilden und einen tieferen und bewussteren Spracherwerb gewährleisten.

Nachwort

Aus Platzgründen habe ich in diesem Artikel darauf verzichtet, so wichtige methodische Fragen im Zusammenhang mit dem Ukrainischunterricht als Fremdsprache, wie den Einsatz von Computertechnologien und elektronischen Textkorpora im Unterricht (Buk 2010; Buk 2012), oder die Erstellung von Schülerkorpora (Buk 2007), zu beschreiben. Ein weiteres aktuelles Thema ist das wachsende Problem des Erlernens des Ukrainischen als ererbte Sprache (Turkevyč 2021; Montrul, Polinsky 2021), das in diesem Artikel nicht behandelt wird. Ukrainische Kinder, die gezwungen waren, mit ihren Eltern ins Ausland zu ziehen, werden nun in den örtlichen Schulen unterrichtet, und viele Bildungseinrichtungen haben spezielle Integrationsklassen für sie eingerichtet, um den Stress zu verringern, insbesondere wenn sie die Sprache des Landes, in dem sie jetzt leben, zuvor nicht gesprochen haben.

Nichtregierungsorganisationen und staatliche Organisationen für Ukrainer im Ausland sowie ukrainische Kirchen haben ukrainischsprachige Sonntagsschulen eingerichtet bzw. ausgebaut. Diese Situation ist im 21. Jahrhundert aufgrund der massiven Arbeitsmigration, der interethnischen Ehen, des saisonalen Tourismus usw. nicht einzigartig. Die soziolinguistischen, historischen, kulturellen und geopolitischen Aspekte dieses Themas bedürfen einer gesonderten und eingehenden Untersuchung.

Eine Reihe von Studien beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, welchen Stellenwert die Ukrainistik innerhalb der Slawistik und der Ukrainistik bei der Förderung der ukrainischen Sprache und Kultur im Ausland einnimmt (Buk, Nikišov 2024; Saikovsʹka 2024; Kiss et al. 2025; Novikova et al. 2024; Novikova, Schweier 2013, 2023; Zambrzycka et al. 2021–2022).

So beschreibt das Bulletin der Deutschen Slavistik 2023 viele Fragen der Förderung der Ukrainistik hierzulande und beginnt mit einem Vorwort von T. Berger (Tübingen), in dem er schreibt: "Die ukrainische Sprache, Literatur und Kultur spielen an den Seminaren eine viel größere Rolle als bisher, auch wenn die institutionelle Verankerung noch deutlich zu wünschen lässt". Der Artikel von S. Schahadat und M. Wingender "Diskussionen zur Entwicklung der Slavistik angesichts des Angriffskriegs Russlands gegen die Ukraine", in dem es darum geht, wie der Krieg die Fachdiskussion in der slawischen Literatur- und Sprachwissenschaft verändert hat und wie sich die Haltung gegenüber der früheren Russlandzentrierung der Slavistik gewandelt hat (Schahadat, Wingender 2023, 8–18). Darüber hinaus werden der institutionelle Status der Ukrainistik und die Nachfrage nach ukrainistischen Studiengängen an den Universitäten sowie das Konzept der Dekolonisierung, das derzeit in allen osteuropäischen Themenfeldern diskutiert wird, thematisiert.

A. Bergmann und A. Kratochvil in ihrem analytischen Artikel "Ukrainisch Lernen in Deutschland: Eine Einschätzung der Rahmenbedingungen, Möglichkeiten und Perspektiven", der zuvor an der Universität Lʹviv veröffentlicht wurde, eine ähnliche Aussage über das wachsende gesellschaftliche Interesse und Bedürfnis nach Kenntnissen der ukrainischen Sprache im Ausland, das über das individuelle Interesse Einzelner am Erlernen der Sprache hinausgeht, obwohl sie anmerken, dass dieses Interesse damals (noch) nicht in erster Linie von wirtschaftlichen Interessen geleitet war, sondern auf der symbolischen Bedeutung der Sprache beruhte (Bergmann, Kratochvil 2017). Dennoch kann ich die Frage des Ukrainischunterrichts in Deutschland nicht ausklammern. Das Studium der ukrainischen Sprache in Deutschland, das sowohl während der sowjetischen Besatzung als auch in der Diaspora eine wichtige Rolle bei der Bewahrung der ukrainischen Identität spielte, hat eine lange Tradition. Viele wissenschaftliche Zentren und Universitäten in Deutschland waren und sind am Studium der ukrai-

nischen Sprache interessiert und bieten entsprechende Kurse an. Alle Einrichtungen, die sich in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz (2004–2015) mit ukrainischen Themen befassen, wurden kürzlich von T. Ševčenko in ihrem Werk "Ukrainische Studien in akademischen Zentren des deutschsprachigen Raums" (Ševčenko 2016) beschrieben. Es enthält Informationen "über die Haupttendenzen in der Entwicklung der Ukrainistik im deutschsprachigen Raum, die Richtungen und Besonderheiten der Forschungs- und Lehrtätigkeit der akademischen Zentren im Bereich der Ukrainistik im letzten Jahrzehnt" (ebd.).

Ein gutes Beispiel ist die Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.

Im Sommersemester 1914 wurde an der *LMU* erstmals eine Einführung in die ukrainische Sprache angeboten. Auch wenn man damals noch nicht von 'Ukrainisch', sondern von 'Kleinrussisch' oder 'Ruthenisch' sprach, ist das Slavische Institut der *LMU* eines der wenigen in Deutschland, das die ukrainische Sprache, Literatur und Kultur von Anfang an in Lehre und Forschung einbezogen hat. Heute wird diese Tradition von Dr. O. Novikova fortgeführt. Sie ist Initiatorin, Mitbegründerin und Koordinatorin am Institut für Slavische Philologie der LMU: seit 2010 – der Internationalen virtuellen Konferenz der Ukrainistik "Dialog der Sprachen – Dialog der Kulturen. Die Ukraine aus globaler Sicht" https://www.ukrainistik-konferenz.slavistik" https://www.ukrainistik-konferenz.slavistik. lmu.de/; seit 2016 – des 'Internationalen Zentrums für Ukrainisch als Fremdsprache' http://www.ukrain isch-zentrum.slavistik.lmu.de/; http://www.ukrainisch-zentrum.slavistik. lmu. de/; Mitherausgeberin der Jahrbücher der Internationalen virtuellen Konferenz der Ukrainistik "Dialog der Sprachen – Dialog der Kulturen. Die Ukraine aus globaler Sicht" (seit 2010).

Die Besonderheiten des UaF-Unterrichts für ein deutschsprachiges Publikum und die Analyse von Lehrbüchern und Unterrichtsmaterialien für deutschsprachige Nutzer wurden von vielen Forschern beschrieben (Amelina 2016; Brunner 2008; Turkevyč 2021). Zahlreiche Lehrbücher und Unterrichtsmaterialien für Deutsch-Muttersprachler sind erschienen (z.B. Amir-Babenko 1999; Amir-Babenko, Pfliegl 2005; Anhalt-Bösche 1996; Börner, Grube 2020; Dniprova 2015; Kolbina, Sotnikova 2004, 2020; Klymenko, Kurzidim 2012; Novikova at al. 2024; Novikova, Schweier 2013, 2023; Schubert 2008; Spiech 2020; Ukrainisch

2021; Zambrzycka et al. 2021–2022). Sie sind inzwischen im Buchhandel und in wissenschaftlichen, universitären und öffentlichen Stadtbibliotheken frei erhältlich.

Aus eigener Erfahrung, sowohl in der Lehre als auch bei der Teilnahme an internationalen slawistischen Konferenzen, weiß ich, dass viele deutsche Slavistinnen und Slavisten sowie Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler anderer Disziplinen gut Ukrainisch sprechen und es erfolgreich in der geisteswissenschaftlichen Analyse und Forschung einsetzen (Besters-Dilger et al. 2019; Hentschel, Palinska 2022; Kuße 2018; Lahjouji-Seppälä et al. 2022; Quasthoff et al. 2016 u.a.).

Deutsche Slavisten haben den russischen Angriff auf die Ukraine scharf verurteilt (Stellungnahme 2022; Landsberg 2022), und verschiedene deutsche Institutionen haben eine Reihe von Stipendien für ukrainische Wissenschaftler und Studenten finanziert, um sie während des Krieges zu unterstützen. Deutschland organisiert aktiv gemeinsame wissenschaftliche Konferenzen, Seminare, kulturelle Begegnungen, Literaturclubs und Lesungen zur Ukraine und zur Ukrainistik.

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BODY AXIOLOGY AS A BASIC ZONE OF TRANSGRESSIVE DAILY LIFE

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The article examines the contemporary culture of everyday life, which is in a state of permanent transgression – a state of constant change and transformation. In this context, human corporeality is analyzed as a basic dimension of human everyday existence. The main attention is paid to four bodily modes: natural, social, cultural and virtual body

Keywords: corporeality, modes of the body, culture of everyday life, transgressive everyday life.

АКСІОЛОГІЯ ТІЛА ЯК БАЗОВОЇ ЗОНИ ТРАНСГРЕСИВНОГО ПОВСЯКДЕННЯ

Ольга Шляхова

У статті досліджується сучасна культура повсякдення, яка перебуває у перманентній трансгресії – стані постійних змін та трансформацій. У контексті такого повсякдення аналізується людська тілесність як базовий вимір повсякденного буття людини. Основна увага присвячена чотирьом тілесним модусам: природному, соціальному, культурному та віртуальному тілу.

Ключові слова: тілесність, модуси тіла, культура повсякдення, трансгресивна повсякденність.

Epidemiological, socio-economic, intercultural processes of our time, as well as Russia's full-fledged conventional war against Ukraine in the heart of Europe – all these circumstances have created a rather complex and ambiguous system of social values not only in Ukraine but, without exaggeration, throughout the world. The constant and continuous rethinking of established traditional values and their transformation

in cultures (national, regional, local) are direct consequences of the above-mentioned global events.

Historically and geographically distant cultures are embarking on a path of dynamic establishment of various kinds of ties, or, in case of Russia, the destruction of previous ones and the construction of new contacts. In the context of everyday life, this process takes the form of an arbitrary, often chaotic exchange of experiences, spiritual and material values, traditions, cultural practices, military strategies, etc. In most cases, such dynamic intercultural and interethnic exchanges borrow form, but not content, from the originals. As a result, things and processes from different socio-cultural worlds are included in one picture of the world, in one objective reality in a person's daily life, and, as a result, are perceived by one in a consistent manner. Over time, each individual culture develops its own value system and cultural interpretation of these still new processes and phenomena, which may only partially correlate with the original version or not correlate with it at all.

To sum up, the above processes point to one of the key characteristics of the current era – 'transgressiveness', that is why the culture of everyday life is also becoming transgressive.

Transgressive daily life has its own characteristic: it constantly overcomes its own established boundaries, constantly adapts to new challenges and atypical circumstances. Therefore, concepts that have traditionally been outside the scope of understanding everyday life are beginning to be included in its categorical apparatus (new, dynamic, unique, rare, important, ideal, theoretical, religious).

The emergence of new categories that fill the meaning of everyday life inevitably affects all its structural zones: the body as basic dimension of everyday human actions and practices, home as the locus of everyday life, and settlements (village, city, metropolis, etc.) as topos of everyday life.

The human body permeates the next two zones of everyday life: the locus of home and the topos of settlement. Therefore, the analysis of the body axiology as a basic zone of transgressive everyday life is fundamental to understanding human as a subject as well as an element of society in more general processes.

Modernity as a historical epoch creates its own configuration of bodily interaction between an individual and society, topos and locus of the cultural landscape. Cultural scholars proved long ago that the habitat is imbued with the results of human activity and is at the same time determined and shaped by it. Human carries out one's daily activity bodily, but not only as a biological, but also as a socio-cultural and existential being. Therefore, the human body is a significant construct for both the individual and the culture as a whole. The world around us affects our appearance, inner feelings, world perception and world understanding, and the study of everyday life introduces corporeality into the problematic field of science.

Every culture in history shaped its own corporeality. In everyday life, it is a priori perceived as an inalienable part of a person, since all of life is connected to this shell from the moment of birth to death. And although the question of the body has long been of interest to philosophers, religious scholars, psychologists, cultural studies scholars, etc, the understanding of its role in everyday life remains rather vague. Is it a biological reality, an internal nature independent of the mind, or, on the contrary, just a "kind of prosthesis", a machine formed by culture? (Šljachova 2020, 47). At the same time, in the situation of contemporary culture of everyday life, the body is also involved in a range of social issues – gender, ethical, aesthetic, class, race, religion, military, etc. The question of its own value and the values it produces in such conditions is quite acute.

Generally speaking, a body is a material thing, a physical body, an object. However, the human body is something special and unique among other material things. By connecting us to things, to other physical bodies in the world, it is something much greater than that. After all, "the human body can only become a real physical thing in the form of a corpse" (Valensa 2009, 24). Since the object of our scientific interest is the human body, it is logical to use the concept of a living body. Thus, the Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary defines the term living body as "an animate body of a person and an animal (in this definition, animate refers only to the human body – O.Š.). The human body in the broadest sense is the basis of spiritual life: body and soul form a primary unity as opposed to spiritual unity".

Husserl addressed the same issue in his phenomenological discoveries. In his work, the scientist paid more attention to corporeality. The meaning of the term corporeality in phenomenology is associated with the distinction between the concepts of *Leib* (translated from German as a living body) and *Körper* (thing, physical body). Accordingly, the concept of *Leiblichkeit* (corporeality) indicates the unique feature of the human body to be alive, to personify subjectivity, to be a "source of experience". For example, the researcher Hanna Valensa noted that Husserl actually elevates corporeality to the level of the basic existentials of human existence, such as intentionality, temporality, and intersubjectivity (Valensa 2009, 26). Such a scientific position completely contradicts the identification of corporeality with the physical or biological body, but does not deny the connection between them. Corporeality seems to complement physiology and thus becomes a basic human characteristic.

Husserl's ideas were developed by Moris Merlo-Ponti. He gives the living body an ontological status, which his predecessors refused to do. By articulating the primordial structures of existence, Merlo-Ponti comes to the question of the subject-world relation. In search of an answer, he reorients the entire phenomenological tradition and places the subject not in thought or consciousness, but in the body. The body is the first locus of intentionality as a pure presence in the world and openness to its possibilities. The living body has the abilities that allow it to adapt to the environment and, if necessary, to move away or break with it (Merlo-Ponti 2001, 130). A living body is a person's primary experience of being in the world.

Volodymyr Ponomarčuk's ideas are essentially similar to Merlo-Ponti's. He believes that corporeality is not limited to the body and, in particular, the senses. It is also determined by the possibility of conscious activity, because only in this case can we talk about corporeality (Šljachova 2020, 49). More radical judgments regarding the distinction between the body and corporeality are proposed in the Encyclopedia of Postmodernism, where the basic interpretation of corporeality is based on Gilles Deleuze. The researcher states: "Corporeality has nothing to do with the body itself. It is a body without an image, in which nothing is represented" (Del'oz, Gvatari 1996, 44). The complete denial

of the materiality of the corporeal reduces the idea of it to a complete abstraction. It cannot be visually seen and clearly recorded, which creates problems for its perception and understanding. It is important that the body in the context of this thought also goes beyond physiology (a body without boundaries); defining one's identity, a person constructs one's image, which through the body becomes an expression of one's everyday life.

Jacque Lacan provides a psychoanalytic explanation of this situation in his famous article "The Mirror Stage as formative of the I function". The researcher suggests that a child between the ages of 6 and 18 months encounters his or her own mirror image, which ultimately becomes decisive in the person's choice of his or her own narcissistic strategy in life. The phenomenon of the mirror appears in infantile experience as a sign that "a human being begins to recognize oneself as separately existing through the body (to distinguish oneself from his mother, from his relatives, from things, etc)". (Lacan 2006, 130). When we carry out a psychoanalytic and phenomenological analysis of the physical body, we necessarily refer to the subject of the physical body, to the Self, which is identified with this body (Karivec′ 2012, 43). Hence, the statement that "the body is subjective, and it is the self" (Michel 1975, 11).

Significant progress in understanding human corporeality has been made within the framework of the sociocultural approach, whose representatives view it as a product of culture. Within this approach, corporeality is understood as a socio-cultural phenomenon. It is defined as "a human body transformed under the influence of social and cultural factors, which has socio-cultural meaning and senses and performs certain socio-cultural functions" (Šljachova 2020, 50). This perspective emphasizes that the process of realizing oneself as a corporeal being is possible only for a thinking, cultural human being. His or her body is constantly subject to objective and intense influences of a number of phenomena that are beyond individual human control: environmental factors, territorial features of lifestyle, political and economic system. At the same time, a human being as a social being intentionally involves oneself in the space of society for subjective reasons by means of one's own body. Therefore, the body is perhaps the only phenome-

non of the organic world whose socio-cultural significance dominates the biological one.

The complex process of interaction and mutual influence of the physiological and superphysical in humans was analyzed by the contemporary anthropologist Viktor Krutkin. In his reflections, he starts with the assertion that the human body cannot be considered only as a material substrate that ensures its existence. Appealing to the uniqueness of the human being, he emphasizes that "this is the only societal living being for whom the semiotic significance of the body significantly prevails over the physical" (Šljachova 2020, 50). Corporeality, in his opinion, is an integral characteristic of a person that does not coincide with either the material or the spiritual side. "It encompasses both physical and metaphysical parameters of a person. The body is the way in which nature becomes human. Man is not just given a body, he is given a body in the existing world. The body and society are not in a state of antagonism. Society genetically «merges» into the body. The body that undergoes socialization ceases to be merely physical, it should be spoken of as social corporeality" (Šljachova 2020, 51).

Summarizing the above views, we conclude that the body is an ontological entity because it expresses being as such. In addition, everyday life is the existence of the body in the conditions of society. In a single (subjective) case, it is characterized by an intentionality to reproduce and qualitatively renew social ties and relations. This understanding of the body, in our opinion, most exhaustively generalizes and summarizes our search for understanding the corporeal, which in the current conditions of globalization results in a further correlation of the concepts: corporeality-society-culture of everyday life.

The researcher Iryna Bychovs′ka, approaching this issue in her work "Corporeality as a Socio-Cultural Phenomenon" identified three hypostases of human corporeality, among which she names the natural, cultural and social body (Šljachova 2020, 51). In the context of globalization, the virtual body as a phenomenon of omnipresent virtual reality also requires additional attention. Each of the hypostases plays an exceptionally important role in the globalized present and is revealed in a special way in the focus of the religiosity of everyday life.

The natural body

The term "natural body" refers to a biological body that obeys the laws of existence, development and functioning of a living organism. In everyday life, the natural body correlates with the empirical side of life, which begins with birth and ends with death. For the physical survival of the body-organism, it is a natural necessity to constantly and regularly satisfy vital needs, such as food, sleep, hygiene, movement, etc. Based on this understanding of the natural body, it would be fair to say that the everyday life of a human being is naturally equivalent to the everyday life of any other living being.

However, the empirical life of Homo Sapiens, unlike that of an animal, is not reduced to the physical survival of the subject or even the entire species. In particular, Olena Zolotuchina-Abolina notes that this aspect of human existence is equally subject to the laws of nature and culture. The empirical dimension of everyday life is inevitably connected with the presence of a private point of view on all aspects of one's physical existence, so it is full of clashes, passions, aspirations, and is overwhelmed by emotions (positive and negative), struggles, personal and collective confrontations. For the lion's share of society, empirical life is a real value that they do not want to part with (Zolotuchina-Abolina 2006, 8). This prioritization of everyday life and vitality is the result of a subjective choice, the motives for which are laid down and often justified by culture.

The context of modernity, with its consumerism, technicalization, and vitrification, requires the prefix non-natural or supernatural when analyzing the natural body. However, it is important to remember that the natural body has been exposed to artificial means from the very beginning of culture and continues to be exposed to them. The purpose of these manipulations is to construct a special "supernatural body", a "second skin of a person" (Šljachova 2020, 52). Instead, the naturalness of the body, in our opinion, has never truly been a special value of a cultured person.

The Book of Genesis also says that after the fall of the first humans and during their expulsion from the Garden of Eden, God dressed the first humans in "leather robes" that they did not have: "And the Lord God made for Adam and his wife garments of leather, and clothed them"

(Genesis 3:2; Biblija 2009, 11). This line, according to the linguist Hryhorij Kredlin, indicates the fact that human skin is not a natural component of the human body (Šljachova 2020, 52–53). From the point of view of cultural anthropology and ethnology, Claude Lévi-Strauss adds that man has always sought to cover his skin with an artificial layer of signs, as evidenced by numerous ethnographic studies of archaic tribes: "For him, the body is the location of symbols" (Lévi-Strauss 1961, 26). While tattoos, scarification, makeup, body paintings, and branding are reliable means of fixing and visualizing them. It follows that at the level of everyday consciousness, a person does not think of his or her body as only natural; from the first moments of biological birth, it already becomes a cultural body, if not for the subject oneself, then for those who surround him or her and represent this culture with their bodies.

The cultural body

In general, the cultural body is the product of the daily formation and upbringing of a person in a certain cultural environment using one's bodily nature. The construction of such a body is "the completion of the process of development from «impersonal» natural-bodily prerequisites to the human being himself, who becomes not only a socially functional being, but also a personal being" (Šljachova 2020, 53).

Using the vocabulary of postmodern philosophers, the cultural body can be seen here as a text within which the principles, laws, and values of everyday life are articulated and implemented. The relationship between the body and everyday life in this context is ambiguous: the subject independently, consciously constructs one's corporeality, around which he or she organizes everyday life, and on the other hand, without one's own active participation, receives ready-made "formulas" for treating the body and dealing with it through Others.

Family, friends, and strangers who "intertwine" in the subject's everyday life become an external source of knowledge about the body and a resource of passive experience from the extra-ordinary dimension of global culture. Alfred Schütz calls this external source an intersubjective knowledge of the cultural world, "because from the very beginning everyday life appears to us as a semantic universe, a set of meanings that we must interpret in order to find a footing in this world"

(Schütz, Luckmann 1974, 130). For the subject, the presence of the bodies of the Others is "knowledge at hand" (according to Schütz). It is a correlative scheme in the formation of one's own idea of the body as an integrity, of its value, possibilities, and associated meanings.

Therefore, the cultural body is always a constructed body. In the process of its creation or transformation, a person in relation to oneself and society in relation to each individual take on the functions of a creator-demiurge. Thus, the semantically expanded framework of the physical body becomes not only a cultural but also a social construct that is created or reproduced on a daily basis. Thus, the next hypostasis of corporeality that is worth exploring is the "social body".

The social body

Communication with the society in which an individual is formed and lives is carried out through the mediation of one's body, i.e. the social roles that one practices on a daily basis. According to Irwin Gofman, a "social role" is a set of rights and obligations associated with a certain status of a person. And it makes sense to talk about social relations when an individual or a "performer" plays the same role in different circumstances in front of the same audience (Gofman 2022, 47–48). His theory of society as theater describes bodily action as a key way and means of social interaction. "The individual", according to Gofman, "always acts in such a way as to express himself, intentionally or unintentionally. Others, in turn, must get an impression of him". The individual's ability to "express himself (and thus his ability to impress others) contains, perhaps, two completely different kinds of signifying activity: voluntary self-expression, by which he gives information about himself, and involuntary self-expression, by which he gives himself away" (Gofman 2022, 33). The private sphere itself is limited here to the "backstage" space, where an individual can rest alone before pretending to be a theatrical character whose role his public self plays in the strategic game of "rituals of interaction" in public places (Kazanova 2017, 20).

The body, which is mastered in social space, always manifests the image of the subject that it chooses or that is attributed to it. By making a continuous series of choices, actions, interpretations, rituals, an individual constantly creates opportunities for himself to fulfill a

particular social role. At the same time, through specific bodily actions and realized practices, one signals to others how one should be perceived, suggesting to interaction partners what one's social roles are at that moment. Modern society has taken a step forward in this regard, adding social gender to the sex determined by nature. In scientific circles, the phenomenon described is commonly referred to as gender.

Addressing gender issues in this study is extremely important, because two important worldview processes are simultaneously taking place in the subject's everyday life: 1) bodily experience determines self-identity; 2) self-identity is expressed and "realized" through bodily images. Both processes are equally reduced to the issue of gender identity in the living space of modern society. The reason for the actualization of this issue is the dominance of social characteristics (but not biological ones) in the definition of 'man' and 'woman'.

A number of researchers, analyzing the relationship between the categories of biological and social body, state that violations in the representation of corporeality lead to further deformations of the individual and one's identity. For example, the contemporary psychologist Tetjana Rebeko, studying gender identity and the representation of the human body, notes that gender identity is formed during ontogenesis, following the path of daily, progressive differentiation from "unconscious identity" to gender certainty. Mature gender identity (as opposed to "gender confusion") is characterized by the stability of the image of the bodily self and, at the same time, by lability, which allows for the integration of cultural norms and individual self-realizations without contradictions (Šljachova 2020, 58). In such conditions of high social significance, bodily experience appears as a kind of response to social demands (social stereotypes, canons of beauty, etc.). In the language of the body, through the mediation of appearance, a person is able to reflect his or her self and, as a result, to receive an assessment of oneself.

Persons who think of themselves as a woman/man use their body to express themselves. To do this, modern culture provides a ready-made matrix of everyday actions and behaviours that are described by the thesis: "how to be a woman/man". In the current processes of globalization, such a matrix exists in the structures of everyday thinking through stereotypical gender norms and expectations for men (their masculinity)

and women (their femininity). The body becomes a physical mirror of the metaphysical essence and the social gender of the subject. Thus, each gender in society acquires value, recognition, and status or, conversely, secondary importance and neglect through the body.

It is important to note that the modern theory of postfeminism criticizes the very existence of the categories of 'man' and 'woman' as specific gender entities. In particular, Judith Batler, relying on Michel Foucault's genealogical method, states that the idea of a defined identity is a mechanism of power. If we assume the existence of these two concepts, then we should perceive the process of acquiring identity as a violent and irreversible act of assigning gender identification by the regulatory apparatus of power through the mechanism of heterosexuality. In fact, "identity is not in the subject, it happens together with him as a performative act" (Batler 1990, 25). Hence, gender identity is an identity that is constantly in the act of creation, and therefore is sensitive and reflexive to globalization challenges and subjective responses to them.

The virtual body

The natural, cultural, and social body in the process of globalization has acquired qualitatively new features and definitions. It is important to note, however, that each of these hypostases can be discussed in the context of any other era. Instead, the virtual body is exclusively a phenomenon of globalization, or rather, one created under the influence of its subsidiary factors: "informationalization", "digitalization", "virtualization", and the creation of avatar images in the vastness of the global Internet. Here we can talk about the virtual body in two meanings: the avatar body that the subject creates (in social networks, computer games) and the digital body that the subject perceives (the means of mass objectification – the same social networks, movies, TV programs, photos).

In scientific circles, the avatar body is usually referred to as the expansion of the body's boundaries and the freedom to choose its images. The contemporary philosopher and cultural critic Zoja Skolota emphasized that "in these difficult new conditions, matter has become a conditional object, information has replaced meaning, and the category of time is determined solely by the speed of information delivery" (Skolota 2012, 69). Undoubtedly, the virtual dimension has had its

impact on the vision and understanding of corporeality. Partly, a person escapes from the basic everyday reality, dissolving in virtuality, which in turn can be understood as a separate, different form of everyday life. Computer technology "drives a person into artificial conditions of activating as many channels as possible, irritating the irritable and breaking through the perceptual anemia and armor of composure, trying to deform both the internal and external body of a person, his or her gestures, actions, deeds" (Šljachova 2020, 60). Everyday attention to such corporeality is extremely high, because the subject creates not just an avatar body, but a whole image that does not necessarily correspond to reality, because this is not his main task. He is called upon to retouch the imperfections of reality or to change it altogether, not so much for an individual as for Others. Quasi-reality is both an alternative and an additional dimension of everyday life, where there is an unlimited number of attempts to construct a bodily image: to complete the imperfect (for example, through Photoshop) or to start the process of self-creation from scratch (for example, to attach a photo of someone else to your name on a social network).

The already mentioned researcher Zoja Skolota identifies two main stages of the formation of corporeality in virtual reality: the first is the creation of one's name, and the second is the indication of extended information about oneself (including the addition of one's visual image) (Skolota 2012, 71).

Thus, the beginning of the formation of corporeality in virtual space is the direct identification of a person in a computer system or network. First, registration is carried out, the user's Name (fictitious or real) and Password (login, user name) are entered. Let's compare this primary information with the original passport data, because their role is similar – it is the initial stage of identification in the virtual space of a new image.

The next step in the acquisition of corporeality is to create a more visual image through which the user presents himself. The user specifies the following information about himself: gender, race, age, and adds a photo, thus defining his physicality. This appearance is capable of transforming a real image beyond recognition, giving it properties and characteristics that it has never had and could never have. Moreover, there can be many such "embodiments" of one person's physicality on

the Web. Corporeality, being the most important part of the psycho-logical whole, is transforming in parallel with the change in methods of thinking and self-determination in virtual space.

It should be noted that the avatar body is not limited to virtual space. In everyday reality, it is fully real, because its "presence" for the subject has quite obvious consequences. The ability to selectively display information, to "filter" the users to whom it will be available, creates a certain virtual "intimacy". This, in turn, promotes a sense of intimacy between users who have opened up to each other. Thus, a person creates the illusion of controlling the flow of information about oneself, and the virtual image embodies all the shades of experiences that are characteristic of real life.

According to the theoretical psychologist Mykola Nosov, virtual reality is a derivative of the psyche, like imagination, but is perceived by the person as an objective reality. The existence of the phenomenon of doubling reality arises from the distinction between the "inner and outer man" (Šljachova 2020, 62). This leads to the idea that the inner (existential) person with a unique spiritual and psycho-emotional content seeks to fix his or her being in time and space. For the same purpose, the subject needs a bodily definition in virtual space, which will "fix" him in timelessness and extra-space (which is characteristic of virtuality), and thus make him immortal.

The digital body should also be judged in the discourse of virtual space, but one that is not limited to the "live" online environment or other media. Modernity is inconceivable without such communication, to which the Spanish post-Marxist sociologist Manuel Castells responded by stating that we are witnessing the birth of a new situation, the culture of real virtuality. To elaborate this idea, the researcher notes that culture, created from communication processes based on the production and consumption of signs, is a symbolic environment. In this environment, there is no separation between reality and symbolic representation. As the basis of modern culture, the new communication hypertext system, organized around the electronic integration of all types of communication (from writing to multisensory), is not the formation of virtual reality, but the construction of real virtuality. We live in a culture where "reality itself (i.e. the material/symbolic existence

of people) is completely immersed in virtual images, in a fictional world where external images are not just on a screen through which experience is transmitted, but become that experience themselves. All messages of different kinds are placed in the medium, because the medium has become so comprehensive, so diverse, so obedient that it absorbs the integrity of human experience in the same multimedia text" (Castells 1996, 351).

Extreme bodily distance and the development of technical means of communication lead to a specific formation of bodily imagery. At the same time, the individual body image is blurred in pursuit of these images, as it correlates with the emergence of new schemes of perception of reality. This correlation is inevitable due to the intersubjective nature of everyday life as such.

Thus, we can see that the transgressive state of everyday life makes it difficult to create collective and individual identity through corporeality and, as a result, complicates the self-identification of each individual in society. In such circumstances, the body serves as a basic value in the construction of personal identity and the preservation of one's own self, as it remains almost the only plane that is consistently under the control of the subject. Thus, we can state that the social and cultural significance of the body in such conditions prevails over the natural one.

The war, which at the beginning was a new, unusual situation for Ukrainians, has become their everyday reality in the last two and a half years. Therefore, it is safe to say that in conditions of the war, a new socio-cultural discourse of understanding one's own physicality is being formed among Ukrainians.

When the aggressor country destroys two of the three dimensions of everyday life of Ukrainians – topos (settlement) and locus (homes), the body remains the only oasis of national identity and cultural authenticity of Ukrainians. So, on the one hand, the human body, which is a social and cultural construct, reflects the transformation of the personality that happens to it because of the war. On the other hand, it preserves the cultural identity, which is imprinted in the everyday practices and behaviour of the entire nation.

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REFLECTIONS ON THE PHENOMENON OF THE "RUSSKIJ MIR" ("RUSSIAN WORLD") IN THE ORTHODOX CHURCH CONTEXT

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РОЗМІРКОВУВАННЯ ПРО ФЕНОМЕН "РУССКОГО МІРА" В ПРАВОСЛАВНОМУ ЦЕРКОВНОМУ КОНТЕКСТІ

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The current Russian aggression against sovereign Ukraine, like any war, has a certain ideology, the purpose of which is to mislead outsiders, and to some extent insiders as well, about the purpose of such actions. This ideology has a number of symbols and codes.

The ideologeme (mythologeme) of "Holy Rus'" is one of the most notable codes and symbols of the "Russkij Mir" ("Russian World"). This concept is given a pseudo-Christian, ethnophyletic meaning in the Russian Orthodox Church.

The word "holy" belongs to the Proto-Slavic languages and in pre-Christian times meant "strong" or "worthy, respected". Subsequently, after the Christianisation of Rus', like in other Slavic lands, it gradually acquired the meaning inherent in Christianity. However, in relation to the fatherland, the native land, this word was used in our language in the sense of "native, dear, beloved".

For example, in a xv–xvi century duma 'The Cry of a Slave' the following passage is found:

> Oh, Lord, set free the poor slave,
> To the *holy Rus'* shore,
> To the joyful land, among the Christian folk (Ukrainian folk Dumas 2009, 239).

Or in the poems by Taras Ševčenko:

> Back in the days of the *holy* Hetmanate,
> Long ago, in times of old ... ("Tytarivna")
> ...He remembered his *holy* Volyn′... ("Varnak") (Ševčenko 2001, 72, 88).

However, theologians of the Russian Orthodox Church are seeking and allegedly have found the origins of the concept of "Holy Rus′" as the basis for the doctrine of "triune Rus′" (the ideological basis for the armed invasion of Ukraine) in the ancient literature of the Moscow principality, the Moscow kingdom and the early imperial period. They believe that as the time went by as if by some gradual revelation from above, "Holy Rus′" began to be understood as its entire people as a kind of "God-bearing people", bearers of special grace, entrusted by God with a special mission to maintain true, pure Orthodoxy. (Meanwhile, in today's Russia, the influence of the church on people is minimal, with only 0,9 percent of the population being churchgoers, and, "Orthodox atheism", that is, the interest in certain cultural aspects of church life, is widespread). This concept has even come to mean all righteous Russians in the Kingdom of Heaven – "heavenly holy Rus′".

The fact that the expression "holy Rus′" acquired a pseudo-religious, non-Christian meaning in works of folklore and some monuments of spiritual and fiction literature of ancient Muscovy does not give grounds to include it in the context of the Orthodox religion. After all, we are aware of the low level of theological education and theology in general in the Moscow state at that time, and we are not talking about the psychological peculiarities of the worldview inherent in folk and artistic creativity in general.

The word "Mir" in the concept of "Russkij Mir" is also a kind of code that needs to be "decoded". In modern Russian spelling, it is spelled the same in all its meanings. But in pre-revolutionary (and Church Slavonic) spelling, they differed: "mir – calmness, quietness", "myr" – the universe; the human race; everything that opposes the spiritual kingdom of Christ; that takes us away from the law of God" (Djačenko 2001, 307–308).

The Russian-language Wikipedia defines this concept as follows:

"*Russkij Mir* is a term used to describe a cultural, civilisational, geo-political and religious concept that implies the unification of Russian-speaking populations around the world. […] Since 2008, the narrative of the need to establish and defend "Russkij Mir⬚ has been used by the Russian government as a foreign policy doctrine. The concept implies the unification of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, as well as increasing influence in countries with a large Russian-speaking population, such as the Baltics. The concept of the "Russkij Mir" has long historical roots. In medieval sources, it defined the civilisation of Ancient Rus'" (Russkij mir).

One of the ideologists of the "Russkij Mir", the academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V. A. Tiškov, notes: "Not all states and peoples manage to give rise to a phenomenon that can be called "mir", that is, a transnational and transcontinental community that is united by its affiliation with a particular state and its loyalty to its culture". He mentions only Spain, France, China, and the United Kingdom alongside Russia (Tiškov 2010, 19).

Thus, it is not about peace as the absence of war, such as the Roman peace (*pax Romana* was a rather long relatively peaceful period in the history of the Roman Empire and its colonies) or other similar "peaces". It is still about territory, albeit under the guise of eloquent talk about "common civilisational values".

A paradoxical cultural symbol of the "Russkij Mir" in the religious sphere is the Church Slavonic language of the Russian origin. While not formally denying any language in Orthodox worship and making limited use of some of them, the ROC (Russian Orthodox Church) consistently and resolutely rejects the modern Russian literary language for prayers of ethnic Russians and Russified believers of other nationalities. This is evidence of the extreme conservatism of the ROC and, in fact, the unwillingness of its hierarchy to make communication between its adherents and God more understandable. The invaders do not leave any opportunity to serve masses in Ukrainian in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

The ideology of the "Russkij Mir" was formalised and articulated in the "order" of the XXV World Russian People's Council, adopted in March 2024, entitled "The Present and Future of the Russian World"

(Decree 2024). Its closer analysis confirms: the "Russkij Mir" is a false religious, distorted doctrine, far from Orthodoxy. It became the ideological basis for the Russian authorities' terrible crime against independent Ukraine – the Great War. Nowadays, many Orthodox theologians around the world are discussing the concept of the "Russkij Mir" and suggesting that it should be declared a heresy.

The author of these lines took part in a meeting of the Council of Hierarchs of the OCU (Orthodox Church of Ukraine), which decided to protect the religious community and the entire society from hostile foreign influence and publicly condemn the "Russkij Mir". We believe that a lot of work is required to make the church masses of the UOC-MP (Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate) realise that this "order of the Russian Council" is being implemented not only by sermons, but by armed forces as well. Ukrainians and Muscovites have to realise that this is not just a war, a battle. This is a war for minds and hearts, not just for territory. We emphasise that the Ukrainians must have a single, strong, common idea in order to be able to resist the enemy and not succumb to the propaganda ideas of the occupiers.

In addition, the Holy Synod adopted a draft letter to His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomaios and the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate with a request to address Kirill (Gundjajev) with a demand to publicly renounce the false doctrine of the "Russkij Mir", condemn and withdraw the aforementioned order of the "World Russian People's Council", which contains elements of this false doctrine, and excommunicate the Russian President Putin.

The UOC should also join these actions, if they say that they "do not belong to the Moscow Patriarchate". They should denounce the "Russkij Mir" by the decision of their Holy Synod. This has already been done by the Ecumenical Patriarchate (which, however, avoids the term 'heresy'), and should be done by Greek Catholics, Roman Catholics, and all local churches, and this doctrine should be condemned at the Pan-Orthodox level. After all, this is not a purely religious issue concerning Ukraine. If the decision of the Russian People's Council is taken as the basis for the existence of the Russian Church, then the ROC is an accomplice to terrorism, and in some ways a terrorist organisation.

The symbols and codes of the "Russkij Mir" in the religious sphere, which were especially evident during the Russian aggression, can be destroyed, first of all, by a clear declaration at the highest level (Pan-Orthodox Council, Pentarchy, Ecumenical Patriarch) of "Russkij Mir" literally being a heresy. Few people, except perhaps the hardened fanatics of the Russian Orthodox Church, will want to live in Ukraine, which has the canonical OCU, to be in a "heretical gathering" rather than in the true Orthodox Church, a sect rather than a true believer. And whoever goes against God's truth and pure church teaching, teaches heretically, subjects himself to anathema and church oblivion (excommunication).

And, hand on heart, we must admit that the best "decoding" of the "Russkij Mir" is taking place at the frontline – through the efforts of all our pious people, first of all, the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

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SCHLUSSWORT

Der vorliegende Band widmet sich dem Thema der Schlüsselrolle der ukrainischen Kultur und Wissenschaft in der gegenwärtigen Kriegszeit und wirft einen Blick auf die mit dieser tiefgreifenden Bedrohung verbundenen Herausforderungen und Existenzgefährdungen.

Die Beiträge zeigen sehr anschaulich, wie die russische Aggression nicht nur die politische und soziale Landschaft, sondern auch die kulturelle Realität der Ukraine verändert hat. Die Aufsätze und Analysen beleuchten die Wurzeln russischer imperialistischer Narrative sowie die Versuche der Instrumentalisierung und Aneignung von historischen Figuren im Rahmen der Doktrin des sogenannten „russkij mir".

Die Autorinnen und Autoren thematisieren die Transformation des Kommunikationsumfeldes und diskutieren damit die Bedeutung und die moralische Funktion der Anwendung und Pflege der ukrainischen Sprache als identitätsbildenden Faktors auf allen gesellschaftlichen Ebenen und im alltäglichen Kriegsgeschehen.

Zugleich eröffnen die kunst- und kulturwissenschaftlichen Recherchen Einblicke in neue Ausdrucksformen der bildenden Kunst und der Folklore oder im Alltagsleben. Auf diese Weise entsteht ein facettenreiches Bild davon, wie Geschichte, Wort und Bild zu Zeugnissen von Widerstand, Identität und schöpferischer Kraft werden.

Darüber hinaus übernimmt die Kultur im Krieg eine zentrale Rolle bei dem Widerstand gegenüber dem russischen Aggressor, trägt wesentlich zur Bewahrung und Stärkung der Identität bei und bildet die Grundlage für eine Weiterentwicklung der Demokratie in der Ukraine.

Die ukrainische Kultur dokumentiert, verarbeitet und transformiert das Kriegsgeschehen und beweist so ihre Fähigkeit, auch unter extremen Bedingungen handlungsfähig, vital und kreativ zu bleiben.

Vor diesem Hintergrund wird in der Monografie gleichsam die aktuelle Lage der ukrainischen Nation als solcher mit ihren Stärken, ihrem Durchhaltevermögen, ihren Werten und Zielen reflektiert. Die Autorinnnen und Autoren ziehen in ihren Betrachtungen und Analysen die positive Bilanz, dass die ukrainische Kultur trotz aller Zerstörungen und Bedrohungen weiterlebt und in entscheidendem Maße

dazu beiträgt, die Widerstandskraft zu stärken und die Eigenständigkeit weiterzuentwickeln.

Die wissenschaftlichen Beiträge selbst sind zugleich Zeugnisse dafür, dass die ukrainische Nation die Fähigkeit besitzt, auf der Grundlage von Freiheit und Demokratie ihre Zukunft als untrennbaren Teil der europäischen Gemeinschaft zu gestalten und sich dauerhaft als selbstbewusster gleichberechtigter Akteur in Europa zu behaupten. Der kontinuierliche Export kultureller Phänomene und Artefakte in verschiedene Länder verdeutlicht die Orientierung der Ukraine an europäischen Werten. Dazu zählen neben Demokratie auch Meinungsfreiheit, schöpferische Entfaltung, Respekt vor territorialen Grenzen und deren Verteidigung gegenüber aggressiven Übergriffen. Ebenso sind eine konstruktive Haltung gegenüber gesellschaftlichen und politischen Herausforderungen, Optimismus, Menschlichkeit sowie Solidarität mit schwächeren Gruppen zentrale Bestandteile dieses Wertefundaments.

Seit Beginn des russischen Krieges gegen die Ukraine werden für Europa neue Dimensionen der ukrainischen Kultur in ihren modernen wie auch traditionellen Ausprägungen erlebbar. Die ukrainische Kultur erweist sich dabei als komplex, pluralistisch und in enger Wechselwirkung mit der europäischen Tradition stehend. Neben etablierten Akteuren wie Schriftstellerinnen und Schriftstellern, Künstlerinnen und Künstlern oder Musikerinnen und Musikern übernehmen geflüchtete Ukrainerinnen und Ukrainer ebenso die Rolle kultureller Repräsentanten, indem sie in ihren jeweiligen europäischen Aufnahmeländern kulturelle und gesellschaftliche Sichtbarkeit erlangen.

Die Europäische Union erkennt Kultur als „Soft Power" an, die maßgeblich zur Resilienz und zur kollektiven Identitätsbildung der ukrainischen Gesellschaft beiträgt. Vor diesem Hintergrund unterstützt sie eine Vielzahl von Initiativen, die auf die Bewahrung und Sichtbarmachung ukrainischer Kultur während des Krieges abzielen. Ein aktuelles Beispiel dafür stellt die im Juli 2025 ins Leben gerufene Initiative „Team Europe for Cultural Heritage in Ukraine" dar. Sie umfasst mehr als zwanzig europäische Staaten, die sich an Projekten zum Schutz und zur Wiederherstellung des durch den Krieg gefährdeten kulturellen Erbes beteiligen.

Wir bedanken uns herzlich bei allen, die an diesem faszinierenden Buchprojekt teilgenommen haben, für ihre akribische Arbeit und wünschen viel Erfolg! Allen Leserinnen und Lesern wünschen wir neue Erkenntnisse und spannende Diskussionen.

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Oktober 2010 – November 2025

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wissenschaftlichen Einrichtungen und gesellschaftlichen Organisationen,
die sich mit der Erforschung, Verbreitung und der Förderung
der ukrainischen Sprache, Literatur und Kultur
in der Ukraine und darüber hinaus beschäftigen.

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LUDWIG-MAXIMILIANS-UNIVERSITÄT MÜNCHEN

Die Sprache ist der Spiegel einer Nation;
wenn wir in diesen Spiegel schauen, so kommt uns
ein großes treffliches Bild von uns selbst daraus entgegen
Friedrich Schiller

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МІЖНАРОДНИЙ ЦЕНТР УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ
МОВИ ЯК ІНОЗЕМНОЇ

Мова – це дзеркало нації.
Коли ми дивимося у це дзеркало,
нам являється великий істинний образ нас самих.
Фрідріх Шиллер

ІНСТИТУТ СЛОВ'ЯНСЬКОЇ ФІЛОЛОГІЇ
УНІВЕРСИТЕТ ЛЮДВІҐА- МАКСИМІЛІАНА, м. МЮНХЕН

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СИЛЬНІ ЖІНКИ СЕРЕДНЬОВІЧЧЯ І ОБРАЗ НОВОЇ ЄВРОПИ

Herausgegeben von
Olena Novikova, Oleksandr Pronkevyč,
Svitlana Romanjuk, Ulrich Schweier

**АНТОЛОГІЯ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ЛІТЕРАТУРИ
”КРІЗЬ ЛІТА. УКРАЇНСЬКІ ПИСЬМЕННИКИ І ЇХНЯ НІМЕЧЧИНА“**

**Herausgegeben von
Olena Novikova und Ulrich Schweier**

Thelem Universitätsverlag und Buchhandlung GmbH & Co. KG,
Dresden und München, 2023, ISBN 978-3-95908-295-2

**UKRAINISCH >>>
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**УКРАЇНА ТА УКРАЇНСЬКА ІДЕНТИЧНІСТЬ В ЄВРОПІ
КРІЗЬ ПРИЗМУ МОВИ, ЛІТЕРАТУРИ ТА КУЛЬТУРИ**

Institut für Slavische Philologie der LMU München

**Ukraine und
ukrainische Identität
in Europa**

Beiträge zur Standortbestimmung
aus/durch Sprache, Literatur, Kultur

Open Publishing LMU

**Herausgegeben von
Olena Novikova, Oleksandr Pronkevyč, Leonid Rudnyc'kyj,
Ulrich Schweier**

Ukrainische Kultur im Schraubstock des Krieges:
Geschichte – Wort – Bild

Der brutale Krieg, der in den letzten über zehn Jahren zur ukraini-
schen Realität geworden ist, stellt eine große Herausforderung für die
politische, soziale und kulturelle Integrität der Ukraine dar.

Der vorliegende Band widmet sich dem Thema der Schlüsselrolle der
ukrainischen Kultur und Wissenschaft in der gegenwärtigen Kriegs-
zeit und wirft einen Blick auf die mit dieser tiefgreifenden Bedrohung
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Weiterentwicklung der Demokratie in der Ukraine. Sie dokumentiert,
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